area handbook series 

Algeria 

a country study 



Algeria 

a country study 



Federal Research Division 




Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Helen Chapin Metz 
Research Completed 
December 1993 



On the cover: A typical village scene, with market and 
houses in the foreground and mosque in the back- 
ground 



Fifth Edition, First Printing, 1994 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Algeria: a country study / Federal Research Division, Library 
of Congress; edited by Helen Chapin Metz. — 5th ed. 
p. cm.— (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) 
(DA Pam; 550-44) 

"Supersedes the 1986 edition of Algeria: A Country 
Study edited by Harold D. Nelson." — T.p. verso. 
"Research completed December 1993." 
Includes bibliographical references (pp. 295-311) and 

index. 
ISBN 0-8444-083 1-X 

1. Algeria. I. Metz, Helen Chapin 1928- . II. Library of 
Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Series. IV. 
Series: DA Pam; 550-44 
DT275.A5771 1994 94-43019 
965-dc20 CIP 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-44 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared 
by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress 
under the Country Studies/ Area Handbook Program spon- 
sored by the Department of the Army. The last two pages of this 
book list the other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign coun- 
try, describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and 
national security systems and institutions, and examining the 
interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are 
shaped by cultural factors. Each study is written by a multidisci- 
plinary team of social scientists. The authors seek to provide a 
basic understanding of the observed society, striving for a 
dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular attention is 
devoted to the people who make up the society, their origins, 
dominant beliefs and values, their common interests and the 
issues on which they are divided, the nature and extent of their 
involvement with national institutions, and their attitudes 
toward each other and toward their social system and political 
order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should 
not be construed as an expression of an official United States 
government position, policy, or decision. The authors have 
sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. 
Corrections, additions, and suggestions for changes from read- 
ers will be welcomed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540-5220 



in 



Acknowledgments 



The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of the 
writers of the 1985 edition of Algeria: A Country Study, edited 
by Harold D. Nelson. Their work provided general background 
for the present volume. 

The authors are grateful to individuals in various govern- 
ment agencies and private institutions who gave of their time, 
research materials, and expertise in the production of this 
book. These individuals include Ralph K. Benesch, who over- 
sees the Country Studies — Area Handbook program for the 
Department of the Army. The authors also wish to thank mem- 
bers of the Federal Research Division staff who contributed 
directly to the preparation of the manuscript. These people 
include Sandra W. Meditz, who reviewed all drafts and served 
as liaison with the sponsoring agency; Marilyn L. Majeska, who 
managed editing and production; Andrea T. Merrill, who 
edited tables and figures; Ramon Miro, who assisted with bib- 
liographic research; Barbara Edgerton and Izella Watson, who 
did word processing; and Stephen C. Cranton and David R 
Cabitto, who prepared the camera-ready copy. 

Also involved in preparing the text were Mimi Cantwell, 
who edited chapters; Catherine Schwartzstein, who performed 
the prepublication editorial review; and Joan C. Cook, who 
compiled the index. 

Graphics were prepared by David R Cabitto, and Tim L. 
Merrill, assisted by Thomas Hall, prepared map drafts. David R 
Cabitto and the firm of Greenhorne and O'Mara prepared the 
final maps. Special thanks are owed to Teresa Kamp, who pre- 
pared the illustrations on the title page of each chapter and the 
cover art. 

Finally, the authors acknowledge the generosity of the Alge- 
rian Embassy in Washington and the other government and 
private bodies and individuals who allowed their photographs 
to be used in this study. 



v 



Contents 



Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xiii 

Table A. Selected Acronyms and 

Contractions xv 

Country Profile xvii 

Introduction xxvii 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

Anthony Toth 

PREHISTORY OF CENTRAL NORTH AFRICA 4 

NORTH AFRICA DURING THE 

CLASSICAL PERIOD 7 

Carthage and the Berbers 7 

The Roman Era 8 

Vandals and Byzantines 10 

ISLAM AND THE ARABS, 642-1 830 11 

Fatimids 13 

Almoravids 14 

Almohads 15 

Zayanids 16 

Marabouts 17 

European Offensive 17 

Privateers 18 

Ottoman Rule 19 

Relations with the United States 21 

FRANCE IN ALGERIA, 1830-1962 22 

Invasion of Algiers 22 

The Land and Colonizers 23 

Opposition to the Occupation 24 

Abd al Qadir 25 

Colonization and Military Control 27 

Hegemony of the Colons 32 

Algerian Nationalism 34 

vii 



Polarization and Politicization 40 

War of Independence 44 

INDEPENDENT ALGERIA, 1962-92 56 

Aftermath of the War 57 

Ben Bella and the FLN 58 

Boumediene Regime 60 

Chadli Benjedid and Afterward 61 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment. 67 

Mary -Jane Deeb 

PHYSICAL SETTING 69 

Geographic Regions 72 

Climate and Hydrology 74 

Terrain 75 

POPULATION 76 

Demographic Profile 76 

Migration 78 

Urbanization and Density 79 

ETHNIC GROUPS AND LANGUAGES 81 

The Peoples 81 

Languages: Arabic and Berber 86 

Arabization 87 

STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY 91 

Preindependence Society 91 

The Revolution and Social Change 95 

Toward a Modern Society 96 

THE INDIVIDUAL, THE FAMILY, AND THE SEXES 99 

Family and Household 100 

Men and Women 101 

Family Code 104 

Family Planning 105 

ISLAM 106 

Early History 107 

Tenets of Islam 108 

Islam and the Algerian State 109 

RELIGIOUS MINORITIES Ill 

EDUCATION 112 

HEALTH AND WELFARE 118 

Health 118 

Social Welfare 121 

Housing 121 



vui 



Chapter 3. The Economy 127 

Boulos A. Malik 

DEVELOPMENT PLANNING 130 

GOVERNMENT ROLE 131 

PUBLIC FINANCES 1 34 

Budget 135 

External Debt and Payments 136 

Currency and Exchange Rates 137 

Foreign Aid 138 

Investments 139 

SERVICES 142 

Banking 142 

Tourism 142 

LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT 143 

NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENERGY 1 45 

Hydrocarbons 145 

Minerals 148 

Electric Power 149 

INDUSTRY 150 

Manufacturing 151 

Construction 151 

AGRICULTURE 152 

Land Tenure and Reform 153 

Crops 157 

Livestock 158 

Forestry 160 

Fishing 160 

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNI- 
CATIONS 160 

Transportation 160 

Telecommunications 166 

TRADE 167 

Trading Partners 168 

Exports and Imports 169 

Balance of Payments 170 

Trade Account 170 

TRENDS 171 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 173 

John P. Entelis with LisaArone 

POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 1 76 

ix 



Postindependence Politics and the 

Socialist Tradition 176 

The Revolutionary Period and 

Independence 177 

The "Heroic** Stage: Ben Bella's 

Regime, 1962-65 177 

Boumediene and the Socialist Experiment 178 

Recent Political Events 181 

POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND PROCESSES 192 

Structure of the National Government 192 

Role of Political Parties 195 

Judicial System 198 

Local and Regional Government 202 

EFFECTIVE INSTITUTIONS 204 

Political Configuration: The Army-Party-State 

Triangle 204 

The Elite 205 

Military Dictatorship 206 

The Islamist Factor 207 

CIVIL SOCIETY 210 

Algerian General Workers' Union and 

the Workers' Movement 211 

Youth and Student Unions 212 

The National Union of Algerian Farmers 213 

The Entrepreneurial Class 214 

Socialist Vanguard Party 214 

The Women's Movement 215 

The Press 218 

The Arabization Movement 220 

FOREIGN POLICY 221 

General Trends 221 

Africa 222 

Arab and Middle East Affairs 227 

The West 228 

Chapter 5. National Security 235 

Jean R. Tartter 
EXTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS AND 

POLICIES 238 

Security Interests Outside the Maghrib 239 

Security Problems with Neighboring States 241 



x 



Strategic Perspectives 244 

DOMESTIC SECURITY CONCERNS 245 

Islamic Opposition 247 

Berber Separatism 249 

THE MILITARY HERITAGE 250 

THE ARMED FORCES 256 

Army 259 

Air Force 262 

Navy 263 

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 265 

Personnel and Recruitment 265 

Conditions of Service 268 

THE DEFENSE BURDEN 270 

FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE 272 

INTERNAL SECURITY 277 

Gendarmerie Nationale 278 

Surete Nationale 279 

Intelligence Agencies 279 

Criminal Justice System 280 

Prison Conditions 283 

Appendix. Tables 285 

Bibliography 295 

Glossary 313 

Index 317 

Contributors 339 

List of figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of Algeria, 1993 xxvi 

2 Roman North Africa, Fourth Century B.C. to 

Third Century A.D 6 

3 French Algeria, 1845-1962 28 

4 Topography and Drainage 70 

5 Population by Age and Gender, 1987 80 

6 Oil and Gas Industry, 1993 146 

7 Economic Activity, 1993 150 

8 Transportation System, 1993 162 

9 Balance of Power in the Maghrib, 1993 246 

10 Organization of National Defense, 1993 258 

11 Military Regions, 1993 260 

xi 



12 Commissioned Officer and Enlisted Personnel 

Ranks and Insignia, 1993 266 



Xll 



Preface 



This edition of Algeria: A Country Study replaces the previous 
edition published in 1985. Like its predecessor, the present 
book attempts to treat in a compact and objective manner the 
dominant historical, social, economic, political, and national 
security aspects of contemporary Algeria. Sources of informa- 
tion included scholarly books, journals, and monographs; offi- 
cial reports and documents of governments and international 
organizations; and foreign and domestic newspapers and peri- 
odicals. Relatively up-to-date economic data were available 
from several sources, but the sources were not always in agree- 
ment. 

Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the book; brief 
comments on some of the more valuable sources for further 
reading appear at the conclusion of each chapter. Measure- 
ments are given in the metric system; a conversion table is pro- 
vided to assist those who are unfamiliar with the metric system 
(see table 1, Appendix). The Glossary provides brief defini- 
tions of terms that may be unfamiliar to the general reader. A 
list of acronyms and contractions also has been provided to 
assist the reader. 

The literature on Algeria is frequently confusing because of 
the tendency of writers to mix English and French translitera- 
tions of Arabic words, personal names, and place-names. For 
the most part, the authors of this study have attempted to 
reduce this confusion by adhering to the system of French 
transliteration, inasmuch as that is the form used among 
French speakers in Algeria and by most Western scholars. In 
transliterating place-names, again with minor exceptions, the 
authors followed a modified version of the system adopted by 
the United States Board on Geographic Names and the Perma- 
nent Committee on Geographic Names for British Official Use, 
known as the BGN/PCGN system; the modification entails the 
omission of most diacritical markings and hyphens. In some 
instances, however, the names of places are so well known by 
another spelling that to have used the BGN/PCGN system may 
have created confusion. For example, the reader will find Al- 
giers rather than Alger. 

The body of the text reflects information available as of 
December 1993. Certain other portions of the text, however, 



xiii 



have been updated. The Introduction discusses significant 
events that have occurred since the completion of research, 
and the Country Profile includes updated information as avail- 
able. 



xiv 



Table A. Selected Acronyms and Contractions 

Acronym or „ 

„ ' . Organization 

Contraction ° 



ACDA United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 

ALN Armee de Liberation Nationale (National Liberation Army) 

AML Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberte (Friends of the Manifesto and of Liberty) 

ANP Armee Nationale Populaire (People's National Army) 

APC Assemblee Populaire Communale (Communal Popular Assembly) 

APN Assemblee Populaire Nationale (National People's Assembly) 

APW Assemblee Populaire de Wilaya (Popular Wilaya Assembly) 

BNP Banque Nationale de Paris (National Bank, of Paris) 

CCN Conseil Consultatif National (National Consultative Council) 

CNDR Comite National pour la Defense de la Revolution (National Committee for 

the Defense of the Revolution) 

CNRA Conseil National de la Revolution Algerienne (National Council of the Alge- 

rian Revolution) 

DGDS Delegation Generale de Documentation et Surete (General Delegation for 

Documentation and Security) 

EPE Entreprises Publiques Economiques (Public Economic Enterprises) 

FFS Front des Forces Socialistes (Front of Socialist Forces) 

FIS Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front) 

GPRA Gouvernement Provisoire de la Republique Algerienne (Provisional Gov- 

ernment of the Algerian Republic) 

HCE Haut Conseil d'Etat (High Council of State) 

HCS Haut Conseil de Securite (High Security Council) 

MDA Mouvement pour la Democratic en Algerie (Movement for Democracy in 

Algeria) 

MNA Mouvement National Algerien (National Algerian Movement) 

MTLD Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertes Democratiques (Movement for 

the Triumph of Democratic Liberties) 

OAS Organisation de 1'Armee Secrete (Secret Army Organization) 

OAU Organization of African Unity 

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 

OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 

OS Organisation Speciale (Special Organization) 

PAGS Parti de l'Avant-Garde Socialiste (Socialist Vanguard Party) 

PGA Parti Communiste Algerien (Algerian Communist Party) 

PLO Palestine Liberation Organization 

Polisario Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el Hamra y Rio de Oro (Popu- 
lar Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro) 

PPA ' Parti du Peuple Algerien (Party of the Algerian People) 

PRS Parti de la Revolution Socialiste (Socialist Revolution Party) 

SADR Saharan Arab Democratic Republic 

SM Securite Militaire (Military Security) 

Sonatrach Societe Nationale pour la Recherche, la Production, le Transport, la Trans- 

formation, et la Commercialisation des Hydrocarbures (National Company 
for Research, Production, Transportation, Processing, and Commercializa- 
tion of Hydrocarbons) 



XV 



Table A. Selected Acronyms and Contractions 



Acronym or 
Contraction 


Organization 


UDMA 


Union Democratique du Manifeste Agerien (Democratic Union of the Alge- 




rian Manifesto) 


UGTA 


Union Generale des Travailleurs Algeriens (General Union of Algerian 




Workers) 


UMA 


Union du Maghreb Arabe (Union of the Arab Maghrib) 


UNEA 


Union Nationale des Etudiants Algeriens (National Union of Algerian Stu- 




dents) 


UNFA 


Union Nationale des Femmes Algeriennes (National Union of Algerian 




Women) 


UNJA 


Union Nationale de la Jeunesse Algerienne (National Union of Algerian 




Youth) 


UNPA 


Union Nationale des Paysans Algeriens (National Union of Algerian Farm- 




ers) 



XVI 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria. 

Short Form: Algeria. 

Term for National(s): Algerian (s) . 

Capital: Algiers. 

Date of Independence: July 5, 1962, from France. 

Note — The Country Profile contains updated information as available. 



xvii 



Geography 



Size: 2,381,741 square kilometers, more than four-fifths desert. 

Topography: Sharp contrast between relatively fertile, moun- 
tainous, topographically fragmented north and vast expanse of 
Sahara in south; northern Algeria dominated by parallel ranges 
of Saharan Atlas mountain system; no navigable rivers. 

Climate: Mediterranean climate in coastal lowlands and moun- 
tain valleys; mild winters and moderate rainfall. Average 
temperatures and precipitation lower in intermountain Hauts 
Plateaux. Hot and arid in desert; little seasonal change in most of 
country but considerable diurnal variation in temperature. 

Society 

Population: Estimated at 27.4 million in 1993, increasing at an 
annual rate of 2.8 percent and expected to reach 32.5 million by 
2000. Majority of population lives in predominantly urban 
coastal lowlands and adjacent mountain valleys, with population 
density dropping sharply toward interior; desert regions 
uninhabited except for isolated nomadic and sedentary 
communities. High urbanization rate of 5.6 percent annually, 
resulting from natural population growth and internal 
migration. 

Ethnic Groups: Population a mixture of Arab and indigenous 
Berber, largely integrated with little or no social stratification 
along racial or ethnic lines; several other ethnic groups present 
in small numbers. Arabs constitute about 80 percent of total. 

Languages: Arabic official language and spoken by vast majority; 
French widely spoken; bilingualism and trilingualism common. 
Berber spoken in a few isolated Saharan communities and in Tell 
hill villages. 

Religion: Islam official state religion; observance of Sunni (see 
Glossary) Islam nearly universal. Unofficial militant Islam 
gaining strength and challenging Western practices in legal and 
political systems. Non-Muslim minorities include about 45,000 



xviii 



Roman Catholics, small number of Protestants, and very small 
Jewish community. 

Education: Free public education at all levels, including nine- 
year system of compulsory basic education. In 1991-92 
enrollments in basic education totaled almost 5.8 million. 
Three-track system of secondary education offers placement in 
general, technical, or vocational instruction. 

Literacy: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization estimates 1990 adult literacy rate at 57.4 percent, 
up from less than 10 percent in 1962; male literacy rate 69.8 
percent; female literacy rate 45.5 percent. 

Health and Welfare: Major transformations in health care system 
reflected in improving health conditions. Infant mortality rate 
reduced from 154 per 1,000 live births in 1965 to sixty-seven per 
1,000 live births in 1990. In 1990 life expectancy at birth sixty-five 
years for males and sixty-six for females. Tuberculosis, trachoma, 
and venereal infections most serious diseases; gastrointestinal 
complaints, pneumonia, diphtheria, scarlet fever, and mumps 
relatively common. Typhoid fever, cholera, dysentery, and 
hepatitis also widespread among all age-groups. National health 
care system based on universal, almost free health care. Network 
of hospitals and clinics organized into health districts providing 
services to 90 percent of population. Modified social security 
system inherited from French colonial administration, 
expanded in 1971 to provide sickness and disability insurance, 
old-age pensions, and family allowances to all workers in formal 
economy. Acute housing shortage worsening despite growth in 
public housing. 

Economy 

Salient Features: State-directed economic system undergoing 
market-oriented structural adjustment and decentralization. 
Central government retains ownership of more than 450 state- 
owned enterprises. Economy dominated by hydrocarbon sector, 
mainly oil, but diversifying into natural gas and refined products. 
Underinvestment in agriculture and other nonoil sectors. 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): In 1992 estimated at US$42 
billion. GDP grew at average annual rate of 6.5 percent during 



xix 



1970s and 4.5 percent during first half of 1980s, largely as result 
of increasing oil revenues. Economy contracted sharply during 
latter half of 1980s and early 1990s; per capita GDP declined 
from US$2,752 in 1987 to US$1,570 in 1992. 

Minerals: Hydrocarbon sector, mainstay of economy and main 
source of exports, constituted 23 percent of GDP in 1990. 
Exports include crude oil, refined petroleum products, and gas. 
Nonfuel minerals include high-grade iron ore, phosphate, 
mercury, and zinc. 

Energy: Electricity supplied mainly by gas-powered plants. 
Overall energy consumption quadrupled between 1970s and 
early 1990s. 

Industry: Manufacturing constituted 10 percent of GDP in 1990. 
Investment concentrated in state-owned heavy industry, mainly 
steel. 

Agriculture: Variably estimated to account for 7 to 11 percent of 
GDP in 1990 and employing more than 22 percent of labor force. 
Arable land restricted mainly to coastal strip in north; pastoral 
agriculture dominant farther south. Production mainly grains, 
dominated by wheat and barley. Other main crops include 
grapes, citrus fruits, vegetables, olives, tobacco, and dates. 
Livestock and poultry production significant but heavily 
dependent on imported feed. Local consumption heavily reliant 
on food imports. Landholding, agricultural marketing, and 
distribution undergoing gradual decentralization and 
reprivatization. 

Foreign Trade: Total exports US$12.7 billion in 1990, of which 
96 percent hydrocarbons. Nonhydrocarbon exports include 
wine, metals and metal products, phosphates, fruits and 
vegetables, and iron ore. Total imports US$9.8 billion in 1989; 
include foodstuffs, semifinished goods, industrial and consumer 
goods. 

External Debt: US$26 billion in 1992, mainly held by public 
sector. Debt service exceeded US$7 billion in 1991. 
International Monetary Fund standby agreement negotiated in 



xx 



May 1994. 



Currency and Exchange Rate: Algerian dinar (DA); US$1 = 
DA40.7in October 1994. 

Fiscal Year: Calendar year. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Railroads: 4,060 kilometers total; 2,616 kilometers standard 
gauge (1.435 meters); 1,188 kilometers 1.055-meter gauge; 256 
kilometers 1.000-meter gauge; 300 kilometers electrified; 215 
kilometers double track. System carries passengers but used 
mainly for freight. 

Ports: Nine major ports at Algiers, Oran, Annaba, Mostaganem, 
Arzew, Bejaia, Skikda, andjijel. Three largest ports handled 71 
percent of traffic in 1991. 

Roads: More than 90,000 kilometers total; 58,868 kilometers 
paved; 31,163 kilometers gravel, crushed stone, or unimproved 
earth. Network unevenly distributed, more developed in 
northern coastal region; south served by limited number of 
national roads, mainly trans-Saharan highway. 

Airports: International airports at Algiers, Oran, Annaba, and 
Constantine; more than 100 secondary and minor airfields, fifty- 
three with permanent surface runways. 

Telecommunications: High-capacity radio-relay and coaxial 
cable trunk routes linking all major population areas along 
northern coast. Sahara linked by satellite ground stations to 
major population centers. Extensive international service based 
on satellite and submarine coaxial cable transmissions. Some 
international broadcasts received but domestic broadcast 
facilities sparse; only larger populated places receive television 
and radio. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Revised constitution of February 1989, suspended 
by military government in January 1992, ended commitment to 
socialism embodied in National Charter and earlier constitutions. 



xxi 



Political system based on strong presidential rule; provides in 
theory for multiparty system, separation of religious institution 
and state, and military subordination to civilian authority. 

Politics: Liberalizing government of President Chadli Benjedid 
toppled by military in January 1992. Presidency replaced by 
military-dominated High Council of State. Emergency rule 
enacted to prevent national electoral victory by Islamist 
(fundamentalist) movement, spearheaded by Islamic Salvation 
Front. In January 1994, military named General Lamine Zeroual 
president; High Council of State abolished. Zeroual to rule in 
coordination with High Security Council. Political violence and 
terrorism endemic, including killings of numerous foreigners 
since 1992. Some legislative functions exercised by National 
Transitional Council, created in May 1994; 200-member body 
provided for political party, trade union, professional, and civil 
service representation. 

Judicial System: Legal system derived from French and Arabic 
legal traditions and influenced by socialism. Supreme Court of 
four chambers reviews application of law by forty-eight 
provincial courts and lower tribunals. Civilian judicial system 
effectively replaced by military tribunals in January 1992. 

Administrative Divisions: Forty-eight provinces administered by 
centrally appointed governors. In 1994 no elected assemblies 
existed at national, provincial, or communal level. 

Foreign Relations: Policy founded on nonalignment, national 
self-determination, and support for Palestine Liberation 
Organization in Arab-Israeli dispute. Membership in League of 
Arab States and Organization of African Unity. Relations with 
West improved during 1980s and early 1990s, primarily as result 
of expanding trade and increasing economic cooperation. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: In late 1993, consisted of 121,700 total active 
forces; included army of 105,000; navy of 6,700, with 10,000- 
member air force; and coast guard of 630. Reserve force of 
150,000 at unknown level of readiness. Internal security forces 



xxn 



include Gendarmerie Nationale of 24,000, Surete Nationale 
force of 16,000, and 1,200-member Republican Guard Brigade. 

Major Tactical Units: Army organized into six geographically 
defined military regions. Bulk of army stationed in populated 
areas of north and in and near major cities as well as near borders 
with Morocco and Western Sahara. Major army units in 1993: two 
armored divisions (each with three tank regiments and one 
mechanized regiment); two mechanized divisions (each with 
three mechanized regiments and one tank regiment); number 
of independent brigades and regiments unclear; five motorized 
infantry brigades, one airborne division, seven independent 
artillery battalions, five air defense battalions, and four engineer 
battalions. Air force in 1993 had 193 combat aircraft, fifty-eight 
armed helicopters configured in three fighter-ground attack 
squadrons, eight fighter squadrons, one reconnaissance 
squadron, one maritime reconnaissance squadron, two 
transport squadrons, five helicopter squadrons of which three 
attack squadrons, two transport squadrons, of which one heavy 
and one medium. Separate air defense force with three brigades 
for air defense and three regiments with SAM missiles. Navy 
bases at Mers el Kebir, Algiers, Annaba, and Jijel. Major naval 
equipment in 1993 consisted of two submarines, three frigates, 
three corvettes, eleven missile craft, eight patrol craft, one 
minesweeper, and three amphibious landing ships. 

Defense Expenditures: 1992 defense budget DA23.0 billion 
(US$1.05 billion); 1993 defense budget DA29. 8 billion (US$1.19 
billion); military expenditures per capita in 1989 US$94. 

Internal Security: Surete Nationale, under the Ministry of 
Interior, Local Communities, Environment, and Administrative 
Reform, performs most urban police duties. Gendarmerie 
Nationale, under the Ministry of Interior but considered 
paramilitary adjunct of armed forces, responsible for rural 
police matters. Military Security responsible for domestic and 
foreign intelligence operations. 



xxiii 




— international boundary 

Administrative boundary 

® National capital 

o Administrative capita 

100 200 300 Kilometers 



100 



200 



300 Miles 



NOTE -- Administralive divisions are known as wilayal 
Names ol wilayat are the same as their capital 
Conventional name Algiers is used here tor 
the wilaya ol Alger 



NIGER 



MALI 



j: Boundary representation 
I not necessarily authoritative 

\ f 

i -J — 



Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Algeria, 1993 



xxvi 



Introduction 



ALGERIA IN OCTOBER 1994 was in a state bordering on civil 
war. The military in late January 1994 had named General 
Lamine Zeroual, previously minister of defense, as president. 
He was to rule in coordination with the High Security Council 
(Haut Conseil de Surete) because the High Council of State 
(Haut Conseil d'Etat — HCE), created two years previously, had 
been abolished. In April armed forces leaders removed Prime 
Minister Redha Malek from his post after an incumbency of 
only eight months, replacing him with Mokdad Sifi, an engi- 
neer technocrat who had served as minister of equipment. 
Efforts to achieve a workable compromise with the major 
Islamic activist group, the Islamic Salvation Front (Front 
Islamique du Salut — FIS), appeared unsuccessful. Martial law, 
imposed in February 1992, continued. 

To understand the forces behind recent events, one must 
look at the factors that have shaped Algeria's history. The indig- 
enous peoples of the region of North Africa that today consti- 
tutes Algeria comprise an ethnic group known as the Berbers. 
In the mid-1990s, the Berbers represented only about 20 per- 
cent of Algeria's population. In A.D. 642, following conquests 
by the Romans, the Vandals, and the Byzantines, the region 
came under the influence of Islam and the Arabs. Hence, the 
vast majority of the population, about 80 percent, are Arabs. 
Islam and arabization, therefore, have profoundly influenced 
the area. 

The Arab rulers of Algeria have come from various groups. 
In chronological order, they have included the Umayyads, the 
Abbasids, the Fatimids, the Almoravids, the Almohads, and the 
Zayanids. The latter group was followed in the sixteenth cen- 
tury and early seventeenth century by a series of privateer mer- 
chant captains. One of the early sixteenth-century Muslim 
privateers, Khair ad Din, ruled present-day Algeria on behalf of 
the Ottoman Turks, who gave him the title of provincial gover- 
nor. The Ottoman sultan nominally controlled the area into 
the nineteenth century but in reality exerted minimal influ- 
ence. 

From their base in Algeria, the privateers preyed on French 
vessels and those of other Western nations. Because France was 
occupied with the Napoleonic wars and their aftermath in the 



xxvii 




Figure 1, Administrative Divisions of Algeria, 1993 



first part of the nineteenth century, it was not in a position to 
act against the Algerian privateers. In 1827, however, as a result 
of an alleged slight to the French consul by the local ruler, or 
dey, France undertook what became a three-year blockade of 
Algiers. The incident led to a full-scale French invasion of Alge- 
ria in 1830 and the imposition of French rule, which lasted 
until Algeria obtained its independence in 1962. 

In the course of French colonization of Algeria, discontent 
on the part of the inhabitants led to several uprisings. The 
most prominent of these was a revolt that originated in the 
Kabylie region in eastern Algeria in 1871 and spread through 
much of the country. Serious disturbances also broke out on V- 
E (Victory in Europe) Day, 1945. In response to the latter upris- 
ings, the French military killed more than 1,500 Algerians and 
arrested more than 5,400 persons. French actions and growing 
Algerian nationalism led in 1954 to the creation by Ahmed Ben 
Bella and his colleagues of the National Liberation Front 
(Front de Liberation Nationale — FLN) and a military network 
throughout Algeria, the National Liberation Army (Armee de 
Liberation Nationale — ALN). 

The FLN launched the War of Independence on November 
1, 1954, and called on all Algerian Muslims to support it. A 
bloody war ensued. The conflict ended on July 1, 1962, with 
Algeria obtaining independence at the cost of as many as 
300,000 Algerian dead. The major reason for the prolongation 
of the war was France's determination to maintain direct con- 
trol of Algeria because of its strategic location. Seeking to inte- 
grate Algeria into the Third French Republic, France had 
made Algeria a part of France proper, whereas under similar 
circumstances it had given Morocco and Tunisia the status of 
protectorates. France granted independence to Morocco and 
Tunisia in March 1956, although their institutions were less 
developed than those of Algeria, believing that it could con- 
tinue to exercise control over the other two states through 
Algeria. 

In the thirty-two years since independence, the Algerian 
republic has seen a number of regimes and several forceful 
overthrows of governments in which the military has played a 
major role. From 1963 to 1989, Algeria was technically a social- 
ist state. In February 1979, following the death of Houari Bou- 
mediene in December 1978, Chadli Benjedid became 
president. Beginning in 1980, Benjedid began to liberalize 
Algeria's economy, shifting from investment in heavy industry 



xxviii 



to concentration on agriculture and light industry. In addition, 
the regime disbanded a number of large government enter- 
prises and state farms. The drop of world oil prices in 1986, 
however, together with poor domestic economic management, 
aggravated the already depressed economic situation. Despite 
some attempts at diversification, the oil industry and especially 
natural gas remained major sources of national income. The 
economy was characterized by high unemployment, particu- 
larly among younger males in the cities. (About 70 percent of 
Algerians are under thirty years old, and 44 percent of the total 
population are under age fifteen.) The resulting social unrest 
stemmed from the discontent of those youths who were either 
unemployed or in dead-end jobs and from food and housing 
shortages. The unrest culminated in a series of strikes in late 
September and early October 1988 in major industrial areas 
and cities, including Algiers. The strikes were repressed by the 
military with considerable force and a loss of life estimated in 
the hundreds. 

To counter this unrest and the rising appeal of the Islamists 
(Muslim activists, sometimes seen as fundamentalists), Benje- 
did expanded the reforms designed to encourage private agri- 
culture and small businesses. In 1989 he also instituted political 
reforms, including a new constitution that eliminated the term 
socialist, separated the FLN from the state, and granted free- 
dom of expression, association, and meeting. However, 
because Boumediene's socialist policies had been exacted at 
such a high cost to the economy, Benjedid's reforms came too 
late, in the opinion of many observers. Furthermore, the con- 
trol of one party, the FLN, between 1962 and 1980 had led to 
an authoritarianism that was difficult to overcome and that had 
resulted in the rise of Islamists, particularly in the form of the 
FIS. 

In response to the newly gained right to form political orga- 
nizations, parties proliferated, of which the FIS constituted the 
leading opposition party. The FIS demonstrated its appeal, or 
perhaps the extent of popular disillusionment with the FLN, by 
defeating the FLN in June 1990 local and provincial elections, 
winning in such major cities as Algiers, Constantine, and Oran. 
The Berber party, Front of Socialist Forces (Front des Forces 
Socialistes — FFS), and Ben Bella's Movement for Democracy in 
Algeria (Mouvement pour la Democratic en Algerie — MDA) 
and several other small opposition parties did not participate. 



xxix 



Again in the December 1991 national elections, the FIS sur- 
prised many by its large-scale victories despite the presence in 
jail of the party's leadership, including Abbassi Madani and 
Ahmed Belhadj. To prevent the holding of second-stage, run- 
off elections in mid-January 1992, which the FIS presumably 
would have won decisively, the army staged a coup led by Minis- 
ter of Defense General Khaled Nezzar. Martial law was reim- 
posed, and Benjedid resigned. The military named Sid Ahmed 
Ghozali president and head of a short-lived, six-person High 
Security Council, which was replaced by the five-person HCE. 
Both bodies were dominated by the military. Army leaders 
recalled Mohamed Boudiaf from his self-imposed exile in 
Morocco to serve on the HCE and be head of state. 

In response to the popular demonstrations that occurred in 
February 1992, the authorities banned the FIS in early March 
and dissolved the communal and municipal assemblies. The 
court banned the FIS on the ground that it violated the consti- 
tution, which prohibited political parties based on religion, 
race, or regional identity. After an initial period of calm, many 
Islamists were arrested and tried by military courts, receiving 
severe sentences; in 1992 about 10,000 Algerians were sent to 
prison camps in the Sahara. The military government's repres- 
sion of the FIS brought sharp responses from other political 
parties; the FLN and the FFS sought an alliance with the FIS to 
preserve the democratic process. Furthermore, the repression 
caused some elements in the FIS and in the military to become 
more radical. Rapidly, a violent environment was created, lead- 
ing to the assassination of Boudiaf in June 1992 and to terrorist 
attacks on civilians as well as military personnel. Ali Kafi of the 
HCE succeeded Boudiaf as head of state, but he was unsuccess- 
ful in resolving the country's political and economic problems. 

The military named Redha Malek prime minister in August 
1993. Recognizing the need for some compromise, Malek 
sought to initiate talks with the opposition, despite his firm 
stance against terrorism. However, because the banned FIS was 
not included in the proposed dialogue scheduled for mid- 
December 1993 when the authorization for the HCE was due 
to end, other parties boycotted the talks. The HCE's mandate 
was extended into January 1994, but because most parties had 
lost confidence in the government only smaller parties partici- 
pated in the dialogue. By September 1994, in the fourth round 
of the national dialogue, five parties were taking part. 



xxx 



In naming General Zeroual as new president, the army took 
direct responsibility for governing. Despite opposition criticism 
of the renewed military rule, Zeroual committed himself to 
working with the opposition, including the FIS. This stance has 
caused divisions within the military over political strategy and 
prompted the removal of Malek as prime minister in April. In a 
conciliatory gesture toward the FIS, in mid-September 1994 the 
government released five senior leaders from prison. Included 
among those released were Abbassi Madani and Ali Belhadj, 
who were placed under house arrest and asked by the govern- 
ment to assist it in reaching a reconciliation with the FIS. In 
pursuit of some sort of accommodation with the FIS, in late 
September three generals were holding negotiations on behalf 
of the government separately with Madani and Belhadj in their 
homes. 

Meanwhile, violence has increased, and more than 10,000 
(some estimates range as high as 30,000) Algerians are reliably 
reported to have been killed between January 1992 and Octo- 
ber 1994. Between February 22, 1993, and May 15, 1994, death 
sentences were passed on 489 persons, of which twenty-six sen- 
tences have been carried out. In addition, some sixty-eight for- 
eigners — the number is variously reported — had been killed by 
October 1994. As a result of the violence, numerous West Euro- 
pean countries and the United States in 1993 urged their 
nationals to leave Algeria. French citizens were particularly 
affected by such warnings because in late 1993 the French gov- 
ernment estimated that approximately 76,000 French nation- 
als, including those holding dual nationality, resided in Algeria. 

The main body of the FIS was willing to consider reconcilia- 
tion with the authorities under certain conditions, such as the 
freeing of FIS members who had been imprisoned and the 
legalization of the party. The most radical group, however, the 
Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Arme — GIA), had 
split from the FIS, which it considered too conciliatory, and 
rejected any compromise. Instead, the GIA, an urban terrorist 
group, began military action in November 1991. It claimed 
responsibility for killing the majority of the sixty-eight foreign- 
ers and also targeted oil installation personnel. Particularly 
embarrassing to the government was the GIA's kidnapping of 
the Omani and Yemeni ambassadors in July 1994. (They were 
subsequently released.) Another Muslim activist group, the FIS- 
sponsored Armed Islamic Movement (Mouvement Islamique 
Arme — MIA), later renamed the Islamic Salvation Army 



xxxi 



(Armee Islamique du Salut — AIS), engaged in traditional guer- 
rilla warfare. The AIS consisted in late 1994 of about 10,000 
men and attacks military bases; it denies any involvement in 
attacks on civilians and foreigners. 

While working on the one hand to promote dialogue, the 
government on the other hand instituted sharp repressive mea- 
sures on Islamists. Curfews designed to counter terrorism, insti- 
tuted in December 1992, were not lifted until 1994, and martial 
law continued to apply. The government undertook a counter- 
offensive against radical Islamist groups beginning in 1992, 
and had succeeded in killing several leaders of the GIA, includ- 
ing the group's head, Mourad Sid Ahmed (known as Djafar al 
Afghani), in February 1994 and Cherif Gousmi, Djafar al 
Afghani's successor, in September 1994. The government's 
apparent inability to stop the killing of unveiled women led to 
the formation of at least two anti-Islamic groups: the Organiza- 
tion of Free Young Algerians, which announced in March 1994 
that it would resort to counterkillings of veiled women at the 
rate of twenty to one, and the Secret Organization for Safe- 
guarding the Algerian Republic. Also in March, thousands of 
Algerians, particularly women, took to the streets to protest 
against the killing of unveiled women and to demonstrate their 
disillusionment with both the government and the FIS. Fur- 
thermore, the regime seemed unable or unwilling to prevent 
Islamist attacks on Berbers. In consequence, in 1993 Berbers 
began arming themselves in self-defense. Also indicative of the 
questionable effectiveness of government security measures 
was the successful escape of about 1,000 prisoners from the 
Tazoult high-security prison near Batna in March 1994. 

Given the absence of basic government bodies such as 
elected assemblies, contemporary Algeria is being governed by 
the military. In late 1994, the only body that theoretically exer- 
cised some legislative functions was the National Transitional 
Council (Conseil National de Transition — CNT), created in 
May 1994. Zeroual installed the CNT, which in principle was to 
consist of 200 members: eighty-five from political parties; 
eighty-five representing unions and professional and social 
organizations; and thirty-five civil service members. In actuality, 
the twenty-two seats for the five legal political parties (the FIS 
was not included) were unoccupied because the parties refused 
to participate. 

Leaders of the armed forces became the main force reject- 
ing Islamists. Elements of the army, however, recognized that a 



xxxii 



compromise with moderate Islamists appeared to be necessary 
if the country were to move ahead. Furthermore, military lead- 
ers seemed aware that the FIS had made inroads within the 
lower ranks of the armed forces. Zeroual undertook a large- 
scale reorganization of the top echelons of military leadership 
after coming to power, introducing younger officers more will- 
ing to consider compromise with Islamists. In addition to mili- 
tary service staff appointments, he named new commanders to 
five out of the six military regions in May 1994. In June Zeroual 
appointed new governors to thirty-nine of the forty-eight 
wilayat, or governorates. 

Public frustration has led to some growth in the number of 
Islamists, but accurate figures as to their strength are lacking. 
The overall Algerian attraction to Islamist groups appears to 
stem from increasing skepticism as to the likelihood of demo- 
cratic government being restored. 

The position of Islamists in general and the FIS in particular 
in contemporary Algerian society reflects the role of Islam in 
Algeria. Historically, the marabouts, or Muslim holy men, 
played a prominent role among the beduin tribes that consti- 
tuted the major element of the culture of the area. A number 
of marabouts were also associated with mystical Sufi Islamic 
brotherhoods that existed primarily in rural and mountainous 
areas of North Africa. When the French came to dominate 
Algeria from 1830 onward, they endeavored to undermine 
Muslim culture and to substitute Western ways. Therefore, the 
contemporary efforts of the FIS to restore the Islamic heritage 
of Algerians can be seen not only as a religious and cultural 
phenomenon but also as part of a nationalist resurgence to 
revive a way of life that was discouraged by a colonial power. 

Since independence in 1962, Algeria has experienced 
ambivalence about the role of Islam in society. The 1962 consti- 
tution made Islam the state religion because the founders saw 
Islam as a force for bringing cohesion to the new country. The 
government assumed control of mosques and religious schools 
and administered religious endowments. In the late 1960s and 
the 1970s, Boumediene's development policies, which led to 
the redistribution of oil revenues, were often considered to be 
instances of Islamic activism. However, many French-educated 
Algerians in the upper and upper-middle classes were secularly 
oriented and wished to minimize the role of Islam in Algerian 
society. 



xxxiii 



A number of Western observers believe that Islamist move- 
ments grew as a result of political underrepresentation and 
economic hardships experienced by the average Algerian. The 
FIS in particular saw itself as the heir of the FLN. It promised to 
continue the redistribution of wealth that the FLN had pro- 
moted in the 1960s and the 1970s, using oil revenues. For 
example, the FIS capitalized on its well-organized party struc- 
ture after the 1989 earthquake by distributing food and medi- 
cal supplies in affected areas and providing such services as 
garbage collection and school tutoring. Such social service pro- 
grams, when added to the FIS's role of providing religious 
instruction, met with popular response and constituted a 
threat in the eyes of many of those in positions of government 
power. 

Because of economic constraints, the government found it 
very difficult in the late 1980s and early 1990s to counter any 
Islamist activities relating to the economy and social services. 
Despite its deteriorating economy, Algeria for years had 
avoided rescheduling its debt payments for fear of losing its 
political and economic independence. Thus, in 1993 the coun- 
try devoted 96 percent of its hydrocarbon export revenues to 
debt repayment. When the economic situation became critical 
in 1994, partly because of a severe drought that resulted in 
Algeria's being able to meet only about 10 percent of its grain 
needs and the consequent death by starvation of about 1,000 
persons monthly, the regime was obliged to act. In addition, 
most industries were operating only at 50 percent of capacity 
because of lack of funds for raw materials and other inputs; 
inflation officially was estimated at 25 percent but actually was 
considerably higher (for example, in September 1991 it had 
reached 227 percent); the 1993 gross domestic product 
(GDP — see Glossary) growth rate was -1.7 percent; land ero- 
sion was causing the loss of about 40,000 hectares of cultivated 
land annually; and water distribution losses were as high as 40 
percent, according to the World Bank (see Glossary) . 

To qualify for an International Monetary Fund (IMF — see 
Glossary) structural adjustment loan, the government needed 
to take preliminary reform measures. These steps included 
instituting 20 percent to 100 percent price increases in late 
March 1994 on nine basic commodities — among which were 
bread, flour, and milk — and devaluing the Algerian dinar (for 
value of the dinar — see Glossary) by 40 percent in early April. 
Following the IMF's approval in May of a US$1.1 billion 



XXXIV 



standby economic stabilization loan extending to April 1995, 
Algeria was able to ask the Paris Club (see Glossary) of official 
creditors for rescheduling of other government debt (total 
indebtedness, including loans from private banks, was esti- 
mated at US$26 billion). In July Algeria received economic aid 
in the amount of US$1.1 billion from France as well as a loan 
from the European Union. In October 1994, Algeria had not 
yet completed its plans for rescheduling its commercial loan 
repayments with the London Club (see Glossary). 

In order to gain popular support for the structural adjust- 
ment program, the IMF specifically asked that other donors 
make loans that would facilitate housing construction. Algeria 
faces a severe housing crisis because between 1962 and 1989 
the country built only about 48,000 housing units annually. 
This figure is in contrast to the 107,000 needed to prevent fur- 
ther deterioration of the situation and the 234,000 units 
needed per year to provide each household with a unit. With 
regard to other services, to maintain its existing health level, 
the country requires an additional 24,000 hospital beds and 
5,000 more paramedics. To meet the needs of the number of 
new students resulting from Algeria's high population growth 
rate (variously estimated at 2.7 percent to 2.9 percent per 
year), it needs 24,000 additional classrooms and 8,000 more 
teachers by 2005. 

Because of the serious economic situation, when Islamists 
made such a good showing in the June 1990 elections, and 
again in the December 1991 elections, some Western observers 
considered the results primarily a vote against the FLN rather 
than an endorsement of Islamism. The military, whose leader- 
ship was secularly oriented, felt threatened, however, and 
determined to take decisive action. 

The repressive measures adopted demonstrated that 
democracy constituted a thin veneer. Algeria's military leaders 
were apparently unwilling to accept the risks connected with 
political pluralism and liberalization. Furthermore, the coun- 
try lacked a solid commitment to the electoral process. In the 
December 1991 elections, of the 13.2 million Algerians eligible 
to vote, only 7.8 million, or 59 percent, voted. Moreover, the 
continued influence of the military on the processes of govern- 
ment represents a further obstacle to true democracy. 

While undergoing these domestic difficulties, the Algerian 
government has sought to obtain not only economic assistance 
from abroad but also political support. Traditionally, Algeria's 



xxxv 



closest economic relations have been with France., to which it 
ships most of its exports and to which thousands of Algerian 
workers continue to migrate, often illegally in contravention of 
immigration restrictions. However, riven Algeria's colonial her- 
itage, a love-hate relationship exists between it and France. 
Manv older Algerians, particularly- militarv officers, are proud 
of their French culture and training but also resent past depen- 
dence: many younger people are ardent nationalists or Islam- 
ists and tend to reject France's role and the influence of the 
West in general. Furthermore, France, concerned at the unrest 
so close to it as well as the potential for subversion of thousands 
of Algerians in France, seems to have been pressuring .Algeria 
to take harsh measures against Islamists. The United States has 
been more conciliators stressing the need for the Algerian 
government to compromise with Islamists in order to move 
toward greater democracv. Democracv appears to be a more 
acceptable course than socialism, in view of developments in 
Eastern Europe in recent vears and the questionable success of 
Boumediene's socialist policies. 

On the regional level. Algeria historically has tended to view 
itself as the leading state of the Arab Maghrib. In recent vears. 
however, the country's economic plight has limited its regional 
influence, and the role of Morocco appears to be growing. 
Algeria is a founding member of the Union of the .Arab Magh- 
rib (Union du Maghreb .Arab e — UMA). which came into exist- 
ence in 1989. designed to create a common market among 
Algeria. Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. Benjedid saw 
the UMA as a factor for peace and stability in the region as well 
as for social and economic progress. Formed at the time of the 
Soviet Union's disintegration and the prospect of serious eco- 
nomic competition from the European Community, the UMA 
was intended not onlv to promote economic cooperation but 
also to promote common policies in the broader political and 
social fields. For example, at its November 1992 meeting, the 
UMA ministers of foreign affairs agreed to take common 
action to counter the rise of Islamism in the Maghrib. However, 
at their February 1993 meeting the ministers decided on a 
"pause" in the UMA's work. In actuality, because of economic 
differences among the members, none of the fifteen conven- 
tions adopted since 19S9 has been implemented. 

Thus, in late 1994 the Algerian government was challenged 
on a number of fronts. Its greatest problems lav in the domestic 
field: the strength of Islamism. which threatened to topple the 



XXXVI 



regime, and the economy. The IMF loan, supplemented by 
Paris Club, London Club, and other foreign financial assis- 
tance, gave some hope of relieving economic hardships in the 
long run. In all likelihood, however, the austerity measures 
nonetheless would create in the immediate future further 
unemployment and cost-of-living increases that would have a 
serious impact on less affluent members of society. Therefore, 
the government needs to make progress in the social and infra- 
structure fields, particularly in housing and to a lesser extent in 
health care and education, if it is to offer a domestic program 
to counteract the popular appeal of Islamists. Wise use for such 
purposes of funds obtained from abroad, while simultaneously 
seeking to negotiate a compromise with moderate Islamist 
groups like the FIS, may represent the government's best hope 
of remaining in power. 

October 27, 1994 Helen Chapin Metz 



XXXVll 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 



Roman arch dedicated to Emperor Caracalla (r. A.D. 212-17) atDjemila in 
northern Algeria 



MODERN-DAY ALGERIA is a leading state of the Arab Magh- 
rib (see Glossary), the term applied to the western part of Arab 
North Africa. Algeria is inhabited predominantly by Muslim 
Arabs, but it has a large Berber minority. The most significant 
forces in the country's history have been the spread of Islam, 
arabization, colonization, and the struggle for independence. 

North Africa served as a transit region for peoples moving 
toward Europe or the Middle East. Thus, the region's inhabit- 
ants have been influenced by populations from other areas. 
Out of this mix developed the Berber people, whose language 
and culture, although pushed from coastal areas by conquer- 
ing and colonizing Carthaginians, Romans, and Byzantines, 
dominated most of the land until the spread of Islam and the 
coming of the Arabs. 

The introduction of Islam and Arabic had a profound 
impact on the Maghrib beginning in the seventh century. The 
new religion and language introduced changes in social and 
economic relations, established links with a rich culture, and 
provided a powerful idiom of political discourse and organiza- 
tion. From the great Berber dynasties of the Almoravids and 
Almohads to the militants seeking an Islamic state in the early 
1990s, the call to return to true Islamic values and practices has 
had social resonance and political power. For 300 years, begin- 
ning in the early sixteenth century, Algeria was a province of 
the Ottoman Empire under a regency that had Algiers as its 
capital. During this period, the modern Algerian state began to 
emerge as a distinct territory between Tunisia and Morocco. 

The French occupation of Algeria, beginning in 1830, had 
great influence. In addition to enduring the affront of being 
ruled by a foreign, non-Muslim power, many Algerians lost 
their lands to the new government or to colonists. Traditional 
leaders were eliminated, coopted, or made irrelevant; social 
structures were stressed to the breaking point. Viewed by the 
Europeans with condescension at best and contempt at worst — 
never as equals — the Algerians endured 132 years of colonial 
subjugation. Nonetheless, this period saw the formation of new 
social classes, which, after exposure to ideas of equality and 
political liberty, would help propel the country to indepen- 
dence. During the years of French domination, the struggles to 



3 



Neolithic cave paintings found in Tassili-n-Ajjer (Plateau of the 

Chasms) region of the Sahara 
Courtesy LaVerle Berry 

survive, to co-exist, to gain equality, and to achieve indepen- 
dence shaped a large part of the Algerian national identity. 

The War of Independence (1954-62), brutal and long, was 
the most recent major turning point in the country's history. 
Although often fratricidal, it ultimately united Algerians and 
seared the value of independence and the philosophy of anti- 
colonialism into the national consciousness. Since indepen- 
dence in 1962, Algeria has sought to create political structures 
that reflect the unique character of the country and that can 
cope with the daunting challenges of rebuilding a society and 
an economy that had been subject to years of trauma and pain- 
ful transformation. 

Prehistory of Central North Africa 

The cave paintings found at Tassili-n-Ajjer, north of Taman- 



Historical Setting 



rasset, and at other locations depict vibrant and vivid scenes of 
everyday life in the central Maghrib between about 8000 B.C. 
and 4000 B.C. They were executed by a hunting people in the 
Capsian period of the Neolithic age who lived in a savanna 
region teeming with giant buffalo, elephant, rhinoceros, and 
hippopotamus, animals that no longer exist in the now-desert 
area. The pictures provide the most complete record of a pre- 
historic African culture. 

Earlier inhabitants of the central Maghrib have left behind 
equally significant remains. Early remnants of hominid occupa- 
tion in North Africa, for example, were found in Ain el 
Hanech, near Saida (ca. 200,000 B.C.). Later, Neanderthal tool 
makers produced hand axes in the Levalloisian and Mouste- 
rian styles (ca. 43,000 B.C.) similar to those in the Levant. 
According to some sources, North Africa was the site of the 
highest state of development of Middle Paleolithic flake-tool 
techniques. Tools of this era, starting about 30,000 B.C., are 
called Aterian (after the site Bir el Ater, south of Annaba) and 
are marked by a high standard of workmanship, great variety, 
and specialization. 

The earliest blade industries in North Africa are called 
Ibero-Maurusian or Oranian (after a site near Oran). The 
industry appears to have spread throughout the coastal regions 
of the Maghrib between 15,000 and 10,000 B.C. Between about 
9000 and 5000 B.C., the Capsian culture began influencing the 
Ibero-Maurusian, and after about 3000 B.C. the remains of just 
one human type can be found throughout the region. 
Neolithic civilization (marked by animal domestication and 
subsistence agriculture) developed in the Saharan and Medi- 
terranean Maghrib between 6000 and 2000 B.C. This type of 
economy, so richly depicted in the Tassili-n-Ajjer cave paint- 
ings, predominated in the Maghrib until the classical period. 

The amalgam of peoples of North Africa coalesced eventu- 
ally into a distinct native population that came to be called Ber- 
bers. Distinguished primarily by cultural and linguistic 
attributes, the Berbers lacked a written language and hence 
tended to be overlooked or marginalized in historical 
accounts. Roman, Greek, Byzantine, and Arab Muslim chroni- 
clers typically depicted the Berbers as "barbaric" enemies, trou- 
blesome nomads, or ignorant peasants. They were, however, to 
play a major role in the area's history. 



5 



Algeria: A Country Study 




Historical Setting 



North Africa During the Classical Period 
Carthage and the Berbers 

Phoenician traders arrived on the North African coast 
around 900 B.C. and established Carthage (in present-day 
Tunisia) around 800 B.C. By the sixth century B.C., a Phoeni- 
cian presence existed at Tipasa (east of Cherchell in Algeria). 
From their principal center of power at Carthage, the 
Carthaginians expanded and established small settlements 
(called emporia in Greek) along the North African coast; these 
settlements eventually served as market towns as well as anchor- 
ages. Hippo Regius (modern Annaba) and Rusicade (modern 
Skikda) are among the towns of Carthaginian origin on the 
coast of present-day Algeria. 

As Carthaginian power grew, its impact on the indigenous 
population increased dramatically. Berber civilization was 
already at a stage in which agriculture, manufacturing, trade, 
and political organization supported several states. Trade links 
between Carthage and the Berbers in the interior grew, but ter- 
ritorial expansion also resulted in the enslavement or military 
recruitment of some Berbers and in the extraction of tribute 
from others. By the early fourth century B.C., Berbers formed 
the single largest element of the Carthaginian army. In the 
Revolt of the Mercenaries, Berber soldiers rebelled from 241 to 
238 B.C. after being unpaid following the defeat of Carthage in 
the First Punic War. They succeeded in obtaining control of 
much of Carthage's North African territory, and they minted 
coins bearing the name Libyan, used in Greek to describe 
natives of North Africa. The Carthaginian state declined 
because of successive defeats by the Romans in the Punic Wars; 
in 146 B.C. the city of Carthage was destroyed. 

As Carthaginian power waned, the influence of Berber lead- 
ers in the hinterland grew. By the second century B.C., several 
large but loosely administered Berber kingdoms had emerged. 
Two of them were established in Numidia, behind the coastal 
areas controlled by Carthage (see fig. 2). West of Numidia lay 
Mauretania, which extended across the Moulouya River in 
Morocco to the Atlantic Ocean. The high point of Berber civili- 
zation, unequaled until the coming of the Almohads and 
Almoravids more than a millennium later, was reached during 
the reign of Masinissa in the second century B.C. After Masi- 
nissa's death in 148 B.C., the Berber kingdoms were divided 
and reunited several times. Masinissa's line survived until A.D. 



7 



Algeria: A Country Study 



24, when the remaining Berber territory was annexed to the 
Roman Empire. 

The Roman Era 

Increases in urbanization and in the area under cultivation 
during Roman rule caused wholesale dislocations of Berber 
society. Nomadic tribes were forced to settle or move from tra- 
ditional rangelands. Sedentary tribes lost their autonomy and 
connection with the land. Berber opposition to the Roman 
presence was nearly constant. The Roman emperor Trajan (r. 
A.D. 98-117) established a frontier in the south by encircling 
the Aures and Nemencha mountains and building a line of 
forts from Vescera (modern Biskra) to Ad Majores (Hennchir 
Besseriani, southeast of Biskra). The defensive line extended at 
least as far as Castellum Dimmidi (modern Messaad, southwest 
of Biskra), Roman Algeria's southernmost fort. Romans settled 
and developed the area around Sitifis (modern Setif) in the 
second century, but farther west the influence of Rome did not 
extend beyond the coast and principal military roads until 
much later. 

The Roman military presence in North Africa was relatively 
small, consisting of about 28,000 troops and auxiliaries in 
Numidia and the two Mauretanian provinces. Starting in the 
second century A.D., these garrisons were manned mostly by 
local inhabitants. 

Aside from Carthage, urbanization in North Africa came in 
part with the establishment of settlements of veterans under 
the Roman emperors Claudius (r. A.D. 41-54), Nerva (r. A.D. 
96-98), and Trajan. In Algeria such settlements included 
Tipasa, Cuicul (modern Djemila, northeast of Setif), Thamu- 
gadi (modern Timgad, southeast of Setif), and Sitifis. The pros- 
perity of most towns depended on agriculture. Called the 
"granary of the empire," North Africa, according to one esti- 
mate, produced 1 million tons of cereals each year, one-quarter 
of which was exported. Other crops included fruit, figs, grapes, 
and beans. By the second century A.D. , olive oil rivaled cereals 
as an export item. 

The beginnings of the decline of the Roman Empire were 
less serious in North Africa than elsewhere. There were upris- 
ings, however. In A.D. 238, landowners rebelled unsuccessfully 
against the emperor's fiscal policies. Sporadic tribal revolts in 
the Mauretanian mountains followed from 253 to 288. The 



8 



Roman ruins atDjemila, west of Constantine 
Courtesy Bechtel Corporation 
Arch to Emperor Trajan (r. A.D. 98-117) at Timgad, 

southwest of Annaba 
Courtesy ANEP 



9 



Algeria: A Country Study 

towns also suffered economic difficulties, and building activity 
almost ceased. 

The towns of Roman North Africa had a substantial Jewish 
population. Some Jews were deported from Palestine in the 
first and second centuries A.D. for rebelling against Roman 
rule; others had come earlier with Punic settlers. In addition, a 
number of Berber tribes had converted to Judaism. 

Christianity arrived in the second century and soon gained 
converts in the towns and among slaves. More than eighty bish- 
ops, some from distant frontier regions of Numidia, attended 
the Council of Carthage in 256. By the end of the fourth cen- 
tury, the settled areas had become Christianized, and some 
Berber tribes had converted en masse. 

A division in the church that came to be known as the 
Donatist controversy began in 313 among Christians in North 
Africa. The Donatists stressed the holiness of the church and 
refused to accept the authority to administer the sacraments of 
those who had surrendered the scriptures when they were for- 
bidden under the Emperor Diocletian (r. 284-305). The 
Donatists also opposed the involvement of Emperor Constan- 
tine (r. 306-37) in church affairs in contrast to the majority of 
Christians who welcomed official imperial recognition. 

The occasionally violent controversy has been characterized 
as a struggle between opponents and supporters of the Roman 
system. The most articulate North African critic of the Donatist 
position, which came to be called a heresy, was Augustine, 
bishop of Hippo Regius. Augustine (354^430) maintained that 
the unworthiness of a minister did not affect the validity of the 
sacraments because their true minister was Christ. In his ser- 
mons and books, Augustine, who is considered a leading expo- 
nent of Christian truths, evolved a theory of the right of 
orthodox Christian rulers to use force against schismatics and 
heretics. Although the dispute was resolved by a decision of an 
imperial commission in Carthage in 411, Donatist communities 
continued to exist through the sixth century. 

Vandals and Byzantines 

Led by their king, Gaiseric, some 80,000 Vandals, a Ger- 
manic tribe, crossed into Africa from Spain in 429. In the fol- 
lowing year, the invaders advanced without much opposition to 
Hippo Regius, which they took after a siege in which Augustine 
died. After further advances, the Vandals in 435 made an agree- 
ment with Rome to limit their control to Numidia and Maure- 



10 



Historical Setting 



tania. But in 439 Gaiseric conquered and pillaged Carthage 
and the rest of the province of Africa. 

The resulting decline in trade weakened Roman control. 
Independent kingdoms emerged in mountainous and desert 
areas, towns were overrun, and Berbers, who had previously 
been pushed to the edges of the Roman Empire, returned. 

Belisarius, general of the Byzantine emperor Justinian based 
in Constantinople, landed in North Africa in 533 with 16,000 
men and within a year destroyed the Vandal kingdom. Local 
opposition delayed full Byzantine control of the region for 
twelve years, however, and imperial control, when it came, was 
but a shadow of the control exercised by Rome. Although an 
impressive series of fortifications were built, Byzantine rule was 
compromised by official corruption, incompetence, military 
weakness, and lack of concern in Constantinople for African 
affairs. As a result, many rural areas reverted to Berber rule. 

Islam and the Arabs, 642-1830 

Unlike the invasions of previous religions and cultures, the 
coming of Islam, which was spread by Arabs, was to have perva- 
sive and long-lasting effects on the Maghrib. The new faith, in 
its various forms, would penetrate nearly all segments of soci- 
ety, bringing with it armies, learned men, and fervent mystics, 
and in large part replacing tribal practices and loyalties with 
new social norms and political idioms. 

Nonetheless, the Islamization and arabization of the region 
were complicated and lengthy processes. Whereas nomadic 
Berbers were quick to convert and assist the Arab invaders, not 
until the twelfth century under the Almohad Dynasty did the 
Christian and Jewish communities become totally marginal- 
ized. 

The first Arab military expeditions into the Maghrib, 
between 642 and 669, resulted in the spread of Islam. These 
early forays from a base in Egypt occurred under local initiative 
rather than under orders from the central caliphate. When the 
seat of the caliphate moved from Medina to Damascus, how- 
ever, the Umayyads (a Muslim dynasty ruling from 661 to 750) 
recognized that the strategic necessity of dominating the Medi- 
terranean dictated a concerted military effort on the North 
African front. In 670, therefore, an Arab army under Uqba ibn 
Nan* established the town of Al Qayrawan about 160 kilometers 
south of present-day Tunis and used it as a base for further 
operations. 



11 



Algeria: A Country Study 

Abu al Muhajir Dina, Uqba's successor, pushed westward 
into Algeria and eventually worked out a modus vivendi with 
Kusayla, the ruler of an extensive confederation of Christian 
Berbers. Kusayla, who had been based in Tilimsan (modern 
Tlemcen), became a Muslim and moved his headquarters to 
Takirwan, near Al Qayrawan. 

This harmony was short-lived, however. Arab and Berber 
forces controlled the region in turn until 697. By 711 Umayyad 
forces helped by Berber converts to Islam had conquered all of 
North Africa. Governors appointed by the Umayyad caliphs 
ruled from Al Qayrawan, the new xvilaya (province) of Ifriqiya, 
which covered Tripolitania (the western part of present-day 
Libya), Tunisia, and eastern Algeria. 

Paradoxically, the spread of Islam among the Berbers did 
not guarantee their support for the Arab-dominated caliphate. 
The ruling Arabs alienated the Berbers by taxing them heavily; 
treating converts as second-class Muslims; and, at worst, by 
enslaving them. As a result, widespread opposition took the 
form of open revolt in 739-40 under the banner of Kharijite 
Islam. The Kharijites objected to Ali, the fourth caliph, making 
peace with the Umayyads in 657 and left Ali's camp (khariji 
means "those who leave"). The Kharijites had been fighting 
Umayyad rule in the East, and many Berbers were attracted by 
the sect's egalitarian precepts. For example, according to Khar- 
ijism, any suitable Muslim candidate could be elected caliph 
without regard to race, station, or descent from the Prophet 
Muhammad. 

After the revolt, Kharijites established a number of theo- 
cratic tribal kingdoms, most of which had short and troubled 
histories. Others, however, like Sijilmasa and Tilimsan, which 
straddled the principal trade routes, proved more viable and 
prospered. In 750 the Abbasids, who succeeded the Umayyads 
as Muslim rulers, moved the caliphate to Baghdad and reestab- 
lished caliphal authority in Ifriqiya, appointing Ibrahim ibn Al 
Aghlab as governor in Al Qayrawan. Although nominally serv- 
ing at the caliph's pleasure, Al Aghlab and his successors ruled 
independently until 909, presiding over a court that became a 
center for learning and culture. 

Just to the west of Aghlabid lands, Abd ar Rahman ibn Rus- 
tum ruled most of the central Maghrib from Tahirt, southwest 
of Algiers. The rulers of the Rustumid imamate, which lasted 
from 761 to 909, each an Ibadi (see Glossary) Kharijite imam 
(see Glossary), were elected by leading citizens. The imams 



12 



Historical Setting 



gained a reputation for honesty, piety, and justice. The court at 
Tahirt was noted for its support of scholarship in mathematics, 
astronomy, and astrology, as well as theology and law. The Rus- 
tumid imams, however, failed, by choice or by neglect, to orga- 
nize a reliable standing army. This important factor, 
accompanied by the dynasty's eventual collapse into deca- 
dence, opened the way for Tahirt's demise under the assault of 
the Fatimids. 

Fatimids 

In the closing decades of the ninth century, missionaries of 
the Ismaili sect of Shia (see Glossary) Islam converted the 
Kutama Berbers of what was later known as the Petite Kabylie 
region and led them in battle against the Sunni (see Glossary) 
rulers of Ifriqiya. Al Qayrawan fell to them in 909. The Ismaili 
imam, Ubaydallah, declared himself caliph and established 
Mahdia as his capital. Ubaydallah initiated the Fatimid Dynasty, 
named after Fatima, daughter of Muhammad and wife of Ali, 
from whom the caliph claimed descent. 

The Fatimids turned westward in 911, destroying the imam- 
ate of Tahirt and conquering Sijilmasa in Morocco. Ibadi Khar- 
ijite refugees from Tahirt fled south to the oasis at Ouargla 
beyond the Atlas Mountains, whence in the eleventh century 
they moved southwest to Oued Mzab. Maintaining their cohe- 
sion and beliefs over the centuries, Ibadi religious leaders have 
dominated public life in the region to this day. 

For many years, the Fatimids posed a threat to Morocco, but 
their deepest ambition was to rule the East, the Mashriq, which 
included Egypt and Muslim lands beyond. By 969 they had con- 
quered Egypt. In 972 the Fatimid ruler Al Muizz established 
the new city of Cairo as his capital. The Fatimids left the rule of 
Ifriqiya and most of Algeria to the Zirids (972-1148). This Ber- 
ber dynasty, which had founded the towns of Miliana, Medea, 
and Algiers and centered significant local power in Algeria for 
the first time, turned over its domain west of Ifriqiya to the 
Banu Hammad branch of its family. The Hammadids ruled 
from 1011 to 1151, during which time Bejaia became the most 
important port in the Maghrib. 

This period was marked by constant conflict, political insta- 
bility, and economic decline. The Hammadids, by rejecting the 
Ismaili doctrine for Sunni orthodoxy and renouncing submis- 
sion to the Fatimids, initiated chronic conflict with the Zirids. 
Two great Berber confederations — the Sanhaja and the 



13 



Algeria: A Country Study 

Zenata — engaged in an epic struggle. The fiercely brave, 
camel-borne nomads of the western desert and steppe as well 
as the sedentary farmers of the Kabylie region to the east swore 
allegiance to the Sanhaja. Their traditional enemies, the 
Zenata, were tough, resourceful horsemen from the cold pla- 
teau of the northern interior of Morocco and the western Tell 
in Algeria. 

In addition, raiders from Genoa, Pisa, and Norman Sicily 
attacked ports and disrupted coastal trade. Trans-Saharan 
trade shifted to Fatimid Egypt and to routes in the west leading 
to Spanish markets. The countryside was being overtaxed by 
growing cities. 

Contributing to these political and economic dislocations 
was a large incursion of Arab beduin from Egypt starting in the 
first half of the eleventh century. Part of this movement was an 
invasion by the Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaym tribes, apparently 
sent by the Fatimids to weaken the Zirids. These Arab beduin 
overcame the Zirids and Hammadids and in 1057 sacked Al 
Qayrawan. They sent farmers fleeing from the fertile plains to 
the mountains and left cities and towns in ruin. For the first 
time, the extensive use of Arabic spread to the countryside. 
Sedentary Berbers who sought protection from the Hilalians 
were gradually arabized. 

Almoravids 

The Almoravid movement developed early in the eleventh 
century among the Sanhaja of the western Sahara, whose con- 
trol of trans-Saharan trade routes was under pressure from the 
Zenata Berbers in the north and the state of Ghana in the 
south. Yahya ibn Ibrahim al Jaddali, a leader of the Lam tuna 
tribe of the Sanhaja confederation, decided to raise the level of 
Islamic knowledge and practice among his people. To accom- 
plish this, on his return from the hajj (Muslim pilgrimage to 
Mecca) in 1048^19, he brought with him Abd Allah ibn Yasin al 
Juzuli, a Moroccan scholar. In the early years of the movement, 
the scholar was concerned only with imposing moral discipline 
and a strict adherence to Islamic principles among his follow- 
ers. Abd Allah ibn Yasin also became known as one of the 
marabouts, or holy persons (from al murabitun, "those who 
have made a religious retreat." Almoravids is the Spanish trans- 
literation of al murabitun — see Marabouts, this ch.). 

The Almoravid movement shifted from promoting religious 
reform to engaging in military conquest after 1054 and was led 



14 



Historical Setting 



by Lamtuna leaders: first Yahya, then his brother Abu Bakr, and 
then his cousin Yusuf ibn Tashfin. With Marrakech as their cap- 
ital, the Almoravids had conquered Morocco, the Maghrib as 
far east as Algiers, and Spain up to the Ebro River by 1106. 
Under the Almoravids, the Maghrib and Spain acknowledged 
the spiritual authority of the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad, 
reuniting them temporarily with the Islamic community in the 
Mashriq. 

Although it was not an entirely peaceful time, North Africa 
benefited economically and culturally during the Almoravid 
period, which lasted until 1147. Muslim Spain (Andalus in Ara- 
bic) was a great source of artistic and intellectual inspiration. 
The most famous writers of Andalus worked in the Almoravid 
court, and the builders of the Grand Mosque of Tilimsan, com- 
pleted in 1136, used as a model the Grand Mosque of Cordoba. 

Almohads 

Like the Almoravids, the Almohads found their initial inspi- 
ration in Islamic reform. Their spiritual leader, the Moroccan 
Muhammad ibn Abdallah ibn Tumart, sought to reform 
Almoravid decadence. Rejected in Marrakech and other cities, 
he turned to his Masmuda tribe in the Atlas Mountains for sup- 
port. Because of their emphasis on the unity of God, his follow- 
ers were known as Al Muwahhidun (unitarians, or Almohads). 

Although declaring himself mahdi, imam, and masum (infal- 
lible leader sent by God), Muhammad ibn Abdallah ibn 
Tumart consulted with a council of ten of his oldest disciples. 
Influenced by the Berber tradition of representative govern- 
ment, he later added an assembly composed of fifty leaders 
from various tribes. The Almohad rebellion began in 1125 with 
attacks on Moroccan cities, including Sus and Marrakech. 

Upon Muhammad ibn Abdallah ibn Tumart's death in 
1130, his successor Abd al Mumin took the title of caliph and 
placed members of his own family in power, converting the sys- 
tem into a traditional monarchy. The Almohads entered Spain 
at the invitation of the Andalusian amirs, who had risen against 
the Almoravids there. Abd al Mumin forced the submission of 
the amirs and reestablished the caliphate of Cordoba, giving 
the Almohad sultan supreme religious as well as political 
authority within his domains. The Almohads took control of 
Morocco in 1146, captured Algiers around 1151, and by 1160 
had completed the conquest of the central Maghrib and 
advanced to Tripolitania. Nonetheless, pockets of Almoravid 



15 



Algeria: A Country Study 



resistance continued to hold out in the Kabylie region for at 
least fifty years. 

After Abd al Mumin's death in 1163, his son Abu Yaqub 
Yusuf (r. 1163-84) and grandson Yaqub al Mansur (r. 1184-99) 
presided over the zenith of Almohad power. For the first time, 
the Maghrib was united under a local regime, and although the 
empire was troubled by conflict on its fringes, handcrafts and 
agriculture flourished at its center and an efficient bureaucracy 
filled the tax coffers. In 1229 the Almohad court renounced 
the teachings of Muhammad ibn Tumart, opting instead for 
greater tolerance and a return to the Maliki (see Glossary) 
school of law. As evidence of this change, the Almohads hosted 
two of the greatest thinkers of Andalus: Abu Bakr ibn Tufayl 
and Ibn Rushd (Averroes). 

The Almohads shared the crusading instincts of their Chris- 
tian adversaries, but the continuing wars in Spain over-taxed 
their resources. In the Maghrib, the Almohad position was 
compromised by factional strife and was challenged by a 
renewal of tribal warfare. The Bani Merin (Zenata Berbers) 
took advantage of declining Almohad power to establish a 
tribal state in Morocco, initiating nearly sixty years of warfare 
there that concluded with their capture of Marrakech, the last 
Almohad stronghold, in 1271. Despite repeated efforts to sub- 
jugate the central Maghrib, however, the Merinids were never 
able to restore the frontiers of the Almohad Empire. 

Zayanids 

From its capital at Tunis, the Hafsid Dynasty made good its 
claim to be the legitimate successor of the Almohads in Ifriqiya, 
while, in the central Maghrib, the Zayanids founded a dynasty 
at Tlemcen. Based on a Zenata tribe, the Bani Abd el Wad, 
which had been settled in the region by Abd al Mumin, the 
Zayanids also emphasized their links with the Almohads. 

For more than 300 years, until the region came under Otto- 
man suzerainty in the sixteenth century, the Zayanids kept a 
tenuous hold in the central Maghrib. The regime, which 
depended on the administrative skills of Andalusians, was 
plagued by frequent rebellions but learned to survive as the 
vassal of the Merinids or Hafsids or later as an ally of Spain. 

Many coastal cities defied the ruling dynasties and asserted 
their autonomy as municipal republics. They were governed by 
their merchant oligarchies, by tribal chieftains from the sur- 



16 



Historical Setting 



rounding countryside, or by the privateers who operated out of 
their ports. 

Nonetheless, Tlemcen prospered as a commercial center 
and was called the "pearl of the Maghrib." Situated at the head 
of the Imperial Road through the strategic Taza Gap to Mar- 
rakech, the city controlled the caravan route to Sijilmasa, gate- 
way for the gold and slave trade with the western Sudan. 
Aragon came to control commerce between Tlemcen's port, 
Oran, and Europe beginning about 1250. An outbreak of priva- 
teering out of Aragon, however, severely disrupted this trade 
after about 1420. 

Marabouts 

The successor dynasties in the Maghrib — Merinids, Zaya- 
nids, and Hasfids — did not base their power on a program of 
religious reform as their predecessors had done. Of necessity 
they compromised with rural cults that had survived the tri- 
umph of puritanical orthodoxy in the twelfth century despite 
the efforts of the Almoravids and Almohads to stamp them out. 

The aridity of official Islam had little appeal outside the 
mosques and schools of the cities. In the countryside, wander- 
ing marabouts, or holy people, drew a large and devoted fol- 
lowing. These men and women were believed to possess divine 
grace (baraka) or to be able to channel it to others. In life, the 
marabouts offered spiritual guidance, arbitrated disputes, and 
often wielded political power. After death, their cults — some 
local, others widespread — erected domed tombs that became 
sites of pilgrimage. 

Many tribes claimed descent from marabouts. In addition, 
small, autonomous republics led by holy men became a com- 
mon form of government in the Maghrib. In Algeria, the influ- 
ence of the marabouts continued through much of the 
Ottoman period, when the authorities would grant political 
and financial favors to these leaders to prevent tribal uprisings. 

European Offensive 

The final triumph of the 700-year Christian reconquest of 
Spain, marked by the fall of Granada in 1492, was accompanied 
by the forced conversion of Spanish Muslims (Moriscos). As a 
result of the Inquisition, thousands of Jews fled or were 
deported to the Maghrib, where many gained influence in gov- 
ernment and commerce. 



17 



Algeria: A Country Study 

Without much difficulty, Christian Spain imposed its influ- 
ence on the Maghrib coast by constructing fortified outposts 
(presidios) and collecting tribute during the fifteenth and 
early sixteenth centuries. On or near the Algerian coast, Spain 
took control of Mers el Kebir in 1505, Oran in 1509, and Tlem- 
cen, Mostaganem, and Tenes, all west of Algiers, in 1510. In the 
same year, the merchants of Algiers handed over one of the 
rocky islets in their harbor, where the Spaniards built a fort. 
The presidios in North Africa turned out to be a costly and 
largely ineffective military endeavor that did not guarantee 
access for Spain's merchant fleet. Indeed, most trade seemed 
to be transacted in the numerous free ports. Moreover, from 
the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, sailing superior ships 
and hammering out shrewd concessions, merchants from 
England, Portugal, Holland, France, and Italy, as well as Spain, 
dominated Mediterranean trade. 

Why Spain did not extend its North African conquests much 
beyond a few modest enclaves has puzzled historians. Some 
suggest that Spain held back because it was preoccupied with 
maintaining its territory in Italy; others that Spain's energies 
were absorbed in obtaining the riches of the New World. Still 
another possibility is that Spain was more intent on projecting 
its force on the high seas than on risking defeat in the forbid- 
ding interior of Africa. 

Privateers 

Privateering was an age-old practice in the Mediterranean. 
North African rulers engaged in it increasingly in the late six- 
teenth and early seventeenth century because it was so lucra- 
tive, and because their merchant vessels, formerly a major 
source of income, were not permitted to enter European ports. 
Although the methods varied, privateering generally involved 
private vessels raiding the ships of an enemy in peacetime 
under the authority of a ruler. Its purposes were to disrupt an 
opponent's trade and to reap rewards from the captives and 
cargo. 

Privateering was a highly disciplined affair conducted under 
the command of the rais (captain) of the fleets. Several cap- 
tains became heros in Algerian lore for their bravery and skill. 
The captains of the corsairs banded together in a self-regulat- 
ing taifa (community) to protect and further the corporate 
interests of their trade. The taifa came to be ethnically mixed, 
incorporating those captured Europeans who agreed to con- 



18 



Historical Setting 



vert to Islam and supply information useful for future raids. 
The taifa also gained prestige and political influence because 
of its role in fighting the infidel and providing the merchants 
and rulers of Algiers with a major source of income. Algiers 
became the privateering city-state par excellence, especially 
between 1560 and 1620. And it was two privateer brothers who 
were instrumental in extending Ottoman influence in Algeria. 

Ottoman Rule 

At about the time Spain was establishing its presidios in the 
Maghrib, the Muslim privateer brothers Aruj and Khair ad 
Din — the latter known to Europeans as Barbarossa, or Red 
Beard — were operating successfully off Tunisia under the Haf- 
sids. In 1516 Aruj moved his base of operations to Algiers, but 
was killed in 1518 during his invasion of Tlemcen. Khair ad Din 
succeeded him as military commander of Algiers. The Otto- 
man sultan gave him the title of beylerbey (provincial governor) 
and a contingent of some 2,000 janissaries, well-armed Otto- 
man soldiers. With the aid of this force, Khair ad Din subdued 
the coastal region between Constantine and Oran (although 
the city of Oran remained in Spanish hands until 1791). Under 
Khair ad Din's regency, Algiers became the center of Ottoman 
authority in the Maghrib, from which Tunis, Tripoli, and Tlem- 
cen would be overcome and Morocco's independence would 
be threatened. 

So successful was Khair ad Din at Algiers that he was 
recalled to Constantinople in 1533 by the sultan, Suleyman I (r. 
1520-66), known in Europe as Suleyman the Magnificent, and 
appointed admiral of the Ottoman fleet. The next year, he 
mounted a successful seaborne assault on Tunis. 

The next beylerbey was Khair ad Din's son Hassan, who 
assumed the position in 1544. Until 1587 the area was gov- 
erned by officers who served terms with no fixed limits. Subse- 
quently, with the institution of a regular Ottoman 
administration, governors with the title of pasha ruled for 
three-year terms. Turkish was the official language, and Arabs 
and Berbers were excluded from government posts. 

The pasha was assisted by janissaries, known in Algeria as 
the ojaq and led by an agha. Recruited from Anatolian peasants, 
they were committed to a lifetime of service. Although isolated 
from the rest of society and subject to their own laws and 
courts, they depended on the ruler and the taifa for income. In 
the seventeenth century, the force numbered about 15,000, but 



19 



Algeria: A Country Study 

it was to shrink to only 3,700 by 1830. Discontent among the 
ojaq rose in the mid-1 600s because they were not paid regularly, 
and they repeatedly revolted against the pasha. As a result, the 
agha charged the pasha with corruption and incompetence 
and seized power in 1659. 

The taifa had the last word, however, when in 1671 it 
rebelled, killed the agha, and placed one of its own in power. 
The new leader received the title of dey, which originated in 
Tunisia. After 1689 the right to select the dey passed to the 
divan, a council of some sixty notables. The divan at first was 
dominated by the ojaq, but by the eighteenth century it became 
the dey's instrument. In 1710 the dey persuaded the sultan to 
recognize him and his successors as regent, replacing the pasha 
in that role. Although Algiers remained a part of the Ottoman 
Empire, the Sublime Porte, or Ottoman government, ceased to 
have effective influence there. 

The dey was in effect a constitutional autocrat, but his 
authority was restricted by the divan and the taifa, as well as by 
local political conditions. The dey was elected for a life term, 
but in the 159 years (1671-1830) that the system survived, four- 
teen of the twenty-nine deys were removed from office by assas- 
sination. Despite usurpation, military coups, and occasional 
mob rule, the day-to-day operation of government was remark- 
ably orderly. In accordance with the millet system applied 
throughout the Ottoman Empire, each ethnic group — Turks, 
Arabs, Kabyles, Berbers, Jews, Europeans — was represented by 
a guild that exercised legal jurisdiction over its constituents. 

The dey had direct administrative control only in the 
regent's enclave, the Dar as Sultan (Domain of the Sultan), 
which included the city of Algiers and its environs and the fer- 
tile Mitidja Plain. The rest of the territory under the regency 
was divided into three provinces (beyliks): Constantine in the 
east; Titteri in the central region, with its capital at Medea; and 
a western province that after 1791 had its seat at Oran, aban- 
doned that year by Spain wHen the city was destroyed in an 
earthquake. Each province was governed by a bey appointed by 
the dey, usually from the same circle of families. 

A contingent of the ojaq was assigned to each bey, who also 
had at his disposal the provincial auxiliaries provided by the 
privileged makhzen tribes, traditionally exempted from paying 
taxes on condition that they collect them from other tribes. 
Tax revenues were conveyed from the provinces to Algiers 
twice yearly, but the beys were otherwise left to their own 



20 



Painting ofKhair ad Din, 
founder of modern Algeria 
Courtesy ANEP 




devices. Although the regency patronized the tribal chieftains, 
it never had the unanimous allegiance of the countryside, 
where heavy taxation frequently provoked unrest. Autonomous 
tribal states were tolerated, and the regency's authority was sel- 
dom applied in the Kabylie region. 

Relations with the United States 

European maritime powers paid the tribute demanded by 
the rulers of the privateering states of North Africa (Algiers, 
Tunis, Tripoli, and Morocco) to prevent attacks on their ship- 
ping by corsairs. No longer covered by British tribute payments 
after the American Revolution, United States merchant ships 
were seized and sailors enslaved in the years that followed inde- 
pendence. In 1794 the United States Congress appropriated 
funds for the construction of warships to counter the privateer- 
ing threat in the Mediterranean. Despite the naval prepara- 
tions, the United States concluded a treaty with the dey of 
Algiers in 1797, guaranteeing payment of tribute amounting to 
US$10 million over a twelve-year period in return for a promise 
that Algerian corsairs would not molest United States shipping. 
Payments in ransom and tribute to the privateering states 
amounted to 20 percent of United States government annual 
revenues in 1800. 



21 



Algeria: A Country Study 

The Napoleonic wars of the early nineteenth century 
diverted the attention of the maritime powers from suppress- 
ing what they derogatorily called piracy But when peace was 
restored to Europe in 1815, Algiers found itself at war with 
Spain, the Netherlands, Prussia, Denmark, Russia, and Naples. 
In March of that year, the United States Congress authorized 
naval action against the Barbary States, the then-independent 
Muslim states of Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli. Commo- 
dore Stephen Decatur was dispatched with a squadron of ten 
warships to ensure the safety of United States shipping in the 
Mediterranean and to force an end to the payment of tribute. 
After capturing several corsairs and their crews, Decatur sailed 
into the harbor of Algiers, threatened the city with his guns, 
and concluded a favorable treaty in which the dey agreed to 
discontinue demands for tribute, pay reparations for damage 
to United States property, release United States prisoners with- 
out ransom, and prohibit further interference with United 
States trade by Algerian corsairs. No sooner had Decatur set off 
for Tunis to enforce a similar agreement than the dey repudi- 
ated the treaty. The next year, an Anglo-Dutch fleet, com- 
manded by British admiral Viscount Exmouth, delivered a 
punishing, nine-hour bombardment of Algiers. The attack 
immobilized many of the dey's corsairs and obtained from him 
a second treaty that reaffirmed the conditions imposed by 
Decatur. In addition, the dey agreed to end the practice of 
enslaving Christians. 

France in Algeria, 1830-1962 

Most of France's actions in Algeria, not least the invasion of 
Algiers, were propelled by contradictory impulses. In the 
period between Napoleon's downfall in 1815 and the revolu- 
tion of 1830, the restored French monarchy was in crisis, and 
the dey was weak politically, economically, and militarily. The 
French monarch sought to reverse his domestic unpopularity. 
As a result of what the French considered an insult to the 
French consul in Algiers by the dey in 1827, France blockaded 
Algiers for three years. France used the failure of the blockade 
as a reason for a military expedition against Algiers in 1830. 

Invasion of Algiers 

Using Napoleon's 1808 contingency plan for the invasion of 
Algeria, 34,000 French soldiers landed twenty-seven kilometers 
west of Algiers, at Sidi Ferruch, on June 12, 1830. To face the 



22 



Historical Setting 



French, the dey sent 7,000 janissaries, 19,000 troops from the 
beys of Constantine and Oran, and about 17,000 Kabyles. The 
French established a strong beachhead and pushed toward Al- 
giers, thanks in part to superior artillery and better organiza- 
tion. Algiers was captured after a three-week campaign, and 
Hussein Dey fled into exile. French troops raped, looted (tak- 
ing 50 million francs from the treasury in the Casbah), dese- 
crated mosques, and destroyed cemeteries. It was an 
inauspicious beginning to France's self-described "civilizing 
mission," whose character on the whole was cynical, arrogant, 
and cruel. 

Hardly had the news of the capture of Algiers reached Paris 
than Charles X was deposed, and his cousin Louis Philippe, the 
"citizen king," was named to preside over a constitutional mon- 
archy. The new government, composed of liberal opponents of 
the Algiers expedition, was reluctant to pursue the conquest 
ordered by the old regime, but withdrawing from Algeria 
proved more difficult than conquering it. A parliamentary 
commission that examined the Algerian situation concluded 
that although French policy, behavior, and organization were 
failures, the occupation should continue for the sake of 
national prestige. In 1834 France annexed the occupied areas, 
which had an estimated Muslim population of about 3 million, 
as a colony. Colonial administration in the occupied areas — the 
so-called regime du sabre (government of the sword) — was 
placed under a governor general, a high-ranking army officer 
invested with civil and military jurisdiction, who was responsi- 
ble to the minister of war. 

The Land and Colonizers 

Even before the decision was made to annex Algeria, major 
changes had taken place. In a bargain-hunting frenzy to take 
over or buy at low prices all manner of property — homes, 
shops, farms, and factories — Europeans poured into Algiers 
after it fell. French authorities took possession of the beylik 
lands, from which Ottoman officials had derived income. Over 
time, as pressures increased to obtain more land for settlement 
by Europeans, the state seized more categories of land, particu- 
larly that used by tribes, religious foundations, and villages. 

Soon after the conquest of Algiers, the soldier-politician 
Bertrand Clauzel and others formed a company to acquire 
agricultural land and, despite official discouragement, to subsi- 
dize its settlement by European farmers, triggering a land rush. 



23 



Algeria: A Country Study 



Clauzel recognized the farming potential of the Mitidja Plain 
and envisioned the production there of cotton on a large scale. 
As governor general (1835-36), he used his office to make pri- 
vate investments in land and encouraged army officers and 
bureaucrats in his administration to do the same. This develop- 
ment created a vested interest among government officials in 
greater French involvement in Algeria. Commercial interests 
with influence in the government also began to recognize the 
prospects for profitable land speculation in expanding the 
French zone of occupation. They created large agricultural 
tracts, built factories and businesses, and exploited cheap local 
labor. 

Called colons (colonists) or, more popularly, pieds noirs (liter- 
ally, black feet), the European settlers were largely of peasant 
farmer or working-class origin from the poor southern areas of 
Italy, Spain, and France. Others were criminal and political 
deportees from France, transported under sentence in large 
numbers to Algeria. In the 1840s and 1850s, to encourage set- 
tlement in rural areas official policy was to offer grants of land 
for a fee and a promise that improvements would be made. A 
distinction soon developed between the grands colons (great col- 
onists) at one end of the scale, often self-made men who had 
accumulated large estates or built successful businesses, and 
the petits blancs (little whites), smallholders and workers at the 
other end, whose lot was often not much better than that of 
their Muslim counterparts. According to historian John Ruedy, 
although by 1848 only 15,000 of the 109,000 European settlers 
were in rural areas, "by systematically expropriating both pasto- 
ralists and farmers, rural colonization was the most important 
single factor in the destructuring of traditional society." 

Opposition to the Occupation 

Whatever initial misgivings Louis Philippe's government 
may have had about occupying Algeria, the geopolitical reali- 
ties of the situation created by the 1830 intervention argued 
strongly for reinforcing the French presence there. France had 
reason for concern that Britain, which was pledged to maintain 
the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, would move to 
fill the vacuum left by a French pullout. The French devised 
elaborate plans for settling the hinterland left by Ottoman pro- 
vincial authorities in 1830, but their efforts at state building 
were unsuccessful on account of lengthy armed resistance. 



24 



Historical Setting 



The most successful local opposition immediately after the 
fall of Algiers was led by Ahmad ibn Muhammad, bey of Con- 
stantine. He initiated a radical overhaul of the Ottoman admin- 
istration in his beylik by replacing Turkish officials with local 
leaders, making Arabic the official language, and attempting to 
reform finances according to the precepts of Islam. After the 
French failed in several attempts to gain some of the bey's terri- 
tories through negotiation, an ill-fated invasion force led by 
Bertrand Clauzel had to retreat from Constantine in 1836 in 
humiliation and defeat. Nonetheless, the French captured 
Constantine the following year. 

Abd al Qadir 

The French faced other opposition as well in the area. The 
superior of a religious brotherhood, Muhyi ad Din, who had 
spent time in Ottoman jails for opposing the dey's rule, 
launched attacks against the French and their makhzen allies at 
Oran in 1832. In the same year, tribal elders chose Muhyi ad 
Din's son, twenty-five-year-old Abd al Qadir, to take his place 
leading the jihad. Abd al Qadir, who was recognized as amir al 
muminin (commander of the faithful), quickly gained the sup- 
port of tribes throughout Algeria. A devout and austere 
marabout, he was also a cunning political leader and a 
resourceful warrior. From his capital in Tlemcen, Abd al Qadir 
set about building a territorial Muslim state based on the com- 
munities of the interior but drawing its strength from the tribes 
and religious brotherhoods. By 1839 he controlled more than 
two-thirds of Algeria. His government maintained an army and 
a bureaucracy, collected taxes, supported education, under- 
took public works, and established agricultural and manufac- 
turing cooperatives to stimulate economic activity. 

The French in Algiers viewed with concern the success of a 
Muslim government and the rapid growth of a viable territorial 
state that barred the extension of European settlement. Abd al 
Qadir fought running battles across Algeria with French forces, 
which included units of the Foreign Legion, organized in 1831 
for Algerian service. Although his forces were defeated by the 
French under General Thomas Bugeaud in 1836, Abd al Qadir 
negotiated a favorable peace treaty the next year. The treaty 
gained conditional recognition for Abd al Qadir's regime by 
defining the territory under its control and salvaged his pres- 
tige among the tribes just as the shaykhs were about to desert 
him. To provoke new hostilities, the French deliberately broke 



25 



Algeria: A Country Study 

the treaty in 1839 by occupying Constantine. Abd al Qadir took 
up the holy war again, destroyed the French settlements on the 
Mitidja Plain, and at one point advanced to the outskirts of Alg- 
iers itself. He struck where the French were weakest and 
retreated when they advanced against him in greater strength. 
The government moved from camp to camp with the amir and 
his army. Gradually, however, superior French resources and 
manpower and the defection of tribal chieftains took their toll. 
Reinforcements poured into Algeria after 1840 until Bugeaud 
had at his disposal 108,000 men, one-third of the French army. 
Bugeaud's strategy was to destroy Abd al Qadir's bases, then to 
starve the population by destroying its means of subsistence — 
crops, orchards, and herds. On several occasions, French 
troops burned or asphyxiated noncombatants hiding from the 
terror in caves. One by one, the amir's strongholds fell to the 
French, and many of his ablest commanders were killed or cap- 
tured so that by 1843 the Muslim state had collapsed. Abd al 
Qadir took refuge with his ally, the sultan of Morocco, Abd ar 
Rahman II, and launched raids into Algeria. However, Abd al 
Qadir was obliged to surrender to the commander of Oran 
Province, General Louis de Lamoriciere, at the end of 1847. 

Abd al Qadir was promised safe conduct to Egypt or Pales- 
tine if his followers laid down their arms and kept the peace. 
He accepted these conditions, but the minister of war — who 
years earlier as general in Algeria had been badly defeated by 
Abd al Qadir — had him consigned to prison in France. In 1852 
Louis Napoleon, the president of the Second Republic who 
would soon establish the Second Empire as Napoleon III, freed 
Abd al Qadir and gave him a pension of 150,000 francs. In 1855 
Abd al Qadir moved from the Byrsa, the citadel area of 
Carthage, to Damascus. There in 1860 Abd al Qadir intervened 
to save the lives of an estimated 12,000 Christians, including 
the French consul and staff, during a massacre instigated by 
local Ottoman officials. The French government, in apprecia- 
tion, conferred on him the Grand Cordon of the Legion of 
Honor, and additional honors followed from a number of 
other European governments. Declining all invitations to 
return to public life, he devoted himself to scholarly pursuits 
and charity until his death in Damascus in 1883. 

Abd al Qadir is recognized and venerated as the first hero of 
Algerian independence. Not without cause, his green and 
white standard was adopted by the Algerian liberation move- 
ment during the War of Independence and became the 



26 



Historical Setting 



national flag of independent Algeria. The Algerian govern- 
ment brought his remains back to Algeria to be interred with 
much ceremony on July 5, 1966, the fourth anniversary of inde- 
pendence and the 136th anniversary of the French conquest. A 
mosque bearing his name has been constructed as a national 
shrine in Constantine. 

Colonization and Military Control 

A royal ordinance in 1845 called for three types of adminis- 
tration in Algeria. In areas where Europeans were a substantial 
part of the population, colons elected mayors and councils for 
self-governing "full exercise" communes {communes deplein exer- 
cice). In the "mixed" communes, where Muslims were a large 
majority, government was in the hands of appointed and some 
elected officials, including representatives of the grands chefs 
(great chieftains) and a French administrator. The indigenous 
communes (communes indigenes), remote areas not adequately 
pacified, remained under the regime du sabre. 

By 1848 nearly all of northern Algeria was under French 
control. Important tools of the colonial administration, from 
this time until their elimination in the 1870s, were the bureaux 
arabes (Arab offices), staffed by Arabists whose function was to 
collect information on the indigenous people and to carry out 
administrative functions, nominally in cooperation with the 
army. The bureaux arabes on occasion acted with sympathy 
toward the local population and formed a buffer between Mus- 
lims and rapacious colons. 

Under the regime du sabre, the colons had been permitted 
limited self-government in areas where European settlement 
was most intense, but there was constant friction between them 
and the army. The colons charged that the bureaux arabes hin- 
dered the progress of colonization. They agitated against mili- 
tary rule, complaining that their legal rights were denied 
under the arbitrary controls imposed on the colony and insist- 
ing on a civil administration for Algeria fully integrated with 
metropolitan France. The army warned that the introduction 
of civilian government would invite Muslim retaliation and 
threaten the security of Algeria. The French government vacil- 
lated in its policy, yielding small concessions to the colon 
demands on the one hand while maintaining the regime du sabre 
to protect the interests of the Muslim majority on the other. 

Shortly after Louis Philippe's constitutional monarchy was 
overthrown in the revolution of 1848, the new government of 



27 




28 



Historical Setting 



the Second Republic ended Algeria's status as a colony and 
declared the occupied lands an integral part of France. Three 
"civil territories" — Algiers, Oran, and Constantine — were orga- 
nized as French departements (local administrative units) under 
a civilian government (see fig. 3). For the first time, French cit- 
izens in the civil territories elected their own councils and may- 
ors; Muslims had to be appointed, could not hold more than 
one-third of council seats, and could not serve as mayors or 
assistant mayors. The administration of territories outside the 
zones settled by colons remained under a regime du sabre. Local 
Muslim administration was allowed to continue under the 
supervision of French military commanders, charged with 
maintaining order in newly pacified regions, and the bureaux 
arabes. Theoretically, these areas were closed to European colo- 
nization. 

European migration, encouraged during the Second 
Republic, stimulated the civilian administration to open new 
land for settlement against the advice of the army. With the 
advent of the Second Empire in 1852, Napoleon III returned 
Algeria to military control. In 1858 a separate Ministry of Alge- 
rian Affairs was created to supervise administration of the 
country through a military governor general assisted by a civil 
minister. 

Napoleon III visited Algeria twice in the early 1860s. He was 
profoundly impressed with the nobility and virtue of the tribal 
chieftains, who appealed to the emperor's romantic nature, 
and was shocked by the self-serving attitude of the colon lead- 
ers. He determined to halt the expansion of European settle- 
ment beyond the coastal zone and to restrict contact between 
Muslims and the colons, whom he considered to have a cor- 
rupting influence on the indigenous population. He envi- 
sioned a grand design for preserving most of Algeria for the 
Muslims by founding a royaume arabe (Arab kingdom) with him- 
self as the roi des Arabes (king of the Arabs). He instituted the 
so-called politics of the grands chefs to deal with the Muslims 
directly through their traditional leaders. 

To further his plans for the royaume arabe, Napoleon III 
issued two decrees affecting tribal structure, land tenure, and 
the legal status of Muslims in French Algeria. The first, promul- 
gated in 1863, was intended to renounce the state's claims to 
tribal lands and eventually provide private plots to individuals 
in the tribes, thus dismantling "feudal" structures and protect- 
ing the lands from the colons. Tribal areas were to be identi- 



29 



Algeria: A Country Study 

fied, delimited into douars (administrative units), and given 
over to councils. Arable land was to be divided among mem- 
bers of the douar over a period of one to three generations, 
after which it could be bought and sold by the individual own- 
ers. Unfortunately for the tribes, however, the plans of Napo- 
leon III quickly unraveled. French officials sympathetic to the 
colons took much of the tribal land they surveyed into the pub- 
lic domain. In addition, some tribal leaders immediately sold 
communal lands for quick gains. The process of converting 
arable land to individual ownership was accelerated to only a 
few years when laws were enacted in the 1870s stipulating that 
no sale of land by an individual Muslim could be invalidated by 
the claim that it was collectively owned. The cudah and other 
tribal officials, appointed by the French on the basis of their 
loyalty to France rather than the allegiance owed them by the 
tribe, lost their credibility as they were drawn into the Euro- 
pean orbit, becoming known derisively as beni-oui-ouis (yes- 
men). 

Napoleon III visualized three distinct Algerias: a French col- 
ony, an Arab country, and a military camp, each with a distinct 
form of local government. The second decree, issued in 1865, 
was designed to recognize the differences in cultural back- 
ground of the French and the Muslims. As French nationals, 
Muslims could serve on equal terms in the French armed 
forces and civil service and could migrate to metropolitan 
France. They were also granted the protection of French law 
while retaining the right to adhere to Islamic law in litigation 
concerning their personal status. But if Muslims wished to 
become full citizens, they had to accept the full jurisdiction of 
the French legal code, including laws affecting marriage and 
inheritance, and reject the competence of the religious courts. 
In effect, this meant that a Muslim had to renounce his reli- 
gion in order to become a French citizen. This condition was 
bitterly resented by Muslims, for whom the only road to politi- 
cal equality became apostasy. Over the next century, fewer than 
3,000 Muslims chose to cross the barrier and become French 
citizens. 

When the Prussians captured Napoleon III at the Battle of 
Sedan (1870), ending the Second Empire, the colons in Algiers 
toppled the military government and installed a civilian admin- 
istration. Meanwhile, in France the government directed one 
of its ministers, Adolphe Cremieux, "to destroy the military 
regime . . . [and] to completely assimilate Algeria into France." 



30 



Historical Setting 



In October 1870, Cremieux, whose concern with Algerian 
affairs dated from the time of the Second Republic, issued a 
series of decrees providing for representation of the Algerian 
departements in the National Assembly of France and confirm- 
ing colon control over local administration. A civilian governor 
general was made responsible to the Ministry of Interior. The 
Cremieux Decrees also granted blanket French citizenship to 
Algerian Jews, who then numbered about 40,000. This act set 
them apart from Muslims, in whose eyes they were identified 
thereafter with the colons. The measure had to be enforced, 
however, over the objections of the colons, who made little dis- 
tinction between Muslims and Jews. (Automatic citizenship was 
subsequently extended in 1889 to children of non-French 
Europeans born in Algeria unless they specifically rejected it.) 

The loss of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany in 1871 led to pres- 
sure on the French government to make new land available in 
Algeria for about 5,000 Alsatian and Lorrainer refugees who 
were resettled there. During the 1870s, both the amount of 
European-owned land and the number of settlers were dou- 
bled, and tens of thousands of unskilled Muslims, who had 
been uprooted from their land, wandered into the cities or to 
colon farming areas in search of work. 

The most serious native insurrection since the time of Abd 
al Qadir broke out in 1871 in the Kabylie region and spread 
through much of Algeria. The revolt was triggered by 
Cremieux's extension of civil (that is, colon) authority to previ- 
ously self-governing tribal reserves and the abrogation of com- 
mitments made by the military government, but it clearly had 
its basis in more long-standing grievances. Since the Crimean 
War (1854-56), the demand for grain had pushed up the price 
of Algerian wheat to European levels. Silos were emptied when 
the world market's impact was felt in Algeria, and Muslim farm- 
ers sold their grain reserves — including seed grain — to specula- 
tors. But the community-owned silos were the fundamental 
adaptation of a subsistence economy to an unpredictable cli- 
mate, and a good year's surplus was stored away against a bad 
year's dearth. When serious drought struck Algeria and grain 
crops failed in 1866 and for several years following, Muslim 
areas faced starvation, and with famine came pestilence. It was 
estimated that 20 percent of the Muslim population of Con- 
stantine died over a three-year period. In 1871 the civil authori- 
ties repudiated guarantees made to tribal chieftains by the 
previous military government for loans to replenish their seed 



31 



Algeria: A Country Study 



supply. This act alienated even pro-French Muslim leaders, 
while it undercut their ability to control their people. It was 
against this background of misery and hopelessness that the 
stricken Kabyles rose in revolt. 

In the aftermath of the 1871 uprising, French authorities 
imposed stern measures to punish and control the whole Mus- 
lim population. France confiscated more than 500,000 hectares 
of tribal land and placed the Kabylie region under a regime 
d' exception (extraordinary rule), which denied the due process 
guaranteed French nationals. A special indigenat (native code) 
listed as offenses acts such as insolence and unauthorized 
assembly not punishable by French law, and the normal juris- 
diction of the cudah was sharply restricted. The governor gen- 
eral was empowered to jail suspects for up to five years without 
trial. The argument was made in defense of these exceptional 
measures that the French penal code as applied to Frenchmen 
was too permissive to control Muslims. 

Hegemony of the Colons 

A commission of inquiry set up by the French Senate in 
1892 and headed by former Premier Jules Ferry, an advocate of 
colonial expansion, recommended that the government aban- 
don a policy that assumed French law, without major modifica- 
tions, could fit the needs of an area inhabited by close to 2 
million Europeans and 4 million Muslims. Muslims had no rep- 
resentation in Algeria's National Assembly and were grossly 
underrepresented on local councils. Because of the many 
restrictions imposed by the authorities, by 1915 only 50,000 
Muslims were eligible to vote in elections in the civil com- 
munes. Attempts to implement even the most modest reforms 
were blocked or delayed by the local administration in Algeria, 
dominated by colons, and by colon representatives in the 
National Assembly, to which each of the three departements sent 
six deputies and three senators. 

Once elected to the National Assembly, colons became per- 
manent fixtures. Because of their seniority, they exercised dis- 
proportionate influence, and their support was important to 
any government's survival. The leader of the colon delegation, 
Auguste Warnier, succeeded during the 1870s and 1880s in 
modifying or introducing legislation to facilitate the private 
transfer of land to settlers and continue the Algerian state's 
appropriation of land from the local population and distribu- 
tion to settlers. Consistent proponents of reform, like Georges 



32 



Historical Setting 



Clemenceau and socialist Jean Jaures, were rare in the National 
Assembly. 

The bulk of Algeria's wealth in manufacturing, mining, agri- 
culture, and trade was controlled by the grands colons. The mod- 
ern European-owned and -managed sector of the economy 
centered around small industry and a highly developed export 
trade, designed to provide food and raw materials to France in 
return for capital and consumer goods. Europeans held about 
30 percent of the total arable land, including the bulk of the 
most fertile land and most of the areas under irrigation. By 
1900 Europeans produced more than two-thirds of the value of 
output in agriculture and practically all agricultural exports. 
The modern, or European, sector was run on a commercial 
basis and meshed with the French market system that it sup- 
plied with wine, citrus, olives, and vegetables. Nearly half of the 
value of European-owned real property was in vineyards by 
1914. By contrast, subsistence cereal production — supple- 
mented by olive, fig, and date growing and stock raising — 
formed the basis of the traditional sector, but the land available 
for cropping was submarginal even for cereals under prevailing 
traditional cultivation practices. 

The colonial regime imposed more and higher taxes on 
Muslims than on Europeans. Muslims, in addition to paying 
traditional taxes dating from before the French conquest, also 
paid new taxes, from which the colons were often exempted. In 
1909, for instance, Muslims, who made up almost 90 percent of 
the population but produced 20 percent of Algeria's income, 
paid 70 percent of direct taxes and 45 percent of the total taxes 
collected. And colons controlled how these revenues would be 
spent. As a result, colon towns had handsome municipal build- 
ings, paved streets lined with trees, fountains, and statues, while 
Algerian villages and rural areas benefited little if at all from 
tax revenues. 

The colonial regime proved severely detrimental to overall 
education for Algerian Muslims, who had previously relied on 
religious schools to learn reading, writing, and engage in reli- 
gious studies (see Education, ch. 2). Not only did the state 
appropriate the habus lands (the religious foundations that 
constituted the main source of income for religious institu- 
tions, including schools) in 1843, but colon officials refused to 
allocate enough money to maintain schools and mosques prop- 
erly and to provide for an adequate number of teachers and 
religious leaders for the growing population. In 1892 more 



33 



Algeria: A Country Study 

than five times as much was spent for the education of Europe- 
ans as for Muslims, who had five times as many children of 
school age. Because few Muslim teachers were trained, Muslim 
schools were largely staffed by French teachers. Even a state- 
operated madrasah (school) often had French faculty members. 
Attempts to institute bilingual, bicultural schools, intended to 
bring Muslim and European children together in the class- 
room, were a conspicuous failure, rejected by both communi- 
ties and phased out after 1870. According to one estimate, 
fewer than 5 percent of Algerian children attended any kind of 
school in 1870. 

Efforts were begun by 1890 to educate a small number of 
Muslims along with European students in the French school 
system as part of France's "civilizing mission" in Algeria. The 
curriculum was entirely French and allowed no place for Ara- 
bic studies, which were deliberately downgraded even in Mus- 
lim schools. Within a generation, a class of well-educated, 
gallicized Muslims — the evolues (literally, the evolved ones) — 
had been created. Almost all of the handful of Muslims who 
accepted French citizenship were evolues; more significantly, it 
was in this privileged group of Muslims, strongly influenced by 
French culture and political attitudes, that a new Algerian self- 
consciousness developed. 

Reporting to the French Senate in 1894, Governor General 
Jules Cambon wrote that Algeria had "only a dust of people left 
her." He referred to the destruction of the traditional ruling 
class that had left Muslims without leaders and had deprived 
France of interlocuteurs valables (literally, valid go-betweens), 
through whom to reach the masses of the people. He lamented 
that no genuine communication was possible between the two 
communities. 

The colons who ran Algeria maintained a condescending 
dialogue only with the beni-oui-ouis. Later they deliberately 
thwarted contact between the evolues and Muslim traditionalists 
on the one hand and between evolues and official circles in 
France on the other. They feared and mistrusted the franco- 
phone evolues, who were classified either as assimilationists, 
insisting on being accepted as Frenchmen but on their own 
terms, or as integrationists, eager to work as members of a dis- 
tinct Muslim elite on equal terms with the French. 

Algerian Nationalism 

A new generation of Muslim leadership emerged in Algeria 



34 



Historical Setting 



at the time of World War I and grew to maturity during the 
1920s and 1930s. It consisted of a small but influential class of 
evolues, other Algerians whose perception of themselves and 
their country had been shaped by wartime experiences, and a 
body of religious reformers and teachers. Some of these people 
were members of the few wealthy Muslim families that had 
managed to insinuate themselves into the colonial system in 
the 1890s and had with difficulty succeeded in obtaining for 
their sons the French education so coveted by progressive Alge- 
rians. Others were among the about 173,000 Algerians who 
had served in the French army during World War I or the sev- 
eral hundred thousand more who had assisted the French war 
effort by working in factories. In France they became aware of a 
standard of living higher than any they had known at home 
and of democratic political concepts, taken for granted by 
Frenchmen in France, which colons, soldiers, and bureaucrats 
had refused to apply to the Muslim majority in Algeria. Some 
Algerians also became acquainted with the pan-Arab national- 
ism growing in the Middle East. 

Political Movements 

One of the earliest movements for political reform was an 
integrationist group, the Young Algerians (Jeunesse Algeri- 
enne). Its members were drawn from the small, liberal elite of 
well-educated, middle-class evolues who demanded an opportu- 
nity to prove that they were French as well as Muslim. In 1908 
they delivered to France's Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau 
a petition that expressed opposition under the status quo to a 
proposed policy to conscript Muslim Algerians into the French 
army. If, however, the state granted the Muslims full citizen- 
ship, the petition went on, opposition to conscription would be 
dropped. In 1911, in addition to demanding preferential treat- 
ment for "the intellectual elements of the country," the group 
called for an end to unequal taxation, broadening of the fran- 
chise, more schools, and protection of indigenous property. 
The Young Algerians added a significant voice to the reformist 
movement against French colonial policy that began in 1892 
and continued until the outbreak of World War I. In part to 
reward Muslims who fought and died for France, Clemenceau 
appointed reform-minded Charles Jonnart as governor gen- 
eral. Reforms promulgated in 1919 and known as the Jonnart 
Law expanded the number of Muslims permitted to vote to 



35 



Algeria: A Country Study 

about 425,000. The legislation also removed all voters from the 
jurisdiction of the humiliating indigenat. 

The most popular Muslim leader in Algeria after the war 
was Khalid ibn Hashim, grandson of Abd al Qadir and a mem- 
ber of the Young Algerians, although he differed with some 
members of the group over acceptance of the Jonnart Law. 
Some Young Algerians were willing to work within the frame- 
work set out by the reforms, but Emir Khalid, as he was known, 
continued to press for the complete Young Algerian program. 
He was able to win electoral victories in Algiers and to enliven 
political discourse with his calls for reform and full assimila- 
tion, but by 1923 he tired of the struggle and left Algeria, even- 
tually retiring to Damascus. 

Some of the Young Algerians in 1926 formed the Federation 
of Elected Natives (Federation des Elus Indigenes — FEI) 
because many of the former group's members had joined the 
circle of Muslims eligible to hold public office. The federa- 
tion's objectives were the assimilation of the evolues into the 
French community, with full citizenship but without surrender- 
ing their personal status as Muslims, and the eventual integra- 
tion of Algeria as a full province of France. Other objectives 
included equal pay for equal work for government employees, 
abolition of travel restrictions to and from France, abolition of 
the indigenat (which had been reinstituted earlier), and elec- 
toral reform. 

The first group to call for Algerian independence was the 
Star of North Africa (Etoile Nord-Africain, known as Star). The 
group was originally a solidarity group formed in 1926 in Paris 
to coordinate political activity among North African workers in 
France and to defend "the material, moral, and social interests 
of North African Muslims." The leaders included members of 
the French Communist Party and its labor confederation, and 
in the early years of the struggle for independence the party 
provided material and moral support. Ahmed Messali Hadj, 
the Star's secretary general, enunciated the groups demands in 
1927. In addition to independence from France, the Star called 
for freedom of press and association, a parliament chosen 
through universal suffrage, confiscation of large estates, and 
the institution of Arabic schools. The Star was banned in 1929 
and operated underground until 1934, when its newspaper 
reached a circulation of 43,500. Influenced by the Arab nation- 
alist ideas of Lebanese Druze Shakib Arslan, Messali Hadj 
turned away from communist ideology to a more nationalist 



36 



Historical Setting 



outlook, for which the French Communist Party attacked the 
Star. He returned to Algeria to organize urban workers and 
peasant farmers and in 1937 founded the Party of the Algerian 
People (Parti du Peuple Algerien — PPA) to mobilize the Alge- 
rian working class at home and in France to improve its situa- 
tion through political action. For Messali Hadj, who ruled the 
PPA with an iron hand, these aims were inseparable from the 
struggle for an independent Algeria in which socialist and 
Islamic values would be fused. 

Algeria's Islamic reform movement took inspiration from 
Egyptian reformers Muhammad Abduh and Muhammad 
Rashid Rida and stressed the Arab and Islamic roots of the 
country. Starting in the 1920s, the reform ulama, religious 
scholars, promoted a purification of Islam in Algeria and a 
return to the Quran and the sunna, or tradition of the Prophet 
(see Islam and the Algerian State, ch. 2). The reformers 
favored the adoption of modern methods of inquiry and 
rejected the superstitions and folk practices of the countryside, 
actions that brought them into confrontation with the 
marabouts. The reformers published their own periodicals and 
books, and established free modern Islamic schools that 
stressed Arabic language and culture as an alternative to the 
schools for Muslims operated for many years by the French. 
Under the dynamic leadership of Shaykh Abd al Hamid Ben 
Badis, the reformist ulama organized the Association of Alge- 
rian Muslim Ulama (Association des Ulema Musulmans 
Algeriens — AUMA) in 1931. Although their support was con- 
centrated in the Constantine area, the AUMA struck a respon- 
sive chord among the Muslim masses, with whom it had closer 
ties than did the other nationalist organizations. As the Islamic 
reformers gained popularity and influence, the colonial 
authorities responded in 1933 by refusing them permission to 
preach in official mosques. This move and similar ones sparked 
several years of sporadic religious unrest. 

European influences had some impact on indigenous Mus- 
lim political movements because Ferhat Abbas and Messali 
Hadj essentially looked to France for their ideological models. 
Ben Badis, however, believed that "Islam is our religion, Arabic 
our language, Algeria our fatherland." Abbas summed up the 
philosophy of the liberal integrationists in opposition to the 
claims of the nationalists when he denied in 1936 that Algeria 
had a separate identity. Ben Badis responded that he, too, had 
looked to the past and found "that this Algerian nation is not 



37 



Algeria: A Country Study 

France, cannot be France, and does not want to be France . . . 
[but] has its culture, its traditions and its characteristics, good 
or bad, like every other nation of the earth." 

The colons, for their part, rejected any movement toward 
reform, whether instigated by integrationist or nationalist orga- 
nizations. Reaction in Paris to the nationalists was divided. In 
the 1930s, French liberals saw only the evolues as a possible 
channel for diffusing political power in Algeria, denigrating 
Messali Hadj for demagoguery and the AUMA for religious 
obscurantism. At all times, however, the French government 
was confronted by the monolithic intransigence of the leaders 
of the European community in Algeria in opposing any devolu- 
tion of power to Muslims, even to basically pro-French evolues. 
The colons also had powerful allies in the National Assembly, 
the bureaucracy, the armed forces, and the business commu- 
nity, and were strengthened in their resistance by their almost 
total control of the Algerian administration and police. 

Viollette Plan 

The mounting social, political, and economic crises in Alge- 
ria for the first time induced older and newly emerged classes 
of indigenous society to engage from 1933 to 1936 in numer- 
ous acts of political protest. The government responded with 
more restrictive laws governing public order and security. In 
1936 French socialist Leon Blum became premier in a Popular 
Front government and appointed Maurice Viollette his minis- 
ter of state. The ulama, sensing a new attitude in Paris that 
would favor their agenda, cautiouslyjoined forces with the FEI. 

Representatives of these groups and members of the Alge- 
rian Communist Party (Parti Communiste Algerien — PCA) met 
in Algiers in 1936 at the first Algerian Muslim Congress. (Mes- 
sali Hadj and the Star were left out owing to misgivings about 
their more radical program.) The congress drew up an exten- 
sive Charter of Demands, which called for the abolition of laws 
permitting imposition of the regime d' exception, political integra- 
tion of Algeria and France, maintenance of personal legal sta- 
tus by Muslims acquiring French citizenship, fusion of Eu- 
ropean and Muslim education systems in Algeria, freedom to 
use Arabic in education and the press, equal wages for equal 
work, land reform, establishment of a single electoral college, 
and universal suffrage. 

Blum and Viollette gave a warm reception to a congress del- 
egation in Paris and indicated that many of their demands 



38 



Historical Setting 



could be met. Meanwhile, Viollette drew up for the Blum gov- 
ernment a proposal to extend French citizenship with full 
political equality to certain classes of the Muslim "elite," includ- 
ing university graduates, elected officials, army officers, and 
professionals. Messali Hadj saw in the Viollette Plan a new 
"instrument of colonialism ... to split the Algerian people by 
separating the elite from the masses." The components of the 
congress — the ulama, the FEI, and communists — were heart- 
ened by the proposal and gave it varying measures of support. 
Mohamed Bendjelloul and Abbas, as spokesmen for the evolues, 
who would have the most to gain from the measure, considered 
this plan a major step toward achieving their aims and redou- 
bled their efforts through the liberal FEI to gain broad support 
for the policy of Algerian integration with France. Not unex- 
pectedly, however, the colons had taken uncompromising 
exception to the Viollette Plan. Although the project would 
have granted immediate French citizenship and voting rights 
to only about 21,000 Muslims, with provision for adding a few 
thousand more each year, spokesmen for the colons raised the 
specter of the European electorate's being submerged by a 
Muslim majority. Colon administrators and their supporters 
threw procedural obstacles in the path of the legislation, and 
the government gave it only lukewarm support, resulting in its 
ultimate failure. 

While the Viollette Plan was still a live issue, however, Mes- 
sali Hadj made a dramatic comeback to Algeria and had signifi- 
cant local success in attracting people to the Star. A mark of his 
success was the fact that in 1937 the government dissolved the 
Star. The same year Messali Hadj formed the PPA, which had a 
more moderate program, but he and other PPA leaders were 
arrested following a large demonstration in Algiers. Although 
Messali Hadj spent many years in jail, his party had the most 
widespread support of all opposition groups until it was 
banned in 1939. 

Disillusioned by the failure of the Viollette Plan to win 
acceptance in Paris, Abbas shifted from a position of favoring 
assimilation of the evolues and full integration with France to 
calling for the development of a Muslim Algeria in close associ- 
ation with France but retaining "her own physiognomy, her lan- 
guage, her customs, her traditions." His more immediate goal 
was greater political, social, and economic equality for Muslims 
with the colons. By 1938 the cooperation among the parties 
that made up the congress began to break up. 



39 



Algeria: A Country Study 

Polarization and Politicization 

Algerian Muslims rallied to the French side at the start of 
World War II as they had done in World War I. Nazi Germany's 
quick defeat of France, however, and the establishment of the 
collaborationist Vichy regime, to which the colons were gener- 
ally sympathetic, not only increased the difficulties of Muslims 
but also posed an ominous threat to Jews in Algeria. The Alge- 
rian administration vigorously enforced the anti-Semitic laws 
imposed by Vichy, which stripped Algerian Jews of their French 
citizenship. Potential opposition leaders in both the European 
and the Muslim communities were arrested. 

Allied landings were made at Algiers and Oran by 70,000 
British and United States troops on November 8, 1942, in coor- 
dination with landings in Morocco. As part of Operation Torch 
under the overall command of Lieutenant General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, Algiers and Oran were secured two days later after 
a determined resistance by French defenders. On November 
11, Admiral Jean Louis Darlan, commander in chief of Vichy 
French forces, ordered a cease-fire in North Africa. Algeria 
provided a base for the subsequent Allied campaign in Tunisia. 

After the fall of the Vichy regime in Algeria, General Henri 
Giraud, Free French commander in chief in North Africa, 
slowly rescinded repressive Vichy laws despite opposition by 
colon extremists. He also called on the Muslim population to 
supply troops for the Allied war effort. Ferhat Abbas and 
twenty-four other Muslim leaders replied that Algerians were 
ready to fight with the Allies in freeing their homeland but 
demanded the right to call a conference of Muslim representa- 
tives to develop political, economic, and social institutions for 
the indigenous population "within an essentially French frame- 
work." Giraud, who succeeded in raising an army of 250,000 
men to fight in the Italian campaign, refused to consider this 
proposal, explaining that "politics" must wait until the end of 
the war. 

In March 1943, Abbas, who had abandoned assimilation as a 
viable alternative to self-determination, presented the French 
administration with the Manifesto of the Algerian People, 
signed by fifty-six Algerian nationalist and international lead- 
ers. Outlining the past evils of colonial rule and denouncing 
continued suppression, the manifesto demanded specifically 
an Algerian constitution that would guarantee immediate and 
effective political participation and legal equality for Muslims. 
It called for agrarian reform, recognition of Arabic as an offi- 



40 



Historical Setting 



cial language on equal terms with French, recognition of a full 
range of civil liberties, and the liberation of political prisoners 
of all parties. 

The French governor general created a commission com- 
posed of prominent Muslims and Europeans to study the mani- 
festo. This commission produced a supplementary reform 
program, which was forwarded to General Charles de Gaulle, 
leader of the Free French movement. De Gaulle and his newly 
appointed governor general in Algeria, General Georges 
Catroux, a recognized liberal, viewed the manifesto as evidence 
of a need to develop a mutually advantageous relationship 
between the European and Muslim communities. Catroux was 
reportedly shocked by the "blinded spirit of social conserva- 
tism" of the colons, but he did not regard the manifesto as a 
satisfactory basis for cooperation because he felt it would sub- 
merge the European minority in a Muslim state. Instead, the 
French administration in 1944 instituted a reform package, 
based on the 1936 Viollette Plan, that granted full French citi- 
zenship to certain categories of "meritorious" Algerian Mus- 
lims — military officers and decorated veterans, university 
graduates, government officials, and members of the Legion of 
Honor — who numbered about 60,000. 

A new factor influencing Muslim reaction to the reintroduc- 
tion of the Viollette Plan — which by that date even many mod- 
erates had rejected as inadequate — was the shift in Abbas's 
position from support for integration to the demand for an 
independent Algerian state federated with France. Abbas 
gained the support of the AUMA and of Messali Hadj, who 
joined him in forming the Friends of the Manifesto and Liberty 
(Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberte — AML) to work for Alge- 
rian independence. Within a short time, the AML's newspaper, 
Egalite, claimed 500,000 subscribers, indicating unprecedented 
interest in independence. 

During this time, the outlawed PPA was creating secret polit- 
ical cells throughout the country and paramilitary groups in 
the Kabylie region and the Constantine region. In addition, 
PPA supporters joined the AML in large numbers and 
attempted to promote Messali Hadj's independence concept in 
contrast to the more moderate autonomy advocates. Social 
unrest grew in the winter of 1944-45, fueled in part by a poor 
wheat harvest, shortages of manufactured goods, and severe 
unemployment. On May Day, the AML organized demonstra- 
tions in twenty-one towns across the country, with marchers 



41 



Algeria: A Country Study 



demanding freedom for Messali Hadj and independence for 
Algeria. Violence erupted in some locations, including Algiers 
and Oran. leaving manv wounded and three dead. 

Nationalist leaders were resolving to mark the approaching 
liberation of Europe with demonstrations calling for their own 
liberation, and it was clear that a clash with the authorities was 
imminent. The tensions between the Muslim and colon com- 
munities exploded on Mav 8, 1945. V-E Dav. in an outburst of 
such violence as to make their polarization complete., if not 
irreparable. Police had told .ANIL organizers thev could march 
in Setif onlv if thev did not display nationalist flags or placards. 
Thev ignored the warnings, the march be^an. and gunfire 
resulted in which a number of police and demonstrators were 
killed. Marchers rampaged, leading to the killing of 103 Euro- 
peans. Word spread to the countryside, and villagers attacked 
colon settlements and government buildings. 

The armv and police responded bv conducting a prolonged 
and systematic ratissage (literally, raking over) of suspected cen- 
ters of dissidence. In addition, military airplanes and ships 
attacked Muslim population centers. According to official 
French figures, 1.500 Muslims died as a result of these counter- 
measures. Other estimates varv from 6.000 to as high as 45.000 
killed. 

In the aftermath of the Setif violence, the AML was out- 
lawed, and 5.460 Muslims, including Abbas, were arrested. 
Abbas deplored the uprising but charged that its repression 
had taken Algeria "back to the days of the Crusades." In April 
1946.. Abbas once again asserted the demands of the manifesto 
and founded the Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto 
(Union Democratique du Manifeste Algerien — UDMA).. aban- 
doning the alliance that the .AML had made with Messali Hadj's 
PPA and the AUMA. Abbas called for a free, secular, and repub- 
lican Algeria looselv federated with France. Upon his release 
from a five-vear house arrest. Messali Hadj returned to .Algeria 
and formed the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Lib- 
erties (Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertes Democra- 
tiques — MTLD). which quickly drew supporters from a broad 
cross-section of society. Committed to unequivocal indepen- 
dence., the MTLD firmlv opposed Abbas's proposal for federa- 
tion. The PPA continued to operate, but clandestinely, always 
striying for an independent. Arab, and Islamic Algeria. The 
clandestine Special Organization (Organisation Speciale — OS) 
was created within the MTLD bv Hocine Ait .All me d in 1947 to 



4:2 



Historical Setting 



conduct terrorist operations when political protest through 
legal channels was suppressed by authorities. Ait Ahmed was 
later succeeded as chief of the OS by Ahmed Ben Bella, one of 
the early Algerian nationalist leaders. 

The National Assembly approved the government-proposed 
Organic Statute of Algeria in August 1947. This law called for 
the creation of an Algerian Assembly with one house represent- 
ing Europeans and "meritorious" Muslims, and the other rep- 
resenting the more than 8 million remaining Muslims. The 
statute also replaced mixed communes with elected local coun- 
cils, abolished military government in the Algerian Sahara, rec- 
ognized Arabic as an official language with French, and 
proposed enfranchising Muslim women. Muslim and colon 
deputies alike abstained or voted against the statute but for dia- 
metrically opposed reasons: the Muslims because it fell short of 
their expectations and the colons because it went too far. 

The sweeping victory of Messali Hadj's MTLD in the 1947 
municipal elections frightened the colons, whose political lead- 
ers, through fraud and intimidation, attempted to obtain a 
result more favorable to them in the following year's first Alge- 
rian Assembly voting. The term election algerienne became a syn- 
onym for rigged election. The MTLD was allowed nine seats, 
Abbas's UDMA was given eight, and government-approved 
"independents" were awarded fifty-five seats. These results may 
have reassured some of the colons that the nationalists had 
been rejected by the Muslim community, but the elections sug- 
gested to many Muslims that a peaceful solution to Algeria's 
problems was not possible. 

At the first session of the colon-controlled Algerian Assem- 
bly, a MTLD delegate was arrested at the door, prompting 
other Muslim representatives to walk out in protest. A request 
by Abbas to gain the floor was refused. Frustrated by these 
events, the nationalist parties, joined by the PCA, formed a 
common political front that undertook to have the results of 
the election voided. French socialists and moderates tried to 
initiate a formal inquiry into the reports of vote fraud but were 
prevented from doing so by the assembly's European delegates, 
who persuaded the governor general that an investigation 
would disturb the peace. New elections in 1951 were subject to 
the same sort of rigging that had characterized the 1948 voting. 

In 1952 anti-French demonstrations precipitated by the OS 
led to Messali Hadj's arrest and deportation to France. Internal 
divisions and attacks by the authorities severely weakened the 



43 



Algeria: A Country Study 

MTLD, draining its energies. Colon extremists took every 
opportunity to persuade the French government of the need 
for draconian measures against the emergent independence 
movement. 

Ben Bella created a new underground action committee to 
replace the OS, which had been broken up by the French 
police in 1950. The new group, the Revolutionary Committee 
of Unity and Action (Comite Revolutionnaire d'Unite et 
d'Action — CRUA), was based in Cairo, where Ben Bella had 
fled in 1952. Known as the chefs historiques (historical chiefs), 
the group's nine original leaders — Ait Ahmed, Mohamed Bou- 
diaf, Belkacem Krim, Rabah Bitat, Larbi Ben M'Hidi, Mourad 
Didouch, Moustafa Ben Boulaid, Mohamed Khider, and Ben 
Bella — were considered the leaders of the Algerian War of 
Independence. 

Between March and October 1954, the CRUA organized a 
military network in Algeria comprising six military regions 
(referred to at the dme as wilayat; sing., wilayd). The leaders of 
these regions and their followers became known as the "inter- 
nals." Ben Bella, Khider, and Ait Ahmed formed the External 
Delegation in Cairo. Encouraged by Egypt's President Gamal 
Abdul Nasser (president, 1954-71), their role was to gain for- 
eign support for the rebellion and to acquire arms, supplies, 
and funds for the wilaya commanders. In October the CRUA 
renamed itself the National Liberation Front (Front de Libera- 
tion Nationale — FLN), which assumed responsibility for the 
political direction of the revolution. The National Liberation 
Army (Armee de Liberation Nationale — ALN), the FLN's mili- 
tary arm, was to conduct the War of Independence within Alge- 
ria. 

War of Independence 

In the early morning hours of All Saints' Day, November 1, 
1954, FLN maquisards (guerrillas) launched attacks in various 
parts of Algeria against military installations, police posts, ware- 
houses, communications facilities, and public utilities. From 
Cairo, the FLN broadcast a proclamation calling on Muslims in 
Algeria to join in a national struggle for the "restoration of the 
Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and social, within the 
framework of the principles of Islam." The French minister of 
interior, socialist Francois Mitterrand, responded sharply that 
"the only possible negotiation is war." It was the reaction of Pre- 
mier Pierre Mendes-France, who only a few months before had 



44 



Historical Setting 



completed the liquidation of France's empire in Indochina, 
that set the tone of French policy for the next five years. On 
November 12, he declared in the National Assembly: "One 
does not compromise when it comes to defending the internal 
peace of the nation, the unity and integrity of the Republic. 
The Algerian departments are part of the French Republic. 
They have been French for a long time, and they are irrevoca- 
bly French .... Between them and metropolitan France there 
can be no conceivable secession." 

FLN 

The FLN uprising presented nationalist groups with the 
question of whether to adopt armed revolt as the main mode of 
action. During the first year of the war, Abbas's UDMA, the 
ulama, and the PCA maintained a friendly neutrality toward 
the FLN. The communists, who had made no move to cooper- 
ate in the uprising at the start, later tried to infiltrate the FLN, 
but FLN leaders publicly repudiated the support of the party. 
In April 1956, Abbas flew to Cairo, where he formally joined 
the FLN. This action brought in many evolues who had sup- 
ported the UDMA in the past. The AUMA also threw the full 
weight of its prestige behind the FLN. Bendjelloul and the 
prointegrationist moderates had already abandoned their 
efforts to mediate between the French and the rebels. 

After the collapse of the MTLD, Messali Hadj formed the 
leftist National Algerian Movement (Mouvement National 
Algerien — MNA), which advocated a policy of violent revolu- 
tion and total independence similar to that of the FLN. The 
ALN subsequently wiped out the MNA guerrilla operation, and 
Messali Hadj's movement lost what little influence it had had in 
Algeria. However, the MNA gained the support of a majority of 
Algerian workers in France through the Union of Algerian 
Workers (Union Syndicate des Travailleurs Algeriens). The 
FLN also established a strong organization in France to oppose 
the MNA. Merciless "cafe wars," resulting in nearly 5,000 
deaths, were waged in France between the two rebel groups 
throughout the years of the War of Independence. 

On the political front, the FLN worked to persuade — and to 
coerce — the Algerian masses to support the aims of the inde- 
pendence movement. FLN-oriented labor unions, professional 
associations, and students' and women's organizations were 
organized to rally diverse segments of the population. Frantz 
Fanon, a psychiatrist from Martinique who became the FLN's 



45 



Algeria: A Country Study 

leading political theorist, provided a sophisticated intellectual 
justification for the use of violence in achieving national libera- 
tion. From Cairo, Ben Bella ordered the liquidation of poten- 
tial interlocuteurs valables, those independent representatives of 
the Muslim community acceptable to the French through 
whom a compromise or reforms within the system might be 
achieved. 

As the FLN campaign spread through the countryside, 
many European farmers in the interior sold their holdings and 
sought refuge in Algiers, where their cry for sterner counter- 
measures swelled. Colon vigilante units, whose unauthorized 
activities were conducted with the passive cooperation of police 
authorities, carried out ratonnades (literally, rat-hunts; synony- 
mous with Arab-killings) against suspected FLN members of 
the Muslim community. The colons demanded the proclama- 
tion of a state of emergency, the proscription of all groups 
advocating separation from France, and the imposition of capi- 
tal punishment for politically motivated crimes. 

By 1955 effective political action groups within the colon 
community succeeded in intimidating the governors general 
sent by Paris to resolve the conflict. A major success was the 
conversion of Jacques Soustelle, who went to Algeria as gover- 
nor general in January 1955 determined to restore peace. Sous- 
telle, a one-time leftist and by 1955 an ardent Gaullist, began 
an ambitious reform program (the Soustelle Plan) aimed at 
improving economic conditions among the Muslim popula- 
tion. 

Philippeville 

An important watershed in the War of Independence was 
the massacre of civilians by the FLN near the town of Philippe- 
ville in August 1955. Before this operation, FLN policy was to 
attack only military and government-related targets. The wilaya 
commander for the Constantine region, however, decided a 
drastic escalation was needed. The killing by the FLN and its 
supporters of 123 people, including old women and babies, 
shocked Soustelle into calling for more repressive measures 
against the rebels. The government claimed it killed 1,273 
guerrillas in retaliation; according to the FLN, 12,000 Muslims 
perished in an orgy of bloodletting by the armed forces and 
police, as well as colon gangs. After Philippeville, all-out war 
began in Algeria. 



46 



Martyrs' monument, 
Algiers, dedicated to 
the dead in the War of 
Independence, 1954-62 
Courtesy Anthony Toth and 
Middle East Report 



Soustelle's successor, Governor General Robert Lacoste, a 
socialist, abolished the Algerian Assembly. Lacoste saw the 
assembly, which was dominated by colons, as hindering the 
work of his administration, and he undertook to rule Algeria 
by decree-law. He favored stepping up French military opera- 
tions and granted the army exceptional police powers — a con- 
cession of dubious legality under French law — to deal with the 
mounting terrorism. At the same time, Lacoste proposed a new 
administrative structure that would give Algeria a degree of 
autonomy and a decentralized government. Although remain- 
ing an integral part of France, Algeria was to be divided into 
five districts, each of which would have a territorial assembly 
elected from a single slate of candidates. Colon deputies were 
able to delay until 1958 passage of the measure by the National 
Assembly. 

In August-September 1956, the internal leadership of the 
FLN met to organize a formal policy-making body to synchro- 
nize the movement's political and military activities. The high- 
est authority of the FLN was vested in the thirty-four-member 
National Council of the Algerian Revolution (Conseil National 
de la Revolution Algerienne — CNRA), within which the five- 
man Committee of Coordination and Enforcement (Comite de 
Coordination et d'Execution — CCE) formed the executive. 
The externals, including Ben Bella, knew the conference was 




47 



Algeria: A Country Study 

taking place but by chance or design on the part of the inter- 
nals were unable to attend. 

Meanwhile, in October 1956 Lacoste had the FLN external 
political leaders who were in Algeria at the time arrested and 
imprisoned for the duration of the war. This action caused the 
remaining rebel leaders to harden their stance. 

France took a more openly hostile view of President Nasser's 
material and political assistance to the FLN, which some 
French analysts believed was the most important element in 
sustaining continued rebel activity in Algeria. This attitude was 
a factor in persuading France to participate in the November 
1956 Anglo-Suez Campaign, meant to topple Nasser from 
power. 

During 1957 support for the FLN weakened as the breach 
between the internals and externals widened. To halt the drift, 
the FLN expanded its executive committee to include Abbas, as 
well as imprisoned political leaders such as Ben Bella. It also 
convinced communist and Arab members of the United 
Nations (UN) to apply diplomatic pressure on the French gov- 
ernment to negotiate a cease-fire. 

Conduct of the War 

From its origins in 1954 as ragtag maquisards numbering in 
the hundreds and armed with a motley assortment of hunting 
rifles and discarded French, German, and United States light 
weapons, the ALN had evolved by 1957 into a disciplined fight- 
ing force of nearly 40,000. More than 30,000 were organized 
along conventional lines in external units that were stationed 
in Moroccan and Tunisian sanctuaries near the Algerian bor- 
der, where they served primarily to divert some French man- 
power from the main theaters of guerrilla activity to guard 
against infiltration. The brunt of the fighting was borne by the 
internals in the wilayat; estimates of the numbers of internals 
range from 6,000 to more than 25,000, with thousands of part- 
time irregulars. 

During 1956 and 1957, the ALN successfully applied hit- 
and-run tactics according to the classic canons of guerrilla war- 
fare. Specializing in ambushes and night raids and avoiding 
direct contact with superior French firepower, the internal 
forces targeted army patrols, military encampments, police 
posts, and colon farms, mines, and factories, as well as trans- 
portation and communications facilities. Once an engagement 
was broken off, the guerrillas merged with the population in 



48 



Historical Setting 



the countryside. Kidnapping was commonplace, as were the rit- 
ual murder and mutilation of captured French military, colons 
of both genders and every age, suspected collaborators, and 
traitors. At first, the revolutionary forces targeted only Muslim 
officials of the colonial regime; later, they coerced or killed 
even those civilians who simply refused to support them. More- 
over, during the first two years of the conflict, the guerrillas 
killed about 6,000 Muslims and 1,000 Europeans. 

Although successful in engendering an atmosphere of fear 
and uncertainty within both communities in Algeria, the revo- 
lutionaries' coercive tactics suggested that they had not as yet 
inspired the bulk of the Muslim people to revolt against French 
colonial rule. Gradually, however, the FLN/ALN gained con- 
trol in certain sectors of the Aures region, the Kabylie region 
and other mountainous areas around Constantine and south of 
Algiers and Oran. In these places, the ALN established a simple 
but effective — although frequently temporary — military 
administration that was able to collect taxes and food and to 
recruit manpower. But it was never able to hold large fixed 
positions. Muslims all over the country also initiated under- 
ground social, judicial, and civil organizations, gradually build- 
ing their own state. 

The loss of competent field commanders both on the battle- 
field and through defections and political purges created diffi- 
culties for the FLN. Moreover, power struggles in the early 
years of the war split leadership in the wilayat, particularly in 
the Aures region. Some officers created their own fiefdoms, 
using units under their command to settle old scores and 
engage in private wars against military rivals within the ALN. 
Although identified and exploited by French intelligence, fac- 
tionalism did not materially impair the overall effectiveness of 
ALN military operations. 

To increase international and domestic French attention to 
their struggle, the FLN decided to bring the conflict to the cit- 
ies and to call a nationwide general strike. The most notable 
manifestation of the new urban campaign was the Battle of Al- 
giers, which began on September 30, 1956, when three women 
placed bombs at three sites including the downtown office of 
Air France. The ALN carried out an average of 800 shootings 
and bombings per month through the spring of 1957, resulting 
in many civilian casualties and inviting a crushing response 
from the authorities. The 1957 general strike, timed to coin- 
cide with the UN debate on Algeria, was imposed on Muslim 



49 



Algeria: A Country Study 

workers and businesses. General Jacques Massu, who was 
instructed to use whatever methods were necessary to restore 
order in the city, frequently fought terrorism with acts of ter- 
rorism. Using paratroopers, he broke the strike and systemati- 
cally destroyed the FLN infrastructure there. But the FLN had 
succeeded in showing its ability to strike at the heart of French 
Algeria and in rallying a mass response to its appeals among 
urban Muslims. Moreover, the publicity given the brutal meth- 
ods used by the army to win the Battle of Algiers, including the 
widespread use of torture, cast doubt in France about its role in 
Algeria. 

Despite complaints from the military command in Algiers, 
the French government was reluctant for many months to 
admit that the Algerian situation was out of control and that 
what was viewed officially as a pacification operation had devel- 
oped into a major colonial war. By 1956 France had committed 
more than 400,000 troops to Algeria. Although the elite air- 
borne units and the Foreign Legion received particular notori- 
ety, approximately 170,000 of the regular French army troops 
in Algeria were Muslim Algerians, most of them volunteers. 
France also sent air force and naval units to the Algerian the- 
ater. 

The French army resumed an important role in local Alge- 
rian administration through th^ pecial Administration Sec- 
tion (Section Administrative L r ^cialisee — SAS), created in 
1955. The SAS's mission was to establish contact with the Mus- 
lim population and weaken nationalist influence in the rural 
areas by asserting the "French presence" there. SAS officers — 
called kepis bleus (blue caps) — also recruited and trained bands 
of loyal Muslim irregulars, known as harkis. Armed with shot- 
guns and using guerrilla tactics similar to those of the ALN, the 
harkis, who eventually numbered about 150,000 volunteers, 
were an ideal instrument of counterinsurgency warfare. 

Late in 1957, General Raoul Salan, commanding the French 
army in Algeria, instituted a system of quadrillage, dividing the 
country into sectors, each permanently garrisoned by troops 
responsible for suppressing rebel operations in their assigned 
territory. Salan's methods sharply reduced the instances of 
FLN terrorism but tied down a large number of troops in static 
defense. Salan also constructed a heavily patrolled system of 
barriers to limit infiltration from Tunisia and Morocco. The 
best known of these was the Morice Line (named for the 
French defense minister, Andre Morice), which consisted of an 



50 



Historical Setting 



electrified fence, barbed wire, and mines over a 320-kilometer 
stretch of the Tunisian border. 

The French military command ruthlessly applied the princi- 
ple of collective responsibility to villages suspected of shelter- 
ing, supplying, or in any way cooperating with the guerrillas. 
Villages that could not be reached by mobile units were subject 
to aerial bombardment. The French also initiated a program of 
concentrating large segments of the rural population, includ- 
ing whole villages, in camps under military supervision to pre- 
vent them from aiding the rebels — or, according to the official 
explanation, to protect them from FLN extortion. In the three 
years (1957-60) during which the regroupement program was fol- 
lowed, more than 2 million Algerians were removed from their 
villages, mostly in the mountainous areas, and resettled in the 
plains, where many found it impossible to reestablish their 
accustomed economic or social situations. Living conditions in 
the camps were poor. Hundreds of empty villages were devas- 
tated, and in hundreds of others orchards and croplands were 
destroyed. These population transfers apparently had little stra- 
tegic effect on the outcome of the war, but the disruptive social 
and economic effects of this massive program continued to be 
felt a generation later. 

The French army shifted its tactics at the end of 1958 from 
dependence on quadrillage to the use of mobile forces deployed 
on massive search-and-destroy missions against ALN strong- 
holds. Within the next year, Salan's successor, General Maurice 
Challe, appeared to have suppressed major rebel resistance. 
But political developments had already overtaken the French 
army's successes. 

Committee of Public Safety 

Recurrent cabinet crises focused attention on the inherent 
instability of the Fourth Republic and increased the misgivings 
of the army and of the colons that the security of Algeria was 
being undermined by party politics. Army commanders chafed 
at what they took to be inadequate and incompetent govern- 
ment support of military efforts to end the rebellion. The feel- 
ing was widespread that another debacle like that of Indochina 
in 1954 was in the offing and that the government would order 
another precipitate pullout and sacrifice French honor to polit- 
ical expediency. Many saw in de Gaulle, who had not held 
office since 1946, the only public figure capable of rallying the 
nation and giving direction to the French government. 



51 



Algeria: A Country Study 



After his tour as governor general, Soustelle had returned 
to France to organize support for de Gaulle's return to power, 
while retaining close ties to the army and the colons. By early 
1958, he had organized a coup d'etat, bringing together dissi- 
dent army officers and colons with sympathetic Gaullists. An 
army junta under General Massu seized power in Algiers on the 
night of May 13. General Salan assumed leadership of a Com- 
mittee of Public Safety formed to replace the civil authority 
and pressed the junta's demands that de Gaulle be named by 
French president Rene Coty to head a government of national 
union invested with extraordinary powers to prevent the "aban- 
donment of Algeria." De Gaulle became premier in June and 
was given carte blanche to deal with Algeria. 

De Gaulle 

Europeans as well as many Muslims greeted de Gaulle's 
return to power as the breakthrough needed to end the hostili- 
ties. On his June 4 trip to Algeria, de Gaulle calculatedly made 
an ambiguous and broad emotional appeal to all the inhabit- 
ants, declaring 'Je vous ai compris" (I have understood you). 
De Gaulle raised the hopes of colons and the professional mili- 
tary, disaffected by the indecisiveness of previous governments, 
with his exclamation of "Vive Algerie francaise" (long live 
French Algeria) to cheering crowds in Mostaganem. At the 
same time, he proposed economic, social, and political reforms 
to ameliorate the situation of Muslims. Nonetheless, de Gaulle 
later admitted to having harbored deep pessimism about the 
outcome of the Algerian situation even then. Meanwhile, he 
looked for a "third force" among Muslims and Europeans, 
uncontaminated by the FLX or the "ultras" — colon extrem- 
ists — through whom a solution might be found. 

De Gaulle immediately appointed a committee to draft a 
new constitution for France's Fifth Republic, which would be 
declared early the next year, with which Algeria would be asso- 
ciated but of which it would not form an integral part. Muslims, 
including women, were registered for the first time with Euro- 
peans on a common electoral roll to participate in a referen- 
dum to be held on the new constitution in September 1958. 

De Gaulle's initiative threatened the FLN with the prospect 
of losing the support of the growing numbers of Muslims who 
were tired of the war and had never been more than lukewarm 
in their commitment to a totally independent Algeria. In reac- 
tion, the FLN set up the Provisional Government of the Alge- 



52 



Historical Setting 



rian Republic (Gouvernement Provisionel de la Republique 
Algerienne — GPRA), a government-in-exile headed by Abbas 
and based in Tunis. Before the referendum, Abbas lobbied for 
international support for the GPRA, which was quickly recog- 
nized by Morocco, Tunisia, and several other Arab countries, 
by a number of Asian and African states, and by the Soviet 
Union and other East European states. 

ALN commandos committed numerous acts of sabotage in 
France in August, and the FLN mounted a desperate campaign 
of terror in Algeria to intimidate Muslims into boycotting the 
referendum. Despite threats of reprisal, however, 80 percent of 
the Muslim electorate turned out to vote in September, and of 
these 96 percent approved the constitution. In February 1959, 
de Gaulle was elected president of the new Fifth Republic. He 
visited Constantine in October to announce a program to end 
the war and create an Algeria closely linked to France in which 
Europeans and Muslims would join as partners. De Gaulle's call 
on the rebel leaders to end hostilities and to participate in elec- 
tions was met with adamant refusal. "The problem of a cease- 
fire in Algeria is not simply a military problem," said the 
GPRA's Abbas. "It is essentially political, and negotiation must 
cover the whole question of Algeria." Secret discussions that 
had been underway were broken off. 

In 1958-59 the French army had won military control in 
Algeria and was the closest it would be to victory. During that 
period in France, however, opposition to the conflict was grow- 
ing among many segments of the population. Thousands of rel- 
atives of conscripts and reserve soldiers suffered loss and pain; 
revelations of torture and the indiscriminate brutality the army 
visited on the Muslim population prompted widespread revul- 
sion; and a significant constituency supported the principle of 
national liberation. International pressure was also building on 
France to grant Algeria independence. Annually since 1955, 
the UN General Assembly had considered the Algerian ques- 
tion, and the FLN position was gaining support. France's seem- 
ing intransigence in settling a colonial war that tied down half 
the manpower of its armed forces was also a source of concern 
to its North American Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. In a 
September 1959 statement, de Gaulle dramatically reversed his 
stand and uttered the words "self-determination," which he 
envisioned as leading to majority rule in an Algeria formally 
associated with France. In Tunis, Abbas acknowledged that de 
Gaulle's statement might be accepted as a basis for settlement, 



53 



Algeria: A Country Study 

but the French government refused to recognize the GPRA as 
the representative of Algeria's Muslim community. 

Claiming that de Gaulle had betrayed them, the colons, 
backed by units of the army, staged an insurrection in Algiers 
in January 1960 that won rapid support in France. As the police 
and army stood by, rioting colons threw up barricades in the 
streets and seized government buildings. In Paris, de Gaulle 
called on the army to remain loyal and rallied popular support 
for his Algeria policy in a televised address. Most of the army 
heeded his call, and in Algiers General Challe quickly defused 
the insurrection. The failure of the colon uprising and the loss 
of many ultra leaders who were imprisoned or transferred to 
other areas did not deter the militant colons. Highly organized 
and well-armed vigilante groups stepped up their terrorist 
activities, which were directed against both Muslims and 
progovernment Europeans, as the move toward negotiated set- 
tlement of the war and self-determination gained momentum. 
To the FLN rebellion against France were added civil wars 
between extremists in the two communities and between the 
ultras and the French government in Algeria. 

The Generals' Putsch 

Important elements of the French army and the ultras 
joined in another insurrection in April 1961. The leaders of 
this "generals' putsch" intended to seize control of Algeria as 
well as topple the de Gaulle regime. Units of the Foreign 
Legion offered prominent support, and the well-armed Secret 
Army Organization (Organisation de l'Armee Secrete — OAS) 
coordinated the participation of colon vigilantes. Although a 
brief fear of invasion swept Paris, the revolt collapsed in four 
days largely because of cooperation from the air force and 
army. 

The "generals' putsch" marked the turning point in the offi- 
cial attitude toward the Algerian war. De Gaulle was now pre- 
pared to abandon the colons, the group that no previous 
French government could have written off. The army had been 
discredited by the putsch and kept a low profile politically 
throughout the rest of France's involvement with Algeria. Talks 
with the FLN reopened at Evian in May 1961; after several false 
starts, the French government decreed that a cease-fire would 
take effect on March 19, 1962. In their final form, the Evian 
Accords allowed the colons equal legal protection with Algeri- 
ans over a three-year period. These rights included respect for 



54 



Historical Setting 



property, participation in public affairs, and a full range of civil 
and cultural rights. At the end of that period, however, Europe- 
ans would be obliged to become Algerian citizens or be classi- 
fied as aliens with the attendant loss of rights. The French 
electorate approved the Evian Accords by an overwhelming 91 
percent vote in a referendum held in June 1962. 

During the three months between the cease-fire and the 
French referendum on Algeria, the OAS unleashed a new ter- 
rorist campaign. The OAS sought to provoke a major breach in 
the cease-fire by the FLN but the terrorism now was aimed also 
against the French army and police enforcing the accords as 
well as against Muslims. It was the most wanton carnage that 
Algeria had witnessed in eight years of savage warfare. OAS 
operatives set off an average of 120 bombs per day in March, 
with targets including hospitals and schools. Ultimately, the ter- 
rorism failed in its objectives, and the OAS and the FLN con- 
cluded a truce on June 17, 1962. In the same month, more 
than 350,000 colons left Algeria. Within a year, 1.4 million refu- 
gees, including almost the entire Jewish community and some 
pro-French Muslims, had joined the exodus to France. Fewer 
than 30,000 Europeans chose to remain. 

On July 1, 1962, some 6 million of a total Algerian electorate 
of 6.5 million cast their ballots in the referendum on indepen- 
dence. The vote was nearly unanimous. De Gaulle pronounced 
Algeria an independent country on July 3. The Provisional 
Executive, however, proclaimed July 5, the 132d anniversary of 
the French entry into Algeria, as the day of national indepen- 
dence. 

The FLN estimated in 1962 that nearly eight years of revolu- 
tion had cost 300,000 dead from war-related causes. Algerian 
sources later put the figure at approximately 1.5 million dead, 
while French officials estimated it at 350,000. French military 
authorities listed their losses at nearly 18,000 dead (6,000 from 
noncombat-related causes) and 65,000 wounded. European 
civilian casualties exceeded 10,000 (including 3,000 dead) in 
42,000 recorded terrorist incidents. According to French fig- 
ures, security forces killed 141,000 rebel combatants, and more 
than 12,000 Algerians died in internal FLN purges during the 
war. An additional 5,000 died in the "cafe wars" in France 
between the FLN and rival Algerian groups. French sources 
also estimated that 70,000 Muslim civilians were killed, or 
abducted and presumed killed, by the FLN. 



55 



Algeria: A Country Study 

Historian Alistair Home considers that the actual figure of 
war dead is far higher than the original FLN and official 
French estimates, even if it does not reach the 1 million 
adopted by the Algerian government. Uncounted thousands of 
Muslim civilians lost their lives in French army ratissages, bomb- 
ing raids, and vigilante reprisals. The war uprooted more than 
2 million Algerians, who were forced to relocate in French con- 
centration camps or to flee to Morocco, Tunisia, and into the 
Algerian hinterland, where many thousands died of starvation, 
disease, and exposure. Additional pro-French Muslims were 
killed when the FLN settled accounts after independence. 

Independent Algeria, 1962-92 

In preparation for independence, the CNRA had met in Tri- 
poli in May 1962 to work out a plan for the FLN's transition 
from a liberation movement to a political party. The Tripoli 
Program called for land reform, the large-scale nationalization 
of industry and services, and a strong commitment to non- 
alignment and anticolonialism in foreign relations. The plat- 
form also envisioned the FLN as a mass organization broad 
enough to encompass all nationalist groups. Adoption of the 
Tripoli Program notwithstanding, deep personal and ideologi- 
cal divisions surfaced within the FLN as the war drew to a close 
and the date for independence approached. Competition and 
confrontation among various factions not only deprived the 
FLN of a leadership that spoke with a single voice, but also 
almost resulted in full-scale civil war. According to historian 
John Ruedy, these factions, or "clans" did not embody "family 
or regional loyalties, as in the Arab East, because the genera- 
tions-long detribalization of Algeria had been too thorough. 
Rather, they represented relationships based on school, war- 
time or other networking." 

The ALN commanders and the GPRA struggled for power, 
including an unsuccessful attempt to dismiss Colonel Houari 
Boumediene, chief of staff of the ALN in Morocco. Boumedi- 
ene formed an alliance with Ben Bella, who together with 
Khider and Bitat, announced the formation of the Political 
Bureau (Bureau Politique) as a rival government to the GPRA, 
which had installed itself in Algiers as the Provisional Execu- 
tive. Boumediene's forces entered Algiers in September, where 
he was joined by Ben Bella, who quickly consolidated his 
power. Ben Bella purged his political opponents from the sin- 
gle slate of candidates for the forthcoming National Assembly 



56 



Historical Setting 



elections. However, underlying opposition to the Political 
Bureau and to the absence of alternative candidates was mani- 
fested in an 18 percent abstention rate nationwide that rose to 
36 percent of the electorate in Algiers. 

The creation of the Democratic and Popular Republic of 
Algeria was formally proclaimed at the opening session of the 
National Assembly on September 25, 1962. Abbas, a moderate 
unconnected with the Political Bureau, was elected president 
of the assembly by the delegates. On the following day, after 
being named premier, Ben Bella formed a cabinet that was rep- 
resentative of the Political Bureau but that also included Bou- 
mediene as defense minister as well as other members of the 
so-called Oujda Group, who had served under him with the 
external forces in Morocco. Ben Bella, Boumediene, and 
Khider initially formed a triumvirate linking the leadership of 
the three power bases — the army, the party, and the govern- 
ment, respectively. However, Ben Bella's ambitions and authori- 
tarian tendencies were to lead the triumvirate to unravel and 
provoke increasing discontent among Algerians. 

Aftermath of the War 

The war of national liberation and its aftermath severely dis- 
rupted Algeria's society and economy. In addition to the physi- 
cal destruction, the exodus of the colons deprived the country 
of most of its managers, civil servants, engineers, teachers, phy- 
sicians, and skilled workers — all occupations from which the 
Muslim population had been excluded or discouraged from 
pursuing by colonial policy. The homeless and displaced num- 
bered in the hundreds of thousands, many suffering from ill- 
ness, and some 70 percent of the work force was unemployed. 
Distribution of goods was at a standstill. Departing colons 
destroyed or carried off public records and utility plans, leav- 
ing public services in a shambles. 

The months immediately following independence had wit- 
nessed the pell-mell rush of Algerians, their government, and 
its officials to claim the lands, houses, businesses, automobiles, 
bank accounts, and jobs left behind by the Europeans. By the 
1963 March Decrees, Ben Bella declared that all agricultural, 
industrial, and commercial properties previously operated and 
occupied by Europeans were vacant, thereby legalizing their 
confiscation by the state. The term nationalization was not used 
in the decrees, presumably to avoid indemnity claims. 



57 



Algeria: A Country Study 

The FLN called its policy of widespread state involvement in 
the economy "Algerian socialism." Public-sector enterprises 
were gradually organized into state corporations that partici- 
pated in virtually every aspect of the country's economic life. 
Although their activities were coordinated by central authori- 
ties, each state corporation was supposed to retain a measure of 
autonomy within its own sphere. 

The departure of European owners and managers from fac- 
tories and agricultural estates gave rise to a spontaneous, grass- 
roots phenomenon, later termed autogestion, which saw workers 
take control of the enterprises to keep them operating. Seek- 
ing to capitalize on the popularity of the self-management 
movement, Ben Bella formalized autogestion in the March 
Decrees. As the process evolved, workers in state-owned farms 
and enterprises and in agricultural cooperatives elected boards 
of managers that directed production activities, financing, and 
marketing in conjunction with state-appointed directors. The 
system proved to be a failure, however. The crucial agricultural 
sector suffered particularly under self-management, partly as 
result of bureaucratic incompetence, graft, and theft. 

Ben Bella and the FLN 

Whereas Ben Bella could count on the support of an over- 
whelming majority in the National Assembly, an opposition 
group led by Ait Ahmed soon emerged. Opponents outside the 
government included the supporters of Messali Hadj, the PCA, 
and the left-wing Socialist Revolution Party (Parti de la Revolu- 
tion Socialiste — PRS) led by Boudiaf. The communists, who 
were excluded from the FLN and therefore from any direct 
political rule, were particularly influential in the postindepen- 
dence press. The activities of all these groups were subse- 
quently banned, and Boudiaf was arrested. When opposition 
from the General Union of Algerian Workers (Union Generale 
des Travailleurs Algeriens — UGTA) was perceived, the trade 
union organization was subsumed under FLN control. 

Contrary to the intent of the Tripoli Program, Ben Bella saw 
the FLN as an elite vanguard party that would mobilize popular 
support for government policies and reinforce his increasingly 
personal leadership of the country. Because Khider envisioned 
the FLN as playing a more encompassing, advisory role, Ben 
Bella forced him from office in April 1963 and replaced him as 
party secretary general. Khider later absconded with the equiv- 
alent of US$12 million in party funds into exile in Switzerland. 



58 



Historical Setting 



In August 1963, Abbas resigned as assembly president to pro- 
test what he termed the FLN's usurpation of the legislature's 
authority. He was subsequently put under house arrest. A new 
constitution drawn up under close FLN supervision was 
approved by nationwide referendum in September, and Ben 
Bella was confirmed as the party's choice to lead the country 
for a five-year term. Under the new constitution, Ben Bella as 
president combined the functions of chief of state and head of 
government with that of supreme commander of the armed 
forces. He formed his government without needing legislative 
approval and was responsible for the definition and direction 
of its policies. There was no effective institutional check on its 
powers. 

Ait Ahmed quit the National Assembly to protest the 
increasingly dictatorial tendencies of the regime, which had 
reduced the functions of the legislature to rubber-stamping 
presidential directives. The Kabyle leaders also condemned the 
government for its failure to carry through on reconstruction 
projects in the war-ravaged Kabylie region, but Ait Ahmed's 
aims went beyond rectifying regional complaints. He formed a 
clandestine resistance movement, the Front of Socialist Forces 
(Front des Forces Socialistes — FFS), based in the Kabylie 
region and dedicated to overthrowing the Ben Bella regime by 
force. Late summer 1963 saw sporadic incidents attributed to 
the FFS and required the movement of regular troops into the 
Kabylie region. 

More serious fighting broke out a year later in the Kabylie as 
well as in the southern Sahara. The insurgent movement was 
organized by the National Committee for the Defense of the 
Revolution (Comite National pour la Defense de la Revolu- 
tion — CNDR), which joined the remnants of Ait Ahmed's FFS 
and Boudiaf s PRS with the surviving regional military leaders. 
Khider was believed to have helped finance the operation. The 
army moved quickly and in force to crush the rebellion. Ait 
Ahmed and Colonel Mohamed Chabaani, a wilaya commander 
leading insurgents in the Sahara, were captured and sentenced 
to death in 1965, after a trial in which Khider and Boudiaf were 
similarly condemned in absentia. Chabaani was executed, but 
Ait Ahmed's sentence was subsequently commuted to life 
imprisonment. In 1966 he escaped from prison and fled to 
Europe where he joined the two other chefs historiques in exile. 

As minister of defense, Boumediene had no qualms about 
sending the army to crush regional uprisings when he felt they 



59 



Algeria: A Country Study 



posed a threat to the state. However, when Ben Bella attempted 
to co-opt allies from among some of the same regionalists 
whom the army had been called out to suppress, tensions 
increased between Boumediene and Ben Bella. In April 1965, 
Ben Bella issued orders to local police prefects to report 
directly to him rather than through normal channels in the 
Ministry of Interior. The minister, Ahmed Medeghri, one of 
Boumediene's closest associates in the Oujda Group, resigned 
his portfolio in protest and was replaced by a Political Bureau 
loyalist. Ben Bella next sought to remove Abdelaziz Bouteflika, 
another Boumediene confidant, as minister of foreign affairs 
and was believed to be planning a direct confrontation with 
Boumediene to force his ouster. On June 19, however, Boume- 
diene deposed Ben Bella in a military coup d'etat that was both 
swift and bloodless. The ousted president was taken into cus- 
tody and held incommunicado. 

Boumediene Regime 

Boumediene described the military coup as a "historic recti- 
fication" of the Algerian War of Independence. Boumediene 
dissolved the National Assembly, suspended the 1963 constitu- 
tion, disbanded the militia, and abolished the Political Bureau, 
which he considered an instrument of Ben Bella's personal 
rule. 

Until a new constitution was adopted, political power 
resided in the Council of the Revolution, a predominantly mili- 
tary body intended to foster cooperation among various fac- 
tions in the army and the party. The council's original twenty- 
six members included former internal military leaders, former 
Political Bureau members, and senior officers of the Armee 
Nationale Populaire (ANP — People's National Army) closely 
associated with Boumediene in the coup. They were expected 
to exercise collegial responsibility for overseeing the activities 
of the new government, which was conducted by the largely 
civilian Council of Ministers, or cabinet, appointed by Boume- 
diene. The cabinet, which shared some functions with the 
Council of the Revolution, was also inclusive; it contained an 
Islamic leader, technical experts, FLN regulars, as well as others 
representing a broad range of Algerian political and institu- 
tional life. 

Boumediene showed himself to be an ardent nationalist, 
deeply influenced by Islamic values, and he was reportedly one 
of the few prominent Algerian leaders who expressed himself 



60 



Historical Setting 



better in Arabic than in French. He seized control of the coun- 
try not to initiate military rule, but to protect the interests of 
the army, which he felt were threatened by Ben Bella. Boume- 
diene's position as head of government and of state was not 
secure initially, partly because of his lack of a significant power 
base outside the armed forces. This situation may have 
accounted for his deference to collegial rule as a means of rec- 
onciling competing factions. Nonetheless, FLN radicals criti- 
cized Boumediene for neglecting the policy of autogestion and 
betraying "rigorous socialism"; in addition, some military offi- 
cers were unsettled by what they saw as a drift away from colle- 
giality. There were coup attempts and a failed assassination in 
1967-68, after which opponents were exiled or imprisoned and 
Boumediene's power consolidated. 

Agricultural production, meanwhile, still failed to meet the 
country's food needs. The so-called agricultural revolution that 
Boumediene launched in 1971 called for the seizure of addi- 
tional property and the redistribution of the newly acquired 
public lands to cooperative farms (see Land Tenure and 
Reform, ch. 3). 

Eleven years after he took power, in April 1976, Boumedi- 
ene set out in a draft document called the National Charter the 
principles on which the long-promised constitution would be 
based. After much public debate, the constitution was promul- 
gated in November 1976, and Boumediene was elected presi- 
dent with 95 percent of the votes (see Structure of the National 
Government, ch. 4). Boumediene's death on December 27, 
1978, set off a struggle within the FLN to choose a successor. As 
a compromise to break a deadlock between two other candi- 
dates, Colonel Chadli Benjedid, a relative outsider, was sworn 
in on February 9, 1979. 

Chadli Benjedid and Afterward 

Benjedid, who had collaborated with Boumediene in the 
plot that deposed Ben Bella, was regarded as a moderate not 
identified with any group or faction; he did, however, com- 
mand wide support within the military establishment. In June 
1980, he summoned an extraordinary FLN Party Congress to 
examine the draft of the five-year development plan for 1980- 
84. The resultant First Five- Year Plan liberalized the economy 
and broke up unwieldy state corporations (see Development 
Planning, ch. 3). 



61 



Algeria: A Country Study 

The Benjedid regime was also marked by protests from Ber- 
ber university students who objected to arabization measures in 
government and especially in education. Although Benjedid 
reaffirmed the government's long-term commitment to arabi- 
zation, he upgraded Berber studies at the university level and 
granted media access to Berber-language programs. These con- 
cessions, however, provoked counterprotests from Islamists 
(also seen as fundamentalists). 

The Islamists gained increasing influence in part because 
the government was unable to keep its economic promises (see 
The Islamist Factor, ch. 4). In the late 1970s, Muslim activists 
engaged in isolated and relatively small-scale assertions of their 
will: harassing women whom they felt were inappropriately 
dressed, smashing establishments that served alcohol, and 
evicting official imams from their mosques. The Islamists esca- 
lated their actions in 1982, when they called for the abrogation 
of the National Charter and the formation of an Islamic gov- 
ernment. Amidst an increasing number of violent incidents on 
campuses, Islamists killed one student. After police arrested 
400 Islamists, about 100,000 demonstrators thronged to Friday 
prayers at the university mosque. The arrests of hundreds more 
activists, including prominent leaders of the movement, 
Shaykh Abdelatif Sultani and Shaykh Ahmed Sahnoun, 
resulted in a lessening of Islamist actions for several years. 
Nonetheless, in light of the massive support the Islamists could 
muster, the authorities henceforth viewed them as a potentially 
grave threat to the state and alternately treated them with 
harshness and respect. In 1984, for example, the government 
opened in Constantine one of the largest Islamic universities in 
the world. In the same year, acceding to Islamist demands, the 
government changed family status law to deprive women of 
freedom to act on their own by making them wards of their 
families before marriage and of their husbands after marriage. 

The country's economic crisis deepened in the mid-1980s, 
resulting in, among other things, increased unemployment, a 
lack of consumer goods, and shortages in cooking oil, semo- 
lina, coffee, and tea. Women waited in long lines for scarce and 
expensive food; young men milled in frustration on street cor- 
ners unable to find work. An already bad situation was aggra- 
vated by the huge drop in world oil prices in 1986. Dismantling 
Algeria's state-controlled economic system seemed to Benjedid 
the only way to improve the economy. In 1987 he announced 
reforms that would retur n control and profits to private hands, 



62 



Historical Setting 



starting with agriculture and continuing to the large state 
enterprises and banks. 

Notwithstanding the introduction of reform measures, inci- 
dents indicating social unrest increased in Algiers and other 
cities as the economy foundered from 1985 to 1988. The alien- 
ation and anger of the population were fanned by the wide- 
spread perception that the government had become corrupt 
and aloof. The waves of discontent crested in October 1988 
when a series of strikes and walkouts by students and workers in 
Algiers degenerated into rioting by thousands of young men, 
who destroyed government and FLN property. When the vio- 
lence spread to Annaba, Blida, Oran, and other cities and 
towns, the government declared a state of emergency and 
began using force to quell the unrest. By October 10, the secu- 
rity forces had restored a semblance of order; unofficial esti- 
mates were that more than 500 people were killed and more 
than 3,500 arrested. 

The stringent measures used to put down the riots of "Black 
October" engendered a ground swell of outrage. Islamists took 
control of some areas. Unsanctioned independent organiza- 
tions of lawyers, students, journalists, and physicians sprang up 
to demand justice and change. In response, Benjedid con- 
ducted a house cleaning of senior officials and drew up a pro- 
gram of political reform. In December he was offered the 
chance to implement the reforms when he was reelected, albeit 
by a reduced margin. A new constitution, approved over- 
whelmingly in February 1989, dropped the word socialist ivom. 
the official description of the country; guaranteed freedoms of 
expression, association, and meeting; and withdrew the guar- 
antees of women's rights that appeared in the 1976 constitu- 
tion. The FLN was not mentioned in the document at all, and 
the army was discussed only in the context of national defense, 
reflecting a significant downgrading of its political status. 

Politics were reinvigorated in 1989 under the new laws. 
Newspapers became the liveliest and freest in the Arab world, 
while political parties of nearly every stripe vied for members 
and a voice. In February 1989, Abbassi Madani and Ali Belhadj 
(also seen as Benhadj) founded the Islamic Salvation Front 
(Front Islamique du Salut — FIS). Although the constitution 
prohibited religious parties, the FIS came to play a significant 
role in Algerian politics. It handily defeated the FLN in local 
and provincial elections held in June 1990, in part because 
most secular parties boycotted the elections. The FLN's 



63 



Algeria: A Country Study 



response was to adopt a new electoral law that openly aided the 
FLN. The FIS, in turn, called a general strike, organized dem- 
onstrations, and occupied public places. Benjedid declared 
martial law on June 5, 1991, but he also asked his minister of 
foreign affairs, Sid Ahmed Ghozali, to form a new government 
of national reconciliation. Although the FIS seemed satisfied 
with Ghozali's appointment and his attempts to clean up the 
electoral law, it continued to protest, leading the army to arrest 
Belhadj, Madani, and hundreds of others. The state of emer- 
gency ended in September. 

Algeria's leaders were stunned in December 1991 when FIS 
candidates won absolute majorities in 188 of 430 electoral dis- 
tricts, far ahead of the FLN's fifteen seats. Some members of 
Benjedid's cabinet, fearing a complete FIS takeover, forced the 
president to dissolve parliament and to resign on January 11, 
1992. Leaders of the takeover included Ghozali, and generals 
Khaled Nezzar (minister of defense) and Larbi Belkheir (min- 
ister of interior). After they declared the elections void, the 
takeover leaders and Mohamed Boudiaf formed the High 
Council of State to rule the country. The FIS, as well as the 
FLN, clamored for a return of the electoral process, but police 
and troops countered with massive arrests. In February 1992, 
violent demonstrations broke out in many cities, and on Febru- 
ary 9 the government declared a one-year state of emergency 
and the next month banned the FIS. 

The end of FLN rule over Algeria opened a period of uncer- 
tain transition. Widespread discontent with the party stemmed 
from many roots. People were frustrated and angry because 
they had no voice in their own affairs, had few or no prospects 
for employment, and had a deteriorating standard of living. In 
addition, the poor and the middle class grew outraged over the 
privileges enjoyed by party members, and many Algerians 
became alienated by what they felt was the unwelcome 
encroachment of secular, or Western, values. Algeria's brief 
democratic interlude unleashed these pent-up feelings, and, as 
in earlier periods of the country's history, the language of 
Islam served many as the preferred medium of social and polit- 
ical protest. 



Whereas the vast majority of the historical writings on Alge- 
ria are in French, several excellent works are available in 
English. John Ruedy's Modern Algeria provides a masterful syn- 



64 



Historical Setting 



thesis and analysis focusing on the period from the French 
occupation to early 1992. Land Policy in Colonial Algeria by the 
same author is also interesting. A History of the Maghrib in the 
Islamic Period by Jamil Abu-Nasr provides a thoughtful and 
detailed look at the region going back to the Arab conquests. 
For an in-depth treatment of the struggle for independence, 
especially political and military affairs, see Alistair Home's A 
Savage War of Peace. For the precolonial period, see Charles- 
Andre Julien's Histoire de VAfrique du nord. Julien's Histoire de 
VAlgerie contemporaine and Charles-Robert Ageron's book by the 
same title cover the colonial period. Raphael Danziger's Abd al- 
Qadir and the Algerians is a serious and comprehensive study of 
this national hero. (For further information and complete cita- 
tions, see Bibliography.) 



65 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 




Modern domed houses at El Oued in eastern Algeria 



ALGERIAN SOCIETY has undergone major changes since the 
mid-1980s. Urbanization has increased steadily, and in 1990 
more than 50 percent of the population lived in urban areas, 
found primarily near the coast. Furthermore, dislocation 
caused by the steep fall of oil prices in 1986 and inefficiencies 
in the public sector caused the government to initiate extensive 
reforms encompassing the economic, social, and political sec- 
tors. The government shifted from its rigid centralized system 
of decision making to a greater emphasis on market forces. 
With the help of international organizations such as the World 
Bank (see Glossary), major transformations began taking place 
in agriculture, banking, and in price controls, thereby chang- 
ing Algeria's socioeconomic structure. The government also 
increased public expenditures in the early 1990s to upgrade 
education and health care. 

Despite those positive changes, the early 1990s have seen a 
rise in unemployment, a drop in per capita income, critical 
housing shortages, and other problems. In part, these prob- 
lems resulted from the policies of previous governments, but 
they were exacerbated by the sharp downturn in oil prices in 
the mid-1980s. Further affecting Algeria's progress on the 
socioeconomic front has been the political turmoil resulting 
from the confrontation between government forces and Islam- 
ists (sometimes seen as fundamentalists). Islamists have sought 
to redefine Algerian identity to be more Arab and more Mus- 
lim and have questioned the legitimacy of the existing political 
system, which they perceive as too secular and too Western. 

Physical Setting 

Algeria comprises 2,381,741 square kilometers, more than 
four-fifths of which is desert. Its Arabic name, Al Jazair (the 
islands), is believed to derive from the rocky islands along the 
Mediterranean coastline. The northern portion, an area of 
mountains, valleys, and plateaus between the Mediterranean 
Sea and the Sahara Desert, forms an integral part of the section 
of North Africa known as the Maghrib (see Glossary). This area 
includes Morocco, Tunisia, and the northwestern portion of 
Libya known historically as Tripolitania (see fig. 4). 



69 



Algeria: A Country Study 




At (antic 
Ocean 



S0> 



MOROCCO 



r 



/ 

WESTERN N. 
SAHARA \ 

r 1 % 

! ^ 

I MAURITANIA \ ^ 

! 

i 




International boundary 

Geographic region boundary 

® National capital 

• Populated place 

Geographic region 
I Tell 

JJ Hauts Plateaux and Atlas Saharien 
TIT Eastern Algeria 
TV" Sahara 

A Spot elevation in meters 



100 200 Kilometers 



X 



X 



MALI 



Figure 4. Topography and Drainage 



70 



The Society and Its Environment 




71 



Algeria: A Country Study 

Geographic Regions 

The Tell 

The fertile Tell is the country's heartland, containing most 
of its cities and population. Made up of hills and plains of the 
narrow coastal region, the several Tell Atlas mountain ranges, 
and the intermediate valleys and basins, the Tell extends east- 
ward from the Moroccan border to the mountains of the 
Grande Kabylie and the Bejaia Plain on the east. Its eastern ter- 
minus is the Soummam River. 

The best agricultural areas are the gentle hills extending 
100 kilometers westward from Algiers; the Mitidja Plain, which 
was a malarial swamp before being cleared by the French; and 
the Bejaia Plain. The alluvial soils in these areas permitted the 
French to establish magnificent vineyards and citrus groves. By 
contrast, in the great valley of the Chelif River and other inte- 
rior valleys and basins, aridity and excessive summer heat have 
limited the development of agriculture. The Grande Kabylie is 
a zone of impoverished small farm villages tucked into convo- 
luted mountains. 

The High Plateaus and the Saharan Atlas 

Stretching more than 600 kilometers eastward from the 
Moroccan border, the High Plateaus (often referred to by their 
French name Hauts Plateaux) consist of undulating, steppe- 
like plains lying between the Tell and Saharan Atlas ranges. 
The plateaus average between 1,100 and 1,300 meters in eleva- 
tion in the west, dropping to 400 meters in the east. So dry that 
they are sometimes thought of as part of the Sahara, the pla- 
teaus are covered by alluvial debris formed when the moun- 
tains eroded. An occasional ridge projects through the alluvial 
cover to interrupt the monotony of the landscape. 

Higher and more continuous than the Tell Atlas, the Sahara 
Atlas range is formed of three massifs: the Ksour near the 
Moroccan border, the Amour, and the Oulad Nail south of Al- 
giers. The mountains, which receive more rainfall than those 
of the High Plateaus, include some good grazing land. Water- 
courses on the southern slopes of these massifs disappear into 
the desert but supply the wells of numerous oases along the 
northern edge of the desert, of which Biskra, Laghouat, and 
Bechar are the most prominent. 



72 



The Society and Its Environment 



Northeastern Algeria 

Eastern Algeria consists of a massif area extensively dis- 
sected into mountains, plains, and basins. It differs from the 
western portion of the country in that its prominent topo- 
graphic features do not parallel the coast. In its southern sec- 
tor, the steep cliffs and long ridges of the Aures Mountains 
create an almost impenetrable refuge that has played an 
important part in the history of the Maghrib since Roman 
times. Near the northern coast, the Petite Kabylie Mountains 
are separated from the Grande Kabylie range at the eastward 
limits of the Tell by the Soummam River. The coast is predomi- 
nantly mountainous in the far eastern part of the country, but 
limited plains provide hinterlands for the port cities of Bejaia, 
Skikda, and Annaba. In the interior of the region, extensive 
high plains mark the region around Setif and Constantine; 
these plains were developed during the French colonial period 
as the principal centers of grain cultivation. Near Constantine, 
salt marshes offer seasonal grazing grounds to seminomadic 
sheep herders. 

The Sahara 

The Algerian portion of the Sahara extends south of the 
Saharan Atlas for 1,500 kilometers to the Niger and Mali fron- 
tiers. The desert is an otherworldly place, scarcely considered 
an integral part of the country. Far from being covered wholly 
by sweeps of sand, however, it is a region of great diversity. A 
characteristic is the erg, or desert area of shifting sand. Such 
areas occupy about one-quarter of the territory. The largest 
such region is the Grand Erg Oriental (Great Eastern Erg), 
where enormous dunes two to five meters high are spaced 
about forty meters apart. Much of the remainder of the desert 
is covered by rocky platforms called humud (sing., hamada), 
and almost the entire southeastern quarter is taken up by the 
high, complex mass of the Ahaggar and Tassili-n-Ajjer high- 
lands, some parts of which reach more than 2,000 meters. Sur- 
rounding the Ahaggar are sandstone plateaus, cut into deep 
gorges by ancient rivers, and to the west a desert of pebbles 
stretches to the Mali frontier. 

The desert consists of readily distinguishable northern and 
southern sectors, the northern sector extending southward a 
little less than half the distance to the Niger and Mali frontiers. 
The north, less arid than the south, supports most of the few 
persons who live in the region and contains most of the desert's 



73 



Algeria: A Country Study 

oases. Sand dunes are the most prominent features of this 
area's topography, but between the desert areas of the Grand 
Erg Oriental and the Grand Erg Occidental (Great Western 
Erg) and extending north to the Atlas Saharien are plateaus, 
including a complex limestone structure called the Mzab 
where the Mzabite Berbers have settled. The southern zone of 
the Sahara is almost totally arid and is inhabited only by the 
Tuareg nomads and, recently, by oil camp workers. Barren rock 
predominates, but in some parts of Ahaggar and Tassili-n-Ajjer 
alluvial deposits permit garden farming. 

Climate and Hydrology 

Northern Algeria is in the temperate zone and enjoys a 
mild, Mediterranean climate. It lies within approximately the 
same latitudes as southern California and has somewhat similar 
climatic conditions. Its broken topography, however, provides 
sharp local contrasts in both prevailing temperatures and inci- 
dence of rainfall. Year-to-year variations in climatic conditions 
are also common. 

In the Tell, temperatures in summer average between 21 °C 
and 24°C and in winter drop to 10°C to 12°C. Winters are not 
cold, but the humidity is high and houses are seldom ade- 
quately heated. In eastern Algeria, the average temperatures 
are somewhat lower, and on the steppes of the High Plateaus 
winter temperatures hover only a few degrees above freezing. A 
prominent feature of the climate in this region is the sirocco, a 
dusty, choking south wind blowing off the desert, sometimes at 
gale force. This wind also occasionally reaches into the coastal 
Tell. 

In Algeria only a relatively small corner of the Sahara lies 
across the Tropic of Cancer in the torrid zone, but even in win- 
ter, midday desert temperatures can be very hot. After sunset, 
however, the clear, dry air permits rapid loss of heat, and the 
nights are cool to chilly. Enormous daily ranges in temperature 
are recorded. 

Rainfall is fairly abundant along the coastal part of the Tell, 
ranging from forty to sixty-seven centimeters annually, the 
amount of precipitation increasing from west to east. Precipita- 
tion is heaviest in the northern part of eastern Algeria, where it 
reaches as much as 100 centimeters in some years. Farther 
inland the rainfall is less plentiful. Prevailing winds that are 
easterly and northeasterly in summer change to westerly and 
northerly in winter and carry with them a general increase in 



74 



Landscape in Saharan area of Tassili-n-Ajjer contains needle-like rocks 
and petrified sand in shapes of castles and cathedrals. 

Courtesy LaVerle Berry 

precipitation from September to December, a decrease in the 
late winter and spring months, and a near absence of rainfall 
during the summer months. 

Terrain 

Clearing of land for agricultural use and cutting of timber 
over the centuries have severely reduced the once bountiful 
forest wealth. Forest fires have also taken their toll. In the 
higher and wetter portions of the Tell Atlas, cork oak and 
Aleppo pine grow in thick soils. At lower levels on thinner soils, 
drought-resistant shrubs predominate. The grapevine is indige- 
nous to the coastal lowlands, and grasses and scrub cover the 
High Plateaus. On the Saharan Atlas, little survives of the once 
extensive forests of Atlas cedar that have been exploited for 
fuel and timber since antiquity. 

The forest reserves in Algeria were severely reduced during 
the colonial period. In 1967 it was calculated that the country's 
forested area extended over no more than 2.4 million hectares 
of terrain, of which 1.8 million hectares were overgrown with 
brushwood and scrub. By contrast, woodlands in 1830 had cov- 
ered 4 million hectares. In the mid-1970s, however, the govern- 



75 



Algeria: A Country Study 

ment embarked on a vast reforestation program to help 
control erosion, which was estimated to affect 100,000 cubic 
meters of arable land annually. Among projects was one to cre- 
ate a barrage vert (green barrier) more or less following the 
ridge line of the Saharan Atlas and extending from Morocco to 
the Tunisian frontier in a zone 1,500 kilometers long and up to 
twenty kilometers wide. 

The barrage vert consists principally of Aleppo pine, a species 
that can thrive in areas of scanty rainfall. It is designed to 
restore a damaged ecological balance and to halt the northern 
encroachment of the Sahara. By the early 1980s, the desert had 
already penetrated the hilly gap between the Saharan Atlas and 
the Aures Mountains as far as the town of Bou Saada, a point 
well within the High Plateaus region. The barrage vert project 
was ended in the late 1980s because of lack of funds. 

Population 

Demographic Profile 

Algeria's population in January 1990 was 25.1 million, of 
whom 12.4 million were female and almost 12.7 were male. 
The figure compared with 12 million recorded in the 1966 cen- 
sus, 8.7 million on the eve of the War of Independence in 1954, 
and 4 million at the turn of the century. During the first twenty 
years after independence in 1962, the population doubled. 
The United States government estimate of Algeria's population 
in 1993 was 27.4 million, and projections were that there would 
be 32.5 million people in the country by the year 2000. 

Various French censuses conducted during the colonial 
period were inexact surveys relying on such techniques as 
counting tents and multiplying by six to determine the number 
of nomads. The surveys were enough, however, to paint a pic- 
ture of a quickening rate of population growth, the average 
annual rate of increase rising from 0.5 percent between 1900 
and 1910 to 2.7 percent between 1950 and 1955. During the 
period of hostilities that extended from 1954 to 1962, the pop- 
ulation grew at a greatly reduced rate because of the number of 
people killed in the war. The exact number of deaths is not 
known; French officials estimated it at 350,000, but Algerians 
placed it at 1.5 million. 

Population growth resumed at the end of hostilities, and in 
1966 the annual growth rate was estimated at 3.3 percent. Sub- 
sequently, the rate rose to 3.4 percent before subsiding to 3.2 



76 



The Society and Its Environment 



percent in the late 1970s, 3.1 in the early 1980s, and 2.8 per- 
cent for the 1990s, according to World Bank projections. 

The crude birth rate per 1,000 inhabitants fell in 1989 to 

34.3 from 45 in 1985, 48.8 for the 1970 to 1975 period, and 

50.4 for the 1960 to 1965 period, as estimated by the Popula- 
tion Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
of the United Nations (UN) and by the World Bank. Under 
progressively improving conditions of health and sanitation, 
the crude death rate declined from twenty-four deaths per 
1,000 in the period from 1950 to 1955 to eighteen per 1,000 in 
1965, three years after independence. By 1990 it had fallen to 
eight per 1,000. Life expectancy at birth rose from forty-two 
years for males and forty-four for females in the 1950 to 1955 
period, to forty-nine years for males and fifty-one years for 
females in 1965, to sixty-five years for males and sixty-six for 
females in 1990, a marked improvement reflecting the major 
transformations in the health sector. 

From the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, the average Algerian 
woman produced seven to eight children. The figure rose to 
slightly more than nine for women who married before the age 
of eighteen, but fell to nearly seven in the case of females who 
married after the age of twenty-one. The birth rate was only 
slightly lower in urban than in rural areas. In 1990 it was esti- 
mated that the total fertility rate had fallen to 5.1 children per 
woman, a considerable decline. 

The 1966 census showed that the population was very 
young; some 48.2 percent of Algerians were under the age of 
fifteen. The 1977 census confirmed this pattern, although the 
age-group under fifteen declined slightly to 47.9 percent of the 
population. By 1990, only 40.6 percent of the population (10.6 
million Algerians) were under the age of fifteen. The propor- 
tion of the population under nineteen also showed signs of 
decline. In the mid-1980s, official sources reported that about 
57 percent of the population was under age nineteen, but by 
1990 that age-group constituted just over one-half the popula- 
tion, or 51.2 percent, a drop of almost 6 percentage points in 
five years. 

In terms of age structure, detailed data showed that in 1990 
males were slightly more numerous than females at birth and 
through the forty- to forty-four age-group. Thereafter, women 
predominated in all age categories because of the somewhat 
higher death rates for men than for women in the higher age- 
groups (see fig. 5). 



77 



Algeria: A Country Study 



Migration 

Two major external migratory movements have reshaped 
the settlement pattern since World War II: the abrupt depar- 
ture of most of the European colonists in 1962 and 1963 and 
the flow of Algerian workers to the European continent — 
chiefly to France. In 1945 Algerian workers and their families 
in France numbered about 350,000, and in 1964 they num- 
bered an estimated 500,000. By the early 1980s, they totaled 
800,000, according to official French figures. About 350,000 
were male workers, the remainder being women and children 
under seventeen years of age. Many were from the Kabylie, a 
poor agricultural region that suffered severely during the War 
of Independence. In addition to these migrants, 400,000 harkis 
(Algerians who served with the French army in the War of 
Independence) resided permanently in France, mostly in the 
south. 

In 1968 the Algerian and French governments set a quota 
on migrants of 35,000 per year, which was reduced to 25,000 in 
1971. Although Algeria suspended all migration to France in 
1973, an estimated 7,000 Algerians nonetheless continued to 
migrate illegally each year at the end of the 1970s. In the mid- 
1970s, both France and Algeria offered incentives to migrants 
to return home, one of them being guaranteed housing. 
Although figures were hard to obtain, it appeared that few 
responded to these gestures. 

The economic crisis in Europe in the aftermath of the Arab 
oil embargo of 1973 led to a recession that affected Algerians 
as well as other North Africans working in Europe, primarily in 
France. Because of rising unemployment, French trade unions 
began to agitate against migrant workers, claiming that they 
took jobs from French men and women. Governments in 
France and other European countries instituted new policies to 
control migration from North Africa and other parts of the 
developing world. 

The impact of those new policies had a paradoxical effect 
on Algerian and other North African migrants in France. They 
had been quite content until then to move back and forth 
between France and their homeland, never quite settling in 
France, and generally keeping their families in Algeria, Tuni- 
sia, or Morocco. After the new policies were instituted, 
migrants feared that they might never be able to return to 
France if they went home to visit their families. Rather than risk 
losing their residence abroad, many migrants opted to bring 



78 



The Society and Its Environment 



their families to Europe and set up more permanent forms of 
residence there. 

French trade unions reacted by formulating policies that 
restricted the rights of migrant workers even more than before. 
By 1980 Algerians and other North African workers had lost 
their union rights and benefits, and by 1984 the unions that 
had sprung up to represent the migrants were no longer insist- 
ing that they have the same economic and social rights as the 
indigenous work force. Whereas in 1974 French trade union 
resolutions stated that migration had to be contained, a decade 
later they had taken the position that migration had to be 
stopped. 

To make matters worse, Algerians and other migrants from 
the Maghrib were always perceived as migrant workers and so 
were rarely naturalized in France. The majority, therefore, in 
the early 1990s had no voice in the French political system and 
did not represent a political force or even an interest group 
that could exert pressure to defend its rights. Their visibility 
and vulnerability, however, made them an easy target for those 
who wished to find scapegoats for the problems ailing Euro- 
pean economies. 

Urbanization and Density 

Data from the World Bank's World Development Report, 1992 
indicated that in 1990 about 52 percent of the Algerian popula- 
tion lived in urban regions. By comparison, in 1981 the UN 
estimated the urbanized segment of the population at 44 per- 
cent, up from 41 percent in 1977 and 30 percent in 1960. 
Urbanization has occurred in part through population growth, 
which has converted villages into towns and towns into cities, 
but urban migration has played at least as important a role. 
During the decade of the 1970s, unofficial estimates held that 
1.7 million peasants settled in Algiers, Oran, Constantine, and 
Annaba, a continuation of the enormous shift in population 
from the countryside to the cities that began at independence. 
The largest cities attracted many of these migrants, but the 
1977 census showed that many smaller towns and cities grew 
even faster, probably because of economic and administrative 
decentralization efforts during the 1970s. Algiers remained the 
largest urbanized area. A city of fewer than 500,000 people with 
a predominantly European population in 1954, it increased to 
nearly 1 million inhabitants by 1966 despite the loss of most of 
its European inhabitants. In 1987 census figures showed that 



79 



Algeria: A Country Study 



TOTAL POPULATION IN 1987: 22.6 MILLION 




2000 1500 1000 500 500 1000 1500 2000 
POPULATION IN THOUSANDS 



Figure 5. Population by Age and Gender, 1987 

Source: Based on information from United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1991, New 
York, 1992, 152-53. 



Algiers proper contained 1,483,000 inhabitants and was still 
growing. Algeria's other major cities also grew between 1977 
and 1987: Oran's population increased from 490,000 to 
590,000; Constantine from 344,000 to 438,000; Annaba from 
240,000 to 310,000; Batna from 102,000 to 182,000; Setif from 
129,000 to 168,000; and Blidafrom 138,000 to 165,000. 

In the mid-1980s the pace of urbanization, estimated unoffi- 
cially at 5.6 percent per year, was causing concern to planning 
authorities, who were endeavoring to slow its tempo if not stop 
it altogether. Government-sponsored agrarian reform pro- 
grams and investment in rural housing were initiated to 
improve the quality of farm life and thus to stabilize the rural 
population. It was hoped that these same measures would 



80 



The Society and Its Environment 



relieve the acute pressure on urban housing, a by-product of 
massive urbanization. 

According to Algerian government figures, 87 percent of 
the population resided on 17 percent of the nation's land. The 
population density, averaging 10.5 inhabitants per square kilo- 
meter in mid-1990, varied enormously from 2,500 per square 
kilometer in Algiers to less than one per square kilometer in 
the mid-Sahara. All major cities and most of the rural popula- 
tion occupied a quadrilateral that extended about 100 kilome- 
ters from the coast and stretched from Morocco to Tunisia. 
Within this area, there was a difference in the way the land was 
used. In the west, formerly the area of French vineyards and cit- 
rus groves, was a region of socialized autogestion (see Glossary) 
farms. A short distance east of Algiers, the land rises toward the 
Kabylie and Aures mountain zones of eastern Algeria. In an 
area only about two hours distant by highway from Algiers, a 
densely packed rural population continues to live in remote 
mountain areas, sheltered from outside influences and main- 
taining Berber languages and customs in their purest forms. 

In the heavily populated northern part of the country, the 
average population density does not change substantially from 
west to east. Farther inland the population density declines 
progressively southward through the High Plateaus and the 
Saharan Atlas mountains, averaging from forty-nine persons 
down to ten people per square kilometer. Within the Sahara, 
the same trend of diminishing population from north to south 
is evident. In the northern half of the Sahara, road distances 
between populated oases seldom exceed 170 kilometers. The 
southern half of the Algerian Sahara, however, is peopled by 
only a few thousand Tuareg. The only town of any importance 
is Tamanrasset, deep in the Ahaggar highlands. 

Ethnic Groups and Languages 
The Peoples 

The origins of the Berbers are unclear; a number of waves 
of people, some from Western Europe, some from sub-Saharan 
Africa, and others from Northeast Africa, eventually settled in 
North Africa and made up its indigenous population. Because 
present-day Berbers and the overwhelming majority of the 
Arabs largely descend from the same indigenous stock, physical 
distinctions carry little or no social connotation and are in 
most instances impossible to make. The term Berber is derived 



81 



Algeria: A Country Study 

from the Greeks, who used it to refer to the people of North 
Africa. The term was retained by the Romans, Arabs, and other 
groups who occupied the region, but is not used by the people 
themselves. Identification with the Berber or Arab community 
is largely a matter of personal choice rather than of member- 
ship in discrete and bounded social entities. In addition to 
their own language, many adult Berbers also speak Arabic and 
French; for centuries Berbers have entered the general society 
and merged, within a generation or two, into the Arab group. 

This permeable boundary between the two major ethnic 
groups permits a good deal of movement and, along with other 
factors, prevents the development of rigid and exclusive ethnic 
blocs. It appears that whole groups slipped across the ethnic 
"boundary" in the past — and others may do so in the future. In 
areas of linguistic contiguity, bilingualism is common, and in 
most cases Arabic eventually comes to predominate. 

Algerian Arabs, or native speakers of Arabic, include 
descendants of Arab invaders and of indigenous Berbers. Since 
1966, however, the Algerian census no longer has had a cate- 
gory for Berbers; thus, it is only an estimate that Algerian 
Arabs, the major ethnic group of the country, constitute 80 
percent of Algeria's people and are culturally and politically 
dominant. The mode of life of Arabs varies from region to 
region. Nomadic herders are found in the desert, settled culti- 
vators and gardeners in the Tell, and urban dwellers on the 
coast. Linguistically, the various Arab groups differ little from 
each other, except that dialects spoken by nomadic and semi- 
nomadic peoples are thought to be derived from beduin dia- 
lects; the dialects spoken by the sedentary population of the 
north are thought to stem from those of early seventh-century 
invaders. Urban Arabs are more apt to identify with the Alge- 
rian nation, whereas ethnic loyalties of more remote rural 
Arabs are likely to be limited to the tribe. 

The major Berber groups are the Kabyles of the Kabylie 
Mountains east of Algiers and the Chaouia of the Aures range 
south of Constantine. Smaller groups include the Mzab of the 
northern Sahara region and the Tuareg of the southern Ahag- 
gar highlands, both of which have clearly definable characteris- 
tics. The Berber peasantry can also be found in the Atlas 
Mountains close to Blida, and on the massifs of Dahra and 
Ouarsenis on either side of the Chelif River valley. Altogether, 
the Berbers constitute about 20 percent of the population. 



82 



The Society and Its Environment 



In the hills north of the Chelif River and in some other parts 
of the Tell, Berbers live in villages among the sedentary Arabs, 
not sharply distinguished in their way of life from the Arabic 
speakers but maintaining their own language and a sense of 
ethnic identity. In addition, in some oasis towns of the Algerian 
Sahara, small Berber groups remain unassimilated to Arab cul- 
ture and retain their own language and some of their cultural 
differences. 

By far the largest of the Berber-speaking groups, the Kaby- 
les, do not refer to themselves as Berbers but as Imazighen or, 
in the singular, as Amazigh, which means noble or free men. 
Some traces of the original blue-eyed and blond-haired Berbers 
survive to contrast the people from this region with the darker- 
skinned Arabic speakers of the plains. The land is poor, and 
the pressure of a dense and rapidly growing population has 
forced many to migrate to France or to the coastal cities. Kaby- 
les can be found in every part of the country, but in their new 
environments they tend to gather and to retain some of their 
clan solidarity and sense of ethnic identity. 

Kabyle villages, built on the crests of hills, are close- knit, 
independent, social and political units composed of a number 
of extended patrilineal kin groups. Traditionally, local govern- 
ment consisted of a jamaa (village council), which included all 
adult males and legislated according to local custom and law. 
Efforts to modify this democratic system were only partially suc- 
cessful, and the jamaa has continued to function alongside the 
civil administration. The majority of Berber mountain peasants 
hold their land as mulk, or private property, in contrast to those 
of the valleys and oases where the tribe retains certain rights 
over land controlled by its members. 

Set apart by their habitat, language, and well-organized vil- 
lage and social life, Kabyles have a highly developed sense of 
independence and group solidarity. They have generally 
opposed incursions of Arabs and Europeans into their region, 
and much of the resistance activity during the War of Indepen- 
dence was concentrated in the Kabylie region. Major Kabyle 
uprisings took place against the French in 1871, 1876, and 
1882; the Chaouia rebelled in 1879. 

Perhaps half as numerous as the Kabyles and less densely 
settled, the Chaouia have occupied the rugged Aures Moun- 
tains of eastern Algeria since their retreat to that region from 
Tunisia during the Arab invasions of the Middle Ages. In the 
north they are settled agriculturalists, growing grain in the 



83 



Algeria: A Country Study 



uplands and fruit trees in the valleys. In the arid south, with its 
date-palm oases, they are seminomadic, shepherding flocks to 
the high plains during the summer. The distinction between 
the two groups is limited, however, because the farmers of the 
north are also drovers, and the seminomads of the south main- 
tain plots of land. 

In the past, the Chaouia lived in isolation broken only by vis- 
its of Kabyle peddlers and Saharan camel raisers, and relatively 
few learned to speak either French or Arabic. Like their society, 
their economy was self-sufficient and closed. Emigration was 
limited, but during the War of Independence the region was a 
stronghold of anti-French sentiment, and more than one-half 
of the population was removed to concentration camps. Dur- 
ing the postindependence era, the ancient Chaouia isolation 
has lessened. 

Far less numerous than their northern Berber kin are the 
Mzab, whose number was estimated at 100,000 in the mid- 
1980s. They live beside the Oued Mzab, from which comes 
their name. Ghardaia is their largest and most important oasis 
community. The Mzab are Ibadi (see Glossary) Muslims who 
practice a puritanical form of Islam that emphasizes asceticism, 
literacy for men and women, and social egalitarianism. 

The Mzab used to be important in trans-Saharan trade but 
now have moved into other occupations. Some of their mem- 
bers have moved to the cities, where in Algiers, for example, 
they dominate the grocery and butchery business. They have 
also extended their commerce south to sub-Saharan Africa, 
where they and other tribal people trade with cash and letters 
of exchange, make loans on the harvest, and sell on credit. 

Of all Berber subgroups, the Tuareg until recently have 
been the least affected by the outside world. Known as "the 
blue men" because of their indigo-dyed cotton robes and as 
"people of the veil" because the men — but not the women — 
always veil, the Tuareg inhabit the Sahara from southwest Libya 
to Mali. In southern Algeria, they are concentrated in the high- 
lands of Tassili-n-Ajjer and Ahaggar and in the 1970s were esti- 
mated to number perhaps 5,000 to 10,000. They are organized 
into tribes and, at least among the Ahaggar Tuareg, into a 
three-tiered class system of nobles, vassals, and slaves and ser- 
vants, the last group often being of negroid origin. Tuareg 
women enjoy high status and many privileges. They do not live 
in seclusion, and their social responsibilities equal those of 
men. 



84 



Tuareg tribesmen dancing 
Courtesy ANEP 



A Kabyle woman 
Courtesy Nadia Benchallal and 
Middle East Report 




85 



Algeria: A Country Study 



In the past, the Tuareg were famed as camel and cattle 
herdsmen and as guides and protectors of caravans that plied 
between West Africa and North Africa. Both occupations have 
greatly declined during the twentieth century under the 
impact of colonial and independent government policies, tech- 
nology, and consumerism associated with the hydrocarbon 
industry and, most recently, drought. The result has been the 
breakup of the old social hierarchy and gradual sedentariza- 
tion around such oases as Djanet and Tamanrasset. 

Although of considerable importance before indepen- 
dence, the non-Muslim minorities have shrunk to a mere frac- 
tion of their former size. Immediately after independence, 
approximately 1 million Europeans, including 140,000 Jews, 
left the country. Most of the Europeans who left had French 
citizenship, and all identified with French rather than Arab cul- 
ture and society. During colonial times, the Algerian and Euro- 
pean groups had effectively formed two separate subsocieties 
having little social interaction or intermarriage except among 
highly Europeanized Algerians. 

In the early 1980s, the total foreign population was esti- 
mated at roughly 117,000. Of this number, about 75,000 were 
Europeans, including about 45,000 French. Many foreigners 
worked as technicians and teachers. 

Languages: Arabic and Berber 

Except for Europeans, ethnic communities in Algeria were 
distinguished primarily by language. Before the arrival of Ara- 
bic-speaking invaders, Berber was the language of the indige- 
nous population. Arabic encroached gradually, spreading 
through the areas most accessible to migrants and conquerors. 
Berber remained the mother tongue in many rural areas. 

Arabic, the language of the majority and the official lan- 
guage of the country, is a Semitic tongue related to Hebrew, 
Aramaic, and Amharic. The dominant language throughout 
North Africa and the Middle East, Arabic was introduced to the 
coastal regions by the Arab conquerors of the seventh and 
eighth centuries A.D. (see Islam and the Arabs, 642-1830, ch. 
1). Arabic language and culture had an even greater impact 
under the influence of the beduin Arabs, who arrived in 
greater numbers from the eleventh century onward. 

Written Arabic is psychologically and sociologically impor- 
tant as the vehicle of Islam and Arab culture and as the link 
with other Arab countries. Two forms are used: the classical 



86 



The Society and Its Environment 



Arabic of the Quran and Algerian dialectical Arabic. Classical 
Arabic is the essential base of written Arabic and formal speech 
throughout the Arab world. It is the vehicle of a vast religious, 
scientific, historical, and literary heritage. Arabic scholars or 
individuals with a good classical education from any country 
can converse with one another. 

In classical Arabic as in other Semitic scripts, only the conso- 
nants are written; vowel signs and other diacritical marks to aid 
in pronunciation are employed occasionally in printed texts. 
The script is cursive, lending itself to use as decoration. 

There has been considerable borrowing of words between 
Berber and Arabic. In some Arabic-speaking areas, the words 
for various flora and fauna are still in Berber, and Berber place- 
names are numerous throughout the country, some of them 
borrowed. Examples of Berber place-names are Illizi, Skikda, 
Tamanrasset, Tipasa, and Tizi Ouzou. 

Berber is primarily a spoken language, although an ancient 
Berber script called tifinagh survives among the Tuareg of the 
Algerian Sahara, where the characters are used more for spe- 
cial purposes than for communication. Several Berber dialect 
groups are recognized in modern Algeria, but only Kabyle and 
Chaouia are spoken by any considerable number. The Chaouia 
dialect, which is distinguishable from but related to Kabyle, 
bears the mark and influence of Arabic. Separate dialects, how- 
ever, are spoken by the Tuareg and by the Mzab. 

Arabization 

Of all Arab countries subject to European rule, Algeria 
absorbed the heaviest colonial impact. The French controlled 
education, government, business, and most intellectual life for 
132 years and through a policy of cultural imperialism 
attempted to suppress Algerian cultural identity and to remold 
the society along French lines. The effects of this policy, which 
continued to reverberate throughout Algeria after 1962, have 
perhaps been most evident in the legacy of a dual language sys- 
tem. 

French colonial policy was explicitly designed to "civilize" 
the country by imposing French language and culture on it. A 
French report written on the eve of the French conquest noted 
that in 1830 the literacy rate in Algeria was 40 percent, a 
remarkable rate even by modern standards. Quranic schools 
were primarily responsible for literacy in Algeria, as reading 
meant being able to learn the Quran. Twenty years later, only 



87 



Algeria: A Country Study 



half the schools continued to operate as a result of the French 
colonial policy of dismantling the existing education system 
and replacing it with a French system. 

As a result, education was oriented toward French, and 
advanced education in literary Arabic declined drastically. Dia- 
lectical Arabic remained the language of everyday discourse 
among the vast majority of the population, but it was cut off 
from contemporary intellectual and technological develop- 
ments and consequently failed to develop the flexibility and 
vocabulary needed for modern bureaucratic, financial, and 
intellectual affairs. 

The better schools and the University of Algiers aimed at 
comparability with French institutions and prepared students 
for French examinations. Gradually, a small but influential 
French-speaking indigenous elite was formed, who competed 
with European colonists for jobs in the modern sector. Berbers, 
or more specifically, Kabyles, were represented in dispropor- 
tionately large numbers in this elite because the French, as part 
of their "divide and rule" policy, deliberately favored Kabyles in 
education and employment in the colonial system. As a result, 
in the years after independence Kabyles moved into all levels of 
state administration across Algeria, where they remained a 
large and influential group. 

In reaction to French cultural and linguistic imperialism, 
the leaders of the War of Independence (1954-62) and succes- 
sive governments committed themselves to reviving indigenous 
Arabic and Islamic cultural values and to establishing Arabic as 
the national language. The aim was to recover the precolonial 
past and to use it, together with Arabic, to restore — if not cre- 
ate — a national identity and personality for the new state and 
population. Translated into an official policy called arabiza- 
tion, it was consistently supported by arabists, who were ascen- 
dant in the Algerian government following independence. 
Their goal was a country where the language (Arabic), religion 
(Islam), and national identity (Algerian) were free, as far as 
practical, of French language and influence. 

Culturally, the emphasis was on developing the various 
forms of public communication and on cultivating Algerian 
themes that could then be popularized through these media. 
The major effort, however, centered on language, and it was 
the quest for a "national" language that became the hallmark 
of arabization and that has aroused the most controversy and 
outright opposition. 



88 



The Society and Its Environment 



Beginning in the late 1960s, the government of President 
Houari Boumediene decided upon complete arabization as a 
national goal and began the first steps to promote Arabic in the 
bureaucracy and in the schools. Arabization was introduced 
slowly in schools, starting with the primary schools and in 
social science and humanities subjects; only in the 1980s did 
Arabic begin to be introduced as the language of instruction in 
some grades and some subjects at the secondary level (see Edu- 
cation, this ch.). 

The problems inherent in the process of language promo- 
tion immediately came to the fore. One of the most obvious 
involved literary Arabic, a language in which many Algerians 
were not conversant. Qualified Arabic teachers were almost 
totally lacking. Other obstacles included the widespread use of 
French in the state-run media and the continued preference 
for French as the working language of government and of 
urban society. It soon became obvious to students who 
obtained an education in Arabic that their prospects for gain- 
ful employment were bleak without facility in French, a fact 
that contributed to general public skepticism about the pro- 
gram. 

Important as these problems were, the real opposition came 
from two main quarters: the "modernizers" among bureaucrats 
and technocrats and the Berbers, or, more specifically, the 
Kabyles. For the urban elite, French constituted the medium of 
modernization and technology. French facilitated their access 
to Western commerce and to economic development theory 
and culture, and their command of the language guaranteed 
their continued social and political prominence. 

The Kabyles identified with these arguments. Young Kabyle 
students were particularly vocal in expressing their opposition 
to arabization. In the early 1980s, their movement and 
demands formed the basis of the "Berber question" or the 
Kabyle "cultural movement." 

Militant Kabyles complained about "cultural imperialism" 
and "domination" by the Arabic-speaking majority. They vigor- 
ously opposed arabization of the education system and the gov- 
ernment bureaucracy. They also demanded recognition of the 
Kabyle dialect as a primary national language, respect for Ber- 
ber culture, and greater attention to the economic develop- 
ment of Kabylie and other Berber homelands. 

The Kabyle "cultural movement" was more than a reaction 
against arabization. Rather, it challenged the centralizing poli- 



89 



Algeria: A Country Study 



cies the national government had pursued since 1962 and 
sought wider scope for regional development free of bureau- 
cratic controls. Essentially, the issue was the integration of 
Kabylie into the Algerian body politic. To the extent that the 
Kabyle position reflected parochial Kabyle interests and region- 
alism, it did not find favor with other Berber groups or with 
Algerians at large. 

Long-simmering passions about arabization boiled over in 
late 1979 and early 1980. In response to demands of Arabic-lan- 
guage university students for increased arabization, Kabyle stu- 
dents in Algiers and Tizi Ouzou, the provincial capital of 
Kabylie, went on strike in the spring of 1980. At Tizi Ouzou, the 
students were forcibly cleared from the university, an action 
that precipitated tension and a general strike throughout Kaby- 
lie. A year later, there were renewed Kabyle demonstrations. 

The government's response to the Kabyle outburst was firm 
yet cautious. Arabization was reaffirmed as official state policy, 
but it proceeded at a moderate pace. The government quickly 
reestablished a chair of Berber studies at the University of Alg- 
iers that had been abolished in 1973 and promised a similar 
chair for the University of Tizi Ouzou, as well as language 
departments for Berber and dialectical Arabic at four other 
universities. At the same time, levels of development funding 
for Kabylie were increased significantly. 

By the mid-1980s, arabization had begun to produce some 
measurable results. In the primary schools, instruction was in 
literary Arabic; French was taught as a second language, begin- 
ning in the third year. On the secondary level, arabization was 
proceeding on a grade-by-grade basis. French remained the 
main language of instruction in the universities, despite the 
demands of arabists. 

A 1968 law requiring officials in government ministries to 
acquire at least minimal facility in literary Arabic has produced 
spotty results. The Ministry of Justice came closest to the goal 
by arabizing internal functions and all court proceedings dur- 
ing the 1970s. Other ministries, however, were slower to follow 
suit, and French remained in general use. An effort was also 
made to use radio and television to popularize literary Arabic. 
By the mid-1980s, programming in dialectical Arabic and Ber- 
ber had increased, whereas broadcasts in French had declined 
sharply. 

The arabization issue developed political aspects as well. For 
example, in 1991 when political parties were allowed to form 



90 



The Society and Its Environment 



and run in national elections, the Front of Socialist Forces, 
headed by Hocine Ait Ahmed, representing the Kabyle people, 
ran on a secular and culturally pluralist platform. Another 
party, also representing the Kabyle, was the Rally for Culture 
and Democracy, which ran on a platform defending Kabyle cul- 
ture and opposing the exclusive use of Arabic at the official 
level and all programs of arabization. 

Structure of Society 

As is true of other peoples of the Maghrib, Algerian society 
has considerable historical depth and has been subjected to a 
number of external influences and migrations. Fundamentally 
Berber in cultural and racial terms, the society was organized 
around extended family, clan, and tribe and was adapted to a 
rural rather than an urban setting before the arrival of the 
Arabs and, later, the French. An identifiable modern class 
structure began to materialize during the colonial period. This 
structure has undergone further differentiation in the period 
since independence, despite the country's commitment to 
egalitarian ideals. 

Preindependence Society 

During the Ottoman period, before the coming of the 
French in 1830, the people were divided among a few ancient 
cities and a sparsely settled countryside where subsistence 
farmers and nomadic herdsmen lived in small, ethnically 
homogeneous groups. Rural patterns of social organization 
had many common features, although some differences 
existed between Arabs and Berbers and between nomads and 
settled cultivators. The groups did not form a cohesive social 
class because individual behavior and action were circum- 
scribed by the framework of tribe or clan. 

In this period, 5 to 6 percent of the population lived in cit- 
ies. The cities were the location of the principal mosques and 
the major sharia (Islamic law) courts and institutions of higher 
Islamic learning. Various Islamic legal schools, such as the 
Hanafi (see Glossary) and Maliki (see Glossary) as well as the 
Ibadi schools, also had their mosques in the cities. In addition, 
cities had public baths and markets, where goods coming from 
various parts of the world were traded. Local military forces 
were housed in citadels that towered over urban centers, and 
the houses and administrative offices of the Ottoman ruling 



91 



Algeria: A Country Study 

elite were also located in some of the principal cities, such as 
Algiers. 

The cities were divided into quarters that were self-con- 
tained and self-sufficient. For security they could be closed off 
at night and during times of crises, and their own leading citi- 
zens managed the internal affairs of the quarters. 

The heterogeneous population of the cities included men 
of mixed Turkish and Algerian descent called Kouloughli 
Moors, a term coined by the French to refer to descendants of 
Andalusian refugees; Christian slaves from around the Mediter- 
ranean captured by Barbary Coast pirates; and African slaves 
who worked as laborers and domestics. The cities also had 
small Jewish communities that would become more important 
under the French colonial system. Many cities had small groups 
of Mzab who owned grocery and butcher shops and operated 
the public baths, and Kabyles who came briefly to the cities 
before returning to their areas of origin. 

In the rural areas, social organization depended primarily 
on kinship ties. The basic kinship unit was the ayla, a small lin- 
eage whose members claimed descent through males from a 
common grandfather or great-grandfather. The male members 
of such a group maintained mutual economic obligations and 
recognized a form of collective ownership of pastoral or agri- 
cultural lands. More than one ayla formed the larger lineage, 
whose members traced their origin to a more remote male 
ancestor. Beyond these lineages were the patrilineal clans 
called adhrum by the Kabyles and firq by the Arabs, in which 
kinship was assumed and the links between individuals and 
families were close. The largest units consisted of tribes that 
were aggregations of clans claiming common or related ances- 
tors or of clans brought together by the force of circumstance. 
Sharing a common territory, name, and way of life, member 
units of a tribe, particularly among the Berbers, had little polit- 
ical cohesion and tended to accept the authority of a chief only 
when faced with the danger of alien conquest or subjugation. 
Tribal confederations were rare in the modern era but were 
more common before the nineteenth century. 

Among settled and nomadic Arab groups, tribes and their 
components were arranged along a gradient of social prestige. 
The standing of an individual depended on membership in a 
ranked group; tribal rank depended on the standing of the 
highest-ranking lineage of each tribe. The shurfa (nobles alleg- 
edly descended from the Prophet Muhammad) and 



92 



The Society and Its Environment 



marabouts, venerated for their spiritual power, held the high- 
est ranks. Affairs of mutual interest to all clans were adminis- 
tered by the clan heads under the leadership of a qaid (tribal 
chief), who exercised nearly absolute authority. 

Settled Berber groups were democratic and egalitarian. The 
community, an aggregation of localized clans consisting of a 
cluster of hamlets or a village inhabited by a single clan, was 
governed by ^jamaa composed of all adult males. Social stratifi- 
cation of the kind found in Arab groups did not exist in Berber 
villages. 

The typical Kabyle villages in the Aures Mountains and the 
Atlas Mountains around Blida were always built above culti- 
vated lands, on or close to mountain tops. They were enclosed 
by walls with doors that opened inward. The slopes were often 
terraced to allow the Kabyles to cultivate olive and fruit 
orchards and to grow wheat and barley. The animals kept by 
the Kabyles grazed on the vegetation that grew on rocky slopes 
unsuitable for agriculture. 

French rule and European settlement brought far-reaching 
social changes. Europeans took over the economic and politi- 
cal life of the country, monopolizing professional, large-scale 
commercial, and administrative activities, exploiting agricul- 
tural and other resources of the land, and remaining socially 
aloof. The small Algerian middle stratum of urban merchants 
and city artisans was squeezed out, and landowners of the coun- 
tryside were dispossessed. 

The European population increased rapidly in the nine- 
teenth century, more than quadrupling from 26,987 in the 
early 1840s to 125,963 a decade later, and reaching almost 2 
million by the turn of the century. This population growth, 
coupled with the appropriation of cultivated and pastoral lands 
by colonials, which increased sharply in the early twentieth cen- 
tury, created tremendous pressures on the cultivable land. Dis- 
placed villagers and tribesmen flocked to towns and cities, 
where they formed an unskilled labor mass, ill-adapted to 
industrial work, scorned by Europeans, and isolated from the 
kinship units that had formerly given them security and a sense 
of solidarity. This urban movement increased after World War I 
and after World War II. At the same time, large numbers of 
Algerians migrated to France in search of work. The Kabyles 
were the principal migrants; during the 1950s, as many as 10 
percent of the people of the Kabylie region were working in 



93 



Algeria: A Country Study 

France at any one time; even larger numbers were working in 
cities of the Tell. 

Europeans constituted a separate sector of society, and the 
European-Algerian dichotomy was the country's basic social 
division. The settlers who came to Algeria in the nineteenth 
century included not only French but also large numbers of 
Italians and Spaniards who could not find work in their home 
countries and came in search of new opportunities. The 
expression pieds noirs (black feet), used to refer to settlers, was 
allegedly based on the barefoot condition of many of the 
impoverished European settlers. 

The top echelon of the country included a few Algerians 
who had amassed land and wealth, as well as some respected 
Arabic scholars and a few successful professionals. An indige- 
nous landowning aristocracy of any importance had never 
existed, however, and French colonials did not want an Alge- 
rian middle class competing with them for jobs and status. 
Moreover, the Algerians lived in quarters of the cities separate 
from the Europeans and seldom intermarried with them. 

In the early twentieth century, a new Algerian merchant 
group began to intermarry with the old upper-stratum families. 
Their children were educated in French schools, at home or in 
France, to become a new Western-oriented elite composed of 
lawyers, physicians, pharmacists, teachers, administrators, and 
a small scattering of political leaders. The opportunity for 
social mobility for these Westernized Algerians, or evolues, how- 
ever, remained extremely limited; on the eve of the revolution, 
only a scattering of jobs requiring professional or technical 
skills were held by Algerians. 

The peasant migrants to the cities tended to gather in sepa- 
rate quarters according to their ethnic origin, and certain peo- 
ples became associated with specific occupations. But 
overcrowding and housing shortages often forced persons of a 
given tribe or village to scatter throughout a city, and the soli- 
darity of migrant groups decreased. Nevertheless, many 
migrants retained contact with family members. 

Nomadic clans no longer holding sufficient flocks or terri- 
tory were obliged to accept the humiliation of sedentary exist- 
ence. The process of sedentarization usually started with the 
settling of a few nomadic families on the outskirts of a town 
with which they had maintained trading relations. Accepted 
eventually as part of the community by the original clan inhab- 
itants, the former nomads often assumed as their own one of 



94 



The Society and Its Environment 



the traditional ancestors or marabouts of the community. Resi- 
dential propinquity usually did not, however, overcome the 
social distance between traditional cultivators and former herd- 
ers because each looked down on the way of life of the other. 

The Revolution and Social Change 

After generations of gradual change under the French, the 
War of Independence struck Algerian society with cataclysmic 
force, and victory introduced other major social changes. The 
influence of the war permeated the society in both country and 
city and at the personal, familial, and local levels. 

In response to the conflict, individuals developed new per- 
ceptions of themselves, their abilities, and their roles through 
wartime activities. Women, accustomed to a sheltered and seg- 
regated life, found themselves suddenly thrust into revolution- 
ary militancy. For many, the war offered the first opportunity 
for independent activity in the world beyond the home. Many 
young people struck out independently of their families and 
their elders, and new leaders emerged, chosen more for per- 
sonal traits than for social position. 

The often brutal fighting, stretching across much of the 
country for nearly eight years, disrupted or emptied many 
rural villages. The deliberate French policy of resettlement of 
rural populations gathered more than 2 million villagers in 
French-built fortified settlements under a regroupement pro- 
gram. The total number of Algerians displaced by the war can- 
not be accurately known, but Algerian authorities place the 
figure at more than 3 million permanently or temporarily 
moved. In 1965 about 2 million people remained in the cen- 
ters. By 1972 their numbers had decreased markedly and some 
of the centers closed; several centers, however, became perma- 
nent settlements. 

As a result of these displacements, a sizable portion of the 
population lost its ties with the land on which ancestors had 
lived for generations and consequently with the social groups 
the land had supported. Families found themselves separated 
from fellow clan members and extended family members. The 
housing supplied by the French was suitable for the nuclear 
family rather than the traditional extended household, and 
persons who had formerly lived by subsistence farming became 
accustomed to functioning in a cash economy. 

The disappearance of small communities of kin eliminated 
the social control by reputation and gossip that had formerly 



95 



Algeria: A Country Study 



existed. Instead, residents of the French relocation centers 
began to develop feelings of solidarity with strangers who had 
shared a common fate. The destruction of the old communi- 
ties particularly affected the lives of women, sometimes in con- 
tradictory ways. Despite being released from the restraints 
imposed by family scrutiny, women from rural villages, where 
wearing the veil was rare, adopted the veil voluntarily as a 
means of public concealment. 

Traditional relations between generations also were over- 
turned, and class differences were submerged. The young 
could adapt to the new ways, but the old were ill-equipped for 
change and so relinquished much of their former prestige and 
authority. In addition, rural people became more interested in 
comfort and consumption, which began to replace the frugal- 
ity that had characterized traditional village life. 

Toward a Modern Society 

At independence Algerian society differed greatly from its 
condition at the beginning of the struggle for liberation. The 
exodus of Europeans in 1962-63, left a society composed pri- 
marily of illiterate peasants and sizable numbers of urban 
laborers. It was estimated that less than 1 percent of the 1964 
population had belonged to the middle and upper classes dur- 
ing the 1950s. Educated persons remaining in the country were 
insufficient to staff all the positions in government and indus- 
try vacated by the Europeans. A criteria of prestige stemming 
from the war had also entered the social reckoning; those who 
had participated actively in the fighting or suffered loss 
because of it became eligible for special benefits or consider- 
ation. 

During the colonial period, the country's most significant 
social distinctions had been those that separated Europeans 
from Algerians. Europeans had ranged from great industrialists 
through middle-class businesspeople, professionals, and farm- 
ers to unskilled workers. The Algerian population had also cov- 
ered a range from well-to-do business and professional families 
to landless rural laborers. Distinctions, however, were blurred 
by the disabilities and discrimination suffered during the war 
by all Algerians and by the ideological emphasis on the unity of 
the Algerian people. 

The removal of the European community permitted the 
appearance of the rudiments of a modern class system in which 
probably the most influential group consisted of French- 



96 



The Society and Its Environment 



trained technocrats, civil servants, army officers, and senior 
functionaries of the National Liberation Front (Front de 
Liberation Nationale — FLN). The few indigenous industrialists 
lacked great influence, but the bureaucrats and technocrats 
who managed the government and its expanding enterprises 
began to form a conspicuous and highly influential group that 
was to contribute upper-echelon personnel for public adminis- 
tration and state enterprises. Education, more than any other 
single factor, became the criterion for membership in the new 
elite. 

Houari Boumediene, who was president from 1967 to 1978, 
headed a government that was dedicated to furthering Islamic 
socialism and held that, because early Islam in Algeria had its 
own egalitarian tendencies, no contradiction was involved. The 
pursuit of socialism since the 1960s, however, has produced its 
own rich assortment of social contradictions and tensions. 

The Boumediene government at times has been criticized 
for its state capitalist tendencies because of its single-minded 
pursuit of industrialization, which led to the emergence of a 
prosperous and reasonably competent elite. After 1968 Boume- 
diene gradually brought more and more educated young 
bureaucrats and technocrats into government service; by the 
late 1970s, they formed part of an administrative and manage- 
rial elite who staffed the government ministries and planned 
and operated the state industrial sector. Largely in control of 
the country, the new social group nonetheless shared status 
and influence with the army and functioned under the supervi- 
sion of senior political officials. Although the explicit ideology 
of the government discouraged the formation of social classes, 
this relatively wealthy and powerful elite seemed to represent 
an important barrier on the road to an egalitarian society. 

The technocrats and bureaucrats tended to be modernizers 
influenced by Western ideas. In general, they subscribed to the 
modernist view of Algerian society and believed that all mem- 
bers of society, including women, should participate actively to 
change the environment to suit the needs of society and its 
members. In socialist-oriented Algeria, the concepts of the 
nation-state, self-determination, and state planning came to 
the fore among members of the elite; local loyalties and family 
ties declined in importance as the society became more mod- 
ern, urban, and educated. 

Aside from the bureaucratic and technocratic elite, the mid- 
dle class consisted of employees of state industrial and service 



97 



Algeria: A Country Study 

enterprises; small businesspeople and shopkeepers; profession- 
als, such as teachers, physicians, and lawyers; and artisans. 
Except for businesspeople, this stratum increased greatly after 
independence, moving to help fill the void created by the 
departure of the French and by the demand for services and 
skilled labor in the postindependence economy. Residing 
mostly in the cities and larger towns, the middle class was by 
Algerian standards relatively well-off. 

An urbanized working class had similarly come into being 
over the previous few decades, finding employment, for exam- 
ple, in state and private industries, construction, public works, 
and transportation. As with the urban middle class, this group 
grew steadily in size after 1962 as a consequence of economic 
expansion. Another sizable group also found in the cities con- 
sisted of the unemployed. A substantial number of the unem- 
ployed were young males, many of them migrants from rural 
areas, who were often forced to settle in squalid housing. Usu- 
ally monolingual in Arabic, lacking job skills, and possessing 
only a primary education, the migrants and the unemployed 
survived on the largesse of the state welfare system. Finally, 
there were the rural agricultural workers, including small and 
medium-sized landowners, landowning and landless peasants, 
and those who worked on large state farms. Some members of 
this class benefited from land distribution in the 1970s and 
early 1980s. Others, such as medium-sized landowners who sur- 
vived land redistribution and the formation of large agricul- 
tural enterprises, reportedly were enjoying a measure of 
prosperity and favored government investment in roads and 
services in rural areas. 

As the nation continued to modernize in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, millions of Algerians were torn between a tradition 
that no longer commanded their total loyalty and a modernism 
that did not satisfy their psychological and spiritual needs. This 
dilemma especially affected the nation's youth. Educated 
young women were torn between the lure of study and a career 
and the demands of their husbands and fathers. Young men 
faced conflicting models of cultural behavior and achievement, 
conflict between demands for fluency in modern Arabic and 
fluency in French, and conflict between devotion to Islam and 
the secularism of modernization. Above all loomed the reality 
of youth unemployment, which reached a staggeringly high 41 
percent in the early 1990s (compared to 30 percent for the 
overall working-age population). With no solution in sight, 



98 



The Society and Its Environment 



unemployment was a prime factor accounting for the bore- 
dom, frustration, and disillusionment that characterized the 
younger generation. Many young people became major sup- 
porters of the Islamic Salvation Front(Front Islamique du 
Salut — FIS) whose groups were located on campuses and in 
major cities throughout the country. Young people contributed 
to the clashes with government forces ongoing since the late 
1980s and to the general political instability. 

To strengthen a sense of national pride in the country's cul- 
ture, in 1970 an officially sponsored "cultural revolution" was 
launched to restore historic monuments and to develop the 
means to communicate cultural themes via radio, television, 
the press, libraries, and museums. In realms such as economics 
and politics where the past offered no guidance, new structures 
were to be devised in keeping with the theory of the 1962 Tri- 
poli Program. This program rejected capitalism, which it asso- 
ciated with Western colonial powers, and disavowed an 
economic system that would make it dependent on the West. 
Instead, it favored a socialist system that allowed for state con- 
trol both of the means of production and of the plan for 
national development. The program opted for a one-party 
political system that would represent the aspirations of the 
rural and urban masses. Other aspects of the cultural revolu- 
tion included substituting Arabic for French and eliminating 
foreign teachers and foreign influence from the educational 
establishment — all part of a policy of constructing an Algeria 
distinctive in personality and proud of its heritage and achieve- 
ments. 

The cultural revolution was fifteen years old in 1985; 
beyond language and education development, however, its 
achievements were hard to measure. The program had suf- 
fered from neglect and lack of funds for projects involving 
monuments and archeological sites, museums, the arts, and 
the publishing industry. A national seminar on the history of 
the Algerian Revolution was successfully organized in 1981, 
however, and in late 1983 Chadli Benjedid (president, 1979- 
92) issued a renewed call for serious attention to cultural 
affairs and to the study of Algerian national history. 

The Individual, the Family, and the Sexes 

In the early 1990s, the tradition of strong family life still 
dominated most areas of the country. A basic social principle 



99 



Algeria: A Country Study 

affecting both the individual and the family was a kind of divi- 
sion between the sexes that made gender one of the most 
important determinants of social status. Seclusion of women 
was not universally practiced, but men and women constituted 
largely separate societies in public life. In private they were 
bound by the same culture, values, traditions, and beliefs and 
the same closeness between generations found in other parts of 
the Middle East. 

The War of Independence and the impetus given to educa- 
tion by the socialist governments of Ahmed Ben Bella (1962- 
65), Boumediene, and Benjedid led to a change in the posi- 
tion of women in Algerian society. Girls were sent to school in 
large numbers; later, many continued their studies in univer- 
sity and then pursued professional lives, especially in urban 
centers. 

Family and Household 

Before independence the basic Algerian family unit, partic- 
ularly in the countryside, was the extended family consisting of 
grandparents, their married sons and families, unmarried sons, 
daughters if unmarried or if divorced or widowed with their 
children, and occasionally other related adults. The structure 
of the family was patriarchal and patrilineal, with the senior 
male member making all major decisions affecting family wel- 
fare, dividing land and work assignments, and representing it 
in dealings with outsiders. Each married couple usually had a 
separate room opening onto the family courtyard and pre- 
pared meals separately. Women spent their lives under male 
authority — first that of their fathers, then of their husbands — 
and were expected to devote themselves entirely to the activi- 
ties of the home. Children were raised by all members of the 
group, who passed on to them the concept and value of family 
solidarity. 

Members of a single patrilineage lived in one compound 
and shared the work on the family's common land. The lineage 
expressed solidarity by adhering to a code of honor that obli- 
gated members to provide aid to relatives in need and even in 
the clinging together of members who had gone to the city to 
find work. Among Berber groups, the honor and wealth of the 
lineage were so important that blood revenge was justified in 
their defense. 

Since independence there has been a trend toward smaller 
family units consisting only of a husband and wife and their 



100 



The Society and Its Environment 



unmarried children. Upon marriage a young man who can 
afford to do so sets up a household for himself and his bride, 
and on the death of the head of an extended family, male 
members and their dependents break off into separate house- 
holds. 

The trend toward the smaller nuclear family has affected 
the extended family structure in both urban and rural areas, 
although it is more pronounced in the former. The nuclear 
family is fast becoming the prevalent family structure. This 
change has occurred gradually in response to many factors, 
including increased urbanization and the development of wage 
labor. 

In the early 1990s, younger and better educated Algerians 
tended to favor smaller families than did previous generations. 
They preferred to live in separate quarters, have fewer chil- 
dren, and run their lives independently. Familial ties of loyalty 
and respect were not in question, although they tended to 
loosen. Rather, family relationships were rearranged with 
respect to living space and decision making. 

Marriage is traditionally a family rather than a personal 
affair and is intended to strengthen already existing families. 
An Islamic marriage is a civil contract rather than a sacrament, 
and consequently, representatives of the bride's interests nego- 
tiate a marriage agreement with representatives of the bride- 
groom. Although the future spouses must, by law, consent to 
the match, they usually take no part in the arrangements. The 
contract establishes the terms of the union and outlines appro- 
priate recourse if they are broken. In the early 1990s, Algeria 
continued to have one of the most conservative legal codes 
concerning marriage in the Middle East, strictly observing 
Islamic marriage requirements. 

Men and Women 

In Algeria, as in the rest of the Middle East, women are tra- 
ditionally regarded as weaker than men in mind, body, and 
spirit. The honor of the family depends largely on the conduct 
of its women; consequently, women are expected to be deco- 
rous, modest, and discreet. The slightest implication of impro- 
priety, especially if publicly acknowledged, can damage the 
family's honor. Female virginity before marriage and fidelity 
afterward are considered essential to the maintenance of fam- 
ily honor. If they discover a transgression, men are traditionally 
bound to punish the offending woman. Girls are brought up to 



101 



Algeria: A Country Study 



believe that they are inferior to men and must cater to them, 
and boys are taught to believe that they are entitled to the care 
and solicitude of women. 

The legal age for marriage is twenty-one for men, eighteen 
for women. Upon marriage the bride usually goes to the house- 
hold, village, or neighborhood of the bridegroom's family, 
where she lives under the critical surveillance of her mother-in- 
law. Much marital friction centers on the difficult relationship 
between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law. 

Because a woman begins to gain status in her husband's 
home when she produces sons, mothers love and favor their 
boys, often nursing them longer than they do the girls. The 
relation between mother and son remains warm and intimate, 
whereas the father is a more distant figure. 

Traditionally, concern for the purity of women led to a 
marked restriction of their activities. Women spent most of 
their adult lives behind their courtyard walls or visiting other 
women in similar courtyards. It was considered improper for a 
woman to be seen by men to whom she was not related, and in 
many areas women were veiled in public. 

French colonizers actively opposed veiling because they 
viewed it as a symbol of national and religious values and 
beliefs that they sought systematically to undermine. In reac- 
tion to French pressure, Algerians stubbornly clung to the 
practice and after independence actually increased its use. Par- 
adoxically, however, this development also resulted from the 
increased freedom enjoyed by women. The veil provides 
mobile seclusion, and the more frequent entry of women into 
public situations called for an increased incidence of veiling. 

Within the confines of the traditional system, there was con- 
siderable variation in the treatment of women. In Arab tribes, 
women could inherit property; in Berber tribes, they could not. 
In Berber society, Kabyle women seem to have been the most 
restricted. A husband could not only divorce his wife by repudi- 
ation, but he could also forbid her remarriage. Chaouia 
women fared much better because they were allowed to choose 
their own husbands. 

During the War of Independence, women fought alongside 
men or, at the least, maintained the household in their 
absence. They thus achieved a new sense of their own identity 
and a measure of acceptance from men that they had not 
enjoyed before. In the aftermath of the war, some women 
maintained their new-found emancipation and became more 



102 




103 



Algeria: A Country Study 

actively involved in the development of the new state, whereas 
others returned to their traditional roles at home. 

After 1962 the status of women began improving, primarily 
because of the increased education of family members, 
broader economic and social development, and the willingness 
or necessity for ever-larger numbers of women to seek gainful 
employment. In the mid-1950s, about 7,000 women were regis- 
tered as wage earners; by 1977 a total of 138,234 women, or 6 
percent of the active work force, were engaged in full-time 
employment. Corresponding figures for the mid-1980s were 
about 250,000, or 7 percent of the labor force. Many women 
were employed in the state sector as teachers, nurses, physi- 
cians, and technicians. 

Although by 1989 the number of women in the work force 
had increased to 316,626, women still constituted only a little 
over 7 percent of the total work force. The number of women 
in the work force, however, may be much higher than official 
statistics suggested. Women in the rural work force were not 
counted; only 140 were listed in official statistics. Among the 
reasons for their omission was their position as unpaid family 
members; culturally, heads of households in a patriarchal soci- 
ety did not acknowledge publicly or to census workers that the 
women of their household were workers. In fact, the majority 
of rural women work full time and should be considered part 
of the Algerian work force. 

Family Code 

The real battleground over the status and rights of women 
has been the family code, a set of legal provisions regulating 
marriage and the family. Debated between those who wanted 
family life organized along Western secularist lines and those 
who favored a family structure conforming to Islamic princi- 
ples and ethics, the code was proposed, discussed, and shelved 
at least three times over a period of two decades before being 
adopted into law in 1984. In one instance, in 1981, the code's 
provisions provoked vehement opposition from female mem- 
bers of the National People's Assembly and street demonstra- 
tions by women in Algiers, both almost unprecedented events 
in Algeria. 

Although some of the 1984 code's provisions are more lib- 
eral than those of the 1981 version, the code essentially reflects 
the influence of Islamic conservatives. The family unit is "the 
basic unit of society"; the head of the family is the husband, to 



104 



The Society and Its Environment 



whom the wife owes obedience. According to the sharia, a Mus- 
lim woman may not marry a non-Muslim; polygyny is permitted 
under certain conditions (although it is rarely practiced); and 
women do not inherit property equally with men. A woman 
cannot be married without her consent, and she may sue for 
divorce in specified circumstances, including desertion and 
nonsupport. Custody of children under age seven in divorce 
cases passes to the wife but reverts to the husband when the 
children are older. Divorce rates have risen steadily since inde- 
pendence, but divorce remains much easier for men than for 
women. 

Family Planning 

Before 1980 Algeria lacked an official birth control pro- 
gram, in contrast to other Arab countries, nearly all of which 
had some kind of family planning program or a policy of limit- 
ing population. To a large extent, this situation reflected the 
conviction that Algeria was not overpopulated, given the vast 
empty expanse of the Sahara and the High Plateaus and the 
scattered population clusters even in the Tell. There was also a 
desire to make up the alleged 1.5 million population loss in the 
War of Independence and the conviction of many parents that 
their well-being lay in producing as many children as possible, 
a common view held by peasants. Despite an employment 
problem arising from overpopulation, Boumediene favored 
economic growth over birth control as the solution to overpop- 
ulation and unemployment. His policy received the blessing of 
the Islamic religious establishment. 

At 1980 growth rates, Algeria's population would have risen 
from 18.3 million to more than 35 million by the year 2000. 
Faced with a demographic explosion that threatened to inhibit 
further social and economic development, if not obliterate 
what had been achieved, the Benjedid government reversed 
directions and devised a cautious family planning policy that 
took into account Islamic sensitivities. The new program 
referred to "birth spacing" rather than "birth control" and 
emphasized the improvement in the health of the mother and 
children and the well-being of the family that would occur if 
births were spaced and families were smaller. The goal was vol- 
untary participation on the part of women of childbearing age. 
The program also aimed at creating the infrastructure within 
the Ministry of Public Health that would enable it to provide 
birth control services, educate the population about family 



105 



Algeria: A Country Study 



planning, and conduct research on the relationship between 
population growth and economic development. 

To implement the program, Maternal and Infant Protection 
Centers (PMICS) were established to dispense advice and con- 
traceptives. In 1980 there were about 260 centers. An educa- 
tional campaign was also launched, using television, billboards, 
and handbills to point out the consequences of unrestrained 
demographic growth and to advertise the services of the 
PMICS. A major effort was made to reconcile family planning 
with the dictates of religion. Religious scholars found birth 
spacing and the use of contraceptives compatible with Islam as 
long as participation was voluntary and practices such as abor- 
tion and sterilization were proscribed. 

By the mid-1980s, family planning had begun to meet with 
some success. The number of PMICS had risen to 300, and the 
demand for information about the program reportedly out- 
stripped supply in some areas. It was estimated that about 10 
percent of the population of childbearing age was using some 
form of contraception, and the government was increasing its 
publicity to encourage still greater participation. 

In 1986 the government created the National Committee 
on Population. Its charter promoted a balance between social 
and economic development needs on the one hand, and popu- 
lation growth on the other. Three years later, in 1989, the 
United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) 
launched a US$8 million program to support maternal and 
child health care, help create a center for the production of 
oral contraceptives, and develop an effective education system 
to inform the general population on the use of contraceptives. 
The UNFPA program also supported demographic research 
and advised the government on population strategies and poli- 
cies. In 1989 it was estimated that 35 percent of Algerian 
women of childbearing age used some form of contraception. 
This percentage would account in part for the sharp drop in 
population growth from 3.1 percent in the mid-1980s to 2.8 
percent in 1990. 

Islam 

Islam, the religion of almost all of the Algerian people, per- 
vades most aspects of life. It provides the society with its central 
social and cultural identity and gives most individuals their 
basic ethical and attitudinal orientation. Orthodox observance 



106 



Celebration of the circumcision of a young boy 

Courtesy ANEP 

of the faith is much less widespread and steadfast than is identi- 
fication with Islam. 

Since the revolution, regimes have sought to develop an 
Islamic Arab socialist state, and a cabinet-level ministry acts 
for the government in religious affairs. Although the Boume- 
diene regime consistently sought, to a far greater extent than 
its predecessor, to increase Islamic awareness and to reduce 
Western influence, the rights of non-Muslims continued to be 
respected. The Benjedid government pursued a similar pol- 
icy. 

Early History 

During the seventh century, Muslim conquerors reached 
North Africa, and by the beginning of the eighth century the 
Berbers had been for the most part converted to Islam. Ortho- 
dox Sunni (see Glossary) Islam, the larger of the two great 



107 



Algeria: A Country Study 

branches of the faith, is the form practiced by the overwhelm- 
ing majority of Muslims in Algeria. Shia (see Glossary) Islam is 
not represented apart from a few members of the Ibadi sect, a 
Shia offshoot. 

Before the Arab incursions, most of the Berber inhabitants 
of the area's mountainous interior were pagan. Some had 
adopted Judaism, and in the coastal plains many had accepted 
Christianity under the Romans. A wave of Arab incursions into 
the Maghrib in the latter half of the seventh century and the 
early eighth century introduced Islam to parts of the area. 

One of the dominant characteristics of Islam in North 
Africa was the cult of holy men, or majaboutism. Marabouts 
were believed to have baraka, or divine grace, as reflected in 
their ability to perform miracles. Recognized as just and spiri- 
tual men, marabouts often had extensive followings locally and 
regionally. Muslims believed that baraka could be inherited, or 
that a marabout could confer it on a follower. 

The turuq (sing., tariqa, way or path), or brotherhoods, were 
another feature of Islam in the Maghrib from the Middle Ages 
onward. Each brotherhood had its own prescribed path to sal- 
vation, its own rituals, signs, symbols, and mysteries. The broth- 
erhoods were prevalent in the rural and mountainous areas of 
Algeria and other parts of North Africa. Their leaders were 
often marabouts or shaykhs. The more orthodox Sunni Mus- 
lims dominated the urban centers, where traditionally trained 
men of religion, the ulama, conducted the religious and legal 
affairs of the Muslim community. 

Tenets of Islam 

The shahada (testimony) states the central belief of Islam: 
"There is no god but God (Allah), and Muhammad is his 
Prophet." This simple profession of faith is repeated on many 
ritual occasions, and recital in full and unquestioning sincerity 
designates one a Muslim. The God preached by Muhammad 
was not one previously unknown to his countrymen because 
Allah, rather than a particular name, is the Arabic for God. 
Muhammad denied the existence of the many minor gods and 
spirits worshiped before his ministry and declared the omnipo- 
tence of the unique creator, God. "Islam" means submission, 
and the one who submits to God is a Muslim. Muhammad is 
the "seal of the Prophets"; his revelation is said to complete for 
all time the series of biblical revelations received by Jews and 
Christians. God is believed to have remained one and the same 



108 



The Society and Its Environment 



throughout time, but humans strayed from God's true teach- 
ings until set right by Muhammad. Muslims recognize the 
prophets and sages of the biblical tradition, such as Abraham 
and Moses, and consider Jesus to be another prophet. Islam 
accepts the concepts of guardian angels, the Day of Judgment, 
general resurrection, heaven and hell, and an eternal life for 
the soul. 

The duties of the Muslim form the "five pillars" of faith. 
These are shahada, testimony and recitation of the creed; salat, 
daily prayer; zakat, almsgiving; sawm, fasting; and hajj, pilgrim- 
age. The believer is to pray in a prescribed manner after purifi- 
cation through ritual ablutions at dawn, midday, midafternoon, 
sunset, and nightfall. Prescribed genuflections and prostrations 
are to accompany the prayers, which the worshiper recites 
while facing Mecca. 

Whenever possible, men pray in congregation at the 
mosque under an imam, or prayer leader, and on Friday they 
are obliged to do so. Women may also attend public worship at 
the mosque, where they are segregated from the men, 
although most frequently those who pray do so in seclusion at 
home. A special functionary, the muezzin, intones a call to 
prayer to the entire community at the appropriate hours; peo- 
ple out of earshot determine the proper hour by other means. 

In the early days of Islam, the authorities imposed a tax on 
personal property proportionate to the individual's wealth, 
which was distributed to the mosques and to the needy. In the 
modern era, zakat, or almsgiving, while still a duty of the 
believer, has become a more private matter. Properties contrib- 
uted to support religious activities have usually been adminis- 
tered as religious foundations, or habus in North Africa. 

The ninth month of the Muslim calendar is Ramadan, a 
period of obligatory fasting in commemoration of Muham- 
mad's receipt of God's revelation, the Quran. During this 
month, all but the sick and certain others are enjoined from 
eating, drinking, smoking, or sexual intercourse during the 
daylight hours. 

Finally, all Muslims at least once in their lifetime should, if 
possible, make the hajj to the holy city of Mecca. There they 
participate in special rites held at several locations during the 
twelfth month of the Islamic calendar. 

Islam and the Algerian State 

The Prophet enjoined his followers to convert nonbelievers 



109 



Algeria: A Country Study 

to the true faith. Jews and Christians, whose religions he recog- 
nized as the precursors of Islam and who were called "people of 
the book" because of their holy scriptures, were permitted to 
continue their own communal and religious life as long as they 
recognized the temporal domain of Muslim authorities, paid 
their taxes, and did not proselytize or otherwise interfere with 
the practice of Islam. 

Soon after arriving in Algeria, the French colonial regime 
set about undermining traditional Muslim Algerian culture. 
According to Islam, however, a Muslim society permanently 
subject to non-Muslim rulers is unacceptable. Muslims believe 
that non-Muslim rule must be ended as quickly as possible and 
Muslim rulers restored to power. For this reason, Islam was a 
strong element of the resistance movement to the French. 

After independence the Algerian government asserted state 
control over religious activities for purposes of national consol- 
idation and political control. Islam became the religion of the 
state in the new constitution and the religion of its leaders. No 
laws could be enacted that would be contrary to Islamic tenets 
or that would in any way undermine Islamic beliefs and princi- 
ples. The state monopolized the building of mosques, and the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs controlled an estimated 5,000 pub- 
lic mosques by the mid-1980s. Imams were trained, appointed, 
and paid by the state, and the Friday khutba, or sermon, was 
issued to them by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. That minis- 
try also administered religious property (the habus), provided 
for religious education and training in schools, and created 
special institutes for Islamic learning. 

Those measures, however, did not satisfy everyone. As early 
as 1964 a militant Islamic movement, called Al Qiyam (values), 
emerged and became the precursor of the Islamic Salvation 
Front of the 1990s. Al Qiyam called for a more dominant role 
for Islam in Algeria's legal and political systems and opposed 
what it saw as Western practices in the social and cultural life of 
Algerians. 

Although militant Islamism was suppressed, it reappeared in 
the 1970s under a different name and with a new organization. 
The movement began spreading to university campuses, where 
it was encouraged by the state as a counterbalance to left-wing 
student movements. By the 1980s, the movement had become 
even stronger, and bloody clashes erupted at the Ben Aknoun 
campus of the University of Algiers in November 1982. The vio- 
lence resulted in the state's cracking down on the movement, a 



110 



The Society and Its Environment 



confrontation that would intensify throughout the 1980s and 
early 1990s (see The Islamist Factor, ch. 4). 

The rise of Islamism had a significant impact on Algerian 
society. More women began wearing the veil, some because 
they had become more conservative religiously and others 
because the veil kept them from being harassed on the streets, 
on campuses, or at work. Islamists also prevented the enact- 
ment of a more liberal family code despite pressure from femi- 
nist groups and associations. 

Religious Minorities 

Christianity came to North Africa in the Roman era. Its 
influence declined during the chaotic period of the Vandal 
invasions but was strengthened in the succeeding Byzantine 
period, only to disappear gradually after the Arab invasions of 
the seventh century. 

The Roman Catholic Church was reintroduced after the 
French conquest, when the diocese of Algiers was established 
in 1838. Proselytization of the Muslim population was at first 
strictly prohibited; later the prohibition was less vigorously 
enforced, but few conversions took place. The several Roman 
Catholic missions established in Algeria were concerned with 
charitable and relief work; the establishment of schools, work- 
shops, and infirmaries; and the training of staff for the new 
establishments. Some of the missionaries of these organizations 
remained in the country after independence, working among 
the poorer segments of the population. In the early 1980s, the 
Roman Catholic population numbered about 45,000, most of 
whom were foreigners or Algerians who had married French or 
Italians. In addition, there was a small Protestant community. 
Because the government adopted a policy of not inquiring 
about religious affiliation in censuses or surveys to avoid pro- 
voking religious tensions, the number of Christians in the early 
1990s was not known. 

The Jewish community is of considerable antiquity, some 
members claiming descent from immigrants from Palestine at 
the time of the Romans. The majority are descendants of refu- 
gees from Spanish persecution early in the fifteenth century. 
They numbered about 140,000 before the Algerian revolution- 
ary period, but at independence in 1962 nearly all of them left 
the country. Because the 1870 Cremieux Decrees, which aimed 
at assimilating the colons of Algeria to France, gave Jews full cit- 



111 



Algeria: A Country Study 

izenship, most members of the Jewish community emigrated to 
France. 

The government of independent Algeria discouraged anti- 
Semitism, and the small remainingjewish population appeared 
to have stabilized at roughly 1,000. It was thought to be close to 
this number in the early 1990s. Although no untoward inci- 
dents occurred during the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973, a 
group of youths sacked the only remaining synagogue in Al- 
giers in early 1977. 

Education 

The French colonial education imposed on Algeria was 
designed primarily to meet the needs of the European popula- 
tion and to perpetuate the European cultural pattern. A large 
majority of the students were children of the colonists. French 
was the language of instruction, and Arabic, when taught, was 
offered as an optional foreign language. 

Segregated schooling of French and Algerian children was 
abolished in 1949, and increases in Muslim enrollments were 
scheduled in the comprehensive 1954 Constantine Plan to 
improve Muslim living conditions. On the eve of indepen- 
dence, however, the European-oriented curricula were still 
taught exclusively in French, and less than one-third of school- 
age Muslim children were enrolled in schools at the primary 
level. At the secondary and university levels, only 30 percent 
and 10 percent of the students, respectively, were Algerians. 

At the beginning of the 1963 school year, the education sys- 
tem was in complete disarray, and enrollments in schools at all 
levels totaled only 850,000. In the years immediately following, 
teachers were trained hastily or recruited abroad; classrooms 
were improvised, many in the vacated homes of former French 
residents. Attendance climbed to 1.5 million in 1967, to nearly 
3 million by 1975, and to 6.5 million in 1991-92 (see table 2, 
Appendix). 

At the time of independence in 1962, the Algerian govern- 
ment inherited the remnants of an education system focused 
on European content and conducted in a foreign language by 
foreign teachers. Algerian authorities set out to redesign the 
system to make it more suited to the needs of a developing 
nation. The hallmarks of their program were indigenization, 
arabization, and an emphasis on scientific and technical stud- 
ies. They sought to increase literacy, provide free education, 
make primary school enrollment compulsory, remove foreign 



112 




Mosque in Blida, south of Algiers 
Courtesy ANEP 

teachers and curricula, and replace French with Arabic as the 
medium of instruction. They also planned to channel students 
into scientific and technical fields, reflecting the needs of Alge- 
rian industrial and managerial sectors. The approach to educa- 
tion has been gradual, incremental, and marked by a 
willingness to experiment — unusual characteristics in a devel- 
oping country. 

The high priority assigned by the government to national 
education was reflected in the amount of money spent on it 
and on the existence of free schooling at all levels. Between 
1967 and 1979, a total of DA171 billion (for value of the 
dinar — see Glossary) was allocated for operating expenditures 
in this sector. In 1985 approximately 16.5 percent of the gov- 
ernment's investment budget was devoted to education; in 
1990 the education sector received 29.7 percent of the national 
budget. 



113 



Algeria: A Country Study 

Algeria received substantial assistance from the World Bank. 
Between 1973 and 1980, Algeria contracted five education loan 
agreements for sums totaling US$276 million. The World Bank 
has continued to provide funds and technical assistance in con- 
nection with a fundamental reform of education, the latest 
phase of which occurred in 1993. The structure of the existing 
basic and secondary systems was being revised, and much 
heavier emphasis was being given to technical and vocational 
schooling. 

In the mid-1970s, the primary and middle education levels 
were reorganized into a nine-year system of compulsory basic 
education. Thereafter, on the secondary level, pupils followed 
one of three tracks — general, technical, or vocational — and 
then sat for the baccalaureate examination before proceeding 
to one of the universities, state technical institutes, or voca- 
tional training centers, or directly to employment. The process 
of reorganization was completed only in 1989, although in 
practice the basic system of schooling remained divided 
between the elementary level, including grades one to six, and 
the middle school level of grades seven to nine. Despite gov- 
ernment support for the technical training programs meant to 
produce middle- and higher-level technicians for the industrial 
sector, a critical shortage remained of workers in fields requir- 
ing those technical skills. 

The reforms of the mid-1970s included abolishing all pri- 
vate education. Formerly, private education was primarily the 
realm of foreign institutions and schools often run by Roman 
Catholic missions. Legislation passed in 1975 stipulated that 
education was compulsory for nine years between the ages of 
six and fifteen, and that it would be free at all levels. The Minis- 
try of National Education and the Ministry of Higher Educa- 
tion were assigned sole responsibility for providing and 
regulating the education system. 

In 1982 about 4 million pupils were enrolled in the nine- 
year basic education track at a time when the government 
claimed 81 percent of all six-year-olds were attending school. 
Attendance approached 90 percent in urban centers and 67 
percent in rural areas. Teachers were nearly all Algerian, and 
instruction was entirely in Arabic, French being introduced 
only in the third year. 

In the 1991-92 school year, about 5.8 million pupils were 
enrolled in grades one through nine; and the gross enrollment 
ratios reached 93 percent for the first six years of school and 75 



114 



The Society and Its Environment 



percent for the next three years. Algerian society in the early 
1990s was still not fully accustomed to women assuming roles 
outside the home, and female enrollments remained slightly 
lower than might have been expected from the percentage of 
girls in the age-group. 

Secondary enrollments totaled 280,000 in 1982, compared 
with 51,000 in 1962-63. The number of secondary schools 
increased from thirty-nine to 319 over the decade, while the 
percentage of Algerian teachers increased from 41 in 1975 to 
71 in 1982. French continued as the favored language of 
instruction in general, particularly in mathematics and science. 
Despite these impressive gains, enrollments still fell short of 
planned targets, especially in scientific and technical fields. 
The same was true of female education. Nationwide, in 1982 
girls accounted for 38.8 percent of total enrollments in second- 
ary and technical schools. A great variation also existed 
between the number of girls attending school in Algiers, where 
the percentage nearly equaled that of boys, and Tamanrasset in 
the south, where the percentage dropped to as low as 7. In 
1984 national primary and secondary enrollments totaled 5 
million. 

In 1990-91, secondary school enrollments represented a 
total of 752,000 students, of whom 20 percent had entered a 
technician, or technical high school. The proportion of girls in 
that cycle of education was 31 percent and constituted 47 per- 
cent of total enrollment at the secondary level. Teachers were 
more than 90 percent Algerian at all levels. Arabization of the 
education system was considered an important objective of the 
1990s. 

Vocational education at the secondary level received atten- 
tion as part of the reorganization of the mid-1970s. The pro- 
gram was designed with the requirements of industry and 
agriculture in mind; students were to be trained as apprentices 
for up to five years. As of 1990, a total of 325 vocational training 
schools were in operation, and about 200,000 apprentices were 
in training. Vocational skills were also taught as part of the 
national service program, which provided employment and 
work experience for large numbers of young men (see Labor 
and Employment, ch. 3). 

The major universities in 1993 were the University of Oran, 
the University of Science and Technology at Oran, the Univer- 
sity of Algiers, and universities at Tlemcen, Sidi Bel Abbes, 
Constantine, and Annaba and the Houari Boumediene Univer- 



115 



Algeria: A Country Study 

sity of Science and Technology. There were also universities at 
Batna, Blida, Setif, and Tizi Ouzou and university centers at 
Bejaia, Mostaganem, Chelif, and Tiaret. Total higher education 
enrollment for the academic year 1989-90 was 177,560 stu- 
dents as compared with 103,000 in 1983-84 and close to 8,000 
in 1967. Only the Algiers campus predated independence, hav- 
ing been founded in 1909. 

The higher education system first adopted by the University 
of Algiers was based on the French model. As such, it stressed 
autonomy of the university faculties not only in administration 
but also in designing curricula and organizing courses of study 
aimed at particular degrees. The system resulted in unwieldi- 
ness, duplication of academic offerings, and complete loss of 
credits by students changing programs. In addition, it led to a 
very high attrition rate. Some reforms designed to modernize 
the university system were introduced in 1971, and major 
reforms were introduced in 1988. Nevertheless, the universities 
still loosely resemble the French model, and French remains 
widely used for instructional purposes. The number of French 
instructors has declined, however, as the number of Algerian 
teachers has increased after 1980. In 1981-82, for instance, 
64.6 percent of the teachers at all levels of education were Alge- 
rian. By the academic year 1990-91, the percentage had 
increased to 93.4 percent. Arabic was widely taught at the ter- 
tiary level, and Zouaouah, the dialect of the Kabyle Berbers, 
was taught at the University of Tizi Ouzou. 

In addition to the universities, a number of state institutes 
provide specialized technical, agricultural, vocational, and 
teacher training. Some function under the direct jurisdiction 
of appropriate ministries and provide one to five years of tech- 
nical training and job experience for trainees. The Ministry of 
Energy and Petrochemical Industries and the Ministry of Agri- 
culture and Fishing each has a number of institutes. Algeria in 
the early 1990s had more than thirty institutes of higher learn- 
ing, including technical studies, teacher-training colleges, and 
Islamic institutes. 

Many Algerian students also study abroad. Most go to 
France or other West European countries, various countries of 
Eastern Europe, and the United States. 

A variety of literacy programs for adults was initiated after 
1962, when the national literacy rate was below 10 percent. The 
Conquest of Literacy program was mounted to help people 
attain literacy in Arabic or French or both languages. Volunteer 



116 



Great Mosque and University of Islamic Studies, Constantine 
Courtesy Embassy of Algeria, Washington 
School children, Algiers 
Courtesy Anthony Toth and Middle East Report 



117 



Algeria: A Country Study 

teachers held classes on the job, in homes, and in abandoned 
buildings; old French or Arabic grammars, copies of the 
Quran, and political tracts were pressed into service as texts. 
Wide-ranging approaches, including correspondence courses 
and use of the public media, were introduced during the Sec- 
ond Four- Year Plan, 1974-77. Major responsibility for out-of- 
school education was assigned to two specialized government 
agencies. These agencies benefited from technical assistance 
under the second of the three World Bank education loans, but 
the main emphasis of the government's education program has 
been on the rapid development of the formal school system. 

Progress in literacy has been noteworthy. About 42 percent 
of the population was literate in 1977. By 1990 adult literacy 
had reached 57.4 percent, according to estimates by the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO); 69.8 percent of Algerian men and 45.5 percent of 
Algerian women were literate. Because, however, priority has 
been given to the education of youth, adult illiteracy has not 
yet received the attention it needs. 

Health and Welfare 
Health 

At independence the Algerian health care system was skele- 
tal, consisting of one physician per 33,000 people (or an esti- 
mated 300 doctors in all) and one trained paramedic per 
40,000. The approach at the time was primarily curative rather 
than preventive. 

Since then the country has made tremendous progress in 
health care. From 1975 onward, a new system of almost free 
national health care was introduced. Hospitalization, medi- 
cines, and outpatient care were free to all. In 1984 the govern- 
ment formally adopted a plan to transform the health sector 
from a curative system to a preventive one more suited to the 
needs of a young population. Rather than investing in expen- 
sive hospitals, the government emphasized health centers and 
clinics, together with immunization programs. The results were 
impressive: whereas the infant mortality rate was 154 per 1,000 
live births in 1965, it had fallen to sixty-seven per 1,000 live 
births by 1990. 

By 1991 Algeria had about 23,000 physicians, or one for 
every 1,200 inhabitants, and one nurse per 330 people. About 
90 percent of the population had access to medical care, and 



118 



The Society and Its Environment 



only in remote rural areas did people have difficulty reaching 
health care services. Algeria also had 2,720 basic health units, 
1,650 health centers, thirteen university hospitals, 178 general 
hospitals, and eighteen specialized hospitals. Overall, there was 
one hospital bed for every 380 people. The average occupancy 
rate of hospitals was 55 percent, while the average length of 
stay was six days. 

In 1993 most health services were provided by the public 
sector, although a small private sector comprising some 20 per- 
cent of Algerian physicians also existed. A network of hospitals 
and ambulatory facilities was organized into health districts. 
The districts consisted of a general hospital, one or more 
urban and rural maternity centers, health care centers, and dis- 
pensaries. These facilities were complemented by specialized 
clinics and teaching hospitals. Three regional public pharma- 
ceutical enterprises oversaw the wholesale purchase and distri- 
bution of drugs, a public company imported and maintained 
medical equipment, and a number of pharmaceutical units 
produced a limited quantity of serums, vaccines, and other 
drugs. 

Expenditures for this health care system increased at an 
annual average rate of 14 percent during the 1980s. Estimates 
for health services expenditures were 5.4 percent of Algeria's 
gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary), compared with a 
5.2 percent average for countries with similar middle income, 
and 7.2 percent for some of the lower-income Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. 
Funding came from the state budget (20 percent), the social 
security system (60 percent), and individual households (20 
percent). 

In the early 1990s, tuberculosis, trachoma, and venereal 
infections were the most serious diseases; gastrointestinal com- 
plaints, pneumonia, diphtheria, scarlet fever, and mumps were 
relatively common, as were waterborne diseases such as typhoid 
fever, cholera, dysentery, and hepatitis among all age-groups. 
Tuberculosis was considered the most serious health hazard, 
and trachoma ranked next; only a small minority of the popula- 
tion was entirely free from this fly-borne eye infection, which 
was directly or indirectly responsible for most cases of blind- 
ness. Malaria and poliomyelitis, both formerly endemic, had 
been brought under control. Acquired immune deficiency syn- 
drome (AIDs), does not appear to be a serious problem, but 
ninety-two cases had been reported as of August 1991. The inci- 



119 



Algeria: A Country Study 

dence of disease is related to nutritional deficiencies, crowded 
living conditions, a general shortage of water, and insufficient 
knowledge of personal sanitation and modern health practices. 

Medical training has been a priority for the Algerian govern- 
ment since independence. In 1990 the following institutions 
had schools of medicine, dentistry, and pharmacy: Algiers, with 
branches in Blida and Tizi Ouzou; Annaba; Constantine, with 
branches in Setif and Batna; and Oran, with branches in Sidi 
Bel Abbes and Tlemcen. The total number of students enrolled 
in those programs in the 1988-89 academic year was 27,472. In 
addition, the government maintained public health schools for 
paramedical personnel in Algiers, Constantine, and Oran that 
recruited from secondary schools for their programs. 

Medical schools have been graduating a large number of 
physicians: 800 to 1,000 annually in the first half of the 1980s, 
and even more in the second half of that decade. Several thou- 
sand women are enrolled in medical school. It is estimated that 
between 1990 and 1995 some 25,000 new doctors will graduate, 
the majority of whom will probably be unable to find work in 
the public health sector. The private sector was expected to 
expand significantly to absorb the large number of graduating 
physicians. 

The Algerian government has made major efforts to train 
women as nurses and technicians since the mid-1970s. Two- 
year nursing courses at the secondary level are offered in Al- 
giers and at several regional centers. Training for midwives is 
available in Oran and Constantine. Problems exist, however, 
with the paramedical staff. Since the mid-1980s, the ratio of 
nursing staff to physicians has dropped from 5.7 percent to one 
to 2.7 percent to one, in part because of low salaries, little 
opportunity for advancement, difficulty in recruiting good 
teachers for paramedical schools, and low compensation for 
those teachers. Furthermore, in an effort to reform the train- 
ing system for medical personnel, a number of those schools 
were temporarily shut down in the latter 1980s, further reduc- 
ing enrollment in those programs. 

Despite the threat of oversupply of medical personnel, a 
small percentage of foreigners has always practiced in Algeria. 
They come from France, Russia, Eastern Europe, and Vietnam. 
Their number, however, is declining rapidly. In 1986 there were 
1,724 specialized physicians, 241 general practitioners, eight 
pharmacists, and nineteen dental surgeons who were not Alge- 
rian; by 1990 only 767 specialized physicians, sixty-seven gen- 



120 



The Society and Its Environment 



eral practitioners, one pharmacist, and ten dental surgeons 
who were not Algerian remained in Algeria. 

Social Welfare 

The social system that prevailed before the coming of the 
French had little need for public welfare. Extended families, 
clans, and tribes cared for their elderly and needy members, 
and granaries maintained by villages or tribal units stored grain 
for use in years of poor harvest. During the French colonial 
period, the old way of life was substantially altered, but in the 
early 1990s enough of the old system remained for the tradi- 
tional sense of personal responsibility to rank high among 
accepted social values. 

The fabric of the socialist system, however, was based largely 
on the concept of public responsibility for welfare, and during 
the first years after independence the government of Algeria 
set about extending the public welfare program. A system of 
family allowances for employed persons had been instituted by 
the French in 1943, and in 1949 a limited social security pro- 
gram had been initiated for urban employees and some agri- 
cultural workers. These systems remained in effect after 
independence. In 1971 a new social security ordinance 
extended to all agricultural personnel the benefits already 
enjoyed by industrial and service-sector workers. This program 
has provided sickness and disability insurance, old-age pen- 
sions, and family allowances and has been financed by contri- 
butions from employees, employers, and the government. 

Housing 

Unchecked population growth and a steady flow of urban 
migration have combined to produce a severe housing short- 
age. The Algerian housing problem has been less pressing than 
in many other developing countries, however, owing to the 
postindependence departure of most Europeans. Nearly all of 
the Europeans had been city dwellers, living in the new towns 
surrounding a medina (traditional city) housing the Algerian 
population. In 1961 and 1962, many Europeans simply aban- 
doned their properties to squatters from the countryside who 
promptly occupied them; sometimes as many as six Algerian 
families lived in a residence that had formerly housed a single 
European family. Property abandonment was so common that 
biens vacants (empty properties) became a term in common 
use. 



121 



Algeria: A Country Study 

Several years were required for the government to inventory 
the vacant properties. In 1965, however, a government finan- 
cial reform endeavored to regularize ownership and collection 
of rents from about 500,000 nationalized or sequestered apart- 
ments and houses in the major cities. 

Rural migrants settled into bidonvilles, named after the flat- 
tened bidons (tin cans) used extensively in their ramshackle 
construction. After independence the bidonville population of 
Algiers alone soon exceeded 100,000. Bidonvilles appeared in 
other cities, and during the early 1970s they emerged on the 
fringes of the oil camps in the Algerian Sahara. 

The proliferation of urban shantytowns has been a world- 
wide phenomenon in developing countries. Proportionately 
fewer have sprung up in Algeria than in neighboring Morocco, 
in part because of government projects to limit urban sprawl by 
creating industrial villages near new factories. In the early 
1970s, industrial villages were started near Algiers and in the 
vicinity of Annaba and Oran. 

During the first twenty years after independence, public 
investment was concentrated in the industrial sector, and little 
attention was paid to the housing sector. Private construction 
was minimal because of tight government regulation and diffi- 
cult access to landownership. In Algiers in particular, the gov- 
ernment sought to discourage the flood of migration by almost 
freezing the housing sector and confining itself to improving 
sanitation and public utility service. 

The consequence of those policies was a severe housing 
shortage starting at the end of the 1970s. By the early 1980s, 
the occupancy rate per three-room housing unit stood at seven 
persons, and the shortfall in public housing was placed at 1 mil- 
lion units. In 1992 the shortage had become critical and had 
risen to 2 million housing units. The shortage had resulted in 
an average occupancy rate of 8.8 persons per unit, compara- 
tively one of the highest in the world. 

Between 1990 and August 1993, as part of a series of 
reforms, the government sought to eliminate the housing 
backlog and built about 360,000 public housing units and 
launched new housing programs for low-income groups. Ear- 
lier plans to produce 100,000 public housing units between 
1980 and 1984 achieved only a 57 percent rate of success. In 
the Second Five-Year Plan (1985-89), the success rate for com- 
pleted housing was even lower, convincing the government 
that major reforms were necessary. 



122 



The Society and Its Environment 



Largely as a result of import restrictions that included build- 
ing materials, the public housing sector in 1992 could produce 
only 35,000 units per year, up from 24,000 units in 1991, but 
down from the 1986 peak year of 88,000 units. At this rate, pub- 
lic housing shortages will not only continue but become worse. 

In November 1990, new land legislation (Loi d'Orientation 
Fonciere) was enacted to abolish the local government monop- 
oly over land transactions, thus freeing urban landowners to 
buy and sell their land as they wish. The law was also intended 
to encourage private-sector investment in housing and con- 
struction. Furthermore, new standards were introduced in 
1991 to simplify urban development procedures by the private 
sector. 

To encourage the private sector to invest in housing, the 
government is proposing legislation that will permit private 
contractors to compete with public enterprises and have access 
to building materials that are exclusively for public housing. 
The private sector is also encouraged to produce locally some 
of the building materials needed, in order to compensate for 
market shortages and for the cost of importing those materials. 
By the early 1990s, some Algerians in the private sector had 
begun producing bricks, ceramic tiles, and steel rods. 

Registered private construction companies remain very 
small and work primarily to build private family homes. Indi- 
viduals also hire workers and architects to build their own 
houses. In 1991 alone, 85,000 building permits were issued to 
private households wishing to build dwellings. Between 1989 
and 1992, an estimated 300,000 such housing units were built 
by private individuals. 

The most conspicuous development in rural housing dur- 
ing the postindependence years has been the One Thousand 
Socialist Villages program undertaken in 1972 in conjunction 
with the agrarian revolution program. Socialist villages repre- 
sented a pilot plan for improving rural housing. According to 
the plan, each village would have a population of as many as 
1,500 people housed in 200 individual units, together with 
schools and clinics. Each unit was to have three rooms and 
would be provided with electricity, heat, and running water. By 
mid-1979 about 120 such villages had been completed. 
Although the villages had much to commend them, the pro- 
gram has done little to slow migration to urban areas. 

In the mid-1980s, urban housing varied from the most mod- 
ern apartment buildings and private dwellings of concrete and 



123 



Algeria: A Country Study 

glass to crowded shantytowns. The cities had grown so rapidly 
that the small-windowed walls and courtyards of a medina occu- 
pied only a small fraction of the urban area. The most common 
rural dwellings are called gourbi, some of which are mere huts 
constructed of mud and branches. Others are more solidly 
built, having walls of stone or clay and containing several 
rooms. Tiled or tin roofs are usually flat; but in parts of eastern 
Algeria subject to heavy rainfall or winter snows, the roofs are 
steeply slanted. 

As a consequence of the heavy urban migration of early 
postindependence years, entire gourbi settlements appeared in 
Annaba and other coastal cities. During this period, the Kabylie 
region was the only part of Algeria to enjoy a housing boom. A 
large majority of the immigrant laborers in France were Ber- 
bers from the Kabylie, and the funds remitted by them to their 
families at home made the surge of building possible in this 
generally impoverished region. 

Significant changes have occurred in Algeria in the last 
decade in the sectors of health, education, and welfare. The 
increase in health care facilities and the general upgrading of 
health services have met the needs of the very young Algerian 
population. The education system also has undergone major 
reforms and has become more responsive to the economic and 
social needs of Algerian society. However, the housing short- 
age, which worsened in the 1980s, has become critical in the 
1990s. Private-sector involvement may alleviate this shortage as 
it plays a larger role in the economy. Another major problem 
confronting the nation is that of unemployment, particularly 
among younger workers. Thus, despite Algeria's achievements 
in some areas, the country in 1993 was facing a number of diffi- 
cult societal pressures that, combined with militant religious 
forces and economic difficulties, posed ongoing challenges to 
the government. 

* * * 

One of the best and most comprehensive recent studies on 
Algerian history and society is John Ruedy's Modern Algeria: The 
Origins and Development of a Nation. Of particular importance 
are Ruedy's descriptions of the structure of the society and how 
it changed as a result of the political and economic upheavals 
that shook the country, especially in the nineteenth and twenti- 
eth century. Two older studies, John R Entelis's Algeria: The Rev- 
olution Institutionalized and the study edited by I. William 



124 



The Society and Its Environment 



Zartman, Man, State, and Society in the Contemporary Maghrib, 
remain of critical importance to an understanding of present- 
day Algerian society. A number of French writers such as Jean- 
Claude Vatin, Remy Leveau, and Jean Leca have written exten- 
sively on Algerian society and are essential reading. 

World Bank reports contain the latest information and sta- 
tistics on major development indicators in Algeria; they have 
contributed greatly to this chapter. Some excellent articles on 
Algeria also have appeared in publications such as the Middle 
East Journal, Third World Quarterly, Annals of the Academy of Politi- 
cal and Social Sciences, and Annuaire de I'Afrique du Nord. (For fur- 
ther information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



125 



Chapter 3. The Economy 



Lighthouse along the Mediterranean coast with fishing boat in foreground 



ALGERIA IN 1993 was in transition, moving from a centralized 
system toward an open market economy. In this connection, its 
physical resources of arable land and hydrocarbons played 
major roles. Algeria's close to 2.4 million square kilometers 
make it the second largest country in Africa, after Sudan, and 
one-third the size of the United States. More than 2 million 
square kilometers are desert or semiarid steppes extending 
into the southern Sahara region, but the country also contains 
a fertile strip of cultivable land concentrated along the coast of 
the Mediterranean Sea. Algeria's main physical resources are 
hydrocarbons: 3.2 trillion cubic meters of proven natural gas 
reserves and 9.2 billion barrels in recoverable reserves of crude 
oil. Algeria, with 4 percent of proven world reserves of natural 
gas, ranks fifth in the world; moreover, only 17 percent of the 
reserves have been exploited. Other resources include iron, 
zinc, phosphates, uranium, and mercury. In 1993 the country's 
population, predominantly Arabs and Berbers traditionally 
dependent on agriculture, was estimated by the United States 
government at 27.4 million, and the work force was thought to 
exceed 5.5 million. 

A bloody eight-year revolution brought independence to 
Algeria's population, at that time numbering about 10 million, 
in 1962. The departure of the French colons and other foreign- 
ers, who had held a tight stranglehold on the country's admin- 
istration, nearly brought the economy to a halt. The formerly 
productive agricultural sector was especially hard-hit, mainly 
because most Algerians were untrained and hence excluded 
from managing any aspect of agriculture or industry. The total 
commitment of the first independent government, headed by 
Ahmed Ben Bella, to a socialist system of centralized adminis- 
trative management and economic self-sufficiency (because of 
its perceived positive correlation to political independence) 
also took a severe toll on the economy. Furthermore, Ben 
Bella's preoccupation with playing a major role in political rela- 
tions with developing countries did not help matters. 

Not until the late 1970s, when more pragmatic and less 
ideological leaders took over the reins of government under 
President Chadli Benjedid, did Algeria recognize the urgent 
need for social and economic reform. Government develop- 
ment plans until then had been driven by rigid central control 



129 



Algeria: A Country Study 

and state ownership of most of the means of production and 
agriculture. The resulting inefficiencies and shortages spurred 
the government to devise an economic program aimed at 
increasing productivity and growth. But it was the widespread 
bread riots of "Black October" 1988 that compelled the govern- 
ment to institute a more serious and accelerated economic 
reform program. What is also referred to as the "Couscous 
Revolt" was attributed to an unacceptably slow pace of political 
and economic reform, as well as critical food shortages caused 
by the 1986 oil price drop and ensuing decrease in hydrocar- 
bon export earnings. 

The main goals of the accelerated reform program were to 
transform the national economy from a tightly controlled cen- 
tralized system to a market-oriented one, create a climate more 
conducive to foreign investment and increased trade, and 
encourage domestic savings and investment. To achieve these 
objectives, the government gave management autonomy to 
two-thirds of the 450 state-owned enterprises, including banks, 
while instituting a profit accountability system for their manag- 
ers. The government also eliminated state-controlled monopo- 
lies for import and distribution and allowed both Algerian and 
foreign companies to engage in these activities. Finally, the 
authorities encouraged continuation of the de facto privatiza- 
tion of the agricultural sector. 

Algeria's development plans reflected the progress made 
toward achieving the goals of economic growth, infrastructure 
building, and movement from a government-dominated econ- 
omy to decentralized reliance on market forces. These plans 
were influenced by the various leaders' personal vision and 
sociopolitical approach to the economic issues facing their 
country. 

Development Planning 

When the French left Algeria, they took with them most of 
the trained European cadre and left behind an economy in a 
state of chaos. The primary reason for this chaos was the lack of 
a trained or semiskilled Algerian labor force. Ahmed Ben Bella 
reacted by instituting a highly centralized socialist system that 
endowed the government with unlimited authority either to 
run the economy or to turn it over to workers' committees. 
These committees, which were guided by socialist principles, 
proved to be totally ineffective. Ben Bella then shifted his atten- 
tion to seeking a role for Algeria on the international stage and 



130 



The Economy 



finding a leadership role for himself as a voice for developing 
countries. 

Houari Boumediene, who took over in 1965 through a mili- 
tary coup, was a more pragmatic president. Boumediene's First 
Three-Year Plan (1967-69) marked the beginning of long-term 
development planning in Algeria. In 1970 a newly created Sec- 
retariat of State for Planning took over economic planning 
from the Ministry of Finance, underscoring the regime's 
emphasis on social and economic development. The new secre- 
tariat developed the First Four- Year Plan (1970-73) and the 
Second Four- Year Plan (1974-77), which emphasized invest- 
ment in capital-intensive heavy industry at the expense of more 
labor-intensive small industries that would generate badly 
needed employment. The years from 1977 to 1979 were a tran- 
sitional period devoted to assessing previous development 
plans and devising new strategies. 

The First Five- Year Plan (1980-84) and Second Five-Year 
Plan (1985-89) aimed at building a diversified economy and 
reflected the more moderate views of the less ideological 
Chadli Benjedid. A special congress of the National Liberation 
Front (Front de Liberation Nationale — FLN) had selected Ben- 
jedid in January 1979 to succeed Boumediene, who had died of 
a rare blood disease in December 1978. The 1985-89 plan 
marked a significant policy shift by placing greater emphasis on 
agriculture. Benjedid's economic liberalization also resulted in 
less central planning and a decrease in government control, as 
evidenced by the abolition in 1987 of the Ministry of Planning, 
which had earlier replaced the Secretariat of State for Plan- 
ning. 

Further proof of this trend came when the Third Five-Year 
Plan (1990-94) turned out to be more of a broad policy outline 
than a directive plan of action. Its main objectives were to liber- 
alize the economy, allow more business entities to break away 
from the state and become Public Economic Enterprises 
(Entreprises Publiques Economiques — EPEs), and attract for- 
eign investment. 

Government Role 

The spirit of jealously guarded independence was the driv- 
ing force behind the new republic's economic plans. The gov- 
ernment's policies, in turn, were initially dictated by the 
political philosophy of a group of freedom fighters with varying 
degrees of commitment to a socialist ideology. Such an ideol- 



131 



Algeria: A Country Study 



ogy favored a self-sufficient economy that would satisfy the 
basic needs of the masses. But these same economic policies 
also evolved in response to a combination of other factors. 
These factors included the legacy of an untrained labor force 
left by the colons and an early obsession with intensive projects 
for national development even at the expense of imposing 
severe hardships on consumers. Other elements influencing 
economic policies were soaring prices, spiraling unemploy- 
ment, runaway population explosion, and popular discontent. 
Ultimately, later and more pragmatic leaders realized that lib- 
eralization of the economy, political life, and social infrastruc- 
ture was inevitable. 

In the immediate postindependence period, the govern- 
ment concentrated on investment in large-scale heavy industry 
turnkey projects, such as steel mills and oil refineries. The early 
1980s saw a reversal of this policy. Large enterprises were bro- 
ken into smaller, more efficient units, and larger amounts of 
the investment budget were shifted to light industries, such as 
textiles, food processing, and housing construction. The gov- 
ernment retained a preponderant economic role, however, in 
large strategic state companies, such as the National Company 
for Research, Production, Transportation, Processing, and 
Commercialization of Hydrocarbons (Societe Nationale pour 
la Recherche, la Production, le Transport, la Transformation et 
la Commercialisation des Hydrocarbures — Sonatrach). 
Sonatrach was established in 1963 but was divided in 1980 into 
thirteen more autonomous and specialized units. The govern- 
ment's austerity program, which directed hydrocarbon reve- 
nues toward national development, and the continued aversion 
of the authorities to labor-intensive sectors such as agriculture 
and manufacturing created more acute unemployment prob- 
lems and unprecedented food shortages. The 1986 oil price 
crash forced the government to rethink its petroleum-depen- 
dence policies and pay more attention to agriculture and other 
sectors. 

The October 1988 bread riots, however, were probably the 
precipitating event that caused Benjedid to embark on a seri- 
ous program of political and economic liberalization. Some of 
the more significant economic reforms came in the form of 
legislation promulgated in 1990 and 1991. The new laws 
defined specific regulations governing such critical issues as 
foreign investment and trade, joint ventures, repatriation of 
capital and profits, and recourse to international arbitration of 



132 



Hydrocarbons plant at Alrar, in eastern Algeria near the Libyan border, 
produces liquefied petroleum gas, butane, propane, and condensates. 

Courtesy Embassy of Algeria, Washington 
Laying pipeline for moving hydrocarbons across the Sahara 

Courtesy Sonatrach 



133 



Algeria: A Country Study 

disputes. The extent of progress made in implementing these 
new laws in the 1990s will be a major factor in determining 
Algeria's economic outlook. Another important determinant is 
the future course of hydrocarbon prices. This factor, although 
beyond the government's control, has prompted it to initiate a 
policy of diversifying hydrocarbon earnings by increasing both 
natural gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports, as well as 
condensates and petrochemicals. 

The World Bank (see Glossary) World Development Report, 
1989 gave Algeria high marks for its efforts to move its econ- 
omy from a directed system based on central planning to a 
more decentralized, market-oriented system. The results of this 
change included returning to individual farmers land collectiv- 
ized in the 1970s, privatizing low-productivity state farms, estab- 
lishing autonomous public enterprises, and giving the Central 
Bank of Algeria (Banque Centrale d'Algerie; hereafter, Central 
Bank) the authority to control credit and money supply. Since 
the establishment in January 1963 of the Central Bank to 
replace the French Colonial Bank of Algeria and act as the gov- 
ernment's financial agent, the banking system has been under 
state control. New legislation on banking and credit intro- 
duced in 1986 and 1987 defined relationships between the 
Central Bank and commercial banks and allowed the latter to 
provide credit to state enterprises and private companies alike. 

Public Finances 

Algeria ranked in the upper range of medium-income coun- 
tries in 1992, and the government had concentrated for some 
years on enlarging its industrial sector. The emphasis placed on 
manufacturing industries resulted in an average gross domestic 
product (GDP — see Glossary) increase of 18 percent over the 
decade from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s. But accelerated 
industrialization was achieved at the expense of the agricul- 
tural sector, whose GDP share declined from 15 percent in 
1965 to 9 percent in 1985 (see table 3, Appendix). The decline 
compelled the government to spend hard-earned foreign cur- 
rency on food imports to meet serious food shortages facing a 
population that was growing at an average annual rate of about 
3.2 percent in the late 1970s. Oil and gas revenues remained 
Algeria's largest single source of income, but the government 
in 1993 used up to 98 percent of its hydrocarbon export reve- 
nues to ensure its foreign-exchange needs. The government in 
1993 also revised its budget to reflect the fluctuating, i.e., 



134 



The Economy 



decreasing, percentage of hydrocarbon earnings caused by oil 
price changes. As a result, the government has decided to 
diversify the hydrocarbon industry away from crude oil toward 
natural gas, condensates, refined products, and petrochemi- 
cals. The success of this policy notwithstanding, and in spite of 
enhanced revenues from other sectors, additional taxation, 
and customs duties, the government has been unwilling to cut 
public expenditures significantly, fearing an adverse socioeco- 
nomic impact. Whereas the government has committed itself 
to reducing its external debt in the 1990s, it seemingly cannot 
afford to abandon investing in critically needed social infra- 
structure plans. 

The government eventually instituted some reforms in pub- 
lic finance management by shifting the responsibility for 
financing economic activity from the Ministry of Finance to 
financial institutions and by decentralizing the decision-mak- 
ing process. Begun in 1986, these reforms were designed to 
transfer economic financing to local governments and public 
enterprises, including state-owned banks. Financial institu- 
tions, which had been limited to acting as cashiers for the min- 
istry, took over the function of financing public enterprises and 
investment. Ministry of Finance investment financing was lim- 
ited to strategic projects. The financial system also absorbed 
most of the ministry's role in housing finance. The Law on 
Money and Credit, promulgated in 1990, formally transferred 
the role of financial management to the Central Bank and the 
Money and Credit Council (see Investment, this ch.). 

Budget 

The government's commitment to nurturing a self-suffi- 
cient economy caused its investment expenditure to exceed 50 
percent of total current expenditures in the 1970s and the first 
half of the 1980s. Most of the nontax revenue came from the 
hydrocarbons industry, which constituted the largest single 
source of income and provided almost 65 percent of the coun- 
try's total revenues until the early 1980s. But the oil price crash 
of 1986 forced the government to revise the budget to bring 
hydrocarbon revenues down to almost 30 percent of the total. 
The Journal Officiel showed the percentage of oil and gas reve- 
nues dropping from 44 in the 1985 budget to 32 in 1986 and to 
23 in the following three years. These figures continued to vary 
as the government introduced new forms of taxation, such as 
corporate, income, road, and property taxes. As of early 1993, 



135 



Algeria: A Country Study 

the most recent tax to have been introduced was the value- 
added tax of April 1992, which established a 7 percent tax on 
strategic goods (e.g., electricity), 13 percent on reduced tariff 
products (e.g., construction materials), 21 percent on regular 
rate goods (e.g., automobiles), and 40 percent on luxury items. 

The government continued to face the dilemma of reconcil- 
ing an austerity policy designed to reduce a huge foreign debt 
with a commitment to sustain a socialist economy with a fero- 
cious appetite for public expenditure. Rising tax receipts 
helped the government cut investment spending by 26 percent 
in 1986. Continuation of the austerity program reduced the fis- 
cal deficit by 50 percent between 1987 and 1989. Fortuitously, 
increased hydrocarbon revenues in 1989 reduced 1988's deficit 
of more than US$4.4 billion to just over US$1.0 billion. 

Historically, the proportion of investment expenditure 
received by each economic sector has varied from year to year. 
The variation resulted from such factors as the underlying phi- 
losophy of each development plan and the government's pro- 
clivity toward heavy industries. A clear trend has favored either 
basic infrastructure projects or education, health, and other 
social services. The government could not ignore the latter 
areas without exposing itself to serious public criticism or even 
social unrest. Education, for instance, received the lion's share 
of current expenditures in 1989 (26.9 percent) and in 1991 
(25.8 percent), whereas defense was limited to 9 percent and 
8.8 percent for those years. The construction industry exempli- 
fied a neglected sector in early development plans. The con- 
struction sector later caught the government's eye, however, 
because of its socially explosive impact on the severe housing 
shortage, about which less-advantaged Algerians had been 
complaining bitterly. 

External Debt and Payments 

Another area of financial concern relates to Algeria's exter- 
nal debt and debt-service payments. The country's substantial 
debt dates back to the 1970s, when the government borrowed 
heavily to finance development projects and meet rising con- 
sumer needs. When the debt mounted to US$16.9 billion in 
1980, Benjedid decided to limit borrowing to DA50 million 
(for value of the dinar — see Glossary) a year, which reduced 
the debt steadily until 1984. Because payments came under 
pressure starting in 1985, however, the debt-service ratio more 
than doubled between 1985 and 1988, increasing from 35 per- 



136 



The Economy 



cent to 80 percent. Amortization payments increased by 38 per- 
cent until they reached US$6.2 billion in 1990. In spite of 
falling oil production and prices, the government managed to 
avoid debt rescheduling by cleverly obtaining soft finance and 
trade credits. 

By the end of 1990, the country's external debt slightly 
exceeded US$26 billion, of which almost US$2 billion was in 
short-term loans. To reduce the debt-servicing burden, the gov- 
ernment subsequently concentrated on obtaining medium- 
and long-term loans to repay its financial obligations as soon as 
they became due. Also, to augment its efforts to obtain more 
concessional financing, such as bilateral lines of credit, the gov- 
ernment has discouraged importers from borrowing from sup- 
pliers; such loans are usually of short duration and hence are 
more expensive than long-term lines of credit. Countries that 
have bilateral credit lines with Algeria include Belgium, 
France, Italy, Japan, and Spain. 

Algeria has viewed debt rescheduling as a politically unac- 
ceptable step. The government was obliged, however, to make 
another politically unpopular move in 1991, by reaching a 
standby agreement with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF — see Glossary). The FLN had always opposed such a 
move as an encroachment on sovereignty. The IMF standby 
agreement, however, had a positive effect on creditors and 
potential donors, including the World Bank, which decided to 
grant Algeria a US$300 million structural adjustment loan. The 
European Community (EC — see Glossary) also agreed in 1991 
to provide a loan worth US$470 million. A year earlier, the 
Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP) had provided a seven-year 
loan of 1 billion French francs to be used in converting short- 
term borrowing into longer-term loans. Another positive sign 
was Algeria's apparent determination not to miss debt-service 
payments despite a debt service exceeding US$7 billion in 
1991. 

Currency and Exchange Rates 

The Central Bank sets the daily price of the Algerian dinar, 
keyed to a basket of currencies most widely used in payment 
for exports but primarily linked to the United States dollar and 
the French franc. The dinar has had a long history of being 
overvalued, resulting in a runaway black market on which the 
dinar was traded at several times the official rate for many 
years. In a serious attempt to bring down black-market rates 



137 



Algeria: A Country Study 

and thus achieve convertibility for the dinar, the government 
decreed a major devaluation in mid-1990 and allowed the 
dinar to drop about 52 percent, from DA8.5 = US$1 in July of 
that year to DA16.6 = US$1 in March 1991. Although this step 
helped the authorities meet IMF demands for reaching a new 
standby agreement, they were concerned about the raised 
price of imported consumer products and the potential social 
implications for the poorer majority of the population. The 
considerable gap between prices and economic costs for cer- 
tain essential commodities, such as energy products, prompted 
the government to institute a policy of gradually reducing con- 
sumer subsidies while recognizing the importance of price sup- 
ports in protecting the most disadvantaged people. Whereas 
the government tempered its policy of moving rapidly to a sys- 
tem in which almost all prices were to be determined by market 
forces, in 1991 it adjusted the prices of subsidized products, 
electricity, natural gas, and petroleum products. These steps 
resulted in reducing total 1991 subsidies by DA9.6 billion. 

Foreign Aid 

Until the early 1990s, foreign assistance to Algeria consisted 
mainly of generous loans extended by Arab countries on 
unusually favorable terms. Algerian businesses have also man- 
aged to obtain soft credits from trading partners, mostly in 
France, Italy, and Spain. 

The EC's Fourth Protocol (1992-96), however, has called 
for more generous treatment of the Mediterranean countries 
that are not members of the EC, including Algeria, Morocco, 
and Tunisia. The Fourth Protocol increased EC spending 
under the Third Protocol by 28 percent and provided for 
financing regionally based projects undertaken by Algeria and 
its Union of the Arab Maghrib partners. The Fourth Protocol 
also allowed Algeria to obtain larger loans and draw on an EC 
budget allocation of 70 million European currency units 
(ECU), compared with ECU54 million in the Third Protocol. 
Algeria's risk capital provision also jumped from ECU6 million 
to ECU15 million. 

Another important factor that should further enhance Alge- 
ria's foreign-aid prospects is the World Bank's increasing sup- 
port for the government's economic reform program. The 
World Bank's loans to Algeria between 1990 and 1995 are 
expected to more than double the US$1.4 billion extended in 
the period 1985-89. 



138 



The Economy 



Investments 

In another major policy shift, the government decided to 
seek badly needed cash and access to credit in order to ensure 
sustained economic growth. Despite concerns about foreign 
ownership of the Algerian "patrimony," economic pragmatism 
dictated passage of the Law on Money and Credit of April 1990. 
This law liberalized the country's foreign-investment code to 
the extent that only telecommunications, electricity produc- 
tion, hydrocarbon refining and distribution, and railroad trans- 
port remained closed to foreigners. As for the exchange 
system, the new law prohibited multiple exchange rates for the 
dinar and assigned the Money and Credit Council, a board 
composed of Central Bank and other Algerian government 
officials, the responsibility of setting foreign-exchange and 
external-debt policy. The council was also charged with approv- 
ing foreign investments and joint ventures. 

Another objective of the April 1990 law was to attract for- 
eign capital by formalizing the legal framework for investment. 
The law permitted the repatriation of capital and accumulated 
profits, subject to approval by the Central Bank. Investments in 
the hydrocarbon sector, however, were still governed by Law 86- 
14 of August 1986, which limited foreign investors to joint ven- 
tures with Sonatrach. The government's investment priorities 
were listed as agriculture and agribusiness; agricultural 
machinery; mineral, hydrocarbon, and electricity production 
and distribution; petrochemicals; basic and primary trans- 
formed steel and metallurgical products; railroad transport; 
capital goods; and tourism. 

The Law on Money and Credit not only created a more pos- 
itive investment climate but also proved to be quite a contrast 
to previous foreign-investment laws of August 1982 and August 
1986. These two laws had allowed only the repatriation of prof- 
its and indemnities awarded by Algerian courts to foreign 
investors, who were denied any recourse to international arbi- 
tration of disputes, except those covered by a special Franco- 
Algerian protocol, and whose commercial disputes could be 
resolved only under Algerian law. 

The Supplementary Finance Law of August 1990 intro- 
duced the system of concessionaires and wholesalers (exclusive 
dealers representing foreign companies) as a major ingredient 
of the import liberalization process. Before this law was passed, 
only monopolies could import goods for resale. The same law 
also broadened the right to use a foreign-currency account to 



139 



Algeria: A Country Study 

include any business in addition to individuals. The new 
accounts could be used for making any legitimate payments 
relating to the business of the account holder. In April 1991, 
the government announced a change in the import system: all 
imports of merchandise not prohibited were given full access 
to foreign exchange at the official exchange rate. All import 
licensing restrictions were abolished, except for imports receiv- 
ing government subsidies, which continued to be subject to 
administrative control because of domestic trading restrictions. 

Several other measures also served to attract foreign capital. 
In December 1987, the government joined the International 
Finance Corporation, a World Bank body that specializes in 
encouraging private enterprises. In June 1990, it signed an 
agreement allowing the Overseas Private Investment Corpora- 
tion to operate its investment promotion, financing, and insur- 
ance program for United States investors in Algeria. In 
October 1990, the government established the Agency for 
Development and Promotion of Investment to familiarize 
potential foreign investors with Algeria's business climate and 
to facilitate their investments in its companies. 

Although the authorities indicated a strong and under- 
standable interest in enhancing employment opportunities in 
the eastern and southern desert areas of the country, geo- 
graphic investment preferences were not made a prerequisite 
for foreign investment. Nor were sectoral preferences 
required, but it was clear that the authorities would evaluate 
any foreign-investment proposal for its potential contribution 
to increasing Algeria's productive capability, nonhydrocarbon 
exports, and technology transfer. The Ministry of Economy 
issued a supplementary regulation in September 1990, outlin- 
ing its own priorities and defining the objectives of invest- 
ments. These were to finance production of goods and services 
that generated hard currency; to reduce imports of goods and 
services; to improve distribution of goods and equipment; and 
to engage in economic activities that enhanced the profitability 
of public transport, telecommunications, and water and elec- 
tricity distribution — subject to approval by the competent gov- 
ernment agencies. Both foreign investors and Algerian entities 
were given equal access to credit from local banks, with no 
restrictions on reinvestment. No discriminatory or preferential 
export or import regulations were to be applied to foreign- 
owned businesses. Any firm engaged in exporting its output 
would, regardless of ownership, be allowed to retain 100 per- 



140 



Carpet merchant in suq at Khroub near Algiers 
Courtesy United Nations 
Workman decorating a table top in a small Algerian furniture factory 

Courtesy Embassy of Algeria, Washington 



141 



Algeria: A Country Study 

cent of its foreign-exchange earnings for use in importing raw 
materials and machinery needed to sustain its production. 

Services 
Banking 

The banking sector is a major facilitator of investment. The 
magnitude of the government's banking reforms can best be 
understood by comparing the current system with that of the 
French colonial era. Under the French, most of Algeria's banks 
were branches of French banks; after independence they sold 
out or were nationalized. The Central Bank of Algeria was 
established in January 1963, to replace the Colonial Bank of 
Algeria and act as the government's agent in financial transac- 
tions, currency issue, and other central bank functions. In 1971 
the Central Bank assumed the role of supervising the country's 
three major commercial banks, the most important of which 
was the National Bank of Algeria (Banque Nationale d'Alge- 
rie), which served both the private and public sectors and held 
the bulk of total bank deposits. The other two, the Foreign 
Bank of Algeria (Banque Exterieure d'Algerie) and the Popu- 
lar Credit of Algeria (Credit Populaire d'Algerie) were more 
sector oriented, with the former handling energy and foreign 
trade and the latter financing smaller sectors. 

The government's economic development and decentraliza- 
tion policies of the 1980s resulted in the establishment of more 
specialized financial institutions. The Agriculture and Rural 
Development Bank (Banque de l'Agriculture et du Developpe- 
ment Rural) provides loans to the farming and food processing 
industries. The National Fund for Provident Savings (Caisse 
Nationale d'Epargne et de Prevoyance) furnishes savings and 
housing loans. The Bank of Manufacturing and Services 
(Banque des Industries de Transformation et des Services) 
deals with the service sector and light industries. The Bank of 
Local Development (Banque de Developpement Local) was 
formed in 1985 to finance communal development projects. 
The Algerian Development Bank (Banque Algerienne de 
Developpement) was created in 1963 to provide long-term 
(ten- to twenty-year) loans. 

Tourism 

Algeria shares with Morocco and Tunisia a coastline with 
great potential as a tourist attraction. Its tourism industry, how- 



142 



The Economy 



ever, has always lagged behind that of its closest neighbors. 
Mainly because of the government's failure to promote tourism 
and the lack of well-run quality hotels and tourist sites, the 
number of foreign visitors to Algeria in the 1980s never 
exceeded one-fourth and one-sixth of those to Tunisia and 
Morocco, respectively. 

Since 1989, however, the government has shown greater 
interest in promoting tourism because of its potential as a 
source of foreign exchange. As part of its efforts to liberalize 
the country's economy, the government has decentralized the 
national tourism company and granted autonomy to many 
state-owned hotels. The government has also allowed foreign 
companies to run newly constructed hotels, such as the Hilton 
just outside Algiers. Another large hotel (350 rooms), managed 
by the French chain Sofitel, opened in early 1992 in the 
Hamma district of the capital. The government continued to 
encourage local private investment and foreign participation 
in joint ventures, hoping to increase hotel capacity to 50,000 
rooms within a decade. The government's decision to lift the 
DA35 million ceiling on local private investments also is 
expected to generate considerable hotel construction activity. 

Labor and Employment 

Algeria's rapidly growing labor force of about 5.5 million 
unskilled agricultural laborers and semiskilled workers in the 
early 1990s accurately reflected the high rate of population 
growth. More than 50 percent of the labor force was between 
fifteen and thirty-four years old. Almost 40 percent of the labor 
force either had no formal education or had not finished pri- 
mary school; 20 percent of the labor force had completed sec- 
ondary school or beyond. Women officially constituted only 
just over 7 percent of the labor force, but that figure did not 
take into account women working in agriculture. Unskilled 
laborers constituted 39 percent of the total active work force, 
but nonprofessional skilled workers, such as carpenters, electri- 
cians, and plumbers, were in short supply because most tended 
to migrate to Europe. The Benjedid government tried without 
much success to entice them to return to their homeland to 
help the domestic economy — even at the expense of losing 
their foreign-exchange remittances. Algerian remittances, how- 
ever, have always been much lower than those of other Maghrib 
(see Glossary) emigrants. Although Algerian workers in France 
and other EC (see Glossary) countries outnumbered other 



143 



Algeria: A Country Study 

North Africans, their annual remittances were estimated at 
US$350 million, whereas non-Algerian transfers amounted to 
US$2 billion. 

The labor force grew at an annual average rate of 4 percent 
between 1985 and 1990, but the growth in employment has 
lagged seriously. The result has been acute unemployment and 
underemployment. Official estimates put the 1990 unemploy- 
ment rate at 26 percent. (Official figures tended to underesti- 
mate actual unemployment because they counted only those 
males actively seeking work.) In 1990 almost 65 percent of all 
the unemployed were fifteen to twenty-four years old, raising 
the unemployment rate within this age bracket to 41 percent. 
Recognizing that the country's demographics would make 
youth unemployment a thorny social problem, in 1988 the gov- 
ernment established the Youth Employment Program (Pro- 
gramme d'Emploi des Jeunes) to provide jobs and training for 
youths between sixteen and twenty-four years of age. Because 
this program failed to meet its target of creating 40,000 train- 
ing opportunities and 60,000 jobs each year, in 1990 the gov- 
ernment initiated two other programs to help establish new 
enterprises either operated by or employing young people. 
One program would subsidize, by up to 30 percent of the initial 
investment, the establishment of new enterprises by young peo- 
ple. The other would guarantee bank loans extended to young 
entrepreneurs. 

Two basic salaries, both paid by the government, set the 
wage scale for the formal sector and the framework for the rest 
of the country. The National Guaranteed Minimum Wage 
(Salaire National Minimum Garanti) is the amount paid by the 
government to people who are unemployed. The sum consti- 
tutes what the government considers a basic minimum wage, 
but it is not legally binding. The minimum wage was intro- 
duced in 1978 at DAI, 000 per month and was not changed 
until 1990, when the government and the largest labor union, 
the General Union of Algerian Workers (Union Generale des 
Travailleurs Algeriens — UGTA), agreed to raise the amount to 
DA1,800 in January 1991 and to DA2,000 in July of the same 
year. The second salary figure, the Minimum Activity Wage 
(Salaire Minimum dActivite), is the minimum paid by the gov- 
ernment to its employees; it is considered a minimum for the 
rest of the formal sector. The same agreement with the UGTA 
incrementally increased this minimum until it reached 
DA2,500 in July 1991. In a move consistent with its continuing 



144 



The Economy 



reform policies, the government later decided to decentralize 
the wage negotiation process. As a result, autonomous public 
enterprises, which had been required to adhere to the civil ser- 
vice wage scale, were allowed to negotiate independently with 
their employees. 

Algerian workers lacked the right to form multiple autono- 
mous labor unions until the June 1990 Law on Trade Union 
Activity was passed by the National Assembly, thus ending the 
monopoly of the FLN party-linked UGTA on labor representa- 
tion. Another 1990 law on industrial relations provided for col- 
lective bargaining, abolishing a previous ban on strikes and 
guaranteeing workers the right to press their demands. It 
required, however, that labor-management disputes be submit- 
ted to a conciliation procedure that was administered by the 
local inspection office but that also provided both parties with 
recourse to arbitration. If the dispute persisted, workers were 
allowed to strike after giving eight days' notice. The new legisla- 
tion also provided managers with a more flexible framework 
for administering personnel policies, including hiring and fir- 
ing procedures. 

Natural Resources and Energy 
Hydrocarbons 

Algeria's economy is dominated by the hydrocarbon sector, 
which in 1990 represented just over 23 percent of GDP and 
which was the largest source of its exports (see table 3, Appen- 
dix). In 1990, for example, US$12.3 billion of the country's 
total export earnings of US$12.7 billion (i.e., 97 percent) came 
from oil, gas, and refined products exports: crude and conden- 
sates (US$6.1 billion), refined products (US$2.7 billion), natu- 
ral gas (US$2.8 billion), and liquefied petroleum gas, known as 
LPG (US$730 million). Algeria's oil, a light variety with low sul- 
fur content that commanded a premium in international mar- 
kets, was the main natural resource on which the government 
depended heavily to sustain its economic development pro- 
grams through the 1970s. Crude oil production, concentrated 
in the Hassi Messaoud field near Haoud el Hamra pumping 
station, south of Constantine, and in the areas of the Zarzaitine 
and Edjeleh fields near the Libyan border, however, has been 
diminishing steadily; in the early 1990s it accounted for no 
more than 1 percent of world production (see fig. 6). 



145 



Algeria: A Country Study 




Figure 6. Oil and Gas Industry, 1993 

Although about fifty oilfields have been producing since 
1989, the peak production level of 1.2 million barrels per day 
(bpd — see Glossary) reached in 1978 was reduced to approxi- 
mately 700,000 bpd in 1990. The government imposed the out- 
put restriction to prolong the life span of the oilfields and to 
abide by production quotas of the Organization of the Petro- 
leum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Algeria's total refining 
capacity stood at 475,000 bpd in 1990. 

The country's oil reserves are expected to be depleted 
within three decades at 1992 rates of production. This alarm- 
ing assessment, coupled with slumping world oil prices and 
diminishing prospects of growth in crude oil sales, prompted 
the government to focus on involving foreign companies in its 
oil industry by liberalizing the application of the August 1986 



146 



The Economy 



exploration code. When the parliament amended this law in 
December 1991, Sonatrach, which has retained firm control 
over all oil policies despite the 1980 restructuring of the hydro- 
carbon industry, was obliged to allow joint ventures with inter- 
national companies interested in exploring low-deposit areas 
that require high-technology methods to enhance production. 
The government also announced that international arbitration 
would be allowed in case of dispute. 

Algeria's considerable natural gas reserves of about 3,200 
billion cubic meters of proven recoverable gas are expected to 
last more than sixty years at 1992 production rates. Natural gas 
has become the country's most valuable export as a result of 
the decline of oil production and prices — and as an outcome 
of the government's diversification strategy. The Hassi R'Mel 
field south of Algiers is the largest and contains almost two- 
thirds of the country's reserves. Other large fields include, in 
descending order, Hassi Messaoud, Alrar (in central Algeria, 
near the Libyan border), Gassi Touil (southeast of Ouargla), 
and Rhourd en Nous (in the center of Algeria). 

The four plants that liquefy natural gas are owned by 
Sonatrach, which in the early 1990s sought to promote pipe- 
line sales through the existing trans-Mediterranean pipeline. It 
was estimated that Algeria's 1990 sales of 12.5 billion cubic 
meters of LNG could be doubled if plans to build a second 
trans-Mediterranean line to Spain were to materialize. After an 
ill-fated attempt by Sonatrach to raise LNG prices — at the insis- 
tence of politicians clamoring that Algeria was not getting fair 
compensation for its natural resources — the government 
decided to abandon OPEC fixed prices and switched to a more 
realistic market-based pricing policy. This new approach 
resulted in contracts extending past 2000 with such clients as 
Gaz de France, Enagas of Spain, Distrigaz of Belgium, and Pan- 
handle of the United States. 

Algeria's condensate reserves, which are extensively used in 
the petrochemicals industry and most of which are located at 
Hassi R'Mel, are estimated at 400 million tons. Condensate 
sales in the 1980s helped to make up for the downturn in oil 
revenues. The respite is likely to be short-lived, however, 
because the drop in the condensate exports is expected to be 
accompanied by a corresponding decrease in output from 
1989 to 1995. 

Enhancing LPG production has been another government 
priority in its diversification strategy. Fortuitously, domestic 



147 



Algeria: A Country Study 

demand for LPG in individual households and public transpor- 
tation has increased steadily. To meet this constantly growing 
demand, Sonatrach reopened its old Arzew plant, west of Al- 
giers, in 1990. It also renovated the equipment at Hassi Mes- 
saoud and planned a construction program of extraction and 
processing plants, pumping stations, 1,000 kilometers of pipe- 
line between Alrar and Hassi R'Mel, and, finally, the long- 
awaited massive new LPG plant at Arzew. Despite Sonatrach's 
successful implementation of its diversification strategy, the 
government was well aware of its overdependence on the reve- 
nue from oil and gas exports to finance its ambitious national 
development program and service its external debt. 

Minerals 

Algeria's nonfuel minerals are used extensively as raw mate- 
rials for domestic manufacturing, but some, such as high-grade 
iron ore, phosphate, mercury, and zinc, have also been 
exported since the early 1970s. The state mining and prospect- 
ing corporation, the National Company for Mineral Research 
and Exploration (Societe Nationale de Recherches et d'Exploi- 
tations Minieres), was established in 1967. As a result of the 
government's decentralization policy, the company was restruc- 
tured in 1983 into separate production and distribution enti- 
ties. The most important of these were an iron ore and 
phosphate company known as Ferphos, which had three pro- 
duction units and a port complex at Annaba, and another com- 
pany called Erem that specialized in conducting mineral 
research at Boumerdas on the Mediterranean Sea and Taman- 
rasset in the south (see fig. 7). 

Iron ore is found at Beni Saf in the northwest and the 
Ouenza and Bou Khadra region near the eastern border. Pro- 
duction levels have tended to vary significantly over the years, 
fluctuating between 1 million and 2 million tons between the 
early 1970s and the early 1990s. The deposits at Ouenza repre- 
sent 75 percent of total production and have been exported 
primarily to Italy and Britain. However, there are massive 
reserves of medium-grade ore at Gara Djebilet, near Tindouf in 
the west. These deposits of an estimated 2 billion tons of 
medium-grade ore have been said to be the largest in the Arab 
world. The most significant zinc deposits have been found at 
the mountain of El Abed near the Algerian-Moroccan border 
and at Kherzet-Youssef in the Setif region. Lead is also mined at 
El Abed and Kherzet-Youssef. 



148 



The Economy 



The large phosphate deposits at Djebel Onk in the north- 
east have been mined since the early 1960s; phosphate rock 
output reached 1.3 million tons in 1988. The total was almost 
evenly divided between export (primarily to France and Spain) 
and local consumption or processing at the Annaba fertilizer 
plant, approximately 350 kilometers away. Most major mines 
are linked by rail to Algeria's ports. Djebel Onk phosphate 
mines near the Tunisian border, as well as the Ouenza iron ore 
mines, are linked by electric rail line to Annaba. Zinc and lead 
mines at El Abed near the Moroccan border in the west are 
linked to Oran. 

Electric Power 

The mounting demand for LPG use in individual house- 
holds has been matched by a similar increase in the demand 
for electricity — a factor of the rapid rate of national develop- 
ment and housing construction. Overall energy consumption 
throughout the country quadrupled between the early 1970s 
and the early 1990s, largely as a result of government efforts to 
complete the rural electrification program and extend the 
domestic gas network. The National Company for Electricity 
and Gas (Societe Nationale de l'Electricite et du Gaz — Sonel- 
gaz) is the state utility company responsible for producing and 
distributing electric power and gas. Sonelgaz has estimated that 
the country's low- and medium-tension power network will 
reach almost 350,000 kilometers by 2005, compared with 
102,000 kilometers in 1987 (the latest figure available in 1993). 

Before independence in 1962, almost half of Algeria's elec- 
tricity was generated by hydroelectric power; three decades 
later, only 7 percent of capacity was hydroelectric. The main 
sources of electricity generation are thermal plants located at 
Algiers, Annaba, and Oran. The Kabylie region has a group of 
small hydroelectric stations. Most production plants had con- 
verted from coal to gas by the early 1980s. 

In its search for alternative energy sources, the government 
established the Commissariat for New Energy (Commissariat 
aux Energies Nouvelles) in 1982 to develop nuclear energy, 
solar energy, and other potential sources of power. Whereas 
solar power was proving to have considerable potential, partic- 
ularly in desert locations, nuclear power may become a casualty 
of international concerns and allegations that it could be used 
for military purposes. 



149 



Algeria: A Country Study 




Internationa 

boundary 

5) National capital 

) Populated place 

3 Light industry 



% 
C 
Fe 



Iron and steel 
production 

Coal 

Iron ore 

100 200 300 Kil 



Hg Mercury 

Pb Lead and zinc 

Ph Phosphate 

U Uranium 

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Grapes, olives, 
citrus, and 
vegetables 



yj Cereal grains 
Nomadic herding 



/ 



NIGER 



MALI 



Boundary representation 
not necessarily suthQfttatlv& 



A 



Figure 7. Economic Activity, 1993 



Industry 

In the early 1990s, the industrial sector represented Alge- 
ria's greatest hope in its search for economic independence. 
The major component of this part of the economy consists of 
hydrocarbon-related processing plants (see Hydrocarbons, this 
ch.). In addition, heavy industrial manufacturing and construc- 
tion constitute significant elements of this sector. 



150 



The Economy 



Manufacturing 

Industry is a growing factor in Algeria's economy, and in 
1990 constituted 10 percent of GDP. Steel production began in 
El Hadjar near Annaba in the early 1970s, when the govern- 
ment was emphasizing heavy industry. A decade later, however, 
this plant was operating at 20 percent of its expanded capacity 
of 2 million tons per year, as a result of poor management, 
shortage of inputs, and heavy-handed bureaucratic procedures. 
Although the Benjedid government continued to invest in 
manufacturing, it was sensitive to consumer demands and 
hence amenable to allocating more funds to lighter industries 
that create more jobs. 

Since the 1970s, smaller manufacturers of shoes and clothes 
and even smaller steel mills have been located in many parts of 
the country and have created some worthwhile opportunities 
for private investors. The manufacture of agricultural equip- 
ment, trucks, and machine tools, once the exclusive domain of 
the National Company for Mechanical Construction (Societe 
Nationale de Constructions Mecaniques), has been decentral- 
ized and used as a model for restructuring other large national 
companies. The success of this experiment encouraged the 
World Bank in 1990 to extend Algeria a US$99.5 million loan 
for restructuring other industrial companies. 

Construction 

Algeria's chronic housing shortage, which has ranked high 
on the government's priority list because of its social implica- 
tions, has had a consistent impact on the construction industry. 
The population over the years has been unevenly distributed: 
about 87 percent of the population lives in the coastal and sub- 
coastal regions, which comprise 17 percent of the country's 
total area (see Urbanization and Density, ch. 2). The influx of 
Algerians moving from rural areas into urban housing left 
vacant by the French and other Europeans, coupled with rapid 
economic development and high birth rates, has dramatically 
accelerated the pace of urbanization. 

Government attention to housing was not evident, however, 
until it was included in economic development plans in the 
1980s. The five-year plans for 1980-84 and 1985-89 outlined a 
number of objectives for housing policies: reduction of con- 
struction delays, integration of housing within social services 
designed to raise living standards, control of expansion of 



151 



Algeria: A Country Study 

housing developments to preserve agricultural land, and sale 
of government-owned dwellings to their occupants. In addi- 
tion, the plans sought to improve the efficiency of the con- 
struction sector and the financial institutions involved in 
housing and to develop the construction material industry. 

The seriousness with which the government viewed the 
housing problem was underlined in 1992 when a new minister 
of housing was appointed and assigned the responsibility of 
urban development in addition to the traditional function of 
overseeing housing construction. Even with governmental 
encouragement of manufacturers of building materials to pro- 
duce more, the public sector has been unable to meet the con- 
stantly growing demand for new housing — estimated at about 
250,000 units a year. In 1993 there was a shortage of 2 million 
housing units. A major obstacle was a chronic shortage of 
inputs in cement production, which was controlled by four 
regional Enterprises for Cement and Derivatives (Entreprises 
des Ciments et Derives). Private-sector firms have been active, 
however, in introducing prefabricated construction techniques 
under the umbrella of the National Office to Promote Prefabri- 
cated Construction (Office National de la Promotion de la 
Construction en Prefabrique). 

Agriculture 

Algerian independence and the subsequent departure of 
French colons and other settlers signaled the collapse of the 
agricultural sector. Agriculture used to be Algeria's dominant 
sector. From the beginning of French colonization until the 
early 1960s, it satisfied almost all of the country's food require- 
ments. It was critically handicapped, however, by the sudden 
loss of foreign managers and skilled labor. Perhaps more 
important was the disruption of a profit-motivated system that 
was not content with self-sufficiency but that also managed to 
export some products. Whereas Algeria produced more than 
90 percent of its grain needs in 1962, the 1989 rate stood at 25 
percent. Before the advent of the oil and gas era, the agricul- 
tural sector accounted for 63 percent of export revenues. But 
the importance of agriculture dwindled steadily as hydrocar- 
bons became the driving force of the economy and the govern- 
ment's development policy favored heavy industries over 
agriculture-related projects. Similarly, agricultural employment 
dropped from 40 percent of the total labor force in the 1960s 
to 24 percent in 1990. The percentage of GDP provided by 



152 



The Economy 



agriculture in 1990 was estimated to be between 7 and 11 per- 
cent; it was clear that agriculture's impact on the economy had 
declined appreciably since colonial times. 

Nevertheless, agriculture remains highly significant. In the 
early 1990s, at least 22 percent of the population lived in rural 
areas and depended on agriculture as a means of livelihood. 
But a number of natural factors beyond the government's con- 
trol have had a negative impact on Algerian agriculture, among 
them unreliable rainfall patterns, floods, and drought. The 
country's arable land is limited to less than 3 percent of its total 
area — about 7.5 million hectares. Another 12 percent of Alge- 
ria's total area is suitable only for forestry and grazing. Because 
40 to 50 percent of the cultivable land is usually left fallow in 
any one season, only about 1.7 percent of the total area (about 
4.2 million hectares) is actually cultivated; more than half of 
the cultivable area, 2.7 million hectares, is used for grains 
alone. In addition, only one-tenth of the cultivable land 
receives adequate rainfall. In 1989 the government, finally rec- 
ognizing that irrigation projects were essential to allow more 
intensive cultivation and substitution of higher-yielding vegeta- 
bles for grains, provided more than 1.8 billion cubic meters of 
water by irrigation to increase agricultural production. 

Land Tenure and Reform 

The government emphasis on agriculture and the impor- 
tance of irrigation in the 1990s is reminiscent of the role of 
agriculture in Algeria's preindependence era. European set- 
tlers then held most of the irrigated land and about one-half of 
the cultivated area. At independence, the newly installed gov- 
ernment took over for its own use farms vacated by the French 
and other foreigners; the lands remained legally owned by the 
settlers, however. This arrangement lasted until October 1963, 
when the authorities decreed that all land abandoned by the 
colons would be owned by the state. By mid-1966 all remaining 
unoccupied properties had been nationalized and turned over 
to workers under a self-management system (autogestion — see 
Glossary). A small portion of farmland had been occupied by 
Algerians claiming to be previous owners, as well as by laborers 
who had worked for the colons. The authorities also gave some 
land as a reward to veterans of the War of Independence. Most 
of the expropriated 2.7 million hectares, however, were turned 
into state farms run by workers' committees, under a socialist 
sector that received almost all of the funds allocated to agricul- 



153 




154 



a 



Djanet, a Saharan oasis in southeastern Algeria 

Courtesy LaVerle Berry 



155 



Algeria: A Country Study 

ture but that suffered from a cumbersome central government 
bureaucracy and lack of motivation. 

Dissolution of the state farming sector was announced in 
1971 by Boumediene, who introduced an agrarian reform pro- 
gram that called for breaking up large state-owned farms and 
redistributing them to landless peasants. The only condition 
with which these peasants had to comply was to join govern- 
ment-organized cooperatives, which would provide them with 
state loans, seed, fertilizers, and agricultural equipment. By 
early 1974, Boumediene's agrarian revolution (1974-78) had 
given ten hectares of private land to each of 60,000 peasants 
and had organized them into 6,000 agricultural cooperatives. 
Encouraged by the initial success of his agrarian reform, Bou- 
mediene inaugurated a new program to construct One Thou- 
sand Socialist Villages; in fact, its ultimate objective was to build 
1,700 villages to house 140,000 farmers. 

After Boumediene's death in 1978, this program ended, pre- 
sumably because of the heavy financial losses it had incurred. 
Other contributing factors may have been the new govern- 
ment's concern over poor agricultural productivity, rising costly 
food imports, and the generally unsatisfactory performance of 
communal farms. Therefore the Benjedid government decided 
to allocate more public funds to agricultural infrastructure, 
especially dam construction and water projects. 

Serious reforms, which eventually reversed the policy of 
concentrating production in state-owned farms in favor of a sys- 
tem of private-sector management, started with the 1980-84 
five-year plan. The government assigned approximately 
700,000 hectares to private farmers, increasing the total pri- 
vate-sector area to 5 million hectares. At the same time, it liber- 
alized the system for marketing agricultural products and gave 
incentives for intensive farming. Further reforms included the 
government's decision in 1987 to break up 3,400 state farms 
(about 700 hectares each) into privately owned farms averag- 
ing eighty hectares each. Because the right of ownership was 
permanent and transferable — provided the farm remained 
undivided to ensure adequate cultivation size — and the new 
owners were entitled to own all their equipment, this measure 
proved an effective incentive for individual farmers. The new 
system resulted in higher production as early as 1988. 

Further proof of the authorities' concern with improving 
agricultural production to prepare the country for "life after 
oil" was found in the 1985-89 plan. The plan allocated higher 



156 



The Economy 



percentages of public funds to the agricultural sector, espe- 
cially water projects. Investment in such projects rose from 10 
percent of the total budget in 1985 to 14.5 percent in 1990, and 
the government announced its intention to add 20,000 irri- 
gated hectares a year. 

Although as of 1993 Algeria was a net agricultural importer 
(total agricultural imports increased 45 percent in 1989 to 
US$3.1 billion), the government has made a special effort to 
ensure an affordable food supply for a rapidly growing popula- 
tion. As a result, it continued to control and subsidize the price 
of staples — bread, cooking oil, flour, milk, and sugar. The eco- 
nomic necessity of lowering food import costs, however, gener- 
ated enough political support to allow relatively free markets in 
agriculture. An important step was the liberalization of the 
marketing of inputs and agricultural output. A 1988 decree 
allowed private farmers to purchase inputs from any suppliers 
they chose. As of April 1991, individuals and farm cooperatives 
could engage in wholesale trading in agricultural inputs; they 
were also authorized to import agricultural inputs at the offi- 
cial rate of exchange. Another law promulgated in 1991 dereg- 
ulated land transactions and eliminated the municipalities' 
monopoly ownership of property reserves, making them avail- 
able for public purchase. 

Crops 

Wheat and barley are Algeria's major grain crops, represent- 
ing 63 percent of all cultivated areas in 1987. In spite of the 
government's longstanding objective of boosting productivity, 
however, grain self-sufficiency dropped from 91 percent at 
independence to 18 percent in 1990. The drop resulted from 
such factors as the rapidly multiplying population, erratic cli- 
matic conditions, agricultural mismanagement, and rural 
migration to urban centers. Grain production plunged 25 per- 
cent between 1986 and 1990, but returned to a record level in 
1991. The bulk of the production was in wheat and barley (see 
table 4, Appendix). Despite the comeback, Algeria continued 
to import 75 percent of its grain needs. The EC was the major 
supplier of barley. Corn imports also doubled between 1985 
and 1990; the United States provided 75 percent of the total. 

Other main crops include grapes, citrus fruits, vegetables, 
olives, tobacco, and dates. In the early 1990s, Algeria was the 
world's fifth largest producer of dates. About three-quarters of 
the annual average of 200,000 tons are consumed locally. 



157 



Algeria: A Country Study 



Wine production, however, although it continues to be 
Algeria's major agricultural export as it had been during 
French occupation, has shown a steady and drastic decline. 
The drop has occurred in part because of decreased demand 
in European markets but also because of the government view 
that dependence on wine exports is economically and politi- 
cally risky as well as possibly inappropriate for a Muslim state. 
France's decision to stop importing Algerian wines in retalia- 
tion for the nationalization of its oil assets in 1969 has been 
cited as one reason for the drop. The country's annual output 
of wine declined from 15 million hectoliters in 1962 to 1 mil- 
lion hectoliters in 1988; the area under vine cultivation 
dropped correspondingly from 370,000 hectares to 82,000 
hectares for the same period. 

In 1990 olive groves covered at least 160,000 hectares, but 
unsatisfactory levels of olive oil production caused the govern- 
ment in 1990 to initiate a ten-year program to rehabilitate an 
additional 100,000 hectares of groves and build 200 oil-press- 
ing plants. The authorities also sought to expand tomato culti- 
vation in addition to other agro-industry projects. Tobacco, 
however, remained the main industrial crop, producing 4,000 
tons a year and employing 13,000 workers. 

Livestock 

Although sheep and goat herds have been increasing since 
independence, especially when contrasted with grain produc- 
tion levels, the viability of the livestock sector as a whole 
depends heavily on such factors as improvement of breeding 
methods, disease control, and imported feed — feed grain 
imports rose sharply in the 1980s. Whereas meat production 
increased through the 1970s, growth tapered off during the 
1980s, and the government was concerned about the failure to 
meet the production target of 228,000 tons in 1989. At least 60 
percent of milk requirements were imported in 1990. Poultry 
production scored remarkable successes and reached self-suffi- 
ciency by the mid-1980s. Earlier, the agrarian revolution had 
tried to restructure the system of grazing on the high plateaus 
but failed to change the pattern of livestock ownership: 5 per- 
cent of herders in 1990 owned 50 percent of the total herds. In 
1990, according to United Nations Food and Agriculture Orga- 
nization estimates, Algeria had about 1.4 million head of cattle, 
3.7 million goats, and 13.4 million sheep. The majority of live- 
stock spend the winter on the open range and the spring and 



158 




Grape production has decreased, 
but vineyards still flourish 
in some areas. 
Courtesy United States 
Department of Agriculture 




Cutting hay; women in the 
foreground, men in the rear 
Courtesy Nadia Benchallal and 
Middle East Report 





159 



Algeria: A Country Study 

summer in the grain-raising area grazing on what is left after 
the wheat and barley harvests. 

Forestry 

In 1991 about 4 million hectares of forest remained in Alge- 
ria according to official estimates, but most experts thought 
that reality fell far short of that figure. The area covered by for- 
ests had been dwindling for decades despite government 
efforts to increase wooded hectarage and prevent the erosion 
of cultivable land. The 1985-89 plan included a project to 
reforest 364,000 hectares. An earlier twenty-year project begun 
in 1975 had initiated the construction of a 1,500-kilometer- 
long green barrier {barrage vert) of forest along the northern 
edge of the Sahara from Morocco to Tunisia. Although the 
project managed in theory to increase the total forest area by 
10 percent annually, the percentage being swallowed up by the 
desert and by sheep grazing was greater. 

A state monopoly, the National Association of Cork and 
Wood Industries (Societe Nationale des Industries des Lieges 
et du Bois), operates the timber industry. The industry pro- 
cessed more than 300,000 cubic meters of wood and cork in 
1991. Algeria ranked third in world cork production, after 
Spain and Portugal. 

Fishing 

Despite Algeria's 1,000 kilometers of Mediterranean coast, 
the fishing industry remains underdeveloped. The govern- 
ment, aware of the industry's potential, established joint enter- 
prises with Mauritania and Senegal by the 1980s to exploit the 
rich fishing waters of the Atlantic. In 1991 the government was 
also modernizing and expanding fishing ports on the Mediter- 
ranean Sea, hoping to increase the 1988 catch of 106,000 tons 
to an annual rate of 115,000 tons. In 1989 the catch had fallen 
to 99,000 tons. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 
Transportation 

Algeria's transportation infrastructure, mostly inherited 
from the French, was badly neglected through the 1970s. How- 
ever, the government has devoted considerable attention and 
funding to it since the early 1980s in order to meet the growing 



160 



The Economy 



needs for balanced regional development and to deal with the 
pressure of rapid urbanization. Public funds have been allo- 
cated to expand, modernize, and upgrade the country's roads, 
railroads, ports, and airports to accommodate constantly rising 
traffic and passenger demands. But the government's insis- 
tence in the early 1990s on continuing its policy of austerity 
and lowering expenditure levels could lead to rehabilitating 
the existing infrastructure rather than investing in new systems. 

Railroads 

Railroads are a state monopoly run by the National Railroad 
Transportation Company (Societe Nationale des Transports 
Ferroviaires — SNTF), a semi-autonomous public entity operat- 
ing under the aegis of the Ministry of Transport. The approxi- 
mately 4,000-kilometer railroad system, which is old and poorly 
designed, is further handicapped by the lack of long-distance 
traffic. Phosphate and iron ore traffic in the eastern region is 
almost the only commercially profitable freight traffic. Passen- 
ger traffic is concentrated mostly around the major urban 
areas, especially the capital (see fig. 8). A main railroad line 
connects major cities along the coast and joins the Moroccan 
and Tunisian systems at their respective borders. However, rail 
links with Morocco were closed for twelve years as a result of 
tension between the two countries and reopened only in Sep- 
tember 1988. 

SNTF has argued that rail transport is 75 percent cheaper 
than road transport and that it should be developed to carry 
up to 40 percent of freight, as in France. The fact that the rail- 
roads carried 53 million passengers and 13 million tons of 
freight in 1989 lent further credence to SNTF's ambitious 
US$11 billion program to double the length and freight capac- 
ity of the existing rail network. The expansion program 
includes a new line running east-west across the Hauts Pla- 
teaux, new track, freight centers, and stations. Although the 
government's austerity policy may affect the level of investment 
in railroad improvement, several new lines were under con- 
struction in 1993 and others were under renovation, including 
the Jij el-Ram dan e Djamal line in the northeast and stretches of 
the line in western Algeria. 

Funding for Algeria's railroads has come from outside 
sources. In 1991 the African Development Bank approved a 
loan to finance construction of a railroad tunnel that would 
cost US$130 million and take more than three years to com- 



161 




Figure 8. Transportation System, 1993 

plete. Part of a US$211 million loan from the World Bank in 
1989 was allotted to the reconstruction of Algeria's railroads. 

An urban rail project involving work on the first twenty-six 
kilometers of the Algiers subway system, which had been 
planned for 1985, was begun in August 1989. The whole system 
is to total sixty-four kilometers when completed in 1994. 

Ports 

Shipping is also a government monopoly run by the state 
concern, the National Corporation for Maritime Transport and 



162 



The Economy 



the Algerian National Navigation Company (Societe Nationale 
de Transports Maritimes et Compagnie Nationale Algerienne 
de Navigation— SNTM-CNAN). SNTM-CNAN started with nine 
vessels in 1971; in the late 1980s, the organization owned sev- 
enty vessels and twenty tugboats. Although the Ministry of 
Transport is responsible for coordinating maritime functions, 
semiautonomous port authorities created in 1984 handle port 
operations. Algeria's major ports — Algiers, Annaba, Oran, 
Skikda, Bejaia, and Mostaganem — handled about 84 million 
tons of cargo in 1990. The three largest ports handled 71 per- 
cent of total traffic in 1991; Algiers took 32 percent, Annaba 23 
percent, and Oran 16 percent. Bejaia and Skikda remain 
important ports for exporting hydrocarbons and minerals, 
Mostaganem handles general cargo, and Arzew boasts large 
LNG terminals. The new container port of Djendjene near 
Jijel, funded by Saudi Arabia and built by an Italian-Dutch con- 
sortium, is to serve the planned Bellara steelworks in eastern 
Algeria. The port may need a massive financial infusion to 
make it fully operative. 

The need to develop container facilities, especially at the 
congested Algiers port, and to continue modernizing other 
ports ranked high on the government's priority list in 1992. 
The World Bank provided a US$63 million loan in 1989 to 
upgrade the port facilities of Algiers, Annaba, and Oran. In 
connection with port improvement programs, the government 
needed to clarify the division of responsibility between the Min- 
istry of Transport, which has authority to coordinate all port 
operations, and the Ministry of Public Works, which oversees 
construction and maintenance of port infrastructures. 

Roads 

Algeria has more than 90,000 kilometers of national roads, 
including 30,000 kilometers of primary routes, or routes natio- 
nales (RN), and 20,000 kilometers of secondary roads, or chem- 
ins de wilaya (CW). The rest of the road network consists of ter- 
tiary but generally accessible roads and tracks known as chemins 
communaux (CC), mainly serving rural areas in the north and 
in the Sahara region. The RN and CW system of major roads is 
managed by the Ministry of Public Works and its regional ser- 
vices, known as Directorates for Basic Infrastructures (Direc- 
tions des Infrastructures de Base); the Ministry of Interior, 
Local Communities, and Tourism and local authorities are 
responsible for tertiary roads. The road network is unevenly 



163 



Algeria: A Country Study 

distributed among the various regions, but it accurately reflects 
the topography and demographic pattern of the country. 
Thus, the network is much more developed in the northern 
coastal region where economic activities and population con- 
centrations are heaviest. The south is served by a limited num- 
ber of national roads linking the few densely populated areas. 

Three major east-west highways run through Algeria and 
link Morocco with Tunisia, and three others run from north to 
south. The most extensive highway project, however, is a trans- 
Saharan road, known as the Road of African Unity. It runs from 
El Golea south to Tamanrasset, all the way to the southern bor- 
ders, branching before it reaches into Niger and Mali. 

Figures on vehicle fleets on Algeria's roads are neither 
readily available nor very reliable, mainly because vehicle regis- 
tration data are not adjusted for vehicle scrapping. Best esti- 
mates put the number of privately owned cars and trucks at 
well over 1 million in the early 1990s. This number is expected 
to increase as the government continues to ease restrictions on 
imports of cars by migrant workers returning to Algeria. State- 
owned trucks constitute about 80 percent of the total vehicle 
fleet capacity. 

Airports 

Civil aviation is an important ingredient of the transporta- 
tion system because of the distances involved in such a large 
country and the dispersion of population, particularly in the 
south. The hydrocarbon industry is partly responsible for the 
mushrooming of the dozens of small airfields and airstrips 
needed to support oil and natural gas exploration and survey- 
ing in various areas. Civil aviation can be expected to receive 
special attention from the government — in spite of increasing 
resource constraints — because of the need for regional devel- 
opment on the Hauts Plateaux and for integrating the deep 
south desert region with the rest of the economy. 

Internationally, Algeria's four major airports — Algiers, Con- 
stantine, Annaba, and Oran — dominate the scene and provide 
97 percent of all services. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, air- 
port infrastructure improvements administered by the Airport 
Directorate of the Ministry of Public Works included the exten- 
sion of one of the two runways in Algiers, completion of 
improvements to airports in the south, construction of a sec- 
ond runway at Tamanrasset, and modernization of navigation 
facilities and equipment at several airports. 



164 



Port of Algiers, the country's principal maritime 
facility for general cargo and passengers 
Courtesy United Nations 



165 



Algeria: A Country Study 



Air Algerie, which was established in 1946 as a charter airline 
by Air France, became the national carrier in 1972 when the 
Algerian government purchased full ownership. It was restruc- 
tured in 1984, when domestic routes were assigned to the newly 
formed Inter-Air Services. In 1989 Inter-Air Services carried 
almost 2 million passengers on its internal network and a simi- 
lar number on international flights. Air Algerie planned a 
major expansion of its passenger fleet in the 1990s, and its ten- 
year renewal program is expected to cost US$1.5 billion. 

Air Algerie has daily passenger and air freight service to 
Europe and weekly service to the Middle East and Africa. Air 
France flies daily into Algiers and less frequently into other 
major airports. Other foreign carriers also have regularly 
scheduled flights. 

Telecommunications 

Algeria's domestic telecommunications system consists of 
high-capacity radio-relay and coaxial-cable trunk routes that 
link all the major population areas along the Mediterranean. 
Lower-capacity routes branch off the trunk routes to the south, 
providing communications with towns in the interior. A domes- 
tic satellite system with fifteen ground stations is used for tele- 
phone and television links from the main station near Algiers 
to remote areas in the Sahara. 

In 1992 Algeria had 900,000 telephones, or 3.4 telephones 
per 100 inhabitants. Although 95 percent of the service is auto- 
matic and capable of international direct-dial service, 5 per- 
cent of the telephones are still connected to manual 
exchanges, requiring an operator to complete all calls. 
Demand for new service far outstrips the government's ability 
to install new lines. To alleviate some of the pressure for new 
telephones, the government ordered 3,000 new public tele- 
phones in 1991 to augment the 6,000 public telephones 
already in service. Mobile telephone service, with an initial 
capacity of 3,000 lines, was also introduced in major coastal cit- 
ies in 1991. 

International telecommunications are considered excellent 
and use a mix of satellite, undersea cable, coaxial cable, and 
radio relay. The coaxial cable and radio-relay lines along the 
coast extend into Morocco in the west and Tunisia in the east. 
A smaller radio-relay line in southeastern Algeria links directly 
with the Libyan national system. Six submarine coaxial cables 
under the Mediterranean Sea provide 3,200 simultaneous 



166 



The Economy 



channels to Europe; two of the cables go to Spain, three to 
France, and one to Italy. Telephone, television, and data com- 
munication to most of Asia and the Americas go via two satel- 
lite ground stations, one working with the International 
Telecommunications Satellite Corporation's (Intelsat's) Atlan- 
tic Ocean satellite and the other with Intelsat's Indian Ocean 
satellite. Television transmission and telephone calls to and 
from other countries in the Middle East are routed through a 
ground station linked to the Arab Organization for Space Com- 
munications (Arabsat) satellite. Arabsat not only provides tele- 
phone, data transmission, telex, and facsimile transmission but 
also is heavily used for live broadcasts of prayers from Mecca 
and Medina and for showing inter-Arab sports events. 

In contrast to international communications links, in 1993 
domestic broadcast facilities were sparse. Only the larger popu- 
lated areas of the country are able to receive television and 
radio. The country has twenty-six amplitude modulation (AM) 
radio stations, broadcasting in Arabic, French, and Kabyle; 
there are no frequency modulation (FM) radio stations. A 
moderate-strength shortwave station with programs in Arabic, 
French, Spanish, and English broadcasts to remote areas of the 
south and to neighboring countries. Eighteen transmitters pro- 
vide television service to major cities. The country had an esti- 
mated 3.5 million radios and 2 million television sets in 1993. 

Trade 

Algeria continued in 1992 to depend on hydrocarbons for 
approximately 95 percent of its export revenues. The govern- 
ment had hoped to reduce such dependence by augmenting 
exports of nonhydrocarbon goods, but rising exports of petro- 
leum products and gas seem to have foiled Sonatrach's efforts 
in that direction. Another distinguishing feature of Algeria's 
foreign trade has been the major disruption in trade patterns 
resulting from the erosion of its special relationship with 
France. The changes are not considered to be permanently 
devastating to trade, however. To cite one example: France's 81 
percent share of Algeria's exports and 82 percent of imports 
before independence dropped to 13 percent and 24 percent, 
respectively, in 1977. By the late 1980s, however, the Algerian 
oil nationalization crisis and France's earlier decision to import 
the bulk of its crude oil needs from Saudi Arabia were swept 
aside by new economic cooperation protocols between Algeria 
and France. 



167 



Algeria: A Country Study 

Trading Partners 

As trade patterns changed, in 1989 the United States joined 
France and Italy to become one of Algeria's three major mar- 
kets, as well as its suppliers (see table 5, Appendix). The appre- 
ciable growth in United States exports (US$948 million in 
1990) resulted from a high level of Commodity Credit Corpo- 
ration guarantees for United States agricultural sales and a con- 
siderable increase in sales of industrial equipment, aircraft, 
and spare parts. Other items that have dominated the United 
States share of the Algerian import market include pharmaceu- 
ticals, mining machinery, electric-power generating equip- 
ment, computers, plastics-processing equipment, medical 
supplies, and telecommunications gear. Algeria's economic 
austerity since the latter 1980s, however, has limited the 
demand for imported finished products. 

The resumption of contracts between Sonatrach and United 
States gas importers in 1989 was the main cause of increased 
United States imports from Algeria (US$2.6 billion in 1990). 
Anadarko Petroleum Corporation in October 1989 signed an 
oil exploration/production contract for US$100 million over 
ten years. Occidental Petroleum Corporation in June 1991 
signed a similar contract for US$32 million. Pfizer in October 
1990 signed a contract establishing a joint venture with the 
Algerian state National Enterprise for Production of Pharma- 
ceuticals (Entreprise Nationale de Production de Produits 
Pharmaceutiques), for construction of a US$27 million phar- 
maceutical plant near Reghai'a, east of Algiers. Air Products 
Company joined forces with Aire Liquide (France) in signing a 
contract with Sonatrach in July 1990 for construction of a 
US$90 million plant at Arzew to produce helium and nitrogen 
gases. 

Despite its close relationship with France, as a socialist coun- 
try committed to safeguarding its economic and political inde- 
pendence, Algeria has developed and maintained special links 
to developing countries and Eastern Europe. However, in the 
early 1990s it continued to rely heavily on Western industrial- 
ized countries for the bulk of its foreign trade. The European 
Community alone, for example, accounted in 1990 for 35 per- 
cent of exports and 40 percent of imports. By contrast, Alge- 
ria's partners in the Union of the Arab Maghrib — Morocco, 
Tunisia, Libya, and Mauritania — accounted for less than 2 per- 
cent of its trade. After diplomatic relations between Algeria 
and Morocco resumed in 1988, the five countries formed the 



168 



The Economy 



union to promote "economic integration and cooperation" in 
February 1989. Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya have agreed since to 
construct a gas pipeline between Algeria and Libya across Tuni- 
sia. 

Exports and Imports 

As a continuation of its efforts to increase nonhydrocarbon 
exports, especially by the private sector, the government 
decreed in 1990 that privately owned companies could export 
surplus textiles, leather goods, agricultural produce, and phos- 
phates. Almost half of Algeria's total hydrocarbon sales in 1990 
consisted of crude oil and condensates (22 percent refined 
products and 30 percent natural gas). Nonhydrocarbon 
exports included, in order of importance, wine, metals and 
metal products, phosphates, fruits and vegetables, and iron 
ore. 

Of Algeria's total imports, worth more than US$9.8 billion 
in 1989, foodstuffs accounted for 31.5 percent, semifinished 
goods 32 percent, industrial goods 25 percent, and other con- 
sumer goods 10.5 percent. After the government decreased the 
number of large-scale national development projects, imports 
of capital goods dropped correspondingly. But imports of con- 
sumer goods have been high, with foodstuffs alone costing 
about US$2 billion in 1989. 

The government's concern over its ability to meet hard-cur- 
rency payments caused it to control the level of imports, even 
at the expense of appearing to contradict its own policy of lib- 
eralizing the economy, including foreign trade rules. This mea- 
sure, however, did not mean a return to the 1978 law that had 
allowed the Ministry of Commerce to monopolize trade and 
subjected commercial transactions to Central Bank approval. 
Private companies continued to import goods on their own 
account, to use foreign exchange generated from their exports 
to finance the imports they needed, and to enter into joint ven- 
tures with foreign partners. Other stringent restrictions, such 
as forbidding foreign firms to engage in direct sales and limit- 
ing them to opening a regional office known as a Liaison 
Bureau (Bureau de Liaison), were removed in 1988. Legisla- 
tion passed in 1991 permitted the establishment of local mar- 
keting operations, as well as agency agreements between 
foreign and Algerian partners known as concessionaires. The 
new distribution system practically ended the government's 
monopoly on foreign trade. Both manufacturers and suppliers 



169 



Algeria: A Country Study 

can now sell either through local wholesalers or through their 
own distribution networks. 

Balance of Payments 

The surpluses of the balance of payments in the 1970s 
resulted from high levels of hydrocarbon exports, considerable 
foreign borrowing by the government, and healthy remittances 
by Algerian workers abroad. The surplus slipped into deficit in 
the early 1980s, however, as the government decided to ease 
import restrictions, suspend foreign borrowing temporarily, 
and repay its external debt more rapidly. The 1986 drop in the 
world oil price decreased revenues from hydrocarbon sales, 
while imports of agricultural products were increasing in 
response to growing domestic demand; the combination of fac- 
tors further worsened the balance of payments. 

Algeria's balance of payments began to improve in 1988, 
largely because of an unexpected rise in oil prices (see table 6, 
Appendix). However, the price of, and demand for, imports 
continued to grow, and the government's interest payments on 
its foreign debt rose from US$1.5 billion in 1988 to nearly 
US$2 billion in 1989. 

Trade Account 

The government's measures to encourage the growth of pri- 
vate-sector trade, combined with fluctuating oil prices, have 
resulted in an erratic trade account pattern, marked mostly by 
a chronic deficit followed by ups and downs of surplus. The for- 
eign trade deficit of the 1960s was not reversed until 1973-74. 
The world oil price boom then overturned Algeria's traditional 
dependence on exports of vegetables, citrus fruit, wine, 
tobacco, iron ore, and phosphates; instead Algeria substituted 
massive hydrocarbon exports. However, the authorities contin- 
ued to retain control over the trade budget process, which 
allowed them to cut imports in 1991 to US$8.2 billion to meet 
the IMF's requirements for a standby agreement. The trade bal- 
ance registered a healthy surplus of almost US$1.6 billion in 
the first half of 1991. In April 1991, the government intro- 
duced a major liberalization of the import system by eliminat- 
ing the administrative allocation of hard currency for imports 
at the official exchange rate. Private firms were allowed to join 
the ranks of state-owned enterprises in purchasing foreign 
goods directly from overseas markets. 



170 



The Economy 



Trends 

Algeria has made considerable progress in its transition 
efforts toward a market economy. A money and credit law pro- 
mulgated in 1990 granted the Central Bank the authority to 
formulate and implement monetary and foreign-exchange pol- 
icies, removed controls on foreign investment in most sectors, 
allowed full foreign ownership of new investment projects, and 
encouraged unrestricted joint ventures between foreign com- 
panies and Algerian private concerns. In a bold move designed 
to promote trade liberalization, the Central Bank devalued the 
dinar almost 100 percent between November 1990 and the end 
of April 1991. On the latter date, the government introduced a 
major liberalization of external trade to augment the already 
far-reaching steps taken to liberalize domestic trade. 

Algeria, not unlike several other countries in North Africa 
and the Middle East, has had to grapple with a heavy debt bur- 
den. The country's international creditworthiness has been 
subjected to closer than normal scrutiny on occasion, such as 
when its ratio of debt to export earnings moved from 130 per- 
cent in 1980 to 280 percent in 1989 and when the debt-service 
ratio shot up from 25 percent in 1981 to 95 percent in 1989. 
However, the combination of fiscal restraint on the govern- 
ment's part, adamant opposition to debt restructuring (mostly 
for reasons of political pride), and prudent use of budget sur- 
plus and intermittent higher revenues (from fluctuating oil 
prices) helped repay Ministry of Finance debts to the Central 
Bank and retire significant portions of foreign debt. 

Over the long haul, however, how much progress Algeria 
makes toward establishing a truly open market economy will 
depend on the correlation between economic liberalization 
efforts and the dynamics of the domestic political situation, 
which was continuing to evolve in the early 1990s. If, for 
instance, the evolving political process encourages passage of 
new legislation similar to the June 1990 Law on Trade Union 
Activity providing for the creation of autonomous labor unions 
and collective bargaining, other key institutional changes 
could accelerate the pace of social progress and generate an 
environment conducive to political accountability and eco- 
nomic reform. 

* * * 



171 



Algeria: A Country Study 

Richard B. Parker's North Africa: Regional Tensions and Strate- 
gic Concerns provides a lucid backdrop as to why and how Alge- 
ria's various economic reforms were conceived and introduced. 
It has the added virtue of placing Algeria in a regional North 
African context, comparing its situation with that of its neigh- 
bors to the east and west. North Africa: Contemporary Politics and 
Economic Development, edited by Richard Lawless and Allan Find- 
lay, gives a solid analysis of the Algerian economy. David B. Ott- 
away and Marina Ottaway's Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist 
Revolution, although published in 1970, remains an informative 
source. For those interested in analyzing the fast-moving devel- 
opments of the Algerian scene, the Economist and Middle East 
Economic Digest are essential. (For further information and com- 
plete citations, see Bibliography.) 



172 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 




Mosque in traditional style in Ghardaia, in north central Algeria 



ALGERIAN POLITICAL CULTURE and government reflect 
the impact of the country's colonial history and its cultural 
identification. The legacy of the revolutionary War of Indepen- 
dence (1954-62) and its lingering implications are still evident 
in recent political events and in the evolution of political pro- 
cesses. A strong authoritative tendency and the supremacy of 
the military, both remnants of the war for liberation, have 
resulted in a sharply divided society in which the political elite 
remains highly remote from, and generally unaccountable to, 
the masses of its impoverished, unemployed, and dissatisfied 
citizens. State-supported socialism, largely fed by petroleum 
exports, and "depoliticization" of the masses during the 1970s 
replaced any real source of legitimacy for the regime and left 
the masses almost no form of political expression short of vio- 
lent confrontation. 

The consequences of this political tradition materialized in 
January 1992 when a conservative military coup overturned 
four years of significant political and economic liberalization 
undertaken by President Chadli Benjedid in the late 1980s. 
Benjedid's extensive political and economic reforms, pursued 
to restore political legitimacy and public confidence in the gov- 
ernment leadership, had opened the way for political opposi- 
tion. The rise of the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique 
du Salut — FIS) as the most significant opposition group threat- 
ened to challenge the secular orientation of the state. The 
coup took place only days before the second round of the first 
freely contested national elections, elections that were likely to 
usher in a new government dominated by Islamists (sometimes 
seen as fundamentalists). Since then, the virtual elimination of 
constitutional government and the resurrection of military 
authoritarianism have returned Algeria to the familiar situa- 
tion of placing power in the hands of a small elite, nullifying 
almost all of the democratic freedoms and many of the free- 
market reforms of the preceding few years. 

Algeria's bloody overthrow of colonial rule resulted in inde- 
pendence in 1962 and a legacy of an authoritarian political 
structure dominated by competing interests. The main actors 
in the national revolution continued to govern the Algerian 
polity after independence, struggling during the immediate 
postindependence period and throughout postindependence 



175 



Algeria: A Country Study 



Algerian history for political control. This tradition has evolved 
into a triangular system of government in which the army, 
party, and state apparatus share power but continually com- 
pete. Benjedid's reforms in the 1980s effectively eliminated the 
party (the National Liberation Front — Front de Liberation 
Nationale — FLN) from a prominent position in the political 
configuration while strengthening his hand as president 
through constitutional reforms. The military, also having suf- 
fered a reduction of authority with the political changes imple- 
mented by the 1989 constitution, appeared to have little 
tolerance for the liberalization visualized by Benjedid and the 
more liberal faction of the FLN. Resurfacing in the early 1990s 
to "ensure the security of the state," the military has demon- 
strated once again that the army remains the dominant arm of 
the political triangle. 

Recent political events are as much a reflection as a determi- 
nant of political culture in Algeria. The nation in late 1993 was 
under a state of emergency, its condition since the military 
coup in January 1992. Martial law ruled, essentially invalidating 
all political structures and institutions. The outcome of this 
period will be determined not only by the political leaders but 
also by civil society, political competition within the state, and 
by mass culture. If the Algerian state is to overcome its political 
crisis, it needs to resolve its myriad socioeconomic problems. If 
it is to successfully conquer its economic problems, it will need 
to become more democratic and decentralized. The current 
situation is potentially dangerous because of the explosive 
nature of the political tensions inherent in the repression of a 
discontented population. 

Political Environment 

Postindependence Politics and the Socialist Tradition 

Algeria's current political culture is a result of the French 
colonial legacy, the War of Independence, the Arab and Islamic 
cultural traditions and the part these play in national unity and 
cohesion, and the integral role of the military. The consolida- 
tion of authority and the institutionalization of political struc- 
ture characterized the postindependence years as the new 
Algerian nation struggled to overcome the instability of the rev- 
olutionary period. National integrity and national institutions 
were viewed as equally important as Algeria worked to consoli- 
date its independent political structure and tradition and to 



176 



Government and Politics 



overcome the administrative and economic vacuum that 
resulted from the departure of most Europeans who had lived 
in Algeria. 

The Revolutionary Period and Independence 

Emerging from more than 132 years of French colonial 
domination and nearly eight years of the War of Indepen- 
dence, Algeria was officially declared independent of France 
on July 3, 1962, but recognizes July 5 as its Independence Day. 
Exhausted from so many years of warfare and internally 
divided into fiercely competitive factions, the military/political 
leadership of the victorious FLN quickly deteriorated into inco- 
hesive groups vying for control of the new state. 

The three major contenders for political predominance 
were the provisional government established by the FLN in 
1958, the military officials, and the wilaya commands (adminis- 
trative district councils established by the military in the pre- 
independence period). The confrontation was characterized 
by fierce personal and ethnic loyalties as well as ideology and 
surfaced even before independence was officially declared. A 
May 1962 meeting in Tripoli of FLN leaders closed with Ahmed 
Ben Bella assuming control of the party and what would 
become the nation of Algeria under a tentative alliance with 
Colonel Houari Boumediene. 

The "Heroic" Stage: Ben Bella's Regime, 1962-65 

With the declaration of independence, Ben Bella assumed 
the title of national president. The first postindependence elec- 
tions were held for the new National Assembly on September 
20, 1962, and on September 26, the National Assembly offi- 
cially elected Ben Bella premier and formally declared the 
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria. Ben Bella formed 
his government from the ranks of the military and close per- 
sonal and political allies, indicating that the factional infight- 
ing was far from suppressed. 

The first and most pressing task of the new government was 
to restore some normality to the war-torn economy and polity. 
The end of the colonial period, although not entirely eliminat- 
ing the French presence in Algeria, had dramatically reduced 
it. The mass exodus of Europeans resulted in a severe shortage 
of highly skilled workers, technicians, educators, and 
property-owning entrepreneurs. The national government 
quickly assumed ownership of the abandoned industrial and 



177 



Algeria: A Country Study 

agricultural properties and began a program of autogestion (see 
Glossary), or socialist workers' management. Workers were 
responsible for overseeing their own administration through a 
series of elected officials. A national system of directors and 
agencies was charged with ensuring that the workers con- 
formed to a national development plan. 

A new constitution was drafted that committed the country 
to a socialist path, established a strong presidential system, and 
protected the hegemonic role of the FLN as the single political 
party. Ben Bella assumed control of the FLN executive as gen- 
eral secretary. In September 1963, Ben Bella was elected presi- 
dent for a five-year term. As the government increasingly 
tended toward a dictatorship, factionalism within the leader- 
ship began to resurface. 

At its first congress in April 1964, the FLN adopted a draft 
statement, the Algiers Charter. The charter outlined the struc- 
ture of the state and government and committed Algeria to the 
autogestion program envisioned by Ben Bella. The charter also 
reaffirmed the significance of the Islamic tradition in Algerian 
political culture. 

Ben Bella was never able to capture the confidence of the 
Algerian public or the military. He was popular among the 
masses more for his status as a "historic chief of the revolution" 
than for his leadership competency. Despite efforts to thwart 
the rival military faction by strengthening the leftist groups, 
Ben Bella was unable to overcome the political challenge of his 
defense minister, Colonel Houari Boumediene, whose alliance 
had been critical to his installation as head of government in 
1962. On June 19, 1965, Algeria's first postindependence presi- 
dent was overthrown by Boumediene in a bloodless coup. 

Boumediene and the Socialist Experiment 

Council of the Revolution, 1965-75 

After the coup, all political power was transferred to Boume- 
diene and his military-dominated Council of the Revolution. 
The constitution and National Assembly were suspended. Bou- 
mediene was named president and prime minister, and his 
associates were named to the twenty other cabinet positions. 
No political institution other than the FLN existed for the next 
ten years. The objectives of the regime were to reestablish the 
principles of the revolution, to remedy the abuses of personal 
power associated with Ben Bella, to end internal divisions, and 



178 



Government and Politics 



to create an "authentic" socialist society based on a sound econ- 
omy. Boumediene's support came from the military and tech- 
nocratic elite who believed in his gradual reformist program. 
Support for the new authoritarian system was not universal, 
and several coups were attempted in the first few years of Bou- 
mediene's regime. By the early 1970s, however, Boumediene 
had consolidated his regime and could focus on the pressing 
economic problems. 

The Boumediene years were characterized by ardent social- 
ism and state-controlled heavy industrialization, funded largely 
by energy exports. Dependence on France during the colonial 
period and the subsequent loss of capital, skill, and technology 
meant that Algeria's very survival in the postindependence 
period appeared to depend on rapid and extensive industrial- 
ization. Boumediene's industrialization program was highly 
centralized and involved the nationalization of almost all indus- 
trial and agricultural enterprises (see Government Role, ch. 3). 
By the early 1970s, almost 90 percent of the industrial sector 
and more than 70 percent of the industrial work force were 
under state control. The agricultural sector was relatively 
neglected at the time. 

In the political realm, authority remained as concentrated 
as it did in the economic sphere. Aside from local and regional 
assemblies, administrative bodies that were essentially subordi- 
nate to the directives of the FLN, all political participation had 
been suspended following the coup. Boumediene had sacri- 
ficed free political exchange for regime stability and state con- 
solidation. By 1975 the factional infighting had ceased and the 
internal situation had stabilized. In June 1975, the regime 
announced plans to resurrect public political institutions and 
draft a national constitution. The country was about to return 
to a constitutional system, Algeria's second national republic. 

Formation of the Second Algerian Republic, 1976-79 

The National Charter approved in June 1976 by a country- 
wide referendum was the subject of much public and party 
debate and was the product of party, trade union, and other 
public association negotiations. The new charter was essentially 
an ideological proclamation reaffirming the socialist tradition 
and implicitly ensuring the authoritarian nature of the regime 
and state. The FLN received explicit recognition as a "unique" 
national front representing the revolutionary heritage and 
ideological identification of the Algerian people. 



179 



Algeria: A Country Study 



The adoption of the National Charter was quickly followed 
by the drafting of a national constitution. The constitution was 
a long document of some 199 articles detailing a new political 
structure in line with the principles enunciated in the National 
Charter. The constitution reestablished a national legislature, 
the National People's Assembly (Assemblee Populaire Nation- 
ale — APN), but reasserted the preeminence of the FLN as the 
single legitimate party. Articles 23 through 26 of the 1976 con- 
stitution recognized the unique role of the FLN in the histori- 
cal tradition and political culture of the Algerian state and 
confirmed its hegemonic position in the new political struc- 
ture. Rather than breaking with the personalist character of the 
past ten years, the constitution reaffirmed the concentration of 
power in the executive. Boumediene was named head of state 
and head of government as president and prime minister, com- 
mander in chief, and minister of national security and defense, 
as well as secretary general of the country's single legal party. 

Boumediene enjoyed the unwavering support of the mili- 
tary establishment. By consolidating authority and institution- 
alizing the Algerian political system, he instilled a degree of 
public confidence in his regime that Ahmed Ben Bella had 
been unable to achieve. Boumediene was reelected to the pres- 
idency in 1976 from a single-candidate ballot. 

Elections for the APN were held in February 1977. Although 
all candidates were members of the FLN, they represented a 
variety of occupations and opinions. The diverse membership 
of the new assembly and the high proportion of industrial and 
agricultural workers and non-elites were lauded as "the final 
step in the construction of a socialist state" that had begun in 
earnest with the creation of workers' self-management assem- 
blies at the local level in the late 1960s. 

Boumediene died in December 1978. He left behind a con- 
solidated national government, an industrializing economy, an 
extensive state-centered socialist program, a burgeoning 
energy export industry, and an apparently stable political sys- 
tem. He also left a political vacuum. Algeria's political develop- 
ment in the 1970s was heavily indebted to Boumediene's 
personal skills and acumen. The lack of an obvious successor 
left the FLN and the APN with a dilemma. The president of the 
APN was named interim head of state; he served until a special 
congress of the FLN named Colonel Chadli Benjedid secretary 
general of the party and candidate for president in January 
1979. His selection was confirmed in a national election one 



180 



Government and Politics 



week later, when 94 percent of those voting supported his nom- 
ination. 

Recent Political Events 

Political-Economic Liberalization under Benjedid, 1979-88 

Despite his overwhelming electoral victory, Benjedid did 
not immediately enjoy the same respect that Boumediene had 
commanded. Accordingly, the new president was especially 
cautious in his first few years in office. His tentative and grad- 
ual reforms wandered little from the socialist course chosen by 
Boumediene. 

Over time, however, Algeria moved slowly away from the 
strict socialism of the Boumediene years. After receiving a sec- 
ond popular mandate in 1985 with more than 95 percent of 
the vote in new presidential elections and after making some 
significant changes in government personnel, Benjedid 
seemed increasingly confident about instituting sweeping 
reforms that eventually altered radically the nature of the Alge- 
rian economy and polity. 

Boumediene's socialist policy had focused almost exclusively 
on developing the industrial sector and relied on energy 
exports to finance its development at the expense of the 
domestic and especially the agricultural sector. Many of these 
industrialization projects were poorly designed and, instead of 
encouraging national development, eventually drained the 
economy. Relying on state initiative as the driving force behind 
economic development, large-scale industries quickly became 
consumed by nationalist imperatives rather than economically 
efficient ambitions. The fall of energy prices in the mid-1980s 
left Algeria, which was heavily dependent on the export of 
hydrocarbons, with a substantial national deficit. Agriculture, 
neglected in favor of heavy industry, was underdeveloped, 
poorly organized, and lacking in private initiative or invest- 
ment. The reliance on food imports meant frequent food 
shortages and rapidly rising agricultural prices. Unfortunately, 
the crisis was not limited to the agricultural sector. The trade 
deficit was only one of Algeria's problems. High unemploy- 
ment, one of the highest population growth rates in the world 
(3.1 percent per year in the early 1980s), an unbalanced indus- 
trial sector focused almost entirely on heavy industry, and rap- 
idly declining revenues had eroded the state's welfare 



181 



Algeria: A Country Study 



capacities and its ability to maintain political security and stabil- 
ity. 

Benjedid's initial reforms concentrated on structural 
changes and economic liberalization. These measures included 
a shift in domestic investment away from heavy industry and 
toward agriculture, light industry, and consumer goods. State 
enterprises and ministries were broken up into smaller, more 
efficient, or at least more manageable, units, and a number of 
state-owned firms were divided and privatized. Benjedid 
opened the economy to limited foreign investment and 
encouraged private domestic investment. The new regime also 
undertook an anticorruption campaign. This campaign, aside 
from the obvious benefits of adding to the legitimacy of the 
regime, enabled Benjedid to eliminate much of the old-guard 
opposition loyal to Boumediene's legacy, thus strengthening 
his political control. 

With his regime consolidated, Benjedid could intensify eco- 
nomic and political reform without the threat of opposition. 
His early reforms had been limited to the economic sector and 
had ensured that Benjedid remained in control of the reform 
process. By 1987 and 1988, however, he added political liberal- 
ization to the agenda and espoused free-market principles. He 
legitimized independent associations, even extending the new 
freedom to organize to the Algerian League of Human Rights, 
which had consistently criticized the regime for suppressing 
public political activity and demonstrations. In the economic 
sector, Benjedid gave state enterprises increased managerial 
autonomy. Central planning by the state ended, and firms 
became subject to the laws of supply and demand. In addition, 
the regime reduced subsidies, lifted price controls, and acceler- 
ated the privatization of state-owned lands and enterprises. 
Finally, Benjedid tackled the heavy fiscal deficit by increasing 
taxes and cutting spending at the central government level, as 
well as reducing state-purchased imports. 

Despite all these measures, or perhaps because of them, 
Algeria found itself in a critical position politically and eco- 
nomically in 1988. Benjedid's reforms had exacerbated an 
already dismal economic situation. The dismantling and priva- 
tization of state enterprises had resulted in rising unemploy- 
ment and a drop in industrial output. Trade liberalization, 
including import reduction and currency devaluation, and the 
removal of price controls and reductions in agricultural subsi- 



182 



Former President Chadli 
Benjedid (1979-92) 
Courtesy Embassy of Algeria, 
Washington 



dies resulted in a drastic increase in prices and an unprece- 
dented drop in purchasing power. 

The negative effects of the economic reforms were felt pri- 
marily by the disadvantaged. In contrast, the bourgeoisie and 
upper classes benefited greatly from economic liberalization. 
Economic measures legalized the private accumulation of 
wealth, ensured privileged access to foreign exchange and 
goods, and provided many with relative security as heads of 
recently privatized state enterprises. The result was widespread 
economic frustration and a lack of public confidence in the 
political leadership. 

In October 1988, this economic and political crisis erupted 
in the most violent and extensive public demonstrations since 
independence. Following weeks of strikes and work stoppages, 
the riots raged for six day — from October 5 to 11. Throughout 
the country, thousands of Algerians attacked city halls, police 
stations, post offices — anything that was seen to represent the 
regime or the FLN. The disorder and violence were a protest 
against a corrupt and inefficient government and a discredited 
party. The riots were a product of declining living standards, 
rapidly increasing unemployment, and frequent food short- 
ages. Furthermore, the riots represented a revolt against persis- 
tent inequality and the privileged status of the elite. 



183 



Algeria: A Country Study 

The poor economic situation was not unique to the Benje- 
did regime. Even the austere socialism of Boumediene, at least 
as tainted by corruption as its successor regime, had not guar- 
anteed the economic well-being of the masses. The high oil 
prices in the 1970s had allowed Boumediene to fund an exten- 
sive state-supported welfare system, however, freeing him some- 
what from popular political accountability. The crash of energy 
prices in the mid-1980s undermined this political tradeoff for a 
minimum standard of living and eventually undid Boumedi- 
ene's successor, who had never managed to achieve quite the 
same level of stability. On the contrary, the political and eco- 
nomic liberalization under Benjedid polarized society by help- 
ing to expose the corruption and excesses of the elites while 
simultaneously opening up the political realm to the masses. 

The government initially responded to the "Black October" 
riots by declaring a state of emergency and calling in the mili- 
tary, but the demonstrations spread. Hundreds were killed, 
including numerous young people, who made up the bulk of 
rioters in Algiers. The brutal military suppression of the riots 
would have far-reaching consequences, consequences that 
would ultimately lead to a redefinition of the military's role in 
the political configuration of the state. On October 10, Benje- 
did addressed the nation, accepting blame for the suppression 
and offering promises of economic and political reform. His 
hand had been forced. In an effort to regain the political initia- 
tive and contain the damage to his regime, Benjedid lifted the 
state of emergency, recalled the tanks, and announced a 
national referendum on constitutional reform. 

Democratization, October 1988-January 11, 1992 

Benjedid is given credit for responding to the country's 
most extensive and destructive riots since independence with 
political liberalization rather than suppression. For the next 
two years, dramatic upheavals of the political system marked 
the opening up of the political arena to public participation. 
The reasons for Benjedid's response are variously seen as a 
means of furthering his own political ambitions by altering the 
political configuration in his favor, a sincere commitment to 
political reform and democratic ideals, or a desperate effort to 
regain the political initiative. Most likely, the impetus for 
reform was a combination of all three factors. 

In the weeks following the strikes, Benjedid tried to distance 
himself from the party and the old guard. He dismissed Prime 



184 



Abbas si Madani, leader 
of the Islamic Salvation 
Front (FIS) 
Courtesy Middle East Report 




Minister Mohamed Cherif Messadia, as well as the head of mili- 
tary security and a number of other officials associated with the 
most conservative factions of the FLN and the military. The 
noticeable absence of FLN party cadres in the new technocratic 
government presaged the president's own departure from the 
FLN leadership. On November 3, 1988, a number of earlier 
proposed reforms were approved in a national referendum, 
and plans for revisions of the national constitution were 
announced. The reforms included separation of party and 
state, free representation in local and national elections, and 
some redefinition of the executive powers. 

The new constitution, accepted by national referendum in 
February 1989, marked the most significant changes in the 
ideological and political framework of the country since inde- 
pendence. The ideological commitment to socialism embodied 
in earlier constitutions was missing, and the new document for- 
malized the political separation of the FLN and the state appa- 
ratus. The 1989 constitution allowed for the creation and 
participation of competitive political associations, further 
strengthened executive powers, diminished the role of the mil- 
itary in the political triangle, and only briefly alluded to the his- 
torical role of the FLN. 



185 



Algeria: A Country Study 



Subsequent legislation formally legalized political parties 
and established a system of proportional representation in 
preparation for the country's first multiparty elections. Propor- 
tional representation was intended to benefit the FLN, but the 
new electoral code did the exact opposite, magnifying the plu- 
rality of the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du 
Salut — FIS) in the local and regional elections of June 12, 
1990. The FIS, competing with more than twelve political par- 
ties and numerous independent candidates in the country's 
first multiparty elections, captured the greatest share of the 
anti-FLN/ antiregime protest vote. The elections were officially 
boycotted by the Berber Front of Socialist Forces (Front des 
Forces Socialistes — FFS) and Ben Bella's Movement for Democ- 
racy in Algeria (Mouvement pour la Democratic en Algerie — 
MDA), along with a number of smaller opposition parties. 
About 65 percent of the eligible voters participated in the elec- 
tions. The high turnout undoubtedly benefited the FIS, which 
as the largest, and possibly the only, plausible challenge to the 
FLN received a good percentage of its mandate as antiregime 
backlash. It has been argued, however, that the 35 percent 
abstention rate resulted largely from a deliberate political 
choice. Ethnic enclaves, especially in the Berber region where 
voters might have been expected to support such boycotting 
parties as the FFS, had some of the lowest turnouts in the coun- 
try, at around 20 percent. 

Despite the devastating defeat dealt to the ruling party, the 
June 1990 results went undisputed by the government, and the 
new council members assumed their positions. The date for 
national legislative elections was advanced to the following 
June, and the country appeared well on its way toward achiev- 
ing the region's first multiparty system to transfer power peace- 
fully to an opposition party. Then on June 5, 1991, as 
campaigning opened for the country's first national multiparty 
elections, the process came to a rapid halt as public demonstra- 
tions erupted against the government's March electoral 
reforms favoring the ruling party. The president called in the 
army to restore order, declared martial law, dismissed the gov- 
ernment, and indefinitely postponed parliamentary elections. 

Three months earlier, in March 1991, the government had 
presented and passed a bill reminiscent of crude gerrymander- 
ing. The bill increased the number of parliamentary seats while 
altering their distribution to achieve over-representation in 
rural areas, where the FLN's base of support rested. The bill 



186 



Government and Politics 



also created a two-round voting system — if no party received an 
absolute majority in the first round, only the top two candi- 
dates would participate in a second-round runoff. The likely 
candidates in such a runoff would be the FIS and the FLN. The 
FLN anticipated that the general public, faced with only two 
choices, would favor the FLN's more traditional and secular 
platform over a party that represented Islamism. The remain- 
ing parties, it was thought, would win seats in parliament in 
their regional strongholds but would be marginalized, each 
expected to win no more than 10 percent of the vote. 

Nearly every political party responded to this distortion of 
the electoral process. The FIS decried the targeting of the 
Islamist party by laws prohibiting the use of mosques and 
schools for political purposes and laws severely restricting 
proxy voting by husbands for their wives. The FFS and many 
other secular opposition parties denounced the electoral 
changes as leaving only "a choice between a police state and a 
fundamentalist state." 

On May 25, the FIS called for a general strike. Tensions 
escalated, and by early June the military was called in for the 
first time since October 1988 to suppress mass protests and 
enforce martial law. Specifically targeting Islamists, the military 
arrested thousands of protesters, among them FIS leaders 
Abbassi Madani and Ali Belhadj (also seen as Benhadj), who 
were later tried and sentenced to twelve years in prison. The 
military also took advantage of the situation to reassert its influ- 
ence in politics, calling for the resignation of Prime Minister 
Mouloud Hamrouche and his cabinet. The new caretaker gov- 
ernment consisted largely of technocrats, a conservative elite 
drawn from the top ranks of the civil service and former state- 
owned enterprises. Sid Ahmed Ghozali, until then minister of 
foreign affairs and a former head of the state-owned gas and oil 
company, was named prime minister. 

The Ghozali government distanced itself from the FLN 
party cadres while remaining subservient to the military. The 
FLN, meanwhile, broke into several factions. Benjedid resigned 
from the party leadership in July, alienating any remaining fac- 
tions in the party that supported his regime. In September 
1991, the state of emergency was lifted and new elections were 
set for December 1991 and January 1992. 

Two months before the start of the elections, in October 
1991, the government issued a new electoral law whose bias was 
hardly better disguised than that of the March reforms that had 



187 



Algeria: A Country Study 



provoked the initial demonstrations in June. The law increased 
the number of seats in the assembly, redistributed them to 
favor FLN strongholds, and omitted earlier provisions facilitat- 
ing the participation of independent candidates. Moreover, 
most of the FIS political leadership was in prison (Madani and 
Benhadj had been joined by the remaining six members of the 
majlis ash shura, the FIS ruling council) and all newspapers 
were banned. Once again, the government sought to ensure 
that the results of the elections would be to its, and the mili- 
tary's, liking. 

Nearly fifty political parties participated in the first round of 
the elections on December 26, 1991. The result was another 
clear victory for the FIS and an equally clear humiliation for 
the FLN, which once again performed poorly. The FIS 
appeared certain of achieving the two-thirds parliamentary 
majority necessary for constitutional reform. Its next closest 
competitor was the FFS, followed by the FLN as a distant third. 
With nearly 200 seats to be decided in runoff elections set for 
January 16, 1992, it appeared certain that a transfer of parlia- 
mentary power to the opposition was imminent. 

The military, however, quickly affirmed its unwillingness to 
see power transferred to a political party it regarded as a threat 
to the security and stability of the state. Calling the govern- 
ment's position toward the Islamists "accommodating," the 
army called for the president's resignation and the suspension 
of the scheduled second round of elections. 

Return to Authoritarianism, January 11, 1992 

The coup, led by the minister of defense, Major General 
Khaled Nezzar, soon returned Algeria to an extremely tense 
state. Military troops were put on alert throughout the country, 
tanks and armored cars were deployed throughout Algiers, and 
military checkpoints were set up. President Benjedid resigned 
on January 11, citing "widespread election irregularities" and a 
risk of "grave civil instability." The military then reappointed 
Sid Ahmed Ghozali as prime minister. Ghozali was also named 
to head the new High Security Council (Haut Conseil de Secu- 
rite — HCS), a six-member advisory body dominated by such 
senior military officials as Major General Nezzar and Major 
General Larbi Belkheir. This new collective executive body 
immediately assumed full political authority, suspending all 
other political institutions, voiding the December 1991 elec- 
tion results, and postponing future elections. 



188 



Government and Politics 



The HCS was soon replaced by the High Council of State 
(Haut Conseil d'Etat — HCE), designed as a transitional govern- 
ment that would have more political legitimacy than the HCS. 
In fact, the HCE differed little from the HCS. The new HCE 
was a five-member collective presidency dominated by military 
officials who had almost unlimited political powers. Former 
independence leader Mohamed Boudiaf was recalled from 
self-imposed exile in Morocco to lead the new HCE and serve 
as head of state. 

The coup initially went almost unchallenged because even 
the FIS leadership discouraged its followers from provoking 
clashes with the military. Relative tranquility prevailed, and the 
military withdrew its tanks and troops in the following days. 

Some Algerians even expressed support for the coup, citing 
fears of an Islamist government. Some 200,000 demonstrators 
marched in Algiers protesting the Islamists, and the main work- 
ers' union, the General Union of Algerian Workers (Union 
Generale des Travailleurs Algeriens — UGTA), in early January 
threatened to resist any Islamist government. 

The period of relative calm, however, was as deceptive as it 
was brief. Within a month, near civil war occurred as Islamists 
struck back against the military crackdown. The new govern- 
ment reimposed a state of emergency, banned the FIS in 
March, and dissolved the communal and municipal assemblies, 
most of which had been controlled by FIS members since the 
June 1990 elections. The government also banned all political 
activity in and around mosques and arrested Islamist activists 
on charges ranging from possession of firearms to promoting 
terrorism and conspiracy against the state. Military courts tried 
and sentenced the activists to lengthy imprisonment or death, 
without right of appeal and/or full awareness of the charges 
brought against them. Thousands of demonstrators were taken 
to makeshift prison camps in the Sahara while hundreds of oth- 
ers were detained for questioning and often tortured. Most of 
the remaining top FIS leadership was arrested, and thousands 
of rank-and-file party members were forced underground. 
Other reversals of the democratization process quickly fol- 
lowed. The press, which had slowly gained freedom, was 
quickly reined in, the National People's Assembly was indefi- 
nitely suspended, and the omnipresent and ubiquitous mukha- 
barat (state security apparatus) resurfaced. 

Despite the military's obvious targeting of the Islamists, the 
latter's political suppression drew heavy criticism even from FIS 



189 



Algeria: A Country Study 



rivals. The FLN and the FFS soon proposed a tactical alliance 
with the FIS to counter the military government in an effort to 
preclude the complete abandonment of the democratic pro- 
cess. 

The repressive military actions of the government against 
the Islamists were reminiscent of the military force used by the 
French colonial authorities against the nationalists during the 
War of Independence. Thousands of troops were mobilized 
and assigned to cities and all major urban centers. Curfews 
were imposed, removed, and reimposed. Entire neighbor- 
hoods were sealed off because of police sweeps and other 
searches for accused "terrorists." Islamists retaliated by killing 
militarv personnel, government officials, and police officers by 
the hundreds. Some 600 members of the security forces, and 
hundreds more civilians and Islamist demonstrators, were 
killed in the first twelve months following the coup. The major- 
ity of Algerians, meanwhile, were caught in the middle, dis- 
trusting the army as much as the Islamists. 

The government, citing a need to "focus its full attention" 
on Algeria's economic problems, warned that it would not tol- 
erate opposition. In reply, FIS leaders warned that the popular 
anger aroused bv the political suppression was beyond their 
control. Hard-liners in FIS split from the more moderate prag- 
matists, criticizing the FIS leadership for cooperating with the 
government. As a result, radical factions replaced the relatively 
moderate FIS leadership, now long imprisoned. Meanwhile, 
other independent and radical armed Islamist groups arose, 
impatient not only with the government but also with the FIS 
itself. The new radicals, FIS officials acknowledged, were 
beyond FIS control. 

On June 29, 1992, head of state Mohamed Boudiaf was 
assassinated during a public speech at the opening of a cultural 
center in Annaba. The death of Boudiaf at the hands of a mili- 
tarv officer illustrated the extent to which Algeria's political cri- 
sis transcended a simple contest for power between Islamists 
and military leaders or between religious and secular forces. 

Twenty months after the coup, the country was still being 
torn apart by constant fighting between Islamists and the mili- 
tarv. Following Boudiaf s assassination, HCE member Ali Kafi 
was appointed head of state. On July 8, only a week later, Prime 
Minister Ghozali resigned, and Belaid Abdessalam was named 
to replace him. Both Boudiaf and Ghozali had begun to move 
toward a rapprochement with the Islamists, no doubt recogniz- 



190 



Government and Politics 



ing their desperate need for popular support in the absence of 
any sort of constitutional legitimacy. 

The months following Boudiaf s assassination and Ghozali's 
resignation were marked by intensified efforts to suppress "ter- 
rorism." Emergency tribunals, headed by unidentified judges 
who levied "exemplary" sentences with no means of appeal, 
were established to try Islamist "terrorists." An antiterrorism 
squad was headed in 1993 by General Mohamed Lamari, a 
former government official under Ghozali who was removed 
from office to facilitate talks with the opposition. Islamist activ- 
ity intensified as Islamists also targeted civilians — teachers, doc- 
tors, professors, and other professionals — whose sympathies 
might lie with the military. 

Cooperation in 1993 among various opposition groups and 
the predominance of professionals, including doctors and 
teachers, in such radical groups as the Armed Islamic Move- 
ment, was considered by a well-informed observer to imply a 
"considerable level of antiregime collaboration among appar- 
ently respectable middle-class Algerians." Moreover, it 
appeared that the radicalization of the opposition, far from 
receding, has spread into traditionally more moderate sectors 
of society. 

Since independence the government has relied on veterans 
of the revolutionary period as leaders, although they represent 
little more than vague historical figures to most Algerians. The 
government has also ignored numerous opportunities for dia- 
logue with the opposition, opting for rule by decree without 
any constitutional mandate. Moreover, divisions within the gov- 
ernment have greatly hindered the development of an effective 
economic policy, undoubtedly the key to Algeria's political tur- 
moil in the early 1990s. 

Prime Minister Abdessalam was greatly hampered in his eco- 
nomic efforts by his connection with Boumediene's failed 
heavy industrialization program from 1965 to 1977. On August 
23, 1993, Abdessalem was dismissed and replaced by Redha 
Malek, formerly a distinguished diplomat but also a traditional 
nationalist vehemently opposed to the FIS and an advocate of a 
hard-line approach to combating "terrorism." 

The legacy of the past has played heavily into the current 
political situation. For years the government had ruled without 
any accountability. Until the mid-1980s, corruption and ineffi- 
ciency were often masked by high oil revenues that sustained 
an acceptable standard of living for most Algerians. Unfortu- 



191 



Algeria: A Country Study 

nately, this legacy has greatly undermined the country's ability 
to rise to the current political challenge by inhibiting the devel- 
opment of an effective economic sector and by provoking wide- 
spread dissatisfaction among the majority of Algerians. 

Political Structure and Processes 

The political triangle of army-party-state that has governed 
Algeria since independence underwent significant changes 
under the liberal reforms of Benjedid: a new constitution was 
adopted, the constitutionally protected role of the FLN elimi- 
nated, and the authoritarian lock on society loosened. Events 
since January 1992, however, have not only reversed those 
reforms but also reasserted the central and preeminent role of 
the military in the government. Algeria has been under a "state 
of emergency" almost since the coup through late 1993, allow- 
ing the state to suspend almost all rule of law. Although the 
civil institutions remained in existence, Algeria in late 1993 was 
essentially a military autocracy whose only functioning author- 
ity was the HCE and an advisory body called the National Con- 
sultative Council (Conseil Consultatif National — CCN). 
Created in February 1992 by presidential decree following the 
dissolution of the APN, the CCN was intended, in the absence 
of a working parliament, to function as an institutional frame- 
work for enacting legislation. In practice, it was little more than 
a rubber stamp for the HCE's proposals. 

Structure of the National Government 

Constitution 

Since independence in 1962, Algeria has had three constitu- 
tions. The first of these was approved by a constitutional refer- 
endum in August 1963, only after prior approval and 
modifications by the FLN. Intended as a means of legitimizing 
Ben Bella's new regime, the constitution also established Alge- 
ria as a republic committed to socialism and to the preserva- 
tion of Algeria's Arab and Islamic culture. The constitution 
lasted only two years, however, and was suspended upon Colo- 
nel Boumediene's military coup in June 1965. For the next ten 
years, Algeria was ruled without a constitution, although repre- 
sentative local and provincial institutions were created in the 
late 1960s in Boumediene's attempt to decentralize political 
authority. In 1976 the National Charter and a new constitution 
were drafted, debated, and eventually passed by national refer- 



192 



Government and Politics 



enda. Together, these documents formed the national constitu- 
tion and ushered in the Second Algerian Republic. The new 
constitution reasserted the commitment to socialism and the 
revolutionary tradition of the nation, and established new gov- 
ernment institutions, including the APN. The 1986 revisions 
continued the conservative nature of the previous constitutions 
but increased the role of the private sector and diminished the 
socialist commitment. 

The revised constitution of February 1989 altered the con- 
figuration of the state and allowed political parties to compete, 
opening the way for liberal democracy. The new constitution 
removed the commitment to socialism embodied in both the 
National Charter and the constitution of 1976 and its 1986 revi- 
sion. The references to the unique and historic character of 
the FLN and the military's role as "guardian of the revolution" 
were eliminated. The provisions for a unicameral legislature 
remained. 

In what was considered a sweeping mandate of support for 
the liberalization efforts of Benjedid, a referendum on the 
1989 constitution passed February 23, 1989, with a 75 percent 
approval and a 78 percent participation rate. The changes 
embodied in the constitution were not universally accepted, 
however. Within a month after the ratification of the new con- 
stitution, a number of prominent senior military officers 
resigned from the FLN Central Committee to protest the revi- 
sions. The most divisive issues included the separation of the 
religious institution and the state; the abandonment of the 
commitment to socialism; and the liberalization of political 
life, allowing independent political parties. 

The 1989 constitution established a "state of law," accentuat- 
ing the role of the executive and, specifically, the president, at 
the expense of the FLN. The president, having the power to 
appoint and dismiss the prime minister at will, and maintain- 
ing singular authority over military affairs, emerged as the 
dominant force. The FLN became but one of many political 
parties. The responsibilities of the army were limited to 
defense and external security. Moreover, the army was obliged 
to become less visible because of its role in suppressing the 
October 1988 revolts. 

Executive: Presidential System 

Constitutional provisions have historically concentrated 
almost all major powers of the state in the hands of the execu- 



193 



Algeria: A Country Study 

tive. The original constitution specified more than twenty pow- 
ers over which the president had sole authority. Leadership 
qualities of the individual presidents have augmented these 
constitutional prerogatives and facilitated the development of 
an essentially authoritarian system. In 1989 the new constitu- 
tion created a "state of law," relying on a strong executive capa- 
ble of implementing the political liberalization necessary to 
democratize Algeria. 

The greatest beneficiary of the constitutional revisions was 
the office of president. The 1989 constitution further strength- 
ened the presidential system at the expense of both the party 
and the army. As head of state, head of the High Judicial Coun- 
cil, commander in chief of the armed forces, and chairman of 
all legislative meetings, the president has effective control over 
all state institutions. The president appoints and dismisses the 
prime minister and all other nonelected civilian and military 
officials. The APN votes on the president's choice, but if the 
president's nominations are rejected twice, the assembly is dis- 
solved. The actions of the prime minister become the responsi- 
bility of the APN although they may not have been validated by 
it. Only the president can initiate constitutional amendments. 
The president may bypass the APN by submitting legislation of 
"national importance" directly to a national referendum. In 
fact, Benjedid's third term in office consisted largely of legisla- 
tion issued through his Council of Ministers, essentially rule by 
decree. 

Legislative: National People's Assembly 

Algeria's first national legislature was formed in September 
1962 under the constitution drafted by the Ben Bella regime 
but was suspended in 1965. For the next ten years, the Council 
of the Revolution ruled Algeria; there was no independent par- 
liament. By 1976, with power consolidated in his hands, Bou- 
mediene commenced a series of reforms to establish formal 
political institutions. One of the first measures was the recre- 
ation of a national parliament. 

The 1976 constitution described the APN as a unicameral, 
elected, representative legislative body. Under the 1989 law, 
deputies are elected for five-year terms, and all Algerians 
"enjoying full civil and political rights" and over the age of 
twenty-five are eligible. Elections occur by secret, direct, and 
universal ballot. Until the country's first multiparty elections in 
December 1991, all candidates were drawn from a single party 



194 



Government and Politics 



list, approved by the FLN, although multiple candidates could 
compete for a single constituency. 

Role of Political Parties 

FLNRole 

The FLN had traditionally served as the only legal political 
party in the legislature and the only source of political identifi- 
cation. It controlled all aspects of political participation, 
including the trade unions and other civil organizations. In the 
prerevolutionary years, the party served as a source of national 
unity and mobilized the fight against French colonial domina- 
tion. Having played such a dominant role in the War of Inde- 
pendence assured the FLN a privileged position in the 
emerging political configuration, a position preserved in the 
early constitutions. 

The first Algerian constitution in 1963 established a 
single-party structure for the new nation and recognized the 
FLN as the single party. The constitution declared the party 
superior to the state — the party was to design national policy, 
the state to execute it. Political hegemony did not last long, 
however. Factional infighting within the party and Boumedi- 
ene's heavily military-oriented presidency greatly undermined 
party authority. During most of the 1970s, with the Council of 
the Revolution as almost the sole political institution and Bou- 
mediene's cabinet primarily composed of military officers, the 
party's political functions were nearly eliminated. The presi- 
dent and his cabinet assumed the party's policy-making initia- 
tive; the elimination of the APN basically annulled 
mobilization responsibilities. The 1976 National Charter and 
constitution reasserted the party's symbolic and national role 
but bestowed little additional responsibility. In the late 1970s, 
with the reemergence of political institutions and elections, the 
party became again an important political actor. The creation 
in 1981 of a Political Bureau (or executive arm of the FLN in a 
communist sense), legislation requiring that all union and 
mass association leaders be FLN party members, and the exten- 
sion of party authority resulted in the growth and increased 
strength of the party until the late 1980s, when its heavily 
bureaucratic structure came under serious scrutiny. 

By the 1980s, the FLN had become discredited by corrup- 
tion, inefficiency, and a broad generation gap that distanced 
the wealthy party elite from the realities of daily life for the 



195 



Algeria: A Country Study 

masses of impoverished young Algerians. The FLN had ceased 
to be the national "front" its name suggests. Algeria's economic 
polarization was such that only 5 percent of the population was 
earning 45 percent of the national income, whereas another 50 
percent was earning less than 22 percent of national income. 
Members of the party elite enjoyed privileged access to foreign 
capital and goods, were ensured positions at the head of 
state-owned enterprises, and benefited from corrupt manage- 
ment of state-controlled goods and services. The masses, how- 
ever, suffered from the increasing unemployment and inflation 
resulting from government reforms and economic austerity in 
the mid- to late 1980s. The riots of October 1988 indicated that 
the FLN had lost legitimacy in the eyes of the masses. 

Increasing economic polarization was but one facet of the 
broadening generation gap. Thirty years after independence, 
the FLN continued to rely on its links to Algeria's revolutionary 
past as its primary source of legitimacy, ignoring the fact that 
for most voters what mattered was not the martyrs of the past 
but the destitution of contemporary life. Indeed, 70 percent of 
the population was born after the revolution. 

Benjedid's call for constitutional reform began the collapse 
of the FLN. The 1989 constitution not only eliminated the 
FLN's monopoly but also abolished all references to the FLN's 
unique position as party of the avant-garde. The new constitu- 
tion recognized the FLN's historical role, but the FLN was 
obliged to compete as any other political party. By mid-1989 
the military had recognized the imminent divestiture of the 
FLN and had begun to distance itself from the party. The resig- 
nation of several senior military officers from party member- 
ship in March 1989, generally interpreted as a protest against 
the constitutional revisions, also reflected a strategic maneuver 
to preserve the military establishment's integrity as guardian of 
the revolution. Finally, in July 1991 Benjedid himself resigned 
from the party leadership. 

The legalization of political parties in 1989 caused a number 
of prominent party officials to defect from the FLN in the 
months that followed, as ministers left to form their own politi- 
cal parties or to join others. A break between the old guard and 
the reform-minded technocrats dealt the final blow to any FLN 
aspirations to remain a national front and foreshadowed the 
party's devastating defeat in the 1990 and 1991 elections. By 
the time of the coup in January 1992, some factions had even 



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Government and Politics 



defected to join or lead Islamist parties, including a group that 
acted in alliance with the FIS. 

Legalization of Political Parties and Beginnings of a Pluralist System 

The legalization of political parties, further enunciated in 
the Law Relative to Political Associations of July 1989, was one 
of the major achievements of the revised constitution. More 
than thirty political parties emerged as a result of these reforms 
by the time of the first multiparty local and regional elections 
in June 1990; nearly sixty existed by the time of the first 
national multiparty elections in December 1991. 

Granting the right to form "associations of a political char- 
acter," the constitution recognized the existence of opposition 
parties. Earlier, such parties were precluded because the FLN 
had a national mandate as a front, eliminating the political 
necessity of competitive political parties. Other political associ- 
ations had also been limited because trade unions and other 
civil associations fell under FLN direction and had little auton- 
omy. The new constitution recognized all political associations 
and mandated only a commitment to national unity and sover- 
eignty. The July law further clarified the guidelines for the 
establishment and participation of political parties. 

The law prohibited associations formed exclusively on 
regional, ethnic, or religious grounds. Ironically, however, the 
two parties that profited most in the 1990 and 1991 elections 
were the FIS and the FFS from the Kabylie region. That these 
parties were among the first legalized in 1989 has given cre- 
dence to those who maintain that Benjedid's liberalization was 
based more on tactical personal considerations than genuine 
democratic ambitions. They argue that these parties had the 
means and appeal to challenge the monopoly of the FLN. The 
FLN became the main antagonist to the liberalization program 
of Benjedid and his then prime minister, Hamrouche. By the 
time of the military coup, the FLN had completely broken with 
the government. 

The December 1991 elections and the scheduled second- 
round runoffs in January 1992 provided the first national test 
for the new multiparty system. The elections were open to all 
registered parties — parties had to register before the campaign 
period began — and were contested by almost fifty parties. Vot- 
ing was by universal and secret ballot, and assembly seats were 
awarded based on a proportional representation system. Only 
231 of the 430 seats were decided in the first round of elections 



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Algeria: A Country Study 

in which 59 percent of eligible voters participated, but an 
Islamist victory seemed assured by the Islamist command of 80 
percent of the contested seats. The second round of elections 
was canceled by the military coup of January 11, 1992. 

Electoral System 

The pre-1989 electoral system allowed for multiple candi- 
dates for local and national elections, although all candidates 
were drawn from an FLN list. Districts were divided based on a 
proportional representation system. The legalization of com- 
petitive political parties in 1989 challenged the FLN with candi- 
dates drawn from other party lists. To preserve the FLN's 
political domination, the National People's Assembly, in which 
the FLN dominated, made modifications to the electoral dis- 
tricts. These redistributions involved heavy overrepresentation 
of the rural and less populated regions, traditional strongholds 
of the FLN, and drew heavy criticism from all political parties. 

In the new system of proportional representation, all seats 
in the local and national assemblies are awarded to the party 
winning a majority of the popular vote. In the absence of an 
absolute majority, the party with a plurality of votes receives 51 
percent of the seats, and the remaining seats are proportionally 
divided among all other parties receiving at least 7 percent of 
the total popular vote. This new electoral system actually served 
to undermine the FLN when the FIS emerged as the most pop- 
ular party in the June 1990 local elections and again in the first 
round of national elections in December 1991. In May 1991 
and again in October 1991, the National People's Assembly 
approved new electoral codes adding extra seats, so that the 
total number of seats came to 430, up from 261 in 1976. 

Judicial System 

The judicial system, in common with other aspects of Alge- 
ria's culture, shares features of its French and Arab traditions. 
Throughout the French colonial period, secular courts pre- 
vailed as the final judicial authority, although Islamic sharia 
courts had jurisdiction over lower-level cases, including civil 
cases, criminal offenses, family law, and other personal matters. 
Secular courts in Algeria owed their existence to the earlier 
Turkish administrative control, however, not French imposi- 
tion. The French courts replaced the Turkish courts and, in so 
doing, modified them to reflect French principles of justice. 
The secular courts were authorized to review sharia court deci- 



198 



Berber men, members of the Front of Socialist 
Forces ofHocine Ait Ahmed, dancing on the street, 1991 
Courtesy Susan Slymovics and Middle East Report 



sions, although for the majority of Algerians, the sharia court 
was the final source of judicial authority. Following indepen- 
dence in 1962, the government promised to create a new judi- 
cial system that would eliminate the French colonial legacy and 
reflect more accurately the ideological orientation of the new 
state, which was committed to both socialism and the Arab and 
Islamic tradition. The revised legal system was not created until 
1975, under Boumediene, when new civil and criminal codes 
were announced. 

These codes reflected the divergent nature of socialist and 
traditional Islamic notions of justice. Family law, personal status 
(especially regarding the rights of women), and certain crimi- 
nal penalties were divisive issues, and many were simply omit- 
ted from the new judicial codes. In the 1980s, Benjedid 



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Algeria: A Country Study 

proposed a family code, which drew extensive public criticism 
but was ultimately passed in 1984. 

Judges are appointed by the executive branch, and their 
appointment may be challenged only by the High Judicial 
Council. Judges are not tenured, although they remain rela- 
tively free from political pressure. The 1976 constitution 
asserted a judicial responsibility to uphold the principles of the 
revolution; this commitment has lessened in importance, how- 
ever, as Algeria has moved away from its socialist origins. 

The judicial tradition has stipulated that defendants be fully 
aware of the charges against them, that they have free access to 
legal counsel, and that they be able to contest a judicial out- 
come in a court of appeal. The constitution upholds basic prin- 
ciples of personal liberty and justice and prohibits the 
unnecessary holding of individuals for questioning for longer 
than forty-eight hours. Under Benjedid's political liberaliza- 
tion, constitutional respect for individual freedoms expanded. 
A number of political prisoners were released, and the elimina- 
tion of exit visas and the legalization of political associations 
facilitated the exercise of free speech, movement, and expres- 
sion. 

Individual freedoms were, however, subordinate to military 
concerns and issues of national security and have been regu- 
larly suspended under periods of martial law. The military lead- 
ership in the early 1990s suspended almost all institutions of 
state, including those of the judicial branch. Islamist leaders 
and other criminal offenders have been tried by military tribu- 
nals and have received heavy sentences of imprisonment or 
death. The HCE, as the military presidency, is an authoritarian 
government responsible only to itself. Even at the best of times, 
the executive is not subordinate to the judicial branch, the 
president serving as head of the High Judicial Council. In the 
early 1990s, however, cases arising out of the state of emer- 
gency as opposed to ordinary civil or criminal cases have been 
assigned to the military tribunals. 

Supreme Court 

The Supreme Court resides in Algiers. Its main directive is 
to ensure the equal and just application of law in all parts of 
the country. The Supreme Court has four major divisions: a 
Private Law chamber for civil and commercial cases, a Social 
Division that presides over issues of social security and labor, a 
Criminal Court, and an Administrative Division. The court has 



200 



Government and Politics 



appellate authority over lower court decisions through the 
power of abrogation. This appellate power is more limited than 
United States notions of judicial review. The Supreme Court 
can review lower court decisions only on questions of proce- 
dure, not questions of legal dispute. When overruled, lower 
court decisions are returned to the lower courts for retrial. The 
Supreme Court issues no legal decisions and lacks jurisdiction 
over government actions and/or the constitutionality of gov- 
ernment decrees. Traditionally, the Supreme Court has ruled 
in favor of sharia law over contemporary secular law. 

Provincial Courts 

The forty-eight provincial courts have four divisions similar 
to those of the Supreme Court: civil law, criminal law, adminis- 
trative, and accusation — or grand jury — courts. Civil cases may 
be referred to the provincial courts by appeal from the tribu- 
nals. Criminal cases can be of original or appellate review. Pro- 
vincial courts have original jurisdiction for serious crimes. The 
Chamber of Accusation, serving as a grand jury, hears and 
charges a criminal suspect. The defendant must then go before 
a criminal tribunal, where a panel of three judges and four lay 
jurors hears the case. 

Tribunals 

Each dairah (pi., dawair, administrative district) has at least 
one tribunal. The tribunals are courts of first instance and 
cover civil and less serious criminal cases. They are intended to 
be easily accessible to the general public and are relatively 
informal injudicial practice. All of these courts are governed 
predominantly by Islamic law. 

Military Tribunals 

Military courts try matters relating to espionage, state secu- 
rity, and other offenses committed by military personnel. 
These courts are also activated under periods of martial law 
and have been used to try numerous Islamists, the most nota- 
ble being Abbassi Madani and Ali Belhadj, leaders of the FIS, 
which was banned in 1992. The courts consist of three civil 
judges and two military judges. One of the civil judges presides. 

High Judicial Council 

The 1976 constitution provided for the establishment of a 



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Algeria: A Country Study 



High Judicial Council responsible for presiding over issues of 
judicial discipline and implementation and the appointment of 
judicial officials. The president of the nation serves as presi- 
dent of the council, and the minister of justice serves as vice 
president. The council is also charged with advising the presi- 
dent on the exercise of his power to pardon. 

Local and Regional Government 

The system of local government existing in the early 1990s 
was established under Boumediene in the late 1960s. The 
decentralization of local government during the latter period 
provided an alternative focus to the concentration of power in 
the highly centralized single-party apparatus and in Boumedi- 
ene's own personalist rule. An extensive system of administra- 
tion restricted the autonomy and independent action of 
provincial and local assemblies. Communal and provincial 
councils were generally confined to purely administrative and/ 
or distributive functions, rubber stamping national govern- 
ment initiatives. Political campaigning was the responsibility of 
the FLN, not the individual candidates; this system eliminated 
electoral competition and resulted in a lethargic and apathetic 
administrative government at the local and regional levels 
despite the FLN's initial mandate to "politicize the masses." 
Voter turnout at local elections has generally been low. In con- 
trast, in Algeria's first multiparty elections in June 1990, almost 
two-thirds of the population participated. 

Wilayat 

Algeria is divided into forty-eight wilayat (sing., wilaya) , 
which are, in effect, provinces (see fig. 1). The wilayat owe their 
origins to the colonial system, where they served as bureau- 
cratic units of colonial administration. The system was 
reformed and expanded (from fifteen provinces to forty-eight) 
by the Wilaya Charter of 1969, which enumerated a specific 
legal code for the government of the provinces. The system was 
reformed again in 1976 by the national constitution. 

Each wilaya is governed by a Popular Wilaya Assembly 
(Assemblee Populaire de Wilaya — APW). This deliberative 
body consists of thirty deputies and holds elections every five 
years. The first APW elections were held in May 1969. Each 
wilaya is also governed by a wali, or governor, who is appointed 
by the president and is the latter's direct political representa- 
tive at the regional level. Both the Executive Council of the 



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Government and Politics 



APW and the APW itself report directly to the wall Wilaya gov- 
ernment is responsible for the distribution of state services; the 
regulation of small and medium-sized industry, agriculture, 
tourism, road transport, and education institutions; and the 
creation of new state-owned enterprises. Efforts, most notably 
in the reforms of the early 1980s, to strengthen the financial 
and political autonomy of these regional governments have 
achieved only mixed success. The APWs and other popularly 
elected bodies were in abeyance in late 1993. 

Datvair 

Algeria has 227 administrative districts, or dawair (sing., 
dairah), units between the wilayat and the communes. Certain 
licenses and permits must be obtained from the dawair, 
although most are distributed by the local communal authori- 
ties. 

Communes 

The local rural governing authority is the Communal Popu- 
lar Assembly (Assemblee Populaire Communale — APC) . The 
APCs are responsible for local administration, economy and 
finance, social and cultural affairs, and planning. Having no 
economic and little political autonomy, however, the com- 
munes administer central government programs rather than 
initiate independent projects. Each communal assembly has 
ten to eighty members, who are elected for five-year terms. The 
first APC elections were held in February 1967. The assembly 
elects a communal executive from its membership. The com- 
munal executive generally consists of a president, two or more 
vice presidents, and several councillors. The APCs and the 
communal executives are directly responsible to the national 
Ministry of Interior, Local Communities, and Tourism and 
receive much assistance, direction, and supervision from vari- 
ous ministries. 

Municipal Government 

The number of seats in each Municipal Council is deter- 
mined by proportional representation. Constituencies with a 
population of fewer than 10,000 residents have a minimum of 
seven council members. Council members are proportionally 
designated up to a maximum of thirty-three for residential dis- 
tricts with more than 200,000 inhabitants. 



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Algeria: A Country Study 



Effective Institutions 

Political Configuration: The Army-Party- State Triangle 

All national power and decision-making authority rest in the 
hands of a select elite and a select group of institutions. This 
elite structure has been characterized by its triangular configu- 
ration of army, party, and state. This configuration persists 
despite its fluidity — vacillating between peaceful coexistence 
and vehement competition for dominance. Events of the early 
1990s and the subsequent realignment of this political configu- 
ration in favor of the military pose substantial challenges for 
Algeria's future development and stability because the adminis- 
trative elite and top party functionaries have been relegated to 
a subordinate position. 

In the years immediately following independence, no one 
faction of the political elite could control the entire political 
system. National preoccupation with state stability and political 
consolidation ensured a relatively stable balance among the 
competing elite factions. Under Boumediene, the party was 
reduced to a minor role while a civil-military autocracy in the 
form of the Council of the Revolution emerged as the predom- 
inant political force — consistent with Boumediene's vision of 
the development of a stable and secure, heavily centralized gov- 
ernment. The party and other national institutions were 
allowed to disintegrate to preclude the emergence of any sig- 
nificant opposition to his highly concentrated government. 

Renewed political institutionalization and mass politiciza- 
tion in the late 1970s countered this diminution of the party's 
role. The 1976 National Charter and constitution acknowl- 
edged the party's historical role while enhancing its position as 
the single legal party affiliation under which candidates could 
run in the newly created local, regional, and national assem- 
blies. The elimination of the Council of the Revolution and the 
subsequent absorption of its remaining members into the Party 
Congress of the FLN after Boumediene's death further 
enhanced the party's national status. 

Benjedid's regime, despite a reduction of formal executive 
powers immediately preceding his assumption of office, was 
marked by "power consolidation," which strengthened his per- 
sonal control at the expense of state, military, and especially 
party elites. The deemphasis on personal politics (at least at the 
highest levels of government) and the increased importance of 
institutional life, however, eventually opened the way for the 



204 



Government and Politics 



army's return as the dominant political force by greatly under- 
mining the other sides of the political triangle. 

The Elite 

Historically, the elite enjoyed its greatest preeminence 
under the socialist Boumediene regime, with its emphasis on 
heavy industrialization. The elite includes civil service employ- 
ees, the technocratic top personnel in the state's major nation- 
alized industries and enterprises (e.g., the National Company 
for Research, Production, Transportation, Processing, and 
Commercialization of Hydrocarbons — Sonatrach — and the 
National Company for Electricity and Gas), and economic and 
financial planners responsible for the national development 
program. Together these elite groups are responsible for plan- 
ning, developing, focusing, and administering Algeria's eco- 
nomic and industrial sector. Having expanded significantly 
under Boumediene, this sector contracted substantially with 
the economic liberalization under Benjedid, although it 
remained a vital force and, historically, the most efficient and 
productive sector of the national elite. Because personal con- 
tacts and privileged access to capital account for personal status 
and class in Algeria, the administrative elite and its networks 
represent a major factor in the political environment. The 
administrative elite, although generally less politically visible 
than the party and military elites, can directly influence devel- 
opment by managing programs linked to economic growth 
and political stability. 

Since the late 1980s, the administrative elite has provided a 
pool of technocrats for the staff of both the civilian govern- 
ment and the military presidency, which rely heavily on them 
in modernizing Algeria's economy. At the same time, the 
administrative elite has increasingly been plagued by factional- 
ism. 

The other major elements of the elite consist of the FLN 
and the military. Within the FLN, the Party Congress is the 
highest political organ. It consists of national delegates, repre- 
sentatives from the various mass associations and professional 
unions, local and regional elected officials, APN deputies, and 
military leaders. The congress determines general party policy, 
adopts and revises party statutes, and elects both the secretary 
general of the party and its Central Committee. The Central 
Committee, which is divided into various commissions, is an 



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Algeria: A Country Study 

elected assembly that serves only during recesses of the Party 
Congress. 

The military, consisting primarily of the People's National 
Army (Armee Nationale Populaire — ANP), has remained a 
constant force in Algerian politics, at times quite visible, at 
times more subtle. The military's most potent source of power 
emanates from its monopoly of the coercive instruments of 
force. Equally significant, however, is the military's symbolic 
role as "guardian of the revolution" and guarantor of state sta- 
bility. Its technical and administrative skills have been critical to 
Algeria's political and economic development. A certain 
domestic prestige stems from the military's influential role in 
regional and international affairs. The military is also very 
active in local and provincial affairs. Army officials are repre- 
sented on all major political institutions and frequently have 
more influence in regional administration than do the civilian 
provincial governors. 

Historically, the army has interfered only when conditions 
"necessitated" military intervention to ensure the security of 
the state. In January 1992, only days away from national legisla- 
tive elections that were likely to return a sweeping Islamist vic- 
tory, the military resurfaced politically in a highly visible 
manner. Anticipating what the armed forces interpreted to be 
a "grave threat" to the secular interests and political stability of 
the state and defying the apparent government and national 
volition, the military demonstrated that it alone would deter- 
mine the course of Algerian politics. 

Military Dictatorship 

The system of power in 1993, like that between 1965 and 
1978, was a military dictatorship with few legal institutions 
defining it. Following the coup of January 1992 that ousted 
Benjedid and eliminated constitutional rule, a collective presi- 
dency was established, responsible for implementing political 
authority. The national constitution has been suspended (a ref- 
erendum on a new constitution and political structure was 
expected to be held in late 1993), so all political powers have 
been assumed on a de facto basis with almost no limitations. 

High Council of State 

The High Council of State (Haut Conseil d'Etat — HCE) is 
the official name for the collective presidency that governed 
Algeria in late 1993. A five-member council, it was presided 



206 



Government and Politics 



over by Ali Kafi, a former War of Independence veteran and 
founding member ofthe FLN, serving as head of state. The 
prime minister was Redha Malek, a distinguished figure of the 
preindependence and postindependence periods, who served 
his country in several diplomatic posts including that of ambas- 
sador to the United States (1979-82); in the latter capacity he 
was instrumental in negotiating the release of United States 
hostages in Iran in 1981. The HCE replaced the High Security 
Council, the transitional government that assumed power 
immediately following the coup, and was dominated by mili- 
tary officials, although it has been marked by frequent changes 
of personnel. Its mandate was due to expire at the end of 1993, 
when it was scheduled to hand over power to a new transition 
government that would be entrusted with resuming the demo- 
cratic process. 

National Consultative Council 

The National Consultative Council (Conseil Consultatif 
National — CCN) was conceived by head of state Mohamed 
Boudiaf in February 1992 as an ex-officio institution to fill the 
legislative vacuum and to validate HCE legislation. The APN, 
Algeria's national legislature, was suspended one week before 
the military coup in January 1992. The CCN is an advisory 
board of sixty members whose principal function is to "provide 
studies, analysis, and examination of policy," and in the 
absence of a working parliament, "to provide an institutional 
framework for passing legislation." The council was originally 
headed by Redha Malek, whose official title was president of 
the council. The council has no members from the FLN or 
from the FIS, which in 1993 was banned. It consists of business 
leaders, journalists, and academics. Several council members 
have been assassinated, allegedly by Muslim extremists intent 
on punishing "collaborators" of the military junta. 

The Islamist Factor 

Islam in Algeria is part of the political tradition dating back 
before independence, when the revolutionary rhetoric of the 
FLN drew upon the unifying force of Islam to strengthen 
national cohesion and opposition to colonial rule. In the 
postindependence period, the government, recognizing the 
mobilizing potential of Islam as a political force, tried to bring 
activist Islamist groups under its control. Despite these efforts, 
an independent Islamist movement eventually emerged that 



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Algeria: A Country Study 

would form the basis for the most significant opposition party 
to the government in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 

Whereas more than fifty independent parties and more 
than one Islamist organization emerged in the months follow- 
ing the legalization of parties, the FIS emerged as the only 
national contender to the hegemony of the FLN. Although not 
the only Islamist party, the FIS could attract a large percentage 
of the electorate. The FIS presented the only viable and com- 
prehensive alternative program to that of the existing regime 
and offered a social and religious focus as well. 

The Islamist Movement since the Late 1980s 

Until the late 1980s, the government required that imams be 
named by the Ministry of Religious Affairs and prohibited the 
formation of any Islamist political or public association. Ser- 
mons and religious speeches were monitored, and worship ser- 
vices could be held only in officially designated mosques. But, 
with the urban growth that occurred during the 1970s and 
1980s, the government could not keep up with the prolifera- 
tion of mosques and neighborhood associations. This "imam 
shortage" opened the way for the independent Islamist move- 
ment, which quickly moved in to fill the public arena. These 
"unofficial imams" preached wherever they could find space 
and occupied official mosques in defiance of government legis- 
lation. The Islamists who occupied these urban mosques 
offered comprehensive social programs that included school- 
ing, business development and neighborhood beautification, 
garbage pickup, tutoring sessions, and economic assistance for 
needy families. In a time of severe economic crisis and appar- 
ent government ineptitude, the Islamists did not seem to be 
limited by the reductions in municipal budgets and appeared 
committed to social welfare programs and improving the mate- 
rial condition of the general populace. 

This social commitment would later benefit the political 
aspirations of the movement by creating a mass base from 
which to draw public support, even from those sectors unlikely 
to support an Islamist party. In fact, the commercial bourgeoi- 
sie — entrepreneurs driven by profit motives — were among the 
most important financial contributors to the Islamist move- 
ment. These businessmen were attracted to the FIS program by 
promises of tax cuts, deregulation, and economic incentives for 
business development. The Islamist movement has a national 
as well as a religious appeal. It has attacked the widespread cor- 



208 



Government and Politics 



ruption in the government and suggested solutions for the 
housing and unemployment crises. All of these efforts provide 
attractive campaign points for any opposition party, religious 
or secular, and allow the Islamist movement to transcend the 
traditional bases of Islamist support. 

Role of the F1S 

The Benjedid government in the early 1980s relaxed the 
restrictions on Islam and its political expression, hoping to pre- 
clude the development of a more politically active Islamist 
movement. Islamist political opposition to the regime was tol- 
erated, more mosques were constructed, religious education in 
the schools was encouraged, and in 1984 a new family code 
closely following Islamic tenets was enacted. A number of 
prominent Islamic leaders were released from prison, includ- 
ing Abbassi Madani, a university professor who would be one of 
the founders of Algeria's first Islamic political party. 

The FIS emerged as a political party on September 16, 1989. 
One of the first parties to apply for legal recognition in Alge- 
ria's new multiparty system, the FIS had begun to take shape in 
the months before the constitutional revision that legalized 
political parties. Islamist leaders met between February and 
August 1989 while the APN was debating the new legislation 
that would enact the constitutional provision allowing for the 
creation of "associations of a political character." The FIS 
named Shaykh Abbassi Madani, a moderate Western-educated 
professor of comparative literature at the University of Algiers, 
as its leader. His second in command was Ali Belhadj, a high 
school teacher known for his fiery and militant rhetoric and 
radical notions of the role of political Islam. This dual leader- 
ship and the lack of a clear doctrine allowed for the variable 
interpretation and pluralistic nature of the FIS as a political 
party. The more moderate Madani represented a conservative 
faction within the party intent on using the democratic system 
to implement its Islamist code. Belhadj, with wider grass-roots 
support, drew the younger population intent on the immediate 
imposition of Islamic law 

In line with the nationalist appeal of the Islamic movement, 
FIS as a political party has transcended religious affiliation. In 
the economic sphere, the FIS advocates a free-market 
approach with lower taxes and incentives for developing the 
private sector. The party also calls for cuts in military spending. 
Its program is largely driven by domestic interests and is not 



209 



Algeria: A Country Study 

linked to an international Islamist movement. In fact, the party 
platform in late 1992 called for international cooperation with 
the West to explore and expand Algeria's natural resources and 
export potential. 

Many people have minimized the strength of the FIS by 
maintaining that its greatest appeal has been in the impover- 
ished urban centers filled with unemployed and discontented 
youth. To this view one must add a few qualifiers. First, in the 
early 1990s more than 70 percent of Algeria's total population 
was under the age of thirty (more than 50 percent was under 
the age of nineteen). To the extent that the party appeals to 
disgruntled youth, it appeals to a huge percentage of the popu- 
lation. Second, whereas large numbers of unemployed fill the 
ranks of the FIS, they are without work primarily as a result of 
poor economic policy and limited opportunity. These factors 
constitute an inevitable and legitimate precipitate for a back- 
lash vote against the incumbent regime. Finally, the June 1990 
local elections demonstrated that the appeal of the FIS was not 
limited to the poorer districts. FIS candidates won in many 
affluent districts in the capital and in such provinces as El Tarf, 
home of Benjedid. 

At the time of the June 1990 elections, the FIS was a pluralist 
and generally moderate party. Under the leadership of Abbassi 
Madani, in contrast to Ali Belhadj, the FIS resembled a moder- 
ate social democratic party more than a radical Islamist party. 
The radicalization of the Islamists and the violent uprisings 
that dominated political life in 1992 and 1993 resulted from 
the revived political authoritarianism led by the army and were 
not necessarily an attribute of the party itself. In fact, the party, 
untested in a national capacity, can be measured only by its 
actions. In those local districts controlled by the FIS since the 
1990 elections, few of the radical changes feared by many out- 
siders and the old guard in the ruling elite have transpired. In 
part the retention of the status quo has been caused by substan- 
tial cuts in municipal budgets and in part by the lack of time 
and flexibility to alter drastically existing legislation. However, 
disagreements within the leadership itself, especially over the 
timetable for implementation of Islamic principles, have been 
perhaps the strongest factor in the lack of change. 

Civil Society 

Politicized Algerian civil society owes its origins to the pre- 
revolutionary period when it absorbed many of the French 



210 



Government and Politics 



notions of associational life and state-society relations. From 
the 1920s until the War of Independence, Algerians were 
allowed to participate in French professional and trade unions 
and other mass organizations. Through most of Algeria's inde- 
pendent history, civil society and mass organizations have been 
subordinate to the state-party apparatus and relegated to roles 
of recruitment and propaganda. From 1968 until 1989, all mass 
associations were incorporated under the direct administration 
of the FLN. From the party's perspective, integrating the inde- 
pendent organizations enabled the party to become a true 
"front," a unique body representing the populace, while simul- 
taneously inhibiting the development of any independent 
political opposition. Subordinate to the party administration, 
the associations quickly became engrossed in mobilizing mass 
support for the party and government and less occupied with 
pursuing the interests of the groups they represented. 

The political crisis of the late 1980s radically altered the 
dynamic in which the people accepted central control in 
return for economic security by shifting some of the initiative 
away from the state and toward civil society. "Associations of a 
political character" were legalized and allowed to organize, 
recruit, and demonstrate. In 1989 the legalization of political 
parties resulted in a large number of independent interest 
groups emerging as political parties, attesting to the pervasive 
nature of associational life in Algerian political culture despite 
government efforts at "depoliticization" and heavy government 
supervision. Party proliferation was facilitated by a loosening of 
government regulations. Government authorization became 
necessary only for those organizations having a "national char- 
acter," and legalization was extended to any party that did not 
pose a direct threat to national sovereignty. Hundreds of inde- 
pendent institutions emerged in the following years. 

Algerian General Workers' Union and the Workers' Movement 

If any one element of civil society has consistently presented 
a cohesive and substantive constituency, it is the workers' 
unions. The explosion of union activity following political lib- 
eralization in the late 1980s indicates that the affiliational role 
of the unions has persisted despite years of subordination to 
party directives. 

The Algerian General Workers' Union (Union Generale des 
Travailleurs Algeriens — UGTA) was created in 1956 after Alge- 
rian participation in French trade unions was banned. Despite 



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Algeria: A Country Study 

the union's efforts to remain independent, it was taken over by 
the FLN leadership in 1963. Under the party structure and the 
socialist tenets of the National Charter, the UGTA became 
more of an administrative apparatus than an independent 
interest group. The UGTA consistently opposed mass strikes 
and public demonstrations that threatened productive eco- 
nomic activity and supported government legislation to pro- 
hibit strikes in certain industrial sectors. Until the mid-1980s, 
all member unions were integrated federations spanning sev- 
eral industries. After 1984 and in response to increasing inde- 
pendent activity on behalf of the workers, these large 
federations were broken down into smaller workers' assem- 
blies, greatly reducing the political force of the large unions 
and strengthening the managerial control of the UGTA 
authorities. The number of strikes sharply declined in the fol- 
lowing years. 

From 1989 until January 1992, union activity increased to an 
intensity not previously witnessed. Splits within the UGTA, the 
creation of a number of new, smaller, and more active unions — 
including the formation of an Islamic labor union — and a 
rapid rise in the number of strikes and demonstrations have 
quickly politicized a previously dormant workers' movement. 
The frequency and size of labor strikes jumped; Ministry of 
Labor figures placed the number of strikes for 1989 at 250 per 
month, four times that of the previous year. 

The growth of the workers' movement illustrates the genu- 
ineness of democratization in the period up to the January 
1992 coup. Labor has generally not supported economic liber- 
alization, and strikes have hampered a number of the govern- 
ment's free-market reforms. The government's response to and 
tolerance for increased mass politicization and especially union 
activity will undoubtedly provide clear evidence of the likeli- 
hood for successful democracy in the 1990s. 

Youth and Student Unions 

The FLN formed the National Union of Algerian Students 
(Union Nationale des Etudiants Algeriens — UNEA), but party 
directives had less impact on the UNEA than on other FLN- 
influenced bodies such as the UGTA. The student union was 
quite active throughout the 1960s despite government 
attempts to quell the movement. Strikes, boycotts, and other 
violent clashes between student groups and government offi- 
cials continued to upset numerous university campuses until 



212 



Government and Politics 



the union was suppressed and dissolved in 1971. The student 
movement was subsequently absorbed into the more docile 
National Union of Algerian Youth (Union Nationale de la Jeu- 
nesse Algerienne — UNJA), a national conglomerate of youth 
organizations controlled by the FLN. The UNJA was the only 
youth group to be recognized officially in the list of national 
associations enumerated in the National Charter of 1976. 

Despite a brief surge of student demonstrations in the late 
1970s, the UNJA leadership has increasingly met with apathy 
and a lack of interest on the part of both high-school and uni- 
versity students — in part because of the existence of a number 
of local organizations that parallel UNJA activities. Most of the 
UNJA's roster in 1993 did not consist of students. 

As has been true for most other elements of civil society, 
FLN dominance has translated into a greater emphasis on 
party propaganda and mobilization than on the association's 
own objectives. Implementing these objectives posed a chal- 
lenge to the student union leadership. Union leaders face a dis- 
illusioned constituency — students who upon completing years 
of education cannot find jobs, masses of impoverished and 
unemployed youth with little confidence in distant authorities, 
and youth without nostalgia for the War of Independence they 
are too young to remember. When the population exploded 
onto the streets in October 1988, it was the students who were 
the first to organize and who made up the bulk of demonstra- 
tors in the six days of rioting. 

The National Union of Algerian Farmers 

The National Union of Algerian Farmers (Union Nationale 
des Paysans Algeriens — UNPA) was created in 1973 and offi- 
cially incorporated by the FLN. The UNPA has great organiza- 
tional complexity, having a number of affiliated and 
administrative bodies at the local and regional levels. The 
UNPA has less autonomy than other national associations 
because the Ministry of Agriculture has assumed many of its 
ostensible functions. Most agricultural lands were nationalized 
under Boumediene, and the union thus consists of farmers 
having few or no noncollectivized lands. Lacking an indepen- 
dent history as a union before its creation as part of the party 
apparatus, the UNPA has been less politically active, less cohe- 
sive, and less influential than some of its counterparts. Recipro- 
cal efforts by the government to revive the agricultural sector 
and by the union to educate the government regarding the 



213 



Algeria: A Country Study 



inherent limitations of small cultivators have improved the 
number of services and general production conditions of agri- 
cultural workers. Government reforms under Benjedid decen- 
tralized and broke up ownership of most of the nationalized 
lands, although demands persisted for the restitution of all 
nationalized lands. These demands were loudest from factions 
that have broken off from the UNPA to form their own inde- 
pendent agricultural unions since 1988. 

The Entrepreneurial Class 

One of the most recent sectors of civil society to emerge as 
an independent movement is that of the entrepreneurs. For 
most of Algeria's political history, the socialist orientation of 
the state precluded the development of a class of small business 
owners and resulted in strong public anticapitalist sentiment. 
Economic liberalization under Benjedid transformed many 
state-owned enterprises into private entities and fostered the 
growth of an active and cohesive group of professional associa- 
tions of small business owners, or patronat. The patronat has 
maintained almost continuous dialogue with the government, 
has strongly supported government reforms, and has persisted 
in its lobbying efforts. The patronat consists of well over 10,000 
members and is steadily expanding. Some of its member associ- 
ations include the Algerian Confederation of Employers, the 
General Confederation of Algerian Economic Operators, and 
the General Union of Algerian Merchants and Artisans. 

Socialist Vanguard Party 

The Socialist Vanguard Party (Parti de FAvant-Garde Social- 
iste — PAGS) , although not legally recognized, has persisted as a 
political opposition party throughout the single-party period. 
As an outgrowth of the Algerian Communist Party (Parti Com- 
muniste Algerien — PCA), which disappeared soon after Alge- 
rian independence, the PAGS has consistently opposed the 
government, offering sharp criticism of all political leaders and 
most of their programs. Its members, referred to as "Pagsistes," 
have infiltrated almost every legally recognized mass associa- 
tion despite their unofficial status. The Pagsistes have been 
especially prominent in such organizations as the UNJA and 
UGTA, encouraging leftist tendencies. The legalization and 
proliferation of political parties in 1989 in practice annulled 
the necessity of the PAGS's continued existence; the Pagsistes 
essentially disappeared into the plethora of nationally recog- 



214 



Government and Politics 



nized opposition groups. No communist party or political asso- 
ciation has been legally recognized. 

The Women's Movement 

The Algerian women's movement has made few gains since 
independence, and women in Algeria remain relegated to a 
subordinate position that compares unfavorably with the posi- 
tion of women in such neighboring countries as Tunisia and 
Morocco. Once the war was over, women who had played a sig- 
nificant part in the War of Independence were expected, by 
the government and society in general, to return to the home 
and their traditional roles. Despite this emphasis on women's 
customary roles, in 1962, as part of its program to mobilize var- 
ious sectors of society in support of socialism, the government 
created the National Union of Algerian Women (Union Natio- 
nale des Femmes Algeriennes — UNFA). On March 8, 1965, the 
union held its first march to celebrate International Women's 
Day; nearly 6,000 women participated. 

The union never captured the interest of feminists, nor 
could it attract membership among rural workers who were 
probably most vulnerable to the patriarchal tradition. In 1964 
the creation of Al Qiyam (values), a mass organization that pro- 
moted traditional Islamic values, delivered another blow to the 
women's movement. The resurgence of the Islamic tradition 
was largely a backlash against the role of French colonists in 
the preindependence period. During the colonial period, the 
French tried to "liberate" Algerian women by pushing for bet- 
ter education and eliminating the veil. After the revolution, 
many Algerians looked back on these French efforts as an 
attempt by the colonists to "divide and conquer" the Algerians. 
Islam and Arabic tradition became powerful mobilizing forces 
and signs of national unity. 

Women's access to higher education has improved, however, 
even if their rights to employment, political power, and auton- 
omy are limited. For the most part, women seem content to 
return to the home after schooling. Overall enrollment at all 
levels of schooling, from primary education through university 
or technical training, has risen sharply, and women represent 
more than 40 percent of students (see Education, ch. 2). 

Another major gain of the women's movement was the Khe- 
misti Law. Drafted by Fatima Khemisti, wife of a former foreign 
minister, and presented to the APN in 1963, the resolution that 
later came to be known as the Khemisti Law raised the mini- 



215 



Algeria: A Country Study 

mum age of marriage. Whereas girls were still expected to 
marry earlier than boys, the minimum age was raised to sixteen 
for girls and eighteen for boys. This change greatly facilitated 
women's pursuit of further education, although it fell short of 
the nineteen-year minimum specified in the original proposal. 

The APN provided one of the few public forums available to 
women. In 1965, following the military coup, this access was 
taken away when Boumediene suspended the APN. No female 
members were elected to the APN under Ben Bella, but women 
were allowed to propose resolutions before the assembly (e.g., 
the Khemisti Law). In the early postindependence years, no 
women sat on any of the key decision-making bodies, but nine 
women were elected to the APN when it was reinstated in 1976. 
At the local and regional level, however, women's public partic- 
ipation rose significantly. As early as 1967, ninety-nine female 
candidates were elected to communal assemblies (out of 
10,852 positions nationwide). By the late 1980s, the number of 
women in provincial and local assemblies had risen to almost 
300. 

The 1976 National Charter went far toward guaranteeing 
legal equality between men and women. The charter recog- 
nizes women's right to education and refers to their role in the 
social, cultural, and economic facets of Algerian life. However, 
as of late 1993, the number of women employed outside the 
home remained well below that of Tunisia and Morocco. 

A new family code backed by conservative Islamists and pro- 
posed in 1981 threatened to encroach on these gains and drew 
the protest of several hundred women. The demonstrations, 
held in Algiers, were not officially organized by the UNFA 
although many of the demonstrators were members. The 
women's objections to the family code were that the code did 
not contain sufficient reforms. The debate over the family code 
forced the government to withdraw its proposal, but a conser- 
vative revision was presented in 1984 and quickly passed by the 
APN before much debate resurfaced. The 1981 proposal had 
offered six grounds for divorce on the part of the wife, allowed 
a woman to work outside the home after marriage if specified 
in the marriage contract or at the consent of her husband, and 
imposed some restrictions on polygyny and the conditions in 
which the wives of a polygynous husband were kept. In the 
revised code, provisions for divorce initiated by women were 
sharply curtailed, as were the restrictions on polygyny, but the 
minimum marriage age was increased for both women and 



216 




Women demonstrating in Algiers and Oran in 
January 1992 against the FIS election victory 
Courtesy Susan Slymovics and Middle East Report 



217 



Algeria: A Country Study 

men (to eighteen and twenty-one, respectively). In effect, how- 
ever, although the legalities were altered, little changed for 
most women. Further, it was argued that the enunciation of 
specific conditions regarding the rights of the wife and the 
absence of such specifications for the husband, and the fact 
that women achieve legal independence only upon marriage 
whereas men become independent at age eighteen regardless 
of marital status, implicitly underline women's inferior status. 
Protest demonstrations were once again organized, but, occur- 
ring after the fact (the code had been passed on June 9), they 
had little impact. 

A number of new women's groups emerged in the early 
1980s, including the Committee for the Legal Equality of Men 
and Women and the Algerian Association for the Emancipa- 
tion of Women, but the number of women actively participat- 
ing in such movements remained limited. Fear of government 
retaliation and public scorn kept many women away from the 
women's groups. At the same time, the government had 
become increasingly receptive to the role of women in the pub- 
lic realm. In 1984 the first woman cabinet minister was 
appointed. Since then, the government has promised the cre- 
ation of several hundred thousand new jobs for women, 
although the difficult economic crisis made achievement of 
this goal unlikely. When the APN was dissolved in January 

1992, few female deputies sat in it, and no women, in any 
capacity, were affiliated with the HCE that ruled Algeria in 

1993, although seven sat on the sixty-member CCN. The popu- 
lar disillusionment with the secular regime and the resurgence 
of traditional Islamist groups threaten to further hamper the 
women's movement, but perhaps no more so than the patriar- 
chal tradition of the Algerian sociopolitical culture and the mil- 
itary establishment that heads it. 

The Press 

From national independence and until the late 1980s, Alge- 
ria had almost no independent news media. Colonial legisla- 
tion banned all nationalist publications during Algeria's fight 
for independence, and, although a few underground papers 
were circulated, independent Algeria emerged with no signifi- 
cant national news source. Ben Bella did not inhibit the free- 
dom of the press in the immediate aftermath of the war, but 
self-imposed limitations kept the press rather prudently 
progovernment. 



218 



Government and Politics 



In 1964 government control tightened, and most Algerian 
news publications were nationalized. All news media became 
subject to heavy censorship by the government and the FLN. A 
union of journalists was formed under FLN auspices but was 
largely insignificant as an independent association until the 
late 1980s. " 

The primary function of the news media was not to inform 
or educate but to indoctrinate — affirming and propagating the 
socialist tenets of the national government, rallying mass sup- 
port behind government programs, and confirming national 
achievements. No substantive and little surface-level criticism 
was levied against the regime, although evaluations of the vari- 
ous economic and social problems confronting the nation were 
available. Article 55 of the 1976 constitution provided that free- 
dom of expression was a protected liberty but that it could not 
jeopardize the socialist objectives or national policy of the 
regime. The Ministry of Information worked to facilitate gov- 
ernment supervision and to inhibit circulation of unauthorized 
periodicals. Almost all foreign newspapers and periodicals were 
likewise prohibited. Television and radio news programs 
escaped some of the more heavy censorship although they, too, 
were expected to affirm government policies and programs. 
Most news broadcasts were limited to international events and 
offered little domestic news other than accounts of visiting for- 
eign delegations and outlines of the government's general 
agenda. 

In the late 1980s, the situation changed under Benjedid. 
Independent national news sources were encouraged and sup- 
ported. The new constitution reaffirmed the commitment to 
free expression, this time with no qualifying restrictions. New 
laws facilitated and even financially assisted emerging indepen- 
dent papers. Limitations on the international press were lifted, 
resulting in a mass proliferation of news periodicals and televi- 
sion programs presenting an independent position to a nation 
accustomed to getting only one side of the picture. 

The liberalization facilitated the creation and circulation of 
a number of independent national French- and Arabic-lan- 
guage newspapers and news programs. A 1990 law legislated a 
guaranteed salary for the first three years to any journalists in 
the public sector establishing independent papers. As a result 
of the explosion of local papers, journals, radio and television 
programs as well as the relaxation of laws inhibiting the inter- 
national press, the Algerian public has been educated and 



219 



Algeria: A Country Study 



politicized. Journalists have become an important and influen- 
tial sector of civil society. One program in particular, "Face the 
Press" (Face a la Presse), appearing weekly and pitting national 
leaders against a panel of journalists, has drawn immense pop- 
ular enthusiasm. Among the major newspapers are Al Moudja- 
hid (The Fighter), the organ of the FLN, published in Arabic 
and French; the Arabic dailies Ach Chaab (The People, also an 
FLN organ), Al Badil (The Alternate), Al Joumhouria (The 
Republic), and An Nasr (The Victory); and the French dailies 
Horizons and Le Soir d'Algerie (Algerian Evening). As part of the 
military crackdown following the January 1992 coup, the news 
media have been restricted once again. A limited number of 
newspapers and broadcasts continue to operate, but journalists 
have been brought in by the hundreds and detained for inter- 
rogating. Tens more have been arrested or have simply disap- 
peared, or have been killed by Islamists. 

The Arabization Movement 

The arabization of society was largely a reaction to elite cul- 
ture and colonial domination and dates back to the revolution- 
ary period when it served as a unifying factor against French 
colonial forces. The Arabic and Islamic tradition of the Alge- 
rian nation has been preserved through constitutional provi- 
sions recognizing its fundamental role in developing Algerian 
political character and national legislation encoding its exist- 
ence in Algerian daily life — in courts and in schools, on street 
signs, and in workplaces. Arabization is seen as a means of 
national unity and has been used by the national government 
as a tool for ensuring national sovereignty. 

Under Boumediene, arabization took the form of a national 
language requirement on street signs and shop signs, despite 
the fact that 60 percent of the population could not read Ara- 
bic. Calls have been made to substitute English for French as 
the second national language, eliminate coeducational school- 
ing, and effect the arabization of medical and technological 
schools. Algeria remains caught between strident demands to 
eliminate any legacy from its colonial past and more pragmatic 
concerns about the costs of rapid arabization. 

Emotional loyalties and practical realities have made arabi- 
zation a controversial issue that has consistently posed a chal- 
lenge to the government. In December 1990, a law was passed 
that would effect complete arabization of secondary school 
and higher education by 1997. In early July 1993, the most 



220 



Government and Politics 

recent legislation proposing a national timetable for imposing 
Arabic as the only legal language in government and politics 
was again delayed as a result of official concerns about the 
existence of the necessary preconditions for sensible arabiza- 
tion. The law was to require that Arabic be the language of offi- 
cial communication — including with foreign nations, on 
television, and in any other official capacities — and would 
impose substantial fines for violations. 

Meanwhile the pressure for arabization has brought resis- 
tance from Berber elements in the population. Different Ber- 
ber groups, such as the Kabyles, the Chaouia, the Tuareg, and 
the Mzab, each speak a different dialect. The Kabyles, who are 
the most numerous, have succeeded, for example, in institut- 
ing the study of Kabyle, or Zouaouah, their Berber language, at 
the University of Tizi Ouzou, in the center of the Kabylie 
region. Arabization of education and the government bureau- 
cracy has been an emotional and dominant issue in Berber 
political participation. Young Kabyle students were particularly 
vocal in the 1980s about the advantages of French over Arabic. 

The arabization of Algerian society would expedite the inev- 
itable break with France. The French government has consis- 
tently maintained a tolerant position, arguing that arabization 
is an Algerian "internal affair"; yet it seems certain that such 
sweeping changes could endanger cultural, financial, and polit- 
ical cooperation between the two countries. Despite both Alge- 
rian and French statements concerning the wish to break free 
of the legacy of the colonial past, both nations have benefited 
from the preferential relationship they have shared, and both 
have hesitated to sever those ties. The language question will 
undoubtedly remain a persistent and emotional issue far into 
the future. 

Foreign Policy 

General Trends 

Algeria's own revolutionary tradition and its commitment to 
self-determination and nationalism have historically influenced 
its foreign policy. Pledged to upholding and furthering the rev- 
olution against imperialism, Algeria has been a prominent 
leader in both the region and the developing world. As time 
has passed, the ideological ambitions of the immediate postin- 
dependence years have been subordinated to more pressing 
economic and strategic interests. Even during the austere 



221 



Algeria: A Country Study 

socialist years of Boumediene, economic factors played a signif- 
icant role in determining the course of foreign policy toward 
both East and West. 

By the late 1980s, Algeria's own economic and political 
problems and the changed global situation and international 
economy had restricted Algerian foreign policy. The new 
domestic regime altered Algeria's ideological commitments, 
moving the country away from its socialist orientation and 
closer to the West. Algeria's strategic economic and political 
initiatives in regional affairs began to take precedence over a 
greater ideological commitment to the developing world and 
Africa. The 1976 National Charter redefined Algeria's foreign 
policy objectives, revoking the commitment to socialist revolu- 
tion and shifting toward nonalignment in the world arena. The 
domestic situation — the growing popular unrest and decreas- 
ing government revenues and standard of living — limited the 
freedom of the government to commit itself externally. Focus- 
ing on issues of direct relevance to the domestic economy 
became the greatest priority. Concurrently, the surge in popu- 
lar movements and opposition parties increased the political 
constraints on foreign policy actors, as evidenced by the dra- 
matic reversal of the government's position on the Iraqi inva- 
sion of Kuwait in 1990. 

Africa 

The Maghrib 

The Maghrib (see Glossary) remains a politically, economi- 
cally, and strategically important area for Algerian foreign pol- 
icy objectives. Sharing economic, cultural, linguistic, and 
religious characteristics, as well as national borders, the Magh- 
rib nations have historically maintained highly integrated dip- 
lomatic interests. Before Algerian independence, the other 
Maghrib nations, former colonies themselves, supported the 
revolutionaries in their fight against the French, providing sup- 
plies, technical training, and political assistance. After indepen- 
dence, relations became strained, especially between Algeria 
and Morocco, whose conservative ideological orientation con- 
flicted with Algeria's socialist direction, and tensions existed 
over boundary issues between the two. Accusations of harbor- 
ing political insurrectionists from each other's countries dam- 
aged relations between Algeria and both Morocco and Tunisia 
throughout the 1970s. In the 1980s, however, political and eco- 



222 



Government and Politics 



nomic liberalization in Algeria drew the countries closer 
together, and relations improved dramatically. As Algeria's for- 
eign policy orientation has shifted toward regional concerns 
and away from unsustainable ideological commitments, efforts 
toward forging a Greater Maghrib have dominated Algerian 
foreign policy. 

The notion of a Greater Maghrib has historical allusions to a 
more glorious and precolonial past and has provided a unify- 
ing objective to which all Maghrib leaders have subscribed. 
Achieving more concrete steps toward political and economic 
cooperation, however, has proved much more difficult because 
political and economic rivalries and strategic regional interests 
have frequently inhibited amicable relations. In 1964 a Magh- 
rib Permanent Consultative Committee was established to 
achieve a Maghrib economic community. This committee was 
plagued with differences, however, and could not reach an 
agreement on economic union. In the late 1980s, following the 
historic diplomatic reconciliation between Algeria and 
Morocco, an accord finally established an economic and politi- 
cal Union of the Arab Maghrib (Union du Maghreb Arabe — 
UMA). 

Morocco in June 1988 acceded to the formation of an 
intra-Maghrib commission responsible for developing a frame- 
work for an Arab Maghrib union. This action broadened the 
scope of the Treaty of Fraternity and Concord that had origi- 
nated in 1983 as a bilateral agreement between Tunisia and 
Algeria. The treaty pledged each nation to respect the other's 
territorial sovereignty, to refrain from supporting insurrection- 
ist movements in the other country, and to abstain from using 
force for resolving diplomatic controversies. Prompted by 
Tunisian diplomatic concerns about Libyan ambitions and 
Algeria's hope to solidify its regionally predominant position 
through a solid political confederation, Tunisia and Algeria 
opened the agreement to all other Maghrib nations, and Mau- 
ritania joined later the same year. (Mauritania's accession to 
the treaty precipitated a bilateral agreement between Libya 
and Morocco, the Treaty of Oujda, signed in August 1984, 
declaring political union and establishing a regional dichot- 
omy.) 

The UMA treaty — signed in February 1989 in Marrakech, 
Morocco, by Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tuni- 
sia — provided a loose framework for regional cooperation. It 
established a presidential council composed of the heads of 



223 



Algeria: A Country Study 

state of each member country; the countries jointly shared a 
rotating presidency, a consultative council, and a judicial body. 
Aside from Libya, political inclinations for turning the UMA 
into a more substantial confederation have been weak. Plans 
for a common economic market will not come into effect until 
the year 2000, and bilateral agreements have dominated politi- 
cal negotiations. The greatest significance of the UMA is its 
symbolism. The North African economic union presents a 
potential counterpart to the European Community (EC — see 
Glossary), whose cooperation threatens to undermine the posi- 
tion of Maghrib exports and migrant workers. Political cooper- 
ation has presented a means of countering the rise of Islamist 
radicals, who in the early 1990s were challenging the political 
regimes in most if not all of the North African nations. Finally, 
the UMA provides a regional forum for resolving conflicts, the 
most notable of which has been the Algerian-Moroccan dispute 
over the Western Sahara. 

Algeria's relations with Morocco, its neighbor to the west 
and most significant Maghrib rival, have been dominated by 
the issue of self-determination for the Western Sahara. The 
national integrity of this former colonial territory has caused a 
deep-seated antagonism and general mistrust between the two 
nations that has permeated all aspects of Moroccan-Algerian 
relations. Algeria's interest in the region dates back to the 
1960s and 1970s when it joined Morocco in efforts to remove 
Spain from the territory. After Spain announced its intention 
to abandon the territory in 1975, the united front presented by 
the two nations quickly disintegrated, as a result of Morocco, 
and subsequently Mauritania, staking claims to the territory. 
Algeria, although not asserting any territorial ambitions of its 
own, was averse to the absorption of the territory by any of its 
neighbors and called for self-determination for the Saharan 
people. Before the Spanish evacuation, Spain, Morocco, and 
Mauritania agreed to divide the territory and transfer the 
major part to Morocco and the remaining southern portion to 
Mauritania. This agreement violated a United Nations (UN) 
resolution that declared all historical claims on the part of 
Mauritania or Morocco to be insufficient to justify territorial 
absorption and drew heavy Algerian criticism. 

Guerrilla movements inside the Saharan territory, most 
especially the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el 
Hamra and Rio de Oro (Frente Popular para la Liberation de 
Saguia el Hamra y Rio de Oro — Polisario), having fought for 



224 



Government and Politics 



Saharan independence since 1973, immediately proclaimed 
the creation of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic 
(SADR). Algeria recognized this new self-proclaimed state in 
1976, and has since pursued a determined diplomatic effort for 
international recognition of the territory; it has also supplied 
food, materiel, and training to the guerrillas. In 1979, after 
many years of extensive and fierce guerrilla warfare, Maurita- 
nia ceded its territorial claims and withdrew. Morocco quickly 
absorbed the vacated territory. Once the SADR gained diplo- 
matic recognition from the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) and many other independent states, Morocco came 
under international pressure. As a result, the Moroccan gov- 
ernment finally proposed a national referendum to determine 
the Saharan territory's sovereignty in 1981. The referendum 
was to be overseen by the OAU, but the proposal was quickly 
retracted by the Moroccan king when the OAU could not 
reach agreement over referendum procedures. In 1987 the 
Moroccan government again agreed to recognize the Polisario 
and to meet to "discuss their grievances." Algeria stipulated a 
solitary precondition for restoration of diplomatic relations — 
recognition of the Polisario and talks toward a definitive solu- 
tion to the Western Saharan quagmire. Without a firm commit- 
ment from the Moroccan king, Algeria conceded and resumed 
diplomatic relations with Morocco in 1988. The political stale- 
mate and the guerrilla fighting have continued almost uninter- 
rupted since 1987. As of late 1993, UN efforts to mediate the 
conflict as a prelude to a referendum on the territory seemed 
to be making modest headway. 

Far less troublesome have been Algeria's relations with 
Tunisia. Smaller and in a more precarious position vis-a-vis 
Libya, Tunisia has consistently made efforts to align with Alge- 
ria. In the 1970s, Tunisia reversed its position on the Western 
Sahara so as not to antagonize Algerian authorities. Tunisia was 
the first nation to sign the Treaty of Fraternity and Concord 
with Algeria, in 1983. Throughout Algeria's independent his- 
tory, it has joined in a number of economic ventures with Tuni- 
sia, including the transnational pipeline running from Algeria 
through Tunisia to Italy. In 1987 the departure from power in 
Tunisia of President Habib Bourguiba and his replacement by 
the more diplomatic Zine el Abidine Ben Ali brought the two 
nations closer again. 

Similarly, relations with Libya have generally been amicable. 
Libyan support for the Polisario in the Western Sahara facili- 



225 



Algeria: A Country Study 

tated early postindependence Algerian relations with Libya. 
Libyan inclinations for full-scale political union, however, have 
obstructed formal political collaboration because Algeria has 
consistently backed away from such cooperation with its unpre- 
dictable neighbor. (A vote by the CCN on June 30, 1987, actu- 
ally supported union between Libya and Algeria, but the 
proposal was tabled and later retracted by the FLN Central 
Committee after the heads of state failed to agree.) The Treaty 
of Oujda between Libya and Morocco, which represented a 
response to Algeria's Treaty of Fraternity and Concord with 
Tunisia, temporarily aggravated Algerian-Libyan relations by 
establishing a political divide in the region — Libya and 
Morocco on one side; Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania on the 
other. Finally, in 1988 Libya was invited to participate in the 
intra-Maghrib commission that was responsible for developing 
the North African union. The establishment of the UMA in 
February 1989 marked the first formal political or economic 
collaboration between the two neighbors. 

Sub-Saharan Africa 

Despite its membership and founding role in the OAU, 
Algeria remains a society much more closely affiliated with its 
Arab neighbors and counterparts than with the African coun- 
tries to the south. In many countries, economic crisis and 
dependency on foreign aid have diminished the prospects of 
liberation movements and hence also reduced the relevance of 
Algeria's liberation experience for those nations. Algeria has, 
however, resolved its remaining border conflicts with Mali, 
Niger, and Mauritania and generally maintains harmonious 
relations with its southern counterparts. Economic linkages 
remain fairly limited in the 1990s, constituting less than 1 per- 
cent of Algeria's total trade balance, although a new transna- 
tional highway running across the Sahara is expected to 
increase trade with sub-Saharan Africa. 

In the early postindependence years, Algeria committed 
itself to the fight against colonialism and national suppression 
in sub-Saharan Africa. Its commitment was reflected in its sup- 
port for the revolutionary movements in Zimbabwe, 
Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique, and Namibia and in its 
condemnation of South Africa. Algeria has not officially 
retreated from its earlier ideological affinity for the revolution- 
ary movements in Africa, but its role has become that of men- 
tor rather than revolutionary front-runner. As Algeria has 



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Government and Politics 



found its influence in the rest of Africa greatly reduced, its eco- 
nomic interests, ideological affiliation, and identification have 
fallen more in line with the Maghrib, the Mediterranean, and 
the Middle East. 

Algeria has consistently reaffirmed its commitment to the 
OAU, although its interests in this regional organization have 
frequently been motivated more by tactical considerations than 
ideological affinity. Algeria has worked toward strengthening 
the structure and mediating capacities of the OAU, largely 
hoping to use the organization to further its own views on the 
issue of self-determination for the Western Sahara. 

Arab and Middle East Affairs 

Algeria's national commitment to pan-Arabism and Arab 
causes throughout the Middle East and North Africa has 
resulted in an active role in the region. It joined the League of 
Arab States (Arab League) immediately following national 
independence in 1962. Since that time, Algeria's historical and 
ideological commitment to national revolution and 
self-determination has resulted in a strong affinity for the Pales- 
tinians in Israel, one of the Arab League's most compelling 
causes. Algeria has consistently supported the Palestinians and 
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and spurned the 
idea of diplomatic resolution with Israel. The Algerian govern- 
ment has steadily backed the mainstream faction of the PLO 
under the leadership of Yasir Arafat — hosting sessions of the 
PLO's National Council, intervening on its behalf in diplo- 
matic negotiations with Syria and Lebanon, condemning inter- 
nal divisions, and working toward the reconciliation of 
competing factions within the organization. Algeria supported 
Arafat's decision, denounced by Palestinian hard-liners, to sign 
a peace treaty with Israel in September 1993. 

Algeria's energetic efforts on behalf of the PLO and the Pal- 
estinian cause have from time to time jeopardized its relations 
with other Arab nations (Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt), 
many of which host significant Palestinian populations of their 
own. Despite Algerian indebtedness to Egypt for assistance dur- 
ing the revolutionary period, the Algerian government severed 
all relations with Egypt in the late 1970s over Egypt's peace 
treaty with Israel; relations gradually improved only with a 
change of leadership in both countries. More recently, Egypt's 
President Husni Mubarak and Algeria's President Chadli Ben- 
jedid found each other's moderate policies more palatable 



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Algeria: A Country Study 



than those of their predecessors and jointly worked toward a 
resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Similarly, Algeria 
incurred difficulties with Iraq over its involvement in the peace 
talks concluding the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq. Per- 
sistent calls by Algeria for an end to the conflict that it consid- 
ered so damaging to the pan-Islamic movement led to a peace 
proposal that Iraq viewed as overly favorable to Iran. The pro- 
posal was alleged to have provoked Iraqi fighters to shoot down 
an Algerian aircraft carrying prominent Algerian officials 
involved in the peace talks, including the country's foreign 
minister. 

Algeria shares a cultural identity with the Arab-Islamic 
nations but is separated by its distance from the rest of the Mid- 
dle East. The closed nature of the authoritarian regime that 
governed Algeria for most of its independent history has pre- 
cluded the development of mass enthusiasm for, or awareness 
of, external causes and conflicts. 

The period of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 
and the subsequent retaliation by the largely Western coalition 
forces was the first time a significant portion of the Algerian 
public became mobilized over a foreign policy issue. Arab iden- 
tification with Iraq drew support from the masses in unprece- 
dented numbers. The overt support for Iraq on the part of the 
FIS and Ben Bella's Movement for Democracy in Algeria (Mou- 
vement pour la Democratic en Algerie) and a mass rally in sup- 
port of Iraq's Saddam Husayn resulted in a fast reversal by the 
government from its original position condemning the Iraqi 
aggression. Changing state-society relations — a more active 
civil society and a more informed public — have meant new for- 
eign policy directions characteristic of a government more 
responsive to its public. In late 1993, Algeria's foreign policy 
toward nations of the Middle East, however, had not changed 
significantly. Its relations with the West, especially its former 
colonizer, had changed markedly since the immediate post- 
independence period. 

The West 

Early Algerian foreign policy caused it direct conflict with 
the Western powers as it struggled against colonialism. Since 
the latter 1970s, however, Algeria has determinedly pursued a 
policy of nonalignment that has facilitated relations with the 
West. Economic and political liberalization have likewise 
reduced the barriers inhibiting diplomatic relations with 



228 



Government and Politics 



Europe and the United States. As Algeria moved toward a 
free-market economy and liberal democratic polity, its diplo- 
matic objectives shifted away from the Soviet Union and toward 
the West. In a rather surprising turn of events, the military 
coup that upset the Algerian democratic experiment was toler- 
ated, even approved of, by the West. 

The United States 

Historically, the United States and Algeria have had compet- 
ing foreign policy objectives that have come closer only gradu- 
ally. Algeria's commitment to strict socialism and to a global 
revolution against Western capitalism and imperialism antago- 
nized relations with the United States, seen, in Algerian eyes, to 
embody all that the revolution scorned. United States mainte- 
nance of good relations with France precluded close ties with 
Algeria in the years during and following the War of Indepen- 
dence, although the United States sent an ambassador to Alge- 
ria in 1962. Algeria broke diplomatic relations with the United 
States in 1967, following the June 1967 war between Israel and 
most of its neighbors, and United States relations remained 
hostile throughout the next decade. United States intervention 
in Vietnam and other developing countries, Algerian sponsor- 
ship of guerrilla and radical revolutionary groups, United 
States sympathies for Morocco in the Western Sahara, and 
United States support for Israel all aggravated a fundamental 
ideological and political antagonism. Official relations 
resumed in the mid-1970s, although it was not until the late 
1970s that relations normalized. By then Algerian leniency and 
passive tolerance for terrorist hijackers drew enough interna- 
tional criticism that the government modified its policy of 
allowing aid and landing clearance at Algerian airports for 
hijackers. 

In the 1980s, increased United States demands for energy 
and a growing Algerian need for capital and technical assis- 
tance lessened tensions and resulted in increased interaction 
with the United States after the relative isolation from the West 
during the Boumediene years. Liberalization measures under- 
taken by Benjedid greatly facilitated the improved relations. In 
fact, an economic rapport with the West had been growing 
throughout the previous decade despite tense political rela- 
tions. Algeria was becoming an important source of petroleum 
and natural gas for the United States. In 1980 the United States 



229 



Algeria: A Country Study 



imported more than US$2.8 billion worth of oil from Algeria 
and was Algeria's largest export market. 

Algeria's role as intermediary in the release of the fifty-two 
United States hostages from Iran in January 1981 and its 
retreat from a militant role in the developing world as its 
domestic situation worsened opened the path to peaceful rela- 
tions with the United States. Algeria's domestic situation was 
becoming increasingly critical because its traditional source of 
economic assistance, the Soviet Union, was threatened by inter- 
nal problems. In search of alternative sources of aid, in 1990 
Algeria received US$25.8 million in financial assistance and 
bought US$1.0 billion in imports from the United States, indi- 
cating that the United States had become an important inter- 
national partner. 

On January 13, 1992, following the military coup that upset 
Algeria's burgeoning democratic system, the United States 
issued a formal but low-key statement condemning the military 
takeover. Twenty-four hours later, Department of State spokes- 
men retracted the statement, calling for a peaceful resolution 
but offering no condemnation of the coup. Since then, the 
United States, like many of its Western counterparts, has 
appeared resigned to accepting a military dictatorship in Alge- 
ria. The military government has reaffirmed its commitment to 
liberalizing its domestic economy and opening the country to 
foreign trade, undoubtedly accounting for some of the West- 
ern support for the new Algerian regime. 

France and the Mediterranean Countries 

Despite ambiguous sentiment in Algeria concerning its 
former colonial power, France has maintained a historically 
favored position in Algerian foreign relations. Algeria experi- 
enced a high level of dependency on France in the first years 
after the revolution and a conflicting desire to be free of that 
dependency. The preestablished trade links, the lack of experi- 
enced Algerian government officials, and the military presence 
provided for in the Evian Accords ending the War of Indepen- 
dence ensured the continuance of French influence. France 
supplied much-needed financial assistance, a steady supply of 
essential imports, and technical personnel. 

This benevolent relationship was altered in the early Bou- 
mediene years when the Algerian government assumed control 
of French-owned petroleum extraction and pipeline interests 
and nationalized industrial and energy enterprises. French mil- 



230 



Government and Politics 



itary units were almost immediately pulled out. France, 
although apparently willing to maintain cooperative relations, 
was overlooked as Algeria, eager to exploit its new indepen- 
dence, looked to other trade partners. Shortly afterward, Alge- 
rian interest in resuming French-Algerian relations resurfaced. 
Talks between Boumediene and the French government con- 
firmed both countries' interest in restoring diplomatic rela- 
tions. France wanted to preserve its privileged position in the 
strategically and economically important Algerian nation, and 
Algeria hoped to receive needed technical and financial assis- 
tance. French intervention in the Western Sahara against the 
Polisario and its lack of Algerian oil purchases, leading to a 
trade imbalance in the late 1970s strained relations and 
defeated efforts toward bilateral rapprochement. In 1983 Ben- 
jedid was the first Algerian leader to be invited to France on an 
official tour, but relations did not greatly improve. 

Despite strained political relations, economic ties with 
France, particularly those related to oil and gas, have persisted 
throughout independent Algerian history. Nationalized Alge- 
rian gas companies, in attempting to equalize natural gas 
export prices with those of its neighbors, alienated French buy- 
ers in the late 1970s and early 1980s, however. Later gas agree- 
ments resulted in a vast growth of bilateral trade into the 
billions of dollars. Further disputes over natural gas pricing in 
the late 1980s led to a drastic drop in French-Algerian imports 
and exports. The former fell more than 10 billion French 
francs, the latter 12 billion French francs between 1985 and 
1987. A new price accord in 1989 resurrected cooperative ties. 
The new agreement provided substantial French financial assis- 
tance to correct trade imbalances and guaranteed French pur- 
chasing commitments and Algerian oil and gas prices. French 
support for Benjedid's government throughout the difficult 
period in 1988 when the government appeared especially pre- 
carious and subsequent support for economic and political lib- 
eralization in Algeria expedited improved French-Algerian 
relations. Finally, rapprochement with Morocco, a number of 
joint economic ventures between France and Algeria, and the 
establishment of the UMA relaxed some of the remaining ten- 
sions. 

One source of steady agitation has been the issue of Alge- 
rian emigration to France. French policies toward Algerian 
immigrants have been inconsistent, and French popular senti- 
ment has generally been unfavorable toward its Arab popula- 



231 



Algeria: A Country Study 



tion. The French government has vacillated between sweeping 
commitments to "codevelopment," involving extensive social 
networks for immigrant Algerian laborers, and support of strict 
regulations concerning work and study permits, random 
searches for legal papers, and expeditious deportation without 
appeal in the event of irregularities. North African communi- 
ties in France remain relatively isolated, and chronic problems 
persist for Algerians trying to obtain housing, education, and 
employment. A number of racially motivated incidents occur 
each year between North African immigrants and French 
police and citizens. 

Equally problematic has been Algeria's handling of the emi- 
grant issue. The government has provided substantial educa- 
tional, economic, and cultural assistance to the emigrant 
community but has been less consistent in defending emigrant 
workers' rights in France, frequently subordinating its own 
workers' interests to strategic diplomatic concerns in maintain- 
ing favorable relations with France. The rise of Islamism in 
Algeria and the subsequent crackdown on the Islamists by the 
government have had serious implications for both countries: 
record numbers of Algerian Islamists have fled to France, 
where their cultural dissimilarity as Arab Islamists is alien to the 
country. 

In the early 1990s, nearly 20 percent of all Algerian exports 
and imports were destined for or originated from France. More 
than 1 million Algerians resided in France and there were 
numerous francophones in Algeria, creating a tremendous cul- 
tural overlap. French remained the language of instruction in 
most schools and the language used in more than two-thirds of 
all newspapers and periodicals and on numerous television 
programs. Algeria and France share a cultural background that 
transcends diplomatic maneuvers and has persisted through- 
out periods of "disenchantment" and strained relations. Over 
time, however, the arabization of Algeria and the increasing 
polarization of society between the francophone elite and the 
Arab masses have mobilized anti-French sentiment. Support 
for the arabization of Algerian society — including the elimina- 
tion of French as the second national language and emphasis 
on an arabized education curriculum — and the recent success 
of the FIS indicate a growing fervor in Algeria for asserting an 
independent national identity. Such an identity emphasizes its 
Arab and Islamic cultural tradition rather than its French colo- 
nial past. However, France's support for the military regime 



232 



Government and Politics 



that assumed power in early 1992 indicates that the cooperative 
relations between the two countries remain strong. 

For obvious geographic reasons, Italy, Spain, Greece, and 
Turkey share a privileged position in Algerian foreign rela- 
tions. The economic and strategic significance of Algeria as a 
geographically adjacent and continentally prominent nation is 
relevant to the foreign policies of the Mediterranean nations. 
Whereas Algeria's relations with France have been complicated 
by confusing emotional and cultural complexities, its relations 
with the other Mediterranean countries have been primarily 
driven by economic factors. Both Spain and Italy have become 
substantial importers of Algerian gas — 1989 figures indicated 
that Italy was Algeria's largest customer for natural gas. A tran- 
snational pipeline with three undersea pipes runs from Algeria 
through Tunisia to Italy, and work has begun on another. 
Greece and Turkey have both signed import agreements with 
Algeria's national hydrocarbons company, known as Sonatrach. 
Spain and Italy have extended sizable credit lines for Algerian 
imports of Spanish and Italian goods. Since the latter 1980s, 
Algeria has devoted increased attention toward regional con- 
cerns, making the geographical proximity of the Mediterra- 
nean nations of growing importance to Algeria's diplomatic 
and economic relations. 

* * * 

For the immediate preindependence and postindepen- 
dence periods, the best political analysis is found in William B. 
Quandt's Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968 
and David B. Ottaway and Marina Ottaway's, Algeria: The Politics 
of a Socialist Revolution. The Boumediene and Benjedid periods 
are covered from contrasting conceptual perspectives in John 
P. Entelis's Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized, MahfoudBen- 
noune's The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 1830-1987, and 
Rachid Tlemcani's State and Revolution in Algeria. The most 
recent analysis incorporating political, economic, and social 
events through the military coup d'etat of January 1992 is the 
work edited by John P. Entelis and Philip C. Naylor, State and 
Society in Algeria. (For further information and complete cita- 
tions, see Bibliography.) 



233 



Chapter 5. National Security 




Tipasa, showing Mount Chenoua in the background; Tipasa marks the termi- 
nus of the Sahel region. 



BORN IN A BLOODY REVOLUTION from French colonial 
rule, Algeria became independent in 1962. The new nation was 
governed for more than twenty-five years by two military fig- 
ures — Houari Boumediene from 1965 until 1978 and Chadli 
Benjedid from 1979 until early 1992. Although both presidents 
relied upon the armed forces for support, their regimes were 
by no means military dictatorships. The military, however, was 
heavily represented in the National Liberation Front (Front de 
Liberation Nationale — FLN), the single party that controlled 
Algeria's socialist state until 1989. Nonetheless, under Boume- 
diene and Benjedid civilian government institutions devel- 
oped, and a multiparty parliamentary system emerged in 1989. 

To avert a likely election victory by the Islamic party, the 
Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut — FIS), the 
minister of defense led a coup in January 1992 that brought 
down the civilian government, which was soon replaced by a 
High Council of State dominated by the military. In the course 
of 1992 and 1993, the army and the police were called upon to 
deal with armed uprisings by those groups who saw the military 
takeover as cheating the Islamic movement of its popular man- 
date. A crackdown against officials and organs of the FIS failed 
to bring an end to the violence, which resulted in 600 deaths 
among the security forces in the twelve months after the coup. 
Hundreds of civilians, including Islamic demonstrators and 
some foreigners, were also killed. The normal processes of gov- 
ernment were paralyzed by the tense internal situation, and the 
army struggled to contain the uprising. 

Security problems beyond the national borders, which had 
in the past motivated the government, aided by the Soviet 
Union, to build up the military, had become less pressing by 
the early 1990s. Algeria's support for a nationalist insurgency in 
the Western Sahara had collided with Morocco's ambition to 
absorb the territory, but by 1993 the conflict seemed to be 
winding down. A cooperation treaty in 1989 among the Magh- 
rib (see Glossary) states, incorporating security clauses 
intended to prevent future military confrontation, reflected 
the more pacific climate prevailing in the region. 

Algeria has a large and reasonably well-equipped military to 
counter foreign and domestic threats. The People's National 
Army (Armee Nationale Populaire — ANP) includes ground 



237 



Algeria: A Country Study 

forces, an air force, a navy, and an air defense command. The 
National Gendarmerie (Gendarmerie Nationale), a paramili- 
tary body, is used mainly as a police force in rural areas. The 
army, in the process of being reorganized into four divisions in 
1993, also has numerous independent brigades and battalions. 
Its antecedents were the conventional military units formed in 
Morocco and Tunisia during the War of Independence from 
France. In 1993 the air force was equipped with about 193 com- 
bat aircraft and fifty-eight armed helicopters. The navy con- 
sisted of a small fleet of frigates, corvettes, and missile craft, 
together with two modern submarines. Except for brief clashes 
with Morocco in 1976, the armed forces have not been 
involved in hostilities against a foreign power. Their combat 
capabilities in defense of the country have thus remained 
untested. 

The arms and equipment initially supplied by the Soviet 
Union were of good quality, but some of the materiel had been 
in inventory for up to two decades. Earlier shipments were 
later supplemented by more modern tanks, armored vehicles, 
and missile launchers. Because of economic dislocation and a 
scarcity of foreign exchange, Algeria in the early 1990s post- 
poned the acquisition of more modern equipment. Instead, it 
assigned priority to training and effective maintenance of exist- 
ing weapons. More than half the army's personnel strength 
consisted of conscripts, some of whom were detailed to eco- 
nomic infrastructure projects after basic training. However, 
since Chadli Benjedid's introduction of market-oriented eco- 
nomic reforms in the late 1980s, the army has curtailed its 
involvement in construction, agricultural, and manufacturing 
activities. 

External Security Problems and Policies 

The Algerian leadership's perceptions of the outside 
world — including its views on what constitutes a threat to 
national security — have historically been strongly influenced by 
ideology. The War of Independence contributed to a set of 
beliefs that emphasized Algeria's identification with the newly 
independent, less-developed countries. Dividing the globe into 
the rich industrial nations of the North and the poor, former 
colonies of the South, Algerian leaders asserted their strong 
opposition to what they saw as a world infected by imperialism, 
Zionism, colonialism, and economic domination by the former 
colonial powers. By definition, these attitudes implied a mea- 



238 



National Security 



sure of suspicion and hostility toward the capitalist states of 
Europe and North America, and sympathy for liberation move- 
ments whose struggles mirrored Algeria's own. 

By the early 1990s, ideology was no longer the guiding prin- 
ciple of Algeria's national security outlook. The views shaped 
by the War of Independence were tempered by more than two 
decades of experience as a sovereign state as well as by Presi- 
dent Benjedid's more cautious, pragmatic style. Under him 
Algeria adopted an active posture as a mediator of disputes 
between Western nations and the more radical states of the 
Arab world. At the same time, Algerian external security objec- 
tives narrowed. The goals of reducing differences with its 
neighbors, the Maghrib countries of North Africa, and espe- 
cially of settling political and economic disputes with the bor- 
dering states of Morocco and Libya, predominated. 

Security Interests Outside the Maghrib 

Under Ahmed Ben Bella, independent Algeria's first presi- 
dent, the government actively supported a host of anticolonial 
struggles throughout Africa. Algeria became a leading contrib- 
utor to the African Liberation Committee of the Organization 
of African Unity (OAU), which was designed to coordinate and 
aid African liberation movements. In 1963 the government 
provided training to 1,000 guerrillas from Mozambique, South 
Africa, and Angola. More controversially, Ben Bella's govern- 
ment also sponsored efforts to overthrow independent African 
governments that were considered to be reactionary or too 
closely linked to former colonial powers. Notably, during this 
time the Algerians supported insurgencies against the govern- 
ments of newly independent Congo (former Belgian Congo, 
present-day Zaire), Niger, and Morocco. Ben Bella's activism, 
however, was ineffective in weakening the opponents at which 
it was aimed. Critics charged that his stance was merely sym- 
bolic, designed to enhance the president's prestige among the 
"radical" bloc of African and Asian states and, by extension, to 
bolster his political position within Algeria. 

After Ben Bella's overthrow in 1965, the Boumediene gov- 
ernment turned its attention to domestic development issues 
and limited its direct involvement in destabilizing foreign gov- 
ernments. As a matter of principle, however, the new regime 
soon started assisting a number of revolutionary groups and 
liberation movements and allowed their representatives to 
operate in Algiers. These groups included liberation move- 



239 



Algeria: A Country Study 

ments opposed to the regimes in Portuguese Africa, Southern 
Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe), South Africa, the Republic 
of Vietnam (South Vietnam), Israel, and others. International 
terrorists associated with Italy's Red Brigades, the Federal 
Republic of Germany's (West Germany) Baader-Meinhof Gang, 
and the Black Panthers, composed of radical American blacks, 
were granted sanctuary and support. Aircraft hijackers were 
allowed to land in Algeria and were often granted asylum until, 
under international pressure, Boumediene abandoned the 
practice in 1978. 

An important element of Algerian security policy has been 
the leadership's attitudes toward Israel and the Palestinian 
nationalists — attitudes that were underscored by Algeria's mili- 
tary contributions during the June 1967 and October 1973 
Arab-Israeli wars. Immediately after the 1967 conflict, the Alge- 
rians sent more than fifty aircraft to Egypt to replace some of 
those lost in the war. Algeria also reportedly sent small contin- 
gents of infantry and artillery to reinforce the Egyptians. Alge- 
ria's contribution to the October 1973 War consisted of a 
number of air force units that joined Egyptian forces on the 
Suez front and two medical teams that were dispatched to the 
Syrian front. Although the direct involvement of Algerian 
forces in these conflicts was minimal, Algeria apparently drew 
important lessons from Arab shortcomings against Israeli mili- 
tary power. Soon after the Arab defeat in 1967, Boumediene 
inaugurated conscription. Later, the Arabs' initial successes in 
the 1973 war using modern Soviet-supplied antiaircraft and 
antitank missiles were believed to have influenced Boumedi- 
ene's decision to upgrade his armed forces with large pur- 
chases of sophisticated Soviet weaponry (see Foreign Military 
Assistance, this ch.). 

Although several liberation movements were still permitted 
to maintain offices in Algeria after Benjedid came to power in 
1979, the government was no longer a major sanctuary for ter- 
rorist groups operating abroad. It drew a distinction between 
terrorism, which it condemned, and violence on the part of 
national liberation movements, which it considered possibly 
legitimate. Algeria, however, has refused to sign international 
agreements intended to counter acts of terrorism. In addition, 
a representative of the Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal Organi- 
zation was allowed to remain in Algiers despite a number of 
attacks against Arab and Western targets and against its Pales- 
tinian opponents in Algeria. Representatives of two other ter- 



240 



National Security 



rorist groups — the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Palestine 
Liberation Front — appeared on national television to rally pop- 
ular support for Iraq after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. 

Algeria continued to back the Palestine Liberation Organi- 
zation (PLO), whose efforts against Israel had long been 
viewed by Algerians as similar to the struggle against the 
French by their own revolutionaries. Although Algeria, like 
other Arab countries, was unable (or unwilling) to help the 
PLO resist the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Benjedid's 
government allowed between 1,000 and 2,000 of the guerrillas 
evacuated from Beirut to establish themselves in military 
camps in Algeria. Algeria focused its main efforts on mediating 
among various Palestinian factions rather than supporting a 
resumption of PLO military activity. 

Security Problems with Neighboring States 

In his efforts to shape a more pragmatic foreign policy, Ben- 
jedid succeeded in moderating the stresses in the country's 
relationships with the West. Concurrently, Algeria's concerns 
shifted to improving regional stability, which had been dis- 
turbed by festering disputes with Morocco and Libya. Reflec- 
tive of improving relationships was the formation in February 
1989 of the Union of the Arab Maghrib (Union du Maghreb 
Arabe — UMA), with Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and 
Tunisia as members. The primary goal of the UMA was 
improved economic cohesion, but the treaty also contained 
important security clauses. The signatories affirmed that any 
aggression against one member would be considered as aggres- 
sion against the other member states. In an apparent allusion 
to the Western Sahara conflict, member states pledged not to 
permit any activity or organization on their territory that could 
endanger the security or territorial integrity of another mem- 
ber state. 

Relations between Algeria and Morocco had long been 
characterized by rivalry and occasional hostility. Immediately 
after Algerian independence, Morocco laid claim to stretches 
of southern and western Algeria that had been under Moroc- 
can sovereignty before the French gained control over the area 
in the nineteenth century. In a series of sharp engagements in 
the disputed territory in October 1963, the professional 
Moroccan army consistently outperformed Algerian regulars 
and local guerrillas. Although OAU-sponsored mediation 
ended the fighting, the success of the Moroccans demonstrated 



241 



Algeria: A Country Study 

the potential threat to Algerian security in the event of a more 
serious dispute. 

In addition to fighting over borders, the two countries each 
sought primacy in the Maghrib. Their claims were rooted in 
part in ideology: Morocco's claim to regional leadership 
derived from its centuries-old national identity, whereas Alge- 
ria's stemmed from the prestige of winning its War of Indepen- 
dence. The ideological differences between the new socialist 
republic and the ancient kingdom were sharpened when, 
almost immediately after independence, Ben Bella began to 
trumpet his country's socialist-revolutionary doctrines and its 
opposition to conservative governments such as Morocco's. 
Relations improved after Boumediene came to power and as 
both countries concentrated on their domestic problems. In 
1972 a treaty was signed defining the international border 
between them. The Moroccan government, however, deferred 
its official ratification of the treaty. Following the mending of 
differences over the Western Sahara question, Morocco's King 
Hassan II finally ratified the border treaty in May 1989. 

The dispute over the Western Sahara had its origins in 1974 
when Morocco began maneuvering to annex the territory, 
which was then under Spanish control and known as the Span- 
ish Sahara. A series of Moroccan diplomatic initiatives — cli- 
maxed by a march of 350,000 Moroccans across the territory's 
northern border — resulted in a treaty by which Spain turned 
over the northern two-thirds of the Western Sahara to Moroc- 
can administration and the rest to Mauritania (see Africa, ch. 
4). By mid-1975 the Algerians were giving supplies, vehicles, 
and light arms to the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (Frente Popular para la Lif> 
eracion de Saguia el Hamra y Rio de Oro — Polisario). The 
Polisario was the strongest of several indigenous national liber- 
ation movements active in the Western Sahara. Algerian 
authorities established refugee camps in the Tindouf area to 
house large numbers of Saharans, popularly known as Sah- 
rawis, who abandoned the territory after the Moroccan take- 
over. Algeria thus became the principal foreign supporter of 
the Polisario in its long-running desert war to oppose Moroc- 
can control of the disputed area. 

Algeria gradually acquired a quantitative military superior- 
ity over Morocco with the introduction of large amounts of 
modern weaponry, mainly from the Soviet Union. Neverthe- 
less, the Algerians avoided direct confrontation with the more 



242 



National Security 



experienced Moroccan troops. In January 1976, however, the 
Moroccans badly defeated two battalions of Algerian troops 
and took prisoners in clashes inside the Western Sahara. After 
that time, Algerian regulars did not venture into the Western 
Sahara despite Moroccan claims to the contrary. For their part, 
the Moroccans refrained from pursuing troops onto Algerian 
territory. 

Initially, fighting in the Western Sahara featured attacks by 
the Polisario's light mobile forces against isolated Moroccan 
outposts. By 1982, however, the struggle had shifted in 
Morocco's favor. Morocco adopted a strategy of constructing 
fortified sand walls, mined and equipped with electronic warn- 
ing systems. Enclosing progressively larger areas of the Sahara, 
Morocco was able to undercut the Polisario's ability to conduct 
hit-and-run attacks. The Moroccan military dominated the bat- 
tlefield, effectively coordinating its modern ground and air 
firepower in spite of Algeria's deliveries of increasingly sophisti- 
cated arms to the Polisario guerrillas. 

The success of Morocco's military strategy was one factor in 
the rapprochement between the two nations in 1988, following 
a twelve-year hiatus in diplomatic relations precipitated by 
Algeria's recognition of the Polisario government. Although 
the Polisario was able to mount an offensive against the sand 
wall in late 1989, breaking a truce that had held for nearly a 
year, Algeria — preoccupied by its own internal security prob- 
lems — was no longer willing to devote enough arms and sup- 
port to keep the independence movement alive. Algeria still 
provided refuge on its territory for about 10,000 guerrillas, but 
by the close of 1992 the Polisario's military defeats had nearly 
ended the insurgency. 

Algeria's resumption of diplomatic relations with Morocco, 
accompanied by the opening of borders and a number of joint 
economic initiatives, eased the security situation on its western 
flank. Morocco's acceptance of the United Nations (UN) peace 
plan for the Western Sahara and the conclusion of the UMA 
treaty in 1989 further helped to abate remaining tensions. 

Whereas Morocco had long been viewed as a potential 
threat, Muammar al Qadhafi's Libya was regarded as somewhat 
more friendly. The Algerian-Libyan security relationship was 
based on a common antipathy for the Western-dominated eco- 
nomic order and deep hostility toward Israel. This relationship, 
however, suffered several setbacks during the 1980s. In 1984 
Morocco and Libya announced that they had secretly negoti- 



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Algeria: A Country Study 

ated an alliance. Although the alliance's effect was short-lived, 
Algeria interpreted the agreement as upsetting the strategic 
balance in the Maghrib. Libya's unilateral annexation of a sec- 
tion of neighboring Chad and its military intervention in Chad 
hardened Algerian attitudes toward Libya, as did the suspicion 
that Libya was linked to unrest instigated by Islamist (also seen 
as fundamentalist) groups in Algeria. Libya's subsequent partic- 
ipation in the UMA, however, appeared to lay a foundation for 
more stable relationships with Algeria and the other states of 
the region. 

Strategic Perspectives 

In the early 1990s, among Algeria's neighbors, only Morocco 
and Libya could be viewed as potential military rivals. The 
active personnel strength of Morocco's armed forces was 
greater than the strength of Algeria's force, but its army was 
inferior in terms of armored vehicles and artillery. The Moroc- 
can combat air force of French and United States fighter air- 
craft was smaller than the Soviet-equipped Algerian air force. 
Libya's equipment inventory — armor, artillery, and combat air- 
craft — was greater than either Morocco's or Algeria's, but its 
ground forces were much smaller. The Libyan navy was some- 
what larger than that of Algeria (see fig. 9). 

Unusual geographic features present Algeria's military lead- 
ership with special challenges in protecting the security of the 
country's borders. In 1993 most of the population of approxi- 
mately 27.4 million was concentrated within 100 kilometers of 
the coast, with the density diminishing rapidly from north to 
south. The vast, unpopulated stretches of the Sahara Desert to 
the south would be difficult to defend against a strong and 
determined adversary. Algeria's western flank south of the 
Atlas Mountains would be especially vulnerable to a Moroccan 
attack, inasmuch as Moroccan forces would benefit from 
shorter communication and supply lines. Between Bechar and 
Tindouf, the strategic highway that roughly follows the Moroc- 
can border could easily be severed, thereby breaking Algeria's 
only ground link to the mineral-rich Tindouf area and its con- 
nections with Western Sahara and Mauritania. In the north- 
west, however, the Atlas Mountains would act as a barrier 
discouraging invasion of the more populous parts of either 
country by the other. 

The problems facing Algeria in the west are duplicated in 
the southeast, where the lengthy border area with Libya is iso- 



244 



National Security 



lated from the remainder of the country. A tenuous link to the 
region is provided by a road reaching the border town of 
Edjeleh, but it would be difficult to mount a defense of this 
remote area in the face of Libya's superiority in combat aircraft 
and armor. 

In the far south, a trans-Saharan route branches before the 
border, connecting Algeria to Mali and to Niger. Fortunately, in 
view of the distances involved and the weak transport links, 
Algeria faces no serious threat from either country. Algerian 
border police have expelled nomadic Tuareg and black Afri- 
cans who were refugees from the Sahel drought or engaged in 
black-market trading. Demarcation agreements were con- 
cluded with Mali and Niger in 1983. 

Tunisia, with its small armed forces, has never presented a 
security problem for Algeria. A twenty-year disagreement over 
the border delineation with Tunisia was settled in 1983. Algeria 
and Tunisia have generally united when faced with Libyan bel- 
licosity. When in 1985 Tunisia came under pressure from Libya 
in the form of border troop movements and violations of Tuni- 
sian air space, Algeria supported Tunisia by moving its troops 
to the border area. Algeria also signed a border agreement 
with Mauritania in 1985, after three years of negotiation. 

Domestic Security Concerns 

During the 1960s and 1970s, Ben Bella and Boumediene 
were primarily concerned with threats to their leadership from 
other figures who had been prominent in the struggle of the 
FLN against the French colonial presence. During the War of 
Independence, the FLN had never been a truly unified force; 
instead, it operated as a coalition of groups based on different 
ideological, personality, or ethnoregional considerations. As a 
result, first Ben Bella and then Boumediene were opposed by a 
range of individuals with strong revolutionary credentials. 
When Boumediene overthrew Ben Bella and assumed power in 
1965, his tight grip on the military enabled him to dominate 
the opposition elements. After the abortive attempt in late 
1967 by armed forces chief of staff Taher Zbiri to depose him, 
Boumediene's control appeared to be complete, and the oppo- 
sition was forced either underground or abroad. 

To maintain his hold on power, Boumediene relied heavily 
on the security forces — particularly the intelligence service of 
the ANP known as Military Security (Securite Militaire), which 
maintained strict surveillance within and beyond the national 



245 



Algeria: A Country Study 




Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1993-1994, London, 1993, 111— 
12, 122-25, 131. 

Figure 9. Balance of Power in the Maghrib, 1993 

boundaries of people whose ideologies were considered ques- 
tionable. All political organizations outside the FLN were con- 
sidered illegal because the FLN was defined as representing all 
legitimate political tendencies. Open criticism of the regime 
was not permitted, and violators were subject to arrest and 
severe punishment. The murders in Europe of two former FLN 
leaders, Belkacem Krim and Mohamed Khider, were blamed 
on Algerian security forces. Many suspected that deaths of 
other well-known FLN personalities were linked to vengeance 
exacted through the Securite Militaire. 

Benjedid, having been designated the FLN nominee for 
president at an FLN party congress in 1979, had greater legiti- 
macy than his predecessors because of the wide support he 
enjoyed from fellow military officers. Reinforcing his position 
over time, he shunted his rivals and potential rivals into minor 
positions or out of the ruling apparatus altogether. By the mid- 
1980s, the government felt confident enough to release from 
prison or house arrest all political prisoners including Ben 
Bella, in detention at the time Benjedid assumed office. 



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National Security 



Amnesties were also granted to those, among them Zbiri, who 
had been involved in the plots against Boumediene. Former 
FLN leaders living abroad were invited to return home. 

Islamic Opposition 

By the early 1980s, the Islamist movement provided a 
greater rallying point for opposition elements than did secular 
leftists. Although Islam was identified with the nationalist strug- 
gle against the French, the Algerian government had con- 
trolled its practice since independence through the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs and the Superior Islamic Council. The coun- 
cil maintained "official" mosques and paid the salaries of 
imams (religious leaders). Beginning in 1979, however, concur- 
rent with the religious revolution that toppled the government 
of Iran, large numbers of young people began to congregate at 
mosques that operated beyond the control of the authorities. 
At prayer meetings, imams not paid by the government 
preached in favor of a more egalitarian society, against the 
arrogance of the rich, and for an end to corrupt practices in 
government, business, and religion. 

In a pattern of escalating violence during the early 1980s, 
religious extremists became increasingly active, assaulting 
women in Western-style dress, questioning the legitimacy of the 
"Marxist" Algerian government, and calling for an Islamic 
republic that would use the Quran as its constitution. After a 
brutal confrontation between Marxist and Islamist demonstra- 
tors at the University of Algiers in November 1982, the authori- 
ties rounded up and prosecuted for subversion students, 
imams, and intellectuals linked with the Algerian Islamic Move- 
ment headed by Moustapha Bouyali. Bouyali himself remained 
at large, forming a guerrilla band that was involved in a num- 
ber of clashes with security forces. He was killed in early 1987, 
and his group was disbanded. 

Serious demonstrations to protest commodity shortages and 
high prices broke out in Algiers, Oran, and other cities in Octo- 
ber 1988. When the police proved unable to curb the outbreak, 
troops supported by armored vehicles assumed responsibility 
for security. Large demonstrations were staged by Islamist 
groups inspired by the intifada, the uprising of Palestinians 
against Israeli rule on the West Bank of the Jordan River and in 
the Gaza Strip. It was estimated that more than 500 people 
were killed after ill-trained soldiers used automatic weapons 
against the demonstrators. More than 3,500 demonstrators 



247 



Algeria: A Country Study 



were arrested, but most were released without charges before 
year's end. Allegations of arbitrary arrest, unfair trials, mistreat- 
ment, and torture compounded public anger against the gov- 
ernment. 

When Benjedid's reforms opened political life to wider pub- 
lic participation, the FIS emerged in 1989 as the primary 
instrument of the Islamic movement. The FIS achieved rapid 
success in local elections, especially in the working-class dis- 
tricts of Algiers and other cities. The FIS leaders, determined 
to remain a legitimate political party, did not acknowledge 
links with Islamist groups dedicated to violence. The party was 
banned in March 1992, however, and thousands of its officials 
and supporters were arrested under the state of emergency. 
After that time, the FIS appeared to have shifted to a policy of 
armed response, declaring that the "state violence" of the 
authorities justified recourse to "means other than dialogue." 

Extremist branches of the Islamist movement engaged 
openly in violence against government targets after the cancel- 
lation of the elections. One of the most radical branches, Al 
Takfir wal Hijra (Repentance and Holy Flight), originally con- 
sisted of about 500 Algerian veterans of service in mujahidin 
(literally "holy warriors" or freedom fighters) forces in Afghan- 
istan. Their acts of urban terrorism often were aimed against 
police and military posts in order to gather weapons and to 
demonstrate the government's inability to maintain control. 

After the government's crackdown against the FIS in 1992, 
various other activist Islamist organizations sprang up, with 
units operating in groups of two to five, without apparent uni- 
fied command. These groups, difficult to distinguish from each 
other, targeted police posts, courthouses and other public 
buildings, and selected public figures. In some cases, assassina- 
tion targets were announced in advance. 

Officials did not ascribe the June 1992 assassination of the 
chairman of the High Council of State, Mohamed Boudiaf, to 
terrorist groups, although Islamic activists welcomed the 
action. The assassin, a junior officer assigned to presidential 
security, was described as "motivated by religious convictions." 

The government interned at least 9,000 persons, many of 
them elected FIS members of assemblies at the province 
(wilaya; pi., wilayaf) and commune levels, at camps in the 
Sahara during the spring of 1992. Many of the urban terrorists 
waged guerrilla warfare from refuges in the mountainous areas 
adjacent to large cities. Large-scale gendarmerie actions 



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National Security 



hunted them down. Although the government claimed it had 
neutralized most terrorist groups, more rigorous measures 
were imposed in December 1992. These measures included a 
major sweep by 30,000 army and police personnel directed at 
every entity connected with the FIS, together with a strict cur- 
few in Algiers and other localities. 

After the banning of the FIS in Algeria, many FIS leaders 
escaped to France, where they reportedly continued to recruit 
new fighters and collect funds and supplies to pursue the 
armed struggle in Algeria. The FIS, as a foreign political party, 
was prohibited from operating on French soil; however, it was 
represented by the Algerian Brotherhood in France set up by 
Algerian students. Previously, the Movement for Democracy in 
Algeria of former President Ben Bella had used intimidation 
and violence in seeking the support of Algerians resident in 
France, but such intimidation was no longer considered neces- 
sary. 

Berber Separatism 

The Berbers, who constitute about one-fifth of the Algerian 
population, have resisted foreign influences since ancient 
times. They fought against the Phoenicians, the Romans, the 
Ottoman Turks, and the French after their 1830 occupation of 
Algeria. In the fighting between 1954 and 1962 against France, 
Berber men from the Kabylie region participated in larger 
numbers than their share of the population warranted. 

Since independence the Berbers have maintained a strong 
ethnic consciousness and a determination to preserve their dis- 
tinctive cultural identity and language. They have particularly 
objected to efforts to force them to use Arabic; they regard 
these efforts as a form of Arab imperialism. Except for a hand- 
ful of individuals, they have not been identified with the Islam- 
ist movement. In common with most other Algerians, they are 
Sunni (see Glossary) Muslims of the Maliki (see Glossary) legal 
school. In 1980 Berber students, protesting that their culture 
was being suppressed by the government's arabization policies, 
launched mass demonstrations and a general strike. In the 
wake of riots at Tizi Ouzou that resulted in a number of deaths 
and injuries, the government agreed to the teaching of the Ber- 
ber language as opposed to classical Arabic at certain universi- 
ties and promised to respect Berber culture. Nevertheless, ten 
years later, in 1990, the Berbers were again forced to rally in 



249 



Algeria: A Country Study 

large numbers to protest a new language law requiring total 
use of Arabic by 1997. 

The Berber party, the Front of Socialist Forces (Front des 
Forces Socialistes — FFS), gained twenty-five of the 231 con- 
tested seats in the first round of the legislative elections of 
December 1991, all of these in the Kabylie region. The FFS 
leadership did not approve of the military's cancellation of the 
second stage of the elections. Although strongly rejecting the 
FIS's demand that Islamic law be extended to all facets of life, 
the FFS expressed confidence that it could prevail against 
Islamist pressure (see Role of Political Parties, ch. 4). 

The Military Heritage 

The People's National Army (Armee Nationale Populaire — 
ANP, known until 1962 as the Army of National Liberation — 
Armee de Liberation Nationale — ALN) stems from a long mili- 
tary tradition in Algerian national life. Throughout their his- 
tory, the peoples of North Africa have demonstrated a decided 
martial prowess, particularly when called upon to defend their 
independence. Berber tribesmen with a warlike reputation 
resisted the spread of Carthaginian and Roman colonization 
before the Christian era, and they struggled for more than a 
generation against the seventh-century Arab invaders who 
spread Islam to North Africa by military conquests mounted as 
jihads, or holy wars. 

Tension, crisis, resistance, dissidence, and revolution have 
characterized Algeria's development, at times pitting Berbers 
against Arabs and during other periods uniting them in opposi- 
tion to a common enemy. The people of the central Maghrib 
have also, on occasion, fought on the side of their foreign rul- 
ers; during the 132 years of colonial domination, tne French 
augmented their pacification forces with Algerian recruits. 
During World War I, about 173,000 Algerians conscripted into 
service with the French army fought with valor against the Ger- 
mans; 25,000 of the Algerians were killed in combat. Algeria 
also supplied France with soldiers in World War II, providing 
the Free French with men in the Italian campaign. The experi- 
ence contributed to a growing dissatisfaction with the French 
presence in Algeria that in 1954 erupted in the eight-year 
struggle for independence. 

At a meeting in 1954, the revolutionary leaders laid down 
the structure of the ALN. The six military regions, known at 
that time as wilayat, were subdivided into zones, areas, and sec- 



250 



National Liberation Army 
fighters during the 
War of Independence 
Courtesy Algerian Ministry 
of Information 




tors. Tactical units were assigned, commanders appointed, and 
a system of military ranks adopted; the designation of colonel 
was fixed as the highest officer grade. 

In 1957 a coordinated campaign of strikes and violence in 
the cities triggered a brutally effective counterinsurgency cam- 
paign by the French that broke down FLN and ALN organiza- 
tions inside Algeria, particularly in urban areas. The military 
and civilian revolutionary leadership took sanctuary in Tunisia 
and Morocco, leaving the "internal ALN" — composed of guer- 
rillas that operated under autonomous local commanders — to 
continue the fight against the French. Largely unassisted by the 
revolutionaries outside Algeria, these internal forces — with a 
strong Berber component — suffered heavily. They were never 
completely destroyed, however, and their resistance succeeded 
in demoralizing the French, whose forces numbered 500,000 at 
their peak. 

The regular ALN units, formed in Tunisia and Morocco 
with the tacit approval of the host countries, established bases 
near the Algeria border. Unlike the internal forces, the "exter- 
nal" ALN had a conventional organization and received train- 
ing and modern equipment from sympathetic foreign sources. 
Although estimates of its size varied, a strength of 35,000 was 
claimed in 1960. Increasingly effective French measures to seal 



251 



Algeria: A Country Study 



the borders hampered efforts to convey arms and supplies to 
the internal forces. 

The external ALN was decisively defeated whenever it 
engaged the French directly. Nevertheless, it emerged as a cen- 
tral element among revolutionary forces, especially after the 
FLN leadership appointed Colonel Boumediene as ALN chief 
of staff in early 1960. Well before independence, regional fac- 
tionalism and fierce personal rivalries raged among FLN inter- 
nal and external military leaders and civilian politicians. Only 
six days before Algeria's formal independence on July 5, 1962, 
the civilian political faction controlling the Provisional Govern- 
ment of the Algerian Republic (Gouvernement Provisoire de la 
Republique Algerienne — GPRA) dismissed Boumediene and 
the rest of the general staff. Boumediene rejected their author- 
ity and instead supported the candidacy of Ben Bella, one of 
the "historic chiefs" of the War of Independence, against the 
GPRA. Boumediene led contingents of the external ALN and 
friendly guerrillas eastward to Algiers, overcoming resistance 
from other internal guerrilla leaders who felt that they had 
earned the right to shape the course of the revolution. Joining 
Ben Bella in the capital, Boumediene became minister of 
defense in the government formed in September 1962. 

The failure of the GPRA to assert its supremacy over the 
external army's general staff constituted a turning point in 
Algerian military development. Thereafter, the political power 
of the ANP was firmly established. Several groups — mostly 
former internal leaders and politically motivated enemies of 
Boumediene — sought to preserve the Algerian armed forces' 
guerrilla traditions; they strongly opposed the creation of a 
strong, centralized military power under Boumediene's con- 
trol. By contrast, according to Boumediene's philosophy, the 
security of a modern state required a well-equipped armed 
force trained and organized along conventional lines. The 
brief border war with Morocco in 1976, in which the conven- 
tional Moroccan army proved to be superior to the ANP, 
underscored the need to convert the ANP into a unified mod- 
ern army. 

The external forces were better organized, equipped, and 
trained and were not fractured by local wilaya loyalties as were 
the internal forces in the War of Independence. The internal 
guerrillas, who may have numbered no more than 25,000 at 
any one time, had, however, borne the brunt of the warfare. In 
addition, about 75,000 part-time irregulars carried out sabo- 



252 



Women's unit of People's National Army parading 
at ceremonies commemorating November 1, 1954, launch of Algerian 

War of Independence 
Courtesy Embassy of Algeria, Washington 

tage, acted as guides, supplied intelligence, and often took part 
in engagements near their own homes. 

Boumediene vigorously undertook to reduce, consolidate, 
reorganize, and train the ANP's various elements. He purged 
most of the headstrong former guerrilla commanders. He 
retained professionals of the external army, as well as about 250 
officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) with experi- 
ence in the French army. The new ANP absorbed about 10,000 
members of the internal guerrilla units; Boumediene dis- 
charged the rest, mostly Berbers. 

In spite of his association with Boumediene, Ben Bella 
moved to gain control of the army in a series of efforts aimed at 
reducing the power of the defense minister. The new constitu- 
tion of 1963 assigned the powers of commander in chief to Ben 



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Algeria: A Country Study 



Bella as head of state. Three weeks later, while Boumediene was 
in Moscow seeking arms, Ben Bella designated former wilaya 
leader Colonel Taher Zbiri as military chief of staff, further 
weakening the position of the minister of defense and the ANR 
Boumediene met these threats by forging alliances with FLN 
leaders previously identified as his rivals. The coup d'etat of 
June 19, 1965, which brought Boumediene to power, demon- 
strated his success in that Zbiri personally arrested Ben Bella. 

Closely identified with the Boumediene government after 
the 1965 coup, the ANP exercised its influence through the 
country's supreme governing body, the Council of the Revolu- 
tion. Of the council's twenty-six original members, twenty-two 
were military men with wartime or postwar service; twelve 
served at the time on the ANP general staff or as commanders 
of military regions. 

In response to a failed coup attempt by chief of staff Zbiri at 
the end of 1967, Boumediene dissolved the general staff and 
solidified his control over the ANP by assuming personally 
many staff responsibilities. He excluded ANP leadership from 
day-to-day policy making but remained close to the army com- 
manders whose support he needed to maintain political con- 
trol. 

Boumediene never considered himself a military profes- 
sional, and he and his top aides never appeared publicly in uni- 
form. He asserted that as a socialist state Algeria was not the 
instrument of a military regime or an officer caste. Nonethe- 
less, the ANP was the best-organized and best-managed institu- 
tion in the country, and many technically competent and 
experienced military personnel entered ministries and para- 
statal (partly government-owned and partly privately owned) 
corporations as part of the national economic elite. 

Military management also undertook local civic-action and 
economic development projects. This role gave regional mili- 
tary commanders powers of patronage that further boosted 
their political influence. The regional commanders became 
more influential in local affairs than the governors of wilayat, 
who served under the Ministry of Interior, Local Communities, 
and Tourism (hereafter Ministry of Interior). The wilayat gov- 
ernors also frequently had military backgrounds. 

After Boumediene was incapacitated by a fatal illness in late 
1978, the Council of the Revolution assumed day-to-day politi- 
cal power on an interim basis. Only eight members of the coun- 
cil remained from the original twenty-six. Five were colonels; 



254 



National Security 



they included Chadli Benjedid, who assumed responsibility for 
national defense matters. The nation's senior military officer, 
Benjedid was viewed as the ANP's candidate to replace Boume- 
diene. He became president when the FLN Party Congress 
became deadlocked over two more prominent candidates. 

Benjedid's Council of Ministers included strong ANP repre- 
sentation. Military men consistently made up half the member- 
ship of the FLN Political Bureau. Indeed, one observer 
described the FLN as a "screen" behind which the military 
exercised its influence as the real foundation of the regime. 
Many officers served in civilian posts; many observers believed, 
however, that their involvement in national decision making 
reflected Benjedid's confidence in their abilities and loyalty 
rather than an effort to impose direct military control. 

The ANP's favorable image, based on its role in the War of 
Independence and in the creation of the postwar Algerian 
state, was badly tarnished by the ruthless way in which it sup- 
pressed the strikes and riots of "Black October" 1988. Troops 
deployed in the center of Algiers and other cities fired indis- 
criminately, with little regard for civilian casualties. Reacting to 
criticisms by human rights activists at home and abroad, Benje- 
did purged a number of military commanders and appointed 
younger, more professional officers with personal loyalty to 
him. Soon thereafter, all senior army officers resigned from the 
FLN Central Committee so as formally, if not actually, to dis- 
tance themselves from civilian politics. 

As the threat of Islamic militancy became more acute, the 
power of the army reemerged as the primary bulwark against 
religiously inspired violence. The role of the armed forces was 
legitimated by a four-month state of emergency declared after 
the May-June 1991 rioting. The military high command felt 
that the government's political liberalization measures and its 
lax attitude toward the Islamic threat were mistaken. When the 
first round of national election results of December 26, 1991, 
resulted in an overwhelming FIS victory, Benjedid was forced 
to resign as president. A five-member High Council of State 
soon assumed presidential powers. The council's only military 
representative was the minister of defense, Major General 
Khaled Nezzar, but the military exerted strong influence on 
the interim government. Troops and armored vehicles were 
deployed in the cities, military checkpoints were set up, and 
gatherings at mosques for political purposes were prohibited. 
The regime declared a one-year state of emergency, banned 



255 



Algeria: A Country Study 

the FIS, and arrested thousands of its supporters. Convinced 
that the stability of the nation was at stake, the army clearly 
intended to crush the FIS. The militants' resort to terrorist 
attacks and the June 1992 assassination of Boudiaf, one of the 
original founders of the group that became the FLN, hardened 
the attitude of the military. Nezzar declared that the army 
would "conduct an implacable war until the total eradication of 
armed Islamic extremists who have soiled their hands with the 
blood of the defenders of order [is achieved]." 

As 1992 drew to a close, the suppression of the Islamic polit- 
ical movement by the ANP and police appeared to be out- 
wardly effective, although individual acts of violence 
continued. In spite of some desertions and arms thefts by sym- 
pathizers in the military, senior commanders asserted that the 
cohesion of the army was unaffected. The military leaders 
maintained that they had deemed it necessary to intervene 
only to head off an anarchic situation. Although the armed 
forces could have assumed power directly during the turmoil of 
1992, they refrained from doing so. They continued to profess 
their intention of returning to their basic mission of providing 
for the defense and territorial integrity of the nation. 

The Armed Forces 

The armed forces consist of four branches: the army, the 
navy, the air force, and air defense (see fig. 10). They are aug- 
mented by the National Gendarmerie, which comes under the 
Ministry of Interior. According to The Military Balance, 1993- 
1994, the total strength of the active armed forces in late 1993 
was 121,700, including the army, 105,000; the navy, 6,700; and 
the air force, 10,000. Air defense manning levels are not 
known, but one source estimates them as 4,000, included 
within the air force complement. The number of reserves is 
listed at 150,000, but their state of readiness is not known. 

Under the constitution, the president is supreme com- 
mander of all the armed forces and is responsible for national 
defense. When Boumediene deposed Ben Bella in 1965, he 
eliminated the national defense portfolio to reinforce his own 
control over the ANP. In July 1990, Benjedid revived the posi- 
tion, appointing Nezzar to head the ministry. Nezzar had been 
chief of staff since he replaced Major General Abdallah Bel- 
houchet in 1988. Belhouchet, who until that time had been 
considered the most important military figure after Benjedid, 
was dismissed as part of the wholesale removal of senior offi- 



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National Security 



cers after the 1988 riots. After Benjedid's resignation as presi- 
dent in early 1992 and Nezzar's appointment as sole military 
representative on the High Council of State, the interim gov- 
erning body, Nezzar was seen as the strong man of the regime. 

Under the constitution, the head of state can turn for advice 
on national security matters to the High Security Council, 
which along with the Council of Ministers, is required to give 
its consent to the declaration of a state of emergency in the 
event the country faces imminent danger to its institutions, its 
independence, or its territorial integrity. The High Security 
Council must also be heard prior to a declaration of war by the 
president. The security council's members include the prime 
minister, the minister of national defense, the chief of staff of 
the armed forces, the minister of interior (an army officer), 
and the minister of justice. Upon Benjedid's resignation, the 
High Security Council assembled to cancel the second round 
of the general election and created the High Council of State 
to exercise interim presidential powers. 

During the 1980s, Benjedid took a number of measures to 
reorganize the military high command so as to enhance the 
ANP's efficiency and military effectiveness. In 1984, after pro- 
moting eight colonels to become the first generals in indepen- 
dent Algeria, Benjedid announced the establishment of an 
ANP general staff. Previously, the armed forces had relied on 
the secretary general of the Ministry of National Defense to 
coordinate staff activities. The previous secretary general of the 
ministry, Major General Moustafa Benloucif, was named the 
first chief of staff. Benloucif had risen quickly in the ANP and 
was also an alternate member of the FLN Political Bureau. 
However, he was dismissed in 1986 without explanation; in 
1992 the regime announced that Benloucif would be tried for 
corruption and the embezzlement of US$11 million, which 
had been transferred to European accounts. 

The general staff had responsibility for operational plan- 
ning for the integrated armed forces, budgeting, information 
and communications, logistics and administrative support, 
mobilization, and recruiting. It was not, however, part of the 
regular chain of command. In practice, the armed forces chief 
of staff dealt directly with the chiefs of the service branches and 
with the commanders of the six military regions. Along with 
Nezzar, the senior hierarchy of the armed forces included the 
chief of staff, Abdelmalek Guenaizia; the commander of the 
National Gendarmerie, Abbas Ghezaiel; the chief of military 



257 



Algeria: A Country Study 









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258 



National Security 



security, Mohamed Mediene; and the inspector general of the 
land forces, Tayeb Derradji. Minister of Interior Larbi Belkheir, 
a major general who had been considered part of the collective 
military leadership, was replaced by a civilian minister after 
Boudiaf s assassination in mid-1992 and was no longer on active 
service. 

Army 

The army's personnel strength of 105,000 in late 1993 
included 65,000 conscripts. The army's size nearly doubled 
after 1978, largely to prepare for possible hostilities with 
Morocco over the Western Sahara. After reaching a manpower 
strength of 120,000 in 1992 to deal with the pressures of 
domestic disturbances, financial considerations required a cut- 
back in personnel. The army commander appointed in the 
spring of 1992 was Major General Khelifa Rahim, who also 
served as deputy chief of staff of the armed forces. 

Territorially, Algeria is divided into six numbered military 
regions, each with headquarters located in a principal city or 
town (see fig. 11). This system of territorial organization, 
adopted shortly after independence, grew out of the wartime 
wilaya structure and the postwar necessity of subduing antigov- 
ernment insurgencies that were based in the various regions. 
Regional commanders control and administer bases, logistics, 
and housing, as well as conscript training. Commanders of 
army divisions and brigades, air force installations, and naval 
forces report directly to the Ministry of National Defense and 
service chiefs of staff on operational matters. 

During the 1980s, most of the army's combat units were con- 
centrated in Military Region II (Oran) and to a lesser extent in 
Military Region III (Bechar). Adjacent to Morocco, region III 
straddles the main access routes from that country. It is also 
near the troubled Western Sahara, embracing territory previ- 
ously claimed by Morocco. 

Much of the internal disorder and violence associated with 
economic distress and the Islamist movement has occurred in 
Military Region I (Blida), which includes the capital of Algiers, 
and Military Region V (Constantine). Army units have been 
strengthened in and near the cities where attacks against the 
government and security forces have occurred. Although 
regional commanders were originally all colonels, the com- 
manders of region I (Mohamed Djenouhat) and region V 
(Abdelhamid Djouadi) were both promoted to major general 



259 



Algeria: A Country Study 




Figure 11. Military Regions, 1993 

in 1992. The two southeastern jurisdictions— Military Region 
IV (Ouargla) and Military Region VI (Tamanrasset) — are 
sparsely populated tracts of desert where a limited number of 
combat troops carry out patrols and man small outposts. The 
Ouargla region assumed a measure of strategic importance 
after relations with Libya soured, but the military's main activi- 
ties there and in Region VI are the construction and planting 
projects undertaken by conscript forces. 

Originally organized as independent infantry battalions, the 
ANP decided in 1966, based on Soviet advice, to form four 



260 



National Security 



mechanized divisions. However, logistical problems and the 
high cost of associated heavy weaponry soon forced a reassess- 
ment of the plan. In 1992 the army again began to reorganize 
on a divisional basis; hence some units have been in a state of 
flux. 

According to The Military Balance, 1993-1994, in 1993 the 
army's main combat units consisted of two armored divisions, 
each with three tank regiments and one mechanized regiment, 
and two mechanized divisions, each with three mechanized 
regiments and one tank regiment. Furthermore, in 1993 there 
were five motorized infantry brigades and one airborne special 
forces brigade. Each infantry brigade consisted of four infantry 
battalions and one tank battalion. In addition, in 1993 the 
army had seven independent artillery battalions, five air 
defense battalions, and four engineering battalions. The bri- 
gades had authorized personnel levels of 3,500 men, but all 
units were believed to be understrength. 

Twelve companies of desert troops, each with about 400 
men, functioned as border guards. Originally these troops 
patrolled on camels, but by the 1980s they relied extensively on 
light reconnaissance vehicles. Two special riot units, said to 
number about 15,000 men, were assigned to maintain civil 
order. In addition to other riot-control equipment, they report- 
edly were armed with shotguns. 

The army was well equipped with both older and more up- 
to-date models of Soviet armor and artillery. In 1993 it had 
nearly 1,000 tanks, including more than 600 T-62s and late- 
model T-72s. About 200 T-72s had been delivered since 1990. 
Earlier versions of wheeled armored personnel carriers 
(APCs), the Soviet BTR-50 and BTR-60, had been supple- 
mented by BMP-1 and BMP-2 tracked armored infantry fight- 
ing vehicles mounted with 73mm guns and a few with Sagger 
antitank missiles. The army's extensive artillery inventory was 
headed by Soviet 122mm and 152mm self-propelled howitzers. 
There were also more than 100 122mm, 140mm, and 240mm 
multiple rocket launchers in the inventory. The principal anti- 
tank weapons were the Soviet Sagger and the French Milan. In 
addition to a variety of towed and self-propelled air defense 
guns, the army had Soviet SA-8 and SA-9 vehicle-mounted sur- 
face-to-air missiles (SAMs) and SA-7 man-portable SAMs (see 
table 7, Appendix). 

During the early years of the army's modernization in the 
1960s and 1970s, thousands of ANP officers went to the Soviet 



261 



Algeria: A Country Study 



Union for training. Since then, Algeria has established its own 
military academies, although Russian advisers were still 
attached to the ANP in 1993. Strategic and tactical doctrine 
continues to be based on Russian models. Basic army cadet 
training is conducted at the military academy at Cherchell, 
west of Algiers, the site of a French interservices military school 
taken over by the government in 1963. Officer candidates 
attend for three years, generally followed by a year of special- 
ized training before being commissioned and assigned to field 
units. The Cherchell academy also includes a staff college for 
advanced training of a limited number of field-grade officers of 
all branches. 

A number of other institutions are used to train army per- 
sonnel. Among these are the school for technical, administra- 
tive, and logistical training at El Harrach, just southeast of 
Algiers; the school for armored units at Batna; the school for 
artillery units at Telerghma near Constantine; the school for 
infantry commandos at Biskra; the school for communications 
technicians at Bougara, on the outskirts of Algiers; and the 
school for desert cavalry units at Ouargla. 

The army's NCOs are trained at Ksar el Boukhari, about 100 
kilometers south of Algiers, where they receive instruction in 
leadership, principles of command and control, tactical 
deployment, and political indoctrination. The NCOs are often 
used in command positions in smaller tactical units. 

Air Force 

The Algerian air force, as of 1993 under the command of 
Colonel Mohamed Mokhtar Boutamine, has responsibility for 
defending the country's air space, supporting ground forces, 
supplying military transportation and cargo airlift, and carry- 
ing out land and maritime reconnaissance. In late 1993, the air 
force was equipped with some 193 combat aircraft and more 
than fifty attack helicopters, flying from about fifteen air bases. 
The service has expanded steadily since its inception in 1962, 
when Egypt donated five MiG-15 jet fighters and supplied a 
training mission. As more MiGs arrived, Algerian pilots were 
sent to Syria and Egypt and later to the Soviet Union for flight 
training. Others received flight training and technical school- 
ing in France. With the help of Soviet advisers, a pilot training 
school was eventually established at Tafraoua near Oran. The 
Air Force Academy and a technical training school are also 
located at the Tafraoua complex. 



262 



National Security 



According to The Military Balance, 1993-1994, in 1993 air 
force combat capabilities were built around three fighter/ 
ground-attack squadrons and eight interceptor squadrons 
equipped exclusively with Soviet aircraft. The most advanced of 
these, although they had been in the inventory for more than a 
decade, were fourteen MiG-25s and three MiG-25Rs in a 
reconnaissance configuration. The fighter squadrons also 
included ninety-five MiG-21s and twenty MiG-23s. The 
fighter/ground-attack squadrons included forty MiG-23s and 
ten older Su-24s (see table 8, Appendix). The basic weapon of 
the fighter aircraft was the Soviet AA-2 (Atoll) and AA-6 air-to- 
air missiles. 

The main pillar of the air force's transport capability in late 
1993 was the fleet of sixteen Lockheed C-130 Hercules pur- 
chased from the United States. These were supplemented by 
six Soviet An-12s of comparable load capacity. Two Super King 
B-200s were outfitted for maritime reconnaissance. 

The helicopter fleet in late 1993 comprised five squadrons 
of heavy- and medium-attack helicopters of Soviet manufac- 
ture, as well as a small number of transport helicopters. Air 
defense was under a separate command. It consisted of three 
brigades equipped with 85mm, 100mm, and 130mm (KS-12, 
KS-19, and KS-30) Soviet antiaircraft guns; and three SAM reg- 
iments, one equipped with Soviet SA-3, SA-6, and SA-8 SAMs. 

Navy 

With help principally from the Soviet Union, the Algerian 
Navy underwent considerable enlargement and modernization 
during the 1980s. Its ambition was to develop a fleet of well- 
armed vessels that would enable it to deal with the Moroccan 
or Libyan fleet and permit Algeria to project naval power 
beyond its own coastal waters. As of 1993, the navy was report- 
edly interested in acquiring surplus vessels from West Euro- 
pean navies for patrolling its exclusive economic zone. These 
purchases, however, had not materialized by late 1993, proba- 
bly owing to financial constraints. 

In 1993 the naval complement of officers, enlisted person- 
nel, and cadets was estimated at 6,700, with an additional 630 
men in the coast guard. The latter group is part of the Ministry 
of Interior, although under the navy's operational control. All 
navy and coast guard personnel are volunteers. Previously, the 
commanding officer of the navy had held the rank of colonel; 



263 



Algeria: A Country Study 

in 1992, however, a brigadier general, Chaabane Ghodbane, 
was named to the post. 

Algeria received its first two submarines, Romeo-class ves- 
sels, from the Soviet Union in 1983. In 1987 and 1988, the 
country acquired two Kilo-class submarines, quiet-running, 
high-speed vessels armed with both torpedoes and mines, from 
the Soviet Union. The Romeos were retired for use as training 
ships. Two additional Kilo-class submarines are reportedly on 
order (see table 9, Appendix). 

The largest surface vessels are three Soviet Koni-class frig- 
ates commissioned between 1980 and 1985. With 1,440 tons 
displacement, each frigate is armed with Gecko SAMs and four 
76mm guns. Three Soviet Nanuchka II-class corvettes of 850 
tons were delivered between 1980 and 1982. They are armed 
with Gecko SAMs and four surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). 
New diesel engines are reportedly being installed on the cor- 
vettes after problems were experienced with the performance 
and reliability of their propulsion mechanisms. 

In addition to the larger combat vessels, in 1993 the naval 
forces operated a number of fast-attack craft and some smaller 
units for coastal patrols. They included eleven former Soviet 
Osa I- and Osa II-class missile boats, each mounted with four 
Styx SSMs. The navy also possessed twelve Kebir-class fast-attack 
craft, each mounted with a 76mm gun. The coast guard was 
temporarily operating six of these. Designed by Brooke 
Marine, the first two were built in Britain and the remainder 
were assembled or built at Mers el Kebir with assistance from 
Vosper Thornycroft. 

The fleet in 1993 boasted a modest amphibious capability, 
based on a Polish LCT (landing craft, tank) and two larger Brit- 
ish-built landing ships acquired in 1983 and 1984. A maritime 
reconnaissance squadron with two Super King 200Ts had been 
assigned to the navy, although the squadron's personnel and 
aircraft came from the air force. 

Algeria's naval academy at Tamentfoust near Algiers pro- 
vides officer training equivalent to that of the army and the air 
force academies. The navy also operates a technical training 
school for its personnel at Tamentfoust. Some higher-ranking 
naval officers have taken advantage of training in France, Rus- 
sia, and the United States. Principal naval bases are located 
near Algiers, at Mers el Kebir, and at Annaba. 

In addition to sixteen Italian-built light patrol craft, the 
coast guard in 1993 operated six Chinese patrol boats delivered 



264 



National Security 



in 1990; a seventh was delivered in 1992. In carrying out its 
coast guard duties, the navy coordinates its activities with ele- 
ments of the Ministry of Interior, with the customs and immi- 
gration services, and the national police. Its goal is to prevent 
smuggling, the illegal entry of undesirable aliens, and other 
offenses in order to ensure the security of coastal areas. 

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 

The army service uniform is of an olive drab shade similar 
in style to the uniform of the United States Army. Airborne 
troops wear camouflage material with distinctive boots. Air 
force uniforms are pale blue, and navy uniforms are dark blue. 
All services have winter, summer, and dress uniforms. 

Insignia of rank are worn on shoulder straps by both offi- 
cers and enlisted men of all services (see fig. 12). Rank designa- 
tions are similar to those of the French military. There are no 
warrant officer grades, nor is there a grade corresponding to 
private first class. The ranks of senior commanders can be iden- 
tified by a large wreath device with two swords plus one star 
(brigadier general) or two stars (major general). 

Personnel and Recruitment 

Independent Algeria has never experienced difficulty in 
meeting its military manpower needs. Its population is pre- 
dominantly young. According to United States government 
data, of an estimated population in 1993 of 27.4 million, more 
than 6 million are males age fifteen to forty-nine. Of these, an 
estimated 3.8 million are considered fit for military service, 
and 293,000 reach the military age of nineteen annually. 
Accordingly, basic manpower resources are more than ade- 
quate to meet any foreseeable military needs. 

Until mid-1967, the ANP relied entirely on volunteer man- 
power. Given the plentiful supply of young men, the economic 
attraction of the army compared with the difficulties of finding 
employment elsewhere, and the absence of aversion to military 
service, the ANP would seem to be able to depend on a volun- 
tary system indefinitely. Algeria's commitment to Arab nation- 
alism, however, caused a rethinking of recruitment policies 
after Arab forces were decisively defeated by Israel in the June 
1967 War. By a 1968 decree, all Algerians were obligated to 
serve two years upon reaching the age of nineteen. The objec- 
tive of this national service plan was to increase substantially 
the personnel strength of the army and, at the same time, to 



265 



Algeria: A Country Study 




266 



National Security 



train a youth corps for national development. The first six 
months were to be spent in military training with the ANP and 
the rest in social and economic projects managed by the armed 
forces. National service was also intended to provide political 
education and indoctrination in the revolutionary socialist pro- 
gram of the government. As initially projected, an equal num- 
ber of young men and women were to be inducted. In practice, 
far fewer than the originally intended numbers of men were 
called to duty, and the induction of women was never imple- 
mented. Some women were accepted as ANP volunteers, 
although fewer were serving in 1993 than in past years. Most of 
these women were in the lower grades and were limited to the 
military health service. 

Conscription has remained in effect since 1969, although 
the period of compulsory service has been reduced to eighteen 
months. Those young men not conscripted by the end of the 
year in which they become eligible can obtain a certificate 
attesting to their exemption from future call-up so that they 
can continue their studies or work without further distraction. 

After the national service program was introduced, con- 
scripts generally were given civic-action assignments following 
their initial military training period of six months. In some 
cases, opportunities were offered for those with limited educa- 
tion to learn trades at various vocational schools, often con- 
nected with civil engineering and construction. Others learned 
to drive motor vehicles and to operate construction equip- 
ment. National service provided a ready source of workers for 
civic-action projects while freeing regular soldiers to concen- 
trate on other military missions. Beginning in the 1980s, how- 
ever, most conscripts appear to have been assigned to regular 
military units to complete their eighteen-month service obliga- 
tion, and fewer were given nonmilitary assignments. Some con- 
scripts, such as doctors who deferred their military service until 
completing their education, were allowed to fulfill their service 
obligation by occupying civilian posts in their special fields in 
rural areas or small towns. 

In 1993 the top echelon of the Algerian officer corps, 
mainly men in their mid-fifties, included many veterans of the 
War of Independence. Most had served in the external ALN, a 
few had been guerrilla officers of the internal maquis (the 
French resistance during World War II), and others had experi- 
ence in the French army. Some, like Nezzar, had served as 
NCOs with the French before defecting to the ALN. 



267 



Algeria: A Country Study 

The army's prestige — rooted in the revolutionary struggle 
against the French — was dimmed by its excessive use of force to 
control the mass demonstrations of 1988 and 1991. Most Alge- 
rian citizens were too young to recall the achievements of 
senior officers in the fight for independence. Moreover, much 
of the anger that had ignited demonstrations among the civil- 
ian population was directed against widespread corruption 
among highly placed officials. Although few of the senior mili- 
tary had been directly implicated, they tended to be regarded 
with the same suspicion as civilian officeholders. 

Nevertheless, the newer military leadership was liberal in its 
outlook, associating itself with the forward-looking managerial 
class that welcomed the abandonment of the socialist experi- 
ment and favored political democratization and the adoption 
of a free-market system. Senior commanders were resolutely 
opposed to an Islamist-led state because they feared it would 
mean an end to the modernization movement. 

Younger officers came from all walks of life. Because of the 
ANP's strict educational requirements, however, people raised 
in urban areas with greater educational opportunities were 
more strongly represented than those raised in rural Algeria. 
Generally, all officer candidates were expected to be eighteen 
to twenty-three years of age, to have completed twelve years of 
education and hold a baccalaureate certificate, to be unmar- 
ried, and to be in good health. Competitive written examina- 
tions were held for entry into the military academies. 

Conditions of Service 

The general environment of Algerian military life has long 
been of sufficiently high quality to make service in the ANP a 
reasonably attractive alternative to the deteriorating conditions 
found in the civilian sector. Most military personnel enjoy a 
higher standard of dignity and comfort than the average civil- 
ian in an economy struggling with unemployment and infla- 
tion. Food and pay compare favorably with that found in the 
civil sector. Other advantages, such as medical care, retirement 
benefits, and in-service training for later use in a civilian career, 
also make military service attractive. In principle, the armed 
forces do not constitute a privileged group insulated from the 
problems afflicting Algerian society as a whole. Nevertheless, 
the system is better organized and the standards of services 
provided tend to be superior to those available in civilian life. 
In a possible allusion to a decline of these standards, General 



268 



National Security 



Nezzar spoke of the "Spartan" conditions of service life in dis- 
cussing the problems of the armed forces in 1992. 

After independence the government realized that the loy- 
alty and morale of the armed forces were essential to its stabil- 
ity and from the start allocated the largest share of the military 
budget for personnel-related expenses: pay, allowances, 
rations, and clothing. The ANP operated post exchange and 
commissary systems, built holiday camps for dependents, and 
extended some opportunities for duty-free purchasing. Mem- 
bers of the armed forces also benefited from a social security 
program maintained by the ANP separately from the national 
program maintained by the government. 

A political commissariat, set up by Boumediene in 1963 and 
patterned after similar groups in Soviet-type regimes, provided 
ideological indoctrination and oversight of the armed forces. 
Its officers reported directly to the FLN. The political commis- 
sariat provided political supervision, operated its own training 
school, and assigned graduates to all ANP units. Although 
apparently an influential agency in the 1970s, a decade later 
the commissariat served mainly as an instrument to provide 
goods and services to boost servicemen's morale. 

In its earlier years, the ANP adopted a reserved and austere 
profile, dedicated to the national goals, exemplary in its con- 
duct, and modest in its lifestyle. Differences between enlisted 
and officer pay, unlike those in some of the older armies of the 
Middle East and North Africa, did not reflect a class distinction 
in which a highly paid officer caste was separated from a mass 
of conscripts by a wide chasm of pay and privilege. Since the 
late 1970s, however, the officer corps has enjoyed comfortable 
living quarters and recreational facilities; had easy access to 
consumer goods, housing, and transportation; and been insu- 
lated from the sometimes overbearing state bureaucracy. 

The officer corps is not characterized by elaborate cere- 
mony, ostentatious attire, or an inflated rank structure. To 
maintain the revolutionary tradition of equality, the military 
hierarchy was deliberately limited to the rank of colonel. In 
1984 this system was modified when the ranks of brigadier gen- 
eral and major general were created. A number of promotions 
in 1992 raised eight of some twenty brigadier generals to major 
general. The result was that commanders of similar rank often 
held vastly different command responsibilities. Seasoned and 
competent officers with relatively low ranks often held posi- 



269 



Algeria: A Country Study 



tions that in other armed forces would be associated with 
higher ranks. 

The Defense Burden 

Algerian military spending since independence has been 
relatively restrained. Despite the influence of the military 
establishment, the government on the whole has refrained 
from unduly favoring defense interests over other sectors: on 
the contrary, it has attempted to avoid burdensome military 
commitments. Algeria's outlays on its armed forces, both in 
terms of share of gross national product (GXP — see Glossary) 
and of total government budget devoted to defense, have been 
well below those of its North African neighbors. Libva. 
Morocco, and Tunisia. 

The bulk of funding for the Ministry of National Defense is 
allocated annually from the country's current budget. In addi- 
tion, an unknown amount is included in the country's capital 
budget. According to official Algerian statistics, funds allocated 
to the ministry measured in dinars (for value of the dinar — see 
Glossary) remained relatively constant through the early 1970s. 
.Although this was a time when the country was still creating a 
professional military establishment and was developing its air 
and naval services, defense funding showed a substantial 
decline as a percentage of the central government's current 
budget, reflecting the government's preoccupation with 
domestic socioeconomic development, 

By the mid-1970s, military spending began to rise as the 
country sought to improve its defensive posture and to achieve 
a higher level of military preparedness after the October 1973 
War in the Middle East and Morocco's moves to annex the 
Western Sahara. According to data compiled bv the United 
States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ( AGDA) . 
defense expenditures continued to increase rapidly between 
1978 and 1982, but fell slightly as a percentage of the govern- 
ment's current budget from 14.1 percent in 1978 to 13.0 per- 
cent in 1982. Military expenditures reached a high point in 
1982, amounting to US$1.6 billion in constant 1991 dollars. 
Algeria's officially reported military expenditures consisted 
entirely of recurring or operating expenditures: all or most 
capital spending and overseas arms purchases were omitted 
from the reported figures. The ACDA studies added estimates 
covering these unreported items to the defense budget. 



270 



People's National Army officer lecturing on mechanical principles at 
the Combined Services Military Academy, Cherchell, west of Algiers 
Courtesy Algerian Ministry of Information 



ACDA's statistics indicated that military spending as a per- 
centage of central government expenditures continued to 
decline after 1982, reaching a low of 6.3 percent in 1985, 
before rising again to nearly 10 percent in 1988. Military 
expenditures remained at 3 to 4 percent of GNP during most 
of the 1980s, but tapered off sharply to under 2 percent in 
1991. Military expenditures per capita were US$50 annually in 
1989 and US$28 in 1991. This sum was comparable to 
Morocco's expenditures, whereas Libya, with a much smaller 
population and an unusually large military sector financed by 
oil exports, spent US$613 per capita in 1991. A separate study, 
World Military and Social Expenditures by Ruth Leger Sivard, 
found that Algeria's military expenditures were proportion- 
ately lower than the average of all the countries of North 
Africa. 



271 



Algeria: A Country Study 

Algeria has no significant arms industry, and therefore valu- 
able foreign exchange must be devoted to the purchase of 
imported weapons systems. To some extent, defense costs are 
offset by the contribution of the military to the civilian econ- 
omy. Under both Boumediene and Benjedid, the government 
stressed the role of the armed forces in national development. 
Soldiers carried out public works projects that were often man- 
aged by officers. This aspect of the ANP's mission was empha- 
sized in Article 82 of the 1976 constitution: "The People's 
National Army, instrument of the revolution, participates in 
the development of the country and in the construction of 
socialism." When a new constitution was adopted in 1989, the 
army's role was defined in a narrower traditional form as that 
of safeguarding national territory. 

During the War of Independence, the FLN initiated a num- 
ber of projects designed to achieve for the military a degree of 
self-sufficiency in producing food and other basic supplies. For 
example, at least fifty large farms were taken from French set- 
tlers and converted to army cooperatives after the war ended in 
1962. These projects supplied some of the ANP's needs, and 
the military also profited from sales on the civilian market. The 
army was also involved in manufacturing and construction 
enterprises. Much of the construction and surfacing of a major 
road across the Sahara to the Niger border was the responsibil- 
ity of the army, as was a notable planting project, the barrage 
vert, or green wall of trees, aimed at limiting the spread of the 
Sahara. 

The army, furthermore, built low-income housing projects 
as well as barracks and housing for its own personnel. Since 
1989, however, the army has discontinued civilian construction 
activities and a number of military enterprises. Some of these 
enterprises, including a brickworks, a wood-processing plant, 
and a poultry-raising business, have been transferred to public 
or private companies. Only certain road and railroad projects 
of a strategic nature have been retained. 

Foreign Military Assistance 

In spite of periodic reports that Algeria was negotiating with 
European manufacturers to produce weapons systems under 
license, the country continues to depend heavily on outsiders 
to supply the ANP. From independence through the 1980s, 
Algeria's most important supplier remained the Soviet Union. 
It was estimated that nearly 90 percent of the equipment in the 



272 



National Security 



ANP inventory in 1993 was of Soviet origin. Algerian leaders 
have frequently stated their desire to diversify their sources of 
arms and to obtain access to up-to-date Western equipment, 
but the country's straitened economic circumstances have pre- 
cluded a major shift to purchases from the West. 

At independence the newly created ANP was using equip- 
ment from various sources. Some small arms had been deliv- 
ered to the ALN during the war from China, Egypt, and other 
countries. The new force also benefited from some military 
supplies turned over by the French forces as they left the coun- 
try and from Egypt's assistance to the air unit. Overall, however, 
the military was very poorly equipped; it lacked the heavy weap- 
ons associated with a modern military establishment. 

Overtures to Western nations by Ben Bella and Boumediene 
resulted in lukewarm responses or, at best, offers on terms the 
Algerians considered too stringent. The French government of 
Charles de Gaulle, in particular, was reluctant to supply heavy 
items on concessional terms to the country it had so recently 
fought. The Soviet Union extended Algeria its first military 
credit, equivalent to about US$100 million, following an 
urgent visit by Boumediene to Moscow in late 1963 after a set- 
back in the border war with Morocco. Soviet heavy arms and 
equipment soon began flowing into the country. After the June 
1967 Arab-Israeli War, the Soviet Union stepped up arms deliv- 
eries and extended additional credits. Moroccan moves to 
annex the Western Sahara apparently provided a catalyst for 
further arms purchases. In 1980 the Soviet Union agreed to 
deliver an estimated US$3.5 billion in arms through 1985. 
Another agreement was signed in 1986 for a further US$2 bil- 
lion in arms. These sales were on a credit basis highly favorable 
to Algeria, with repayment over an extended period at low 
interest rates. Nevertheless, Algeria was unwilling to enter into 
a close military relationship with the Soviet Union. It refused 
the Soviet Union basing rights at the large naval installation at 
Mers el Kebir, which the French had handed over in 1968, and 
the holding of joint military exercises. 

Algeria received some of the most modern Soviet-made 
arms during the 1975 to 1985 period. The ANP was one of the 
first armies outside Eastern Europe to be equipped with the T- 
72 tank. It also received the BMP-1 and BMP-2 infantry fight- 
ing vehicle, MiG-23 and MiG-25 fighter aircraft, Mi-24 attack 
helicopters, modern rapid-firing artillery, and SA-2 and SA-3 
air defense missiles. Although these were the "export" versions 



273 



Algeria: A Country Study 

of various models, which lacked the capabilities of those in 
first-line Soviet units, they represented high-quality weaponry. 

The Soviet Union also provided extensive training to ANP 
personnel. Between late 1963 and 1985, more than 3,500 offic- 
ers and enlisted personnel received technical instruction in the 
Soviet Union. The number of Soviet military advisers assigned 
to Algeria to train and guide ANP personnel in the use of 
Soviet equipment as well as in tactical operations is estimated 
to have reached a high of 3,000, although by 1993 the number 
of Russians had fallen below 500. 

During the 1980s, Algerian officials evinced a growing inter- 
est in ending the Soviet Union's almost complete monopoly in 
the sale of arms. The Benjedid government sought to practice 
strict nonalignment in its relations with the superpowers. The 
Algerians were impressed by the superior performance of West- 
ern equipment used by the Israelis during the 1982 invasion of 
Lebanon and by the more comprehensive training and support 
packages Western suppliers provided to their customers. None- 
theless, few negotiations with Western countries were actually 
consummated, presumably because of Algeria's tight budgetary 
and foreign-exchange limitations. 

Available data reflected the continued predominance of the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as sources of weaponry. 
According to ACDA, of a total of US$3.82 billion in arms 
imports during the period 1981 to 1985, about US$3.2 billion 
originated in the Soviet Union, US$170 million in the United 
States (primarily C-130 transport aircraft), US$100 million in 
France, US$160 million in Britain, and US$160 million in the 
Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). During the 
period 1985 to 1989, Algerian arms imports totaled US$3.26 
billion, of which US$2. V billion originated in the Soviet Union, 
US$430 million in other East European nations, US$50 million 
in the United States, US$40 million in Britain, and US$20 mil- 
lion in France. Deliveries reached a peak of US$1.4 billion in 
1981, representing 12.4 percent of all imports. By 1989 arms 
deliveries were down to US$600 million, only 6.8 percent of 
total imports, and continued to fall sharply in 1990 and 1991. 

Under a set of agreements signed in 1963 and 1967, French 
military advisers maintained a permanent presence in Algeria 
after independence. A number of places at the French military 
academy at St. Cyr and the French gendarmerie school at 
Melun were allotted to Algerians. In 1969 about 340 French 
officers and NCOs were detached to work with the training ser- 



274 



Russian materiel of the type used by the Algerian Armed Forces: 

Mi-24 helicopter and T-55 tank 



275 



Algeria: A Country Study 

vices of the ANP. Relations chilled, however, after France esca- 
lated its military support for Morocco during the Western 
Sahara conflict; by 1981 only about twenty French advisers 
remained in Algeria. 

The administration of the socialist Francois Mitterrand, who 
was elected president of France in 1981, was thought to be 
more attuned to Algerian interests than previous French gov- 
ernments had been. The French government increased the 
number of places in French military schools for Algerian 
cadets and extended additional credits. Algeria bought Pan- 
hard armored personnel carriers for the gendarmerie and 
Milan antitank missiles, but more extensive purchases, notably 
a national command-and-control radar network, failed to mate- 
rialize. 

From independence through the early 1980s, the ANP had 
purchased relatively small amounts of less sensitive military 
equipment from the United States such as several executive 
transport aircraft and unarmed primary trainers. Beginning in 
1981, as part of a rapprochement that was kindled by Algeria's 
role as an intermediary in the release of the American hostages 
in Iran, Algerian requests for more sensitive military equip- 
ment were reviewed more favorably. In addition to the Lock- 
heed C-130 transport aircraft, the United States furnished 
telecommunications equipment and military trucks during this 
period. 

All of these sales were conducted on a commercial basis, 
and all of the equipment was classified as nonlethal. During 
Benjedid's 1985 visit to the United States, however, Washington 
approved Algeria's eligibility to purchase general defense 
equipment under the conditions of the Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS) program. Algerian arms requests were examined on a 
case-by-case basis. Direct purchases under FMS were minimal. 
They amounted to only US$2.2 million in fiscal year (FY — see 
Glossary) 1991 and were estimated to reach only $1 million in 
FY 1992 and FY 1993, although commercial transactions were 
somewhat larger. Since 1985, the United States Department of 
Defense has provided a small annual grant under the Interna- 
tional Military Education and Training Program to provide 
professional military development courses and technical train- 
ing for Algerian officers in leadership positions or deemed to 
be potential leaders. 

Algeria purchased two tank landing ships from Britain in 
the early 1980s. In addition, the British undertook a joint 



276 



National Security 



project with the Algerian navy for the delivery of twelve fast- 
attack craft armed with Italian Otomat missiles. The first two of 
the attack craft were built in Britain, and ten others were built 
or assembled at the Mers el Kebir shipyard with British techni- 
cal assistance. 

Algeria has purchased some patrol craft from China, but 
there has been little other evidence of military cooperation 
between the two countries since the War of Independence. In 
1991 it was disclosed that the Chinese were assisting in the con- 
struction of a nuclear reactor at Ain Oussera, about 140 kilo- 
meters south of Algiers. Subsequent reports stated that Iraq 
had sent scientists and some uranium to Algeria. Algerians 
asserted that the reactor was intended to produce only radioac- 
tive isotopes for medical research and to generate electric 
power. However, the secrecy surrounding the program, which 
had been initiated in 1986, raised suspicions. Algeria is not a 
signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, having 
rejected it on the principle that Algeria should not have to 
renounce a nuclear weapons program when other nations 
could continue with theirs. Algeria subsequently agreed to 
inspection of the site by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency. 

Internal Security 

Responsibility for maintaining law and order is shared by 
the Gendarmerie Nationale and the Surete Nationale. Opera- 
tions against subversives are conducted by various civilian orga- 
nizations as well as by Military Security (Securite Militaire — 
SM). The gendarmerie, active principally in rural areas and 
remote mountain and desert regions, and the Surete, an urban 
police force, were both formed after independence in 1962 
and were patterned after their counterparts in metropolitan 
France. Both organizations carry out normal police duties, 
although they handle routine internal security functions as 
well. Military Security is responsible for foreign intelligence, 
military offenses, and- civilian espionage and subversion, espe- 
cially at times of a breakdown of public order. 

The SM operates under the authority of the Ministry of Inte- 
rior, as does the gendarmerie, although the latter is considered 
a paramilitary adjunct to the armed forces. In the early 1990s, 
the SM had about 6,000 to 10,000 military personnel equipped 
with shotguns and other small arms organized into counterter- 
rorist brigades. SM personnel are commanded by an army gen- 



277 



Algeria: A Country Study 

eral and report directly to the minister of national defense. 
Active in Algiers and the surrounding area, they have as their 
mission to investigate and respond to intelligence provided by 
the police and the gendarmerie. A Republican Guard Brigade 
of 1,200 persons is also available to deal with civil disturbances. 
It is equipped with light tanks and armored vehicles. 

Gendarmerie Nationale 

The Gendarmerie Nationale serves as the main rural police 
force. It was commanded in 1993 by Major General Abbas 
Ghezaiel, who reported directly to the minister of national 
defense. In 1993 gendarmerie personnel constituted a total 
force of 35,000. Although generally regarded as a versatile and 
competent paramilitary force, the gendarmerie since 1988 has 
been severely tested in dealing with civil disorder. It frequently 
has lacked sufficient manpower at the scene of disorder, and its 
units have been inadequately trained and equipped for riot 
control. The gendarmerie, however, has demonstrated the abil- 
ity to root out terrorist groups operating from mountain hide- 
outs. 

The gendarmerie is responsible for maintaining law and 
order in villages, towns, and rural areas; providing security sur- 
veillance over local inhabitants; and representing government 
authority in remote regions, especially where tensions and con- 
flicts have occurred in the past. The gendarmerie is organized 
in battalions, whose component companies and platoons are 
dispersed to individual communities and desert outposts. Its 
regional headquarters are in the same cities as the six military 
regional headquarters; it has subdivisions in the forty-eight 
wilayat. A highly mobile force, the gendarmerie possesses a 
modern communications system connecting its various units 
with one another and with the army. Gendarmerie equipment 
includes light armored weapons and transport and patrol vehi- 
cles. The force in 1993 had forty-four Panhard armored per- 
sonnel carriers, fifty Fahd armored personnel carriers, and 
twenty-eight Mi-2 light helicopters. In addition to utilizing 
training provided by the French since independence, the gen- 
darmerie operates its own schools for introductory and 
advanced studies. The gendarmerie's main training center is at 
Sidi Bel Abbes, the former headquarters of France's Foreign 
Legion. The academy for officers is at Isser, about 150 kilome- 
ters east of Algiers. 



278 



National Security 



Surete Nationale 

The Surete Nationale is the primary policing authority in 
Algeria's principal cities and other urban areas. Subordinated 
administratively to the Ministry of Interior, the Surete is 
charged with maintaining law and order, protecting life and 
property, investigating crimes, and apprehending offenders. In 
addition, it performs other routine police functions, including 
traffic control. 

Under the direction of its inspector general, the Surete in 
1993 consisted of a force of 16,000 and is believed to be orga- 
nized along the lines of its French counterpart, with opera- 
tional and investigative branches and supporting services. The 
judiciary police branch is responsible for criminal investiga- 
tions, working in close coordination with the Office of the Pub- 
lic Prosecutor in the Ministry of Justice. Police elements 
assigned to the capitals of the wilayat are under the nominal 
control of the individual governors. A special riot police force 
is equipped with modern riot-control gear. Although the police 
were able to cope with urban disturbances and violence during 
the early and mid-1980s, the military had to be called in to help 
quell the severe riots in late 1988. 

Elements of the Surete also play a role in countering threats 
to the government arising from political subversion. The 
Surete assigns police contingents to work with customs inspec- 
tors at legal points of entry to control illegal activities. Their 
main concerns are apprehending undesirable immigrants and 
contraband traffickers. 

Intelligence Agencies 

Military Security is the principal and most effective intelli- 
gence service in the country. Its chief in 1993, General 
Mohamed Mediene, was believed to number among the more 
influential officers of the ANP. After Boumediene took power 
in 1965, he relied on Military Security to strengthen his control 
over the ANP during the difficult process of amalgamating 
"external" and "internal" ALN personnel, some of whom were 
of questionable loyalty. Military Security became the dominant 
security service in the 1970s, responsible to the head of state 
for monitoring and maintaining files on all potential sources of 
opposition to the national leadership. 

Although theoretically bound by the same legal restrictions 
as the Surete and gendarmerie, Military Security is less circum- 



279 



Algeria: A Country Study 



scribed in its operations. Frequent cases of incommunicado 
detention of suspects have been ascribed mainly to Military 
Security. An important role in the area of national security was 
later assumed by the General Delegation for Documentation 
and Security (Delegation Generale de Documentation et 
Surete — DGDS) as the principal civilian apparatus for conduct- 
ing foreign intelligence and countering internal subversion. 
The security services are believed to infiltrate Islamist groups, 
to employ paid informers for monitoring opposition move- 
ments, and to practice extensive telephone surveillance with- 
out prior court authorization as required by law. During and 
after the riots of October 1988, widely published accounts told 
of torture and other human rights abuses of detainees. Both 
Military Security and the DGDS were implicated in the brutal 
treatment of detainees to obtain confessions or extract infor- 
mation on clandestine political activists. Government officials 
have acknowledged that individual cases of improper behavior 
by security forces occurred but stressed that torture was not 
sanctioned and that evidence of it would be investigated. 

In September 1990, Benjedid announced the dissolution of 
the DGDS after criticism of its repressive role in the 1988 riots. 
The dissolution coincided with other government reforms to 
remove barriers to individual liberties. Informed sources 
believed, however, that this action did not represent an end to 
domestic intelligence operations but rather a transfer of DGDS 
functions to other security bodies. Surveying the intelligence 
picture in August 1992, the French periodical Jeune Afrique con- 
cluded that Military Security, with its abundant documentation 
on the leadership and organization of the violent Islamist 
groups, remained the senior intelligence body concerned with 
internal security. Other intelligence groups include a Coordi- 
nating Directorate of Territorial Security, an Antiterrorist 
Detachment, and a working group of the High Council of State 
charged with political and security matters. The precise func- 
tions and jurisdictions of these bodies remain fluid, according 
to Jeune Afrique. 

Criminal Justice System 

Ordinary criminal cases are heard in the regular civil court 
system by judges appointed by the Ministry of Justice through 
an independent board. Criminal cases are heard in forty-eight 
provincial courts, which have jurisdiction over more serious 
crimes as well as appellate jurisdiction over lower courts in 



280 



National Security 



local tribunals (tribunaux) , which have original jurisdiction for 
less serious offenses. According to the United States Depart- 
ment of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 
1992, the judiciary is generally independent of executive or 
military control, except in cases involving security or public 
order. During the period of martial law in 1991 and the state of 
emergency in 1992, this independence was largely circum- 
vented. 

In December 1992, special antiterrorist courts with civilian 
judges were established to try crimes specifically relating to ter- 
rorism. According to the Department of State, these courts are 
believed to have been formed so that the government might 
have greater influence over the outcome of security-related 
criminal cases. A State Security Court, which had previously 
tried cases involving endangerment of national security, had 
been abolished in 1989 as part of Benjedid's political reform 
program. Muslim sharia law predominated in local courts, but 
there were no Islamic courts as such. Military courts dealt with 
offenses by military personnel and all types of espionage cases. 
During the 1991 state of emergency, about 700 persons were 
tried in military courts whose jurisdictions had been widened 
to include acts endangering national security. The trials of 
seven FIS leaders in 1992 were among those heard by military 
courts. Some of the rights normally accorded in civil courts 
were ignored or circumscribed in the military courts. 

Defendants in civil courts usually have full access to counsel 
who can function freely without governmental interference. 
The Algerian Bar Association provides pro bono legal services to 
defendants unable to pay for their own lawyer. In connection 
with criminal investigations, detention for questioning nor- 
mally cannot exceed forty-eight hours, but an antiterrorist law 
issued in 1992 permits prearraignment detentions of up to 
twelve days. 

Detainees must be informed immediately of the nature of 
charges against them. Once charged, a person can be held 
under pretrial detention indefinitely while the case is being 
investigated. No bail system exists, but provisional liberty may 
be granted if the detainee can demonstrate availability at all 
stages of the inquiry. Lawyers are entitled to have access to 
their clients at all times under visual supervision of a guard. 
Defendants have the right to confront witnesses and present 
evidence. Trials are public, and defendants have the right of 
appeal. 



281 



Algeria: A Country Study 

Prior to the civil unrest of 1991 and 1992, the government 
had introduced political reforms that liberalized the justice sys- 
tem with respect to actions deemed to threaten internal secu- 
rity. Previously, citizens could be arrested for expressing views 
critical of or different from those of the government, for dis- 
turbing the public order, for associating with illegal organiza- 
tions, or, in extreme cases, for threatening state security. The 
new constitution of 1989 provides the right to form political 
parties and civic associations and to strike, and strengthens the 
right of freedom of expression and opinion. Nevertheless, 
under legislation introduced in 1990, persons convicted of 
publishing information endangering state security or national 
unity can be sentenced for a term of up to ten years. Criticizing 
Islam or another revealed religion can bring a penalty of up to 
three years' imprisonment. 

According to Amnesty International, more than 100 per- 
sons were under sentence of death at the close of 1992. At least 
twenty-six Islamists were sentenced to death after the banning 
of the FIS in 1992, but no executions were actually carried out 
in 1992. More than 100 civilians and supporters of Islamic 
opposition groups were killed by security forces during 1992, 
and more than 1,000 people were in detention at the end of 
1992 according to government sources. 

The principal leaders of the FIS arrested in 1991 — Abbassi 
Madani and Ali Belhadj (also seen as Benhadj) — were tried by 
a military court in mid-1992 for fomenting rebellion against 
the state. They could have been given the death sentence, but 
government prosecutors asked for life imprisonment. The 
court's sentence of twelve years was lighter than expected. Its 
leniency was construed as having been dictated by the govern- 
ment in an effort to ease tensions and improve the atmosphere 
for possible reconciliation with more moderate Islamic fac- 
tions. 

In 1987, reversing its previous policy, the government offi- 
cially recognized a human rights group, the Algerian League of 
Human Rights. Legal status was subsequently accorded to the 
Committee Against Torture, which investigated allegations of 
government torture, as well as to a number of other human 
rights organizations. They have been permitted to lobby, publi- 
cize their findings, and publish reports on the treatment of 
detainees. 

Under the 1991 state of emergency and the 1992 martial law 
decrees that gave military and security authorities wide latitude 



282 



National Security 



to enforce public order, large numbers of Islamists were 
detained. The government acknowledged that it detained 
9,000 persons at eight desert camps without formal charges in 
1992. By the end of the year, 1,000 were still held in four 
remaining camps, despite government plans to close them 
down. FIS leaders claimed that the number of those rounded 
up by the government had actually reached 30,000. 

Prison Conditions 

The prison system is operated as a separate function of the 
Ministry of Justice. The system includes many facilities estab- 
lished and operated by the French during their rule. Persons 
convicted of lesser crimes are sent to provincial civil prisons. 
Those found guilty of more serious crimes, including murder, 
kidnapping, or rape, which carry a potential death sentence, 
serve time in one of three penitentiaries. Persons convicted of 
treason, terrorism, and other crimes against the state are also 
sent to the penitentiaries. 

According to the United States Department of State, condi- 
tions in both types of institutions range from primitive to mod- 
ern. Conditions in the penitentiaries are said to be worse than 
in the more numerous civil prisons. At El Harrach, the main 
prison in Algiers, prisoners are often crowded together, and 
sanitary facilities are poor. Inmates at other prisons, especially 
those in outlying areas, are thought to live under better condi- 
tions. Prisoners are segregated according to the seriousness of 
their crimes and the length of their sentences. 

Medical care is described as rudimentary in most cases, 
although a local doctor under contract visits each prison regu- 
larly to treat sick prisoners. Seriously ill prisoners are sent to 
local hospitals. Inmates of civil prisons can receive visits from 
their families once a week. It is more difficult to visit prisoners 
held in penitentiaries. Conjugal visits are sometimes permitted 
at the discretion of local prison authorities. The prison diet is 
described as bland and starchy. Visiting families may bring food 
to augment the inadequate prison fare. 

Detainees in the Saharan security camps have been forced 
to contend with extreme heat, poor food, inadequate bedding, 
and overcrowding. Next of kin often have not been notified 
about inmates' detention, and many detainees have been 
released near the camps without transportation home. A medi- 
cal team under the auspices of the Algerian League of Human 
Rights found no evidence of torture in the detention camps, 



283 



Algeria: A Country Study 

however. The United States Department of State has observed 
that in 1992 there were fewer reports of torture and brutal 
treatment than in prior years. The government has responded 
to concerns that have been raised about conditions in prisons 
and desert internment camps by organizations such as Amnesty 
International and has promised to remind military command- 
ers of their responsibility to safeguard the rights of internees. 

* * * 

Most of the data on the strength and equipment of the 
armed forces are based on The Military Balance, 1993-1994, and 
on Jane's Fighting Ships, 1992-93. Little detailed information 
has been disclosed by Algerian authorities on the structure and 
performance standards of the service branches. The role of the 
military in the political crisis of 1991-92 has been analyzed by 
several authorities, including Guy Mandron in Jane's Intelligence 
Review and John P. Entelis and Lisa J. Arone in Middle East Pol- 
icy. Numerous articles in the French periodical, Jeune Afrique, 
have followed the efforts of the security forces to maintain 
order against violence by Islamic radicals. 

Alastair Home's A Savage War of Peace is a balanced and com- 
prehensive account of the military and political aspects of the 
Algerian War of Independence. The functioning of the crimi- 
nal justice system and the record of the police and the gen- 
darmerie in the struggle against Islamic-inspired dissidence are 
summarized in the United States Department of State's annual 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and in annual reports 
by Amnesty International. (For further information and com- 
plete citations, see Bibliography.) 



284 



Appendix 



1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Students and Teachers by Education Level, Academic Year 

1990-91 

3 Gross Domestic Product by Sector, 1985, 1988, and 1990 

4 Major Crops, 1986-91 

5 Major Trading Partners, Selected Years, 1984-90 

6 Balance of Payments, Selected Years, 1984-90 

7 Major Army Equipment, 1993 

8 Major Air Force and Air Defense Equipment, 1993 

9 Major Navy Equipment, 1993 



285 



Appendix 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you know 


Multiply by 


To find 


Millimeters 


0.04 


inches 


Centimeters 


0.39 


inches 






foot 

ieei 






miles 




9 Al 


acres 






square miles 




35.3 


cubic feet 


Liters 


0.26 


pounds 




2.2 


pounds 


Metric tons 


0.98 


long tons 




1.1 


short tons 




2,204.0 


pounds 


Degrees Celsius 


1.8 


degrees 


(Centigrade) 


and add 32 


Fahrenheit 



287 



Algeria: A Country Study 



Table 2. Students and Teachers by Education Level, Academic Year 

1990-91 



Students 

Education Level Males Females Total Teachers 
Basic education 

Years 1-6 2,312,412 1,876,740 4,189,152 151,262 

Years 7-9 831,217 592,099 1,423,316 82,741 

Total basic education 3,143,629 2,468,839 5,612,468 234,003 

Secondary education 

General 296,043 302,861 598,904 37,965 

Technical 105,666 47,694 153,360 6,318 



Total secondary education 401,709 350,555 752,264 44,283 

Source: Based on information from Leslie S. Nucho (ed.), Education in the Arab World, 1, 
Washington, n.d., 17,19, 26. 

Table 3. Gross Domestic Product by Sector, 1985, 1988, and 1990 
(in billions of Algerian dinars) 7 



1985 1988 1990 

Sector Value Percentage Value Percentage Value Percentage 

Agriculture 27~1 9A 36~3 1L3 47J8 9^6 

Hydrocarbons.... 64.0 22.3 42.0 13.1 115.0 23.1 

Manufacturing... 31.1 10.8 42.2 13.2 51.3 10.3 
Public works and 

construction .... 41.7 14.5 51.2 16.0 75.8 15.3 

Services 39.0 13.6 n.a. 2 n.a. 91.2 18.4 

Transportation 

and commerce . . n.a. n.a. 65.9 20.6 n.a. n.a. 

Other 84.5 29.4 82.4 25.8 115.9 23.3 

TOTAL 287.4 100.0 320.0 100.0 497.0 100.0 



For value of the Algerian dinar — see Glossary. 
2 n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Algeria, 

1991-92, London, 1991, 16; and Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Alge- 
ria, 1992-93, London, 1992, 15. 



288 



Appendix 



Table 4. Major Crops, 1986-91 
(in thousands of tons) 



Crop 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 

Wheat U29 1J75 614 U52 858 1,742 

Barley 1,083 820 390 790 865 1,751 

Citrus 253 277 312 268 281 n.a. 1 

Tomatoes n.a. 193 255 212 168 n.a. 



n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Algeria, 
1992-93, London, 1992, 19. 



Table 5. Major Trading Partners, Selected Years, 1984-90 
(in percentages) 



Country 


1984 


1986 


1988 


1990 


Exports 












27.8 


21.5 


13.9 


13.8 


Germany 1 


2.9 


3.2 


10.3 


7.4 


Italy 


17.7 


19.9 


17.8 


19.2 


Netherlands 


11.7 


14.2 


6.3 


7.4 


Spain 


n.a. 


5.7 


5.1 


5.3 


United States 


21.2 


17.4 


22.1 


21.0 


Imports 










France 


23.1 


24.0 


21.2 


28.5 


Germany 1 


10.5 


11.1 


10.6 


9.8 


Italy 


8.6 


12.9 


10.9 


12.3 


Japan 


n.a. 


4.6 


3.0 


3.5 


Spain 


4.3 


4.6 


4.9 


6.1 


United States 


5.5 


7.7 


9.9 


10.0 



Includes former German Democratic Republic (East Germany) as of July 1990; earlier years include trade only with Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany (West Germany). 



Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Algeria, 

1990-91, London, 37; Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Algeria, 1991- 
92, London, 1991, 40; and Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Algeria, 
1992-93, London, 1992, 39. 



289 



Algeria: A Country Study 



Table 6. Balance of Payments, Selected Years 1984-90 
(in millions of United States dollars) 





1984 


1986 


1988 


1990 2 


Merchandise exports, f.o.b. 3 . 


12,792 


8,065 


7,620 


10,150 


Merchandise imports, c.i.f. 4 


-9,235 


-7,879 


-6,675 


-9,160 


Trade balance 


3,557 


185 


946 


990 


Exports of services 


599 


549 


470 


n.a. 5 




-2,583 


-2,035 


-1,347 


n.a. 


Other income received 


179 


172 


71 


n.a. 


Other income paid 


-1,859 


-1,865 


-2,571 


n.a. 


Net private transfers 


186 


765 


385 


n.a. 


Net official transfers 


-5 


-1 


5 


n.a. 


Current account balance 


74 


-2,230 


-2,040 


-680 


Direct investment 


-14 


11 


8 


n.a. 


Portfolio investment 


n.a. 


n.a. 


2 


n.a. 


Other capital 


-197 


579 


734 


n.a. 




-211 


590 


744 


n.a. 


Errors and omissions 


-197 


142 


335 


n.a. 


Overall balance 


-234 


-1,498 


-960 


n.a. 



Figures may not compute to balances because of rounding. 
Estimated. 

f.o.b. — free on board. 

ci.f. — cost, insurance, freight 

n.a. — not available. 



Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Algeria, 

1991-92, London, 1991, 41; "Algeria: Statistical Survey," in Middle East and North 
Africa, 1992-93, 1992, 326; and United States, Department of Commerce, Foreign 
Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States: Algeria, Washington 
1991,2. 



290 



Appendix 



Table 7. Major Army Equipment, 1993 



Type and Description 
Tanks 

T-72 main battle tank, 120mm gun 

T-62 main battle tank, 115mm gun 

T-54/-55 main battle tank, 100mm gun 

Armored vehicles 

BRDM-2 amphibious scout car 

BMP-1/-2 infantry fighting vehicle 

BTR-50/-60 armored personnel carrier 

Artillery 
Towed 

122mm, various models 

M-46, 130mm 

ML-20 (M-1937), 152mm 

Self-propelled 

2S 1, 122mm 

2S 3, 152mm 

Mortars 

M-37, 82rnm 

M-1943, 120mm 

M-1943, 160mm 

Antitank weapons 
Missiles 

AT-3 Sagger 

Milan 

Guns 

D-44, 85mm 

SU-100, 100mm, self-propelled 

Multiple rocket launchers 

BM-21, 122mm 

BM-14/-16, 140mm 

BM-24, 240mm 

Air defense weapons 
Guns 

14.5, 20, 23, 37, and 57mm, various models. . . . 

ZSU-23-4, 23mm, self-propelled 

KS-12, 85mm; KS-19, 100mm KS-30, 130mm 



Country of 
Origin 



In Inventory 



Soviet Union 
-do- 
-do- 



-do- 

France/ 
Germany 

Soviet Union 
-do- 



-do- 
-do- 
-do- 



-do- 
-do- 
-do- 



300 
330 
330 



120 
915 
460 



375 
10 
20 

150 
25 

150 
120 
60 



490 
210 
180 



291 



Algeria: A Country Study 



Table 7. Major Army Equipment, 1993 



Type and Description 


Country of 
Origin 


In Inventory 


Missiles 






SA-7 man-portable, surface-to-air (SAM) 


-do- 


n.a. 


SA-8 self-propelled SAM. 


-do- 


n.a. 


SA-9 Gaskin, self-propelled SAM 


-do- 


n.a. 



n.a. — not available. 



Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1993-1994, London, 1993, 111. 



292 



Appendix 



Table 8. Major Air Force and Air Defense Equipment, 1993 



Type and Description 


Country of 
Origin 


In Inventory 


Fighter-ground attack craft 






MiG-23 BN 


Soviet Union 


40 


Su-24 


-do- 


10 


Fighter 






MiG-21 MF/bis 


-do- 


95 


MiG-25 


-do- 


14 


MiG-23 B/E 


-do- 


20 


Reconnaissance 






MiG-25R 


-do- 


3 


Super King Air B-200T (maritime) 


United States 


2 


Transport 






C-130H and C-130H-30 Hercules 


-do- 


16 


An-12 




6 


11-76 


-do- 


3 


Helicopters 






Attack 






Mi-24 




38 


Mi-8/-17 




20 


Transport 










i < 
l j 


Medium: Mi-17 


-do- 


12 


Antiaircraft guns 








-do- 


n.a. 1 


Surface-to-air missiles 






S A-3 low-to-medium range, fixed site 


-do- 


21 




-do- 


2 


SA-8 


-do- 


n.a 









n.a.— not available. 



Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1993-1994, London, 1993, 111. 



293 



Algeria: A Country Study 



Table 9. Major Navy Equipment, 1993 



Type and Description 


Country of 
Origin 


In Inventory 


Submarines 

Kilo-class 


Soviet Union 


2 


Frigates 

Koni-class with SA-N-4 surface-to-air 
missiles (SAMs) 


-do- 


3 


Corvettes 
Nanuchka II-class with SS-N-2C 
surface-to-surface missiles 
(SSMs) and SA-N-4 SAMs 


do- 


3 


Fast-attack craft, missile 

Osal-class, Styx SSMs 

Osa II-class, Styx SSMs 


Soviet Union 
-do- 


2 
9 


Fast-attack craft, gun 
Kebir-class, 76mm gun 


Britain/ 
Algeria 


12 1 


Amphibious vessels 

Landing ship, logistic 

Polnochny-class landing craft, tank 


Britain 
Soviet Union 


2 
1 



1 Six on loan to coast guard. 

Source: Based on information from Jane's Fighting Ships, 1992-93, Alexandria, Virginia, 
1992, 4; and The Military Balance, 1993-1994, London, 1993, 110. 



294 



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Algeria: A Country Study 



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Algeria: A Country Study 



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311 



Glossary 



autogestion — Self-management system. Originated in takeover 
of management functions by farm and industrial workers 
after Algerian independence. 

barrels per day (bpd) — Production of crude oil and petroleum 
products is frequently measured in barrels per day and 
often abbreviated as bpd. A barrel is a volume measure of 
forty-two United States gallons. Conversion of barrels to 
tons depends on the density of the specific product. About 
17.3 barrels of average crude oil weigh one ton. Light 
products such as gasoline and kerosene average close to 
eighteen barrels per ton. 

dinar (DA) — Unit of Algerian currency since 1964; divided 
into 100 centimes. The average exchange rate was DA9.0 
in 1990, DA18.5 in 1991, DA21.8 in 1992, DA24.5 in 1993, 
and DA40.7 in October 1994. 

European Community (EC) — See European Union (EU). 

European Union (EU) — Until November 1993, the EU was 
known as the European Community (EC). The EU com- 
prises three communities: the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community 
(EEC), and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom). Each community is a legally distinct body, but 
since 1967 they have shared common governing institu- 
tions. The EU forms more than a framework for free trade 
and economic cooperation: the signatories to the treaties 
governing the communities have agreed in principle to 
integrate their economies and ultimately to form a politi- 
cal union. Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Neth- 
erlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany (West 
Germany) were charter members of the EU; Britain, Den- 
mark, and Ireland joined on January 1, 1973; Greece 
became a member on January 1, 1981; and Portugal and 
Spain entered on January 1, 1986. 

GDP (gross domestic product) — A value measure of the flow of 
domestic goods and services produced by an economy 
over a period of time, such as a year. Only output values of 
goods for final consumption and investment are included 
because the values of primary and intermediate produc- 
tion are assumed to be included in final prices. GDP is 



313 



Algeria: A Country Study 

sometimes aggregated and shown at market prices, mean- 
ing that indirect taxes and subsidies are included; when 
these have been eliminated, the result is GDP at factor 
cost. The word gross indicates that deductions for deprecia- 
tion of physical assets have not been made. See also GNP. 

GNP (gross national product) — The gross domestic product 
(q.v.) plus the net income or loss stemming from transac- 
tions with foreign countries. GNP is the broadest measure- 
ment of the output of goods and services by an economy. 
It can be calculated at market prices, which include indi- 
rect taxes and subsidies. Because indirect taxes and subsi- 
dies are only transfer payments, GNP is often calculated at 
factor cost by removing indirect taxes and subsidies. 

Hanafi — One of four major legal schools in Sunni (q.v.) Islam, 
the Hanafi school makes substantial use of reason in legal 
opinions. Named for Ali Numan Abu Hanifa (ca. 700-67), 
a leading theologian in Iraq. 

Ibadi — From Abu Allah ibn Ibad (ca. 660-ca. 715), a moderate 
Kharijite who spent considerable time in Basra, Iraq. The 
Kharijites were members of the earliest sect in Islam that 
left the followers of Ali or Shia (q.v.) because of Shia will- 
ingness to allow human arbitration of Ali's dispute with the 
caliph, Uthman, rather than divine judgment. 

imam — A word used in several senses. In general use, it means 
the leader of congregational prayers; as such it implies no 
ordination or special spiritual powers beyond sufficient 
education to carry out this function. It is also used figura- 
tively by many Sunni (q.v.) Muslims to mean the leader of 
the Islamic community. Among Shia (q.v.) the word takes 
on many complex meanings; in general, however, and par- 
ticularly when capitalized, it indicates that particular 
descendant of the Party of Ali who is believed to have been 
God's designated repository of the spiritual authority 
inherent in that line. The identity of this individual and 
the means of ascertaining his identity have been major 
issues causing divisions among Shia. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with 
the World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized 
agency affiliated with the United Nations and is responsi- 
ble for stabilizing international exchange rates and pay- 
ments. The main business of the IMF is the provision of 
loans to its members (including industrialized and devel- 
oping countries) when they experience balance of pay- 



314 



Glossary 

merits difficulties. These loans frequently carry conditions 
that require substantial internal economic adjustments by 
the recipients, most of which are developing countries. 

London Club — An informal group of commercial banks that 
come together to negotiate a debt rescheduling agree- 
ment with a country. The group has two committees, an 
economics committee that develops economic data projec- 
tions and a negotiating committee. Committee members 
usually come from the five principal banks that hold the 
largest amounts of a country's debt. 

Maghrib — The western Islamic world (northwest Africa); dis- 
tinguished from the Mashriq, or eastern Islamic world (the 
Middle East). Literally, "the time and place of the sunset — 
the west." For its Arab conquerors, the region was the 
"island of the west" (jazirat al maghrib), the land between 
the "sea of sand" (the Sahara) and the Mediterranean Sea. 
Traditionally includes Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Tri- 
politania (in Libya); more recently some sources have 
treated Mauritania as part of the region. Also transliter- 
ated as Maghreb. 

Maliki — Named for Malik ibn Anas (ca. 710-95), a leading 
jurist from Medina. The Maliki school is one of four major 
legal schools in Sunni (q.v.) Islam, which recorded the 
Medina consensus of opinion, using tradition as a guide. 

Paris Club — The informal name for a consortium of Western 
creditor countries (Belgium, Britain, Canada, France, Ger- 
many, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and the United States) that have made loans or guaran- 
teed export credits to developing nations and that meet in 
Paris to discuss borrowers' ability to repay debts. Paris Club 
deliberations often result in the tendering of emergency 
loans to countries in economic difficulty or in the resched- 
uling of debts. Formed in October 1962, the organization 
has no formal or institutional existence. Its secretariat is 
run by the French treasury. It has a close relationship with 
the International Monetary Fund (q.v.), to which all of its 
members except Switzerland belong, as well as with the 
World Bank (q.v.) and the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The Paris Club is 
also known as the Group of Ten (G-10). 

Shia (from Shiat Ali, the Party of Ali) — A member of the 
smaller of the two great divisions of Islam. The Shia sup- 
ported the claims of Ali and his line to presumptive right 



315 



Algeria: A Country Study 

to the caliphate and leadership of the Muslim community, 
and on this issue they divided from the Sunni (q.v.) in the 
major schism within Islam. Later schisms have produced 
further divisions among the Shia over the identity and 
number of imams {q.v.). Most Shia revere Twelve Imams, 
the last of whom is believed to be hidden from view. 
Sunni — The larger of the two great divisions of Islam. The 
Sunni, who rejected the claims of Ali's line, believe that 
they are the true followers of the sunna, the guide to 
proper behavior set forth by Muhammad's personal deeds 
and utterances. 

World Bank — Informal name used to designate a group of four 
affiliated international institutions: the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the Interna- 
tional Development Association (IDA), the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Invest- 
ment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The IBRD, established 
in 1945, has the primary purpose of providing loans to 
developing countries for productive projects. The IDA, a 
legally separate loan fund but administered by the staff of 
the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the poor- 
est developing countries on much easier terms than those 
of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in 1956, 
supplements the activities of the IBRD through loans and 
assistance specifically designed to encourage the growth of 
productive private enterprises in the less developed coun- 
tries. The MIGA, founded in 1988, insures private foreign 
investment in developing countries against various non- 
commercial risks. The president and certain senior offic- 
ers of the IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The 
four institutions are owned by the governments of the 
countries that subscribe their capital. To participate in the 
World Bank group, member states must first belong to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF — q.v.). 



316 



Index 



Abbas, Ferhat, 37, 39, 40, 41, 45; head of 
government-in-exile, 53; head of 
National Assembly, 57; placed under 
house arrest, 59 

Abbasid caliphate, 15 

Abbasids, xxvii, 12 

Abd Allah ibn Yasin aljuzuli, 14 

Abd al Mumin, 15, 16 

Abd al Qadir, 25-27 

Abd ar Rahman ibn Rustum, 12 

Abd ar Rahman II, 26 

Abdessalam, Belaid, 190, 191 

Abduh, Muhammad, 37 

Abu al Muhajir Dina, 12 

Abu Bakr ibn Ibrahim al Jaddali, 15 

Abu Bakr ibn Tufayl, 16 

Abu Nidal Organization, 240 

Abu Yaqub Yusuf , 1 6 

Ach Chaab (The People), 220 

acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
(AIDS), 119 

Africa, sub-Saharan: refugees from, 245; 
relations in, 226-27 

African Development Bank, 161 

Agency for Development and Promotion 
of Investment, 140 

agrarian reform, 80, 156, 158 

agrarian revolution (1971), 61, 123, 158 

agricultural: exports, 152, 170; imports, 
157, 181; infrastructure, 156; produc- 
tion, 61, 156-57; workers, 98 

agricultural products (see also under indi- 
vidual crops): grain, 157; imports of, 
157; tree crops, 157, 158 

agriculture (see also under agrarian) , 132, 
152-160; under Almohad rule, 16; 
areas for, 72; of Berbers, 93; under 
Ben Bella, 178; under Benjedid, xxix, 
131; under Boumediene, 61, 179; 
under French rule, 33; government 
role in, 178, 203; investment in, 139; 
nationalized, 130, 179, 213; as per- 
centage of gross domestic product, 
134, 152-53; privatization in, 63, 69, 
130; under Roman rule, 8 



Agriculture and Rural Development 
Bank (Banque de l'Agriculture et du 
Developpement Rural), 142 

Ahaggar highlands, 73, 81; Berbers in, 
82, 84 

Ahmad ibn Muhammad, 25 

Ahmed, Mourad Sid (see also Djafar al 

Afghani) , xxxii 
AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency 

syndrome 

Ain el Hanech: prehistoric inhabitants 

of, 5 
Air Algerie, 166 
air defense, 256 
Aire Liquide (France), 168 
air force, 256, 262-63; aircraft of, 238, 

262, 263; insignia, ranks, uniforms, 

265 

Air Force Academy, 262 

Air France, 166 

airports, 161, 164-66 

Air Products Company, 168 

AIS. See Islamic Salvation Army 

Ait Ahmed, Hocine, 42, 43, 44, 91; oppo- 
sition of, to Ben Bella, 58, 59 

Al Aghlab, Ibrahim ibn, 12 

Al Badil (The Alternate) , 220 

Algerian Assembly: abolished, 47 

Algerian Association for the Emancipa- 
tion of Women, 218 

Algerian Brotherhood, 249 

Algerian Communist Party (Parti Com- 
muniste Algerien— PCA) , 38, 214; 
opposition of, to Ben Bella, 58 

Algerian Confederation of Employers, 
214 

Algerian Development Bank (Banque 

Algerienne de Developpement), 142 
Algerian General Workers' Union 

(Union Generale des Travailleurs 

Algeriens — UGTA) , 211-12 
Algerian Islamic Movement, 247 
Algerian League of Human Rights, 182, 

282, 283 
Algerian Muslim Congress, 38 



317 



Algeria: A Country Study 



Algerian National Assembly, 32 
Algerian socialism. See nationalization 
Algiers, 3; airport of, 164; captured by 
Almohads, 15; electricity generation 
at, 149; European migration to, 23; 
founded, 13; French administration 
of, 29; French blockade of, xxviii, 22; 
invasion of, xxviii, 22-23; under Khair 
ad Din, 19; migration to, 46, 79; popu- 
lation of, 79-80; port of, 163; subway 
system, 162; uprisings in, 54 
Algiers Charter (1964), 178 
Aljazair, 69 

Al Joumhouria (The Republic) , 220 
Almohad rebellion (1125), 15 
Almohads, xxvii, 3, 11, 15-16; conquests 
by, 15 

Almoravids, xxvii, 3, 14—15; activities of, 
14-15 

AlMoudjahid (The Fighter), 220 
Al Muizz, 13 

ALN. See National Liberation Army 

Al Qayrawan: established, 11; sacked, 14 

AlQiyam, 110,215 

Alrar gas field, 147, 148 

Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberte. See 

Friends of the Manifesto and Liberty 
AML. See Friends of the Manifesto and 

Liberty 

Amnesty International, 282, 284 
Amour massif, 72 

Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, 168 
Anatolia, 19-20 

Andalus {see also Spain): influence of, 15; 

refugees from, 92 
Anglo-Suez Campaign (1956), 48 
Angola: support for revolutionaries in, 

226, 239 

Annaba, 73; airport of, 164; electricity 
generation at, 149; population of, 80; 
port of, 1 63 
An Nasr (The Victory) , 220 
ANP. See People's National Army 
Antiterrorist Detachment, 280 
APC. See Communal Popular Assembly 
APN. See National People's Assembly 
APW. See Popular Wilaya Assembly 
Arab countries: economic aid from, 138; 

relations with, 227-28 
Arabic language, 86-87, 89; broadcasts 
in, 90, 167; education in, 112; instruc- 
tion in, 90; introduction of, 3; newspa- 



pers in, 220; as official language, 25, 
43,90, 221; spread of, 14 

Arab League. See League of Arab States 

Arab-Israeli dispute, 227-28 

Arab-Israeli wars: of 1967, 240, 229, 273; 
of 1973, 240, 270 

arabization, 11-17, 87-91, 220-21, 232; 
of Berbers, 14, 62, 221; under Boume- 
diene, 220; in education, 112-13, 115, 
220, 221; impact of, xxvii; opposition 
to, 62, 89, 90, 249-50; political aspects 
of, 90-91, 221 

Arab Organization for Space Communi- 
cations (Arabsat), 167 

Arab rule: opposition to, 12; slavery 
under, 12 

Arabs, xxvii, 11-17; alienation of Berbers 
by, 12, 250; identification with, 82; as 
percentage of population, 82; social 
structure of, 82, 91; and women, 102 

Arabsat. See Arab Organization for Space 
Communications 

Arafat, Yasir, 227 

Aragon: trade with, 17 

armed forces, 237-38, 250, 256-70; anti- 
Islamist actions of, xxxii-xxxiii; atti- 
tudes toward, 255; civic action role of, 
238, 254, 260, 267, 272; commander 
in chief, 194, 256; general staff, 257; 
high command of, 257-59; ideological 
indoctrination in, 269; internal secu- 
rity by, 184, 187, 255, 268; manpower 
resources, 265; materiel of, 238, 240, 
261, 262, 263, 264, 272-74, 276, 277; 
missions of, 272; modernization of, 
252; number of personnel in, 252, 
256; as political elite, 205; political 
role of, 177, 180, 205, 206, 237, 252, 
254; purged, 253, 255; under Roman 
rule, 8; reserves, 256; restructuring of, 
253; self-sufficiency of, 272; social 
security program of, 269; uniforms, 
ranks, and insignia of, 265; women in, 
102,267 

Armed Islamic Group (Groupe 
Islamique Arme — GIA), xxxi; govern- 
ment activities against, xxxii 

Armed Islamic Movement (Mouvement 
Islamique Arme — MIA) {see also 
Islamic Salvation Army), xxxi-xxxii, 
191 

Armee de Liberation Nationale. See 



318 



Index 



National Liberation Army 
Armee Islamique du Salut. See Islamic 

Salvation Army 
Armee Nationale Populaire. See People's 

National Army 
army, 256, 259-62; deployment of, 237, 

259- 60; insignia, ranks, and uniforms, 
265; materiel of, 261; number of per- 
sonnel in, 256, 259; organization of, 

260- 61; political power of, 176, 193; 
restructuring of, 238, 261; territorial 
organization of, 259-60; training of, 

261- 62 
Arslan, Shakib, 36 
Aruj, 19 

Arzew gas plant, 148 

Assemblee Populaire Communale. See 
Communal Popular Assembly 

Assemblee Populaire de Wilaya. See Pop- 
ular Wilaya Assembly 

Assemblee Populaire Nationale. See 
National People's Assembly 

Association des Ulema Musulmans 
Algeriens. See Association of Algerian 
Muslim Ulama 

Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama 
(Association des Ulema Musulmans 
Algeriens— AUMA), 37, 41-42, 45; 
French view of, 38; outlawed, 42 

Atlas mountains, 72; Berbers in, 82, 93 

Augustine of Hippo, 10 

AUMA. Association of Algerian Mus- 
lim Ulama 

Aures Mountains, 73; Berbers in, 82, 83, 
93; population in, 81 

autogestion, 58, 61, 153, 178 

Averroes. Seelbn Rushd 

Baader-Meinhof Gang: military support 
for, 240 

balance of payments, 1 70 

BaniAbd el Wad, 16 

Bani Merin (Zenata Berbers), 16 

banking, 142; under French rule, 142; 
and investment, 142; privatization in, 
63, 69; reform, 142 

Bank of Local Development (Banque de 
Developpement Local) , 142 

Bank of Manufacturing and Services 
(Banque des Industries de Transfor- 
mation et des Services), 142 

banks: foreign, 134; privatized, 63, 69 



Banque Algerienne de Developpement. 
See Algerian Development Bank 

Banque Centrale d'Algerie. See Central 
Bank of Algeria 

Banque de Developpement Local. See 
Bank of Local Development 

Banque de l'Agriculture et du Deve- 
loppement Rural. See Agriculture and 
Rural Development Bank 

Banque des Industries de Transforma- 
tion et des Services. St*? Bank of Manu- 
facturing and Services 

Banque Exterieure d'Algerie. See Foreign 
Bank of Algeria 

Banque Nationale d'Algerie. See National 
Bank of Algeria 

Banque Nationale de Paris: loan from, 
137 

Banu Hilal tribe, 14 
Banu Sulaym tribe, 14 
baraka, 17 

Barbarossa. See Khair ad Din 
barrage vert (green barrier), 160, 272 
Batna: population of, 80 
Battle of Algiers (1956), 49, 50 
Battle of Sedan (1870), 30 
Bechar oasis, 72 

beduin: arrival of, 14; sedentarization of, 

94-95; social structure of, 91 
Bejaia, 13, 73; port of, 163 
Bejaia Plain, 72 

Belgium: bilateral credit lines with, 137 
Belhadj, Ali, xxx, xxxi, 63, 209; arrested, 

64, 187, 282 
Belhouchet, Abdallah, 256 
Belisarius, 11 

Belkheir, Larbi, 188, 259; in coup d'etat 

of 1992, 64 
Ben Ali, Zine el Abidine, 225 
Ben Badis, Abd al Hamid, 37-38 
Ben Bella, Ahmed, 43, 44, 256; as com- 
mander in chief, 253-54; deposed, 60; 
external security under, 139; foreign 
policy of, 130-31; nationalist activities 
of, xxviii, xxix, 56-57; opposition to, 
58, 59, 60, 245; as president, 59, 177, 
178; in War of Independence, 46, 47- 
48 

Ben Bella government, 59, 177-78; econ- 
omy under, 129; education under, 100 
Ben Boulaid, Moustafa, 44 
Bendjelloul, Mohamed, 39 



319 



Algeria: A Country Study 



Benhadj, Ali. SeeBelhadj, Ali 

Benjedid, Chadli: forced to resign, 64, 
188, 255, 257; politics of, 61; as presi- 
dent, xxviii-xxiv, 61, 99, 180-81, 237, 
255 

Benjedid government, 61-64, 204-5, 
255; amnesties under, 246-47; anticor- 
ruption campaign under, 182; eco- 
nomic reforms under, xxix, 61, 129- 
30, 131, 156, 175, 181-84, 205, 229, 
248; education under, 100; family 
code under, 200; foreign policy under, 
227, 241; Islam under, 107, 209; manu- 
facturing under, 151; military assis- 
tance under, 240; opposition to, 62; 
political reforms under, 175, 176, 181- 
84, 192, 196, 200, 229, 248; press 
under, 219; social reforms under, 129- 
30 

Benloucif, Moustafa, 257 

Ben M'Hidi, Larbi, 44 

Berber kingdoms, 7-8 

Berber language, 81, 86-87, 249; broad- 
casts in, 90; dialects of, 87, 221 

Berber question, 89-90 

Berber separatism, 249-50 

Berbers, xxvii, 11, 81; arabization of, 14, 
62, 221, 249-50; under Arab rule, 12; 
blood revenge among, 100; under 
Carthaginian rule, 7-8; geographic 
distribution of, 82-83; identification 
with, 82; Islamist attacks on, xxxii; mil- 
itary heritage of, 250; origins of, 3, 5, 
81-82; percentage of, in population, 

82, 249; political parties of, xxix, 91, 
186, 250; political protests by, 62; reli- 
gions of, 10, 107, 108, 249; under 
Roman rule, 8; social structure of, 91, 
93; taxes on, 12; and women, 102 

Berbers, Chaouia, 72; anti-French upris- 
ings by, 38-84; dialect of, 87, 221; and 
women, 102 

Berbers, Kabyle, 59, 82, 83; antiarabiza- 
tion demonstrations by, 90; anti- 
French uprisings by, 38-84; cultural 
movement of, 89-90; dialect of, 87, 
116, 221; as evolues, 88; migration by, 

83, 92, 93-94, 1 24; villages of, 93 
Berbers, Kutama: converted to Islam, 13 
Berbers, Mzab, 74, 82, 84; dialect of, 87, 

221 

Berbers, Tuareg, 81, 82, 84-86, 245; dia- 



lect of, 87, 221; occupations of, 86; 

population of, 84 
Berbers, Zenata, 16 
bidonvilles. See shanty towns 
biens vacants. See housing, abandoned 
birth control. See family planning 
Biskra oasis, 72 
Bitat, Rabah, 44, 56 

Black October riots, 130, 132, 183, 184, 

196, 213, 247-48, 257,268, 280 
Black Panthers: military support for, 240 
Blida: population of, 80 
Blum, Leon, 38 

border problems: with Mali, 226; with 
Mauritania, 226, 245; with Morocco, 
222, 242, 252; with Niger, 226; with 
Tunisia, 222, 245 

border security, 244-45 

Boudiaf, Mohamed, 44; assassinated, 
xxx, 190, 248, 256, 259; as head of 
state, xxx, 64, 189, 207; opposition of, 
to Ben Bella, 58 

Boumediene, Houari, 56-57, 97, 177; as 
ALN chief of staff, 252; coup by, 60, 
131, 178, 192, 256; death of, xxviii, 61, 
131, 180; opposition to, 61, 245; poli- 
tics of, 60-61; as president, 61, 237; 
support for, 1 80 

Boumediene government, 60-61, 178- 
81; agrarian reform under, 156, 213; 
arabization under, 89, 220; education 
under, 100; elite under, 205; external 
security under, 239; foreign policy 
under, 242; industrialization under, 
97; Islam under, 107; legal system 
under, 199; local government under, 
202; political parties under, 195, 204; 
political reform under, 194 

Bourguiba, Habib, 225 

Boutamine, Mohamed Mokhtar, 262 

Bouyali, Moustapha, 247 

Britain: materiel from, 264, 274, 276-77; 
trade with, 18 

Brooke Marine, 264 

budget, 135-36 

budget deficit: efforts to limit, 136 
Bugeaud, Thomas, 25; military strategy 
of, 26 

bureaucracy. See civil service 
Bureau Politique. See Political Bureau 
bureaux arabes, 27 
Byzantine rule, 3 



320 



Index 



Byzantines, xxvii, 11 

Cairo: established, 13 

Caisse Nationale d'Epargne et de Prevoy- 
ance. See National Fund for Provident 
Savings 

Cambon, Jules, 34 

Capsian culture, 4-5 

Carthage, 7-8; destroyed, 7, 11 

Carthaginian rule, 3; Berbers under, 7- 
8, 250; opposition to, 250; towns estab- 
lished under, 7 

Catholicism, Roman: introduction of, 
111 

Catholic missions. See missions 

Catroux, Georges, 41 

CCE. See Committee of Coordination 

and Enforcement 
CCN. See National Consultative Council 
censorship, 219 
census, 76, 77 

Central Bank of Algeria (Banque Cen- 
trale d'Algerie), 134; established, 142; 
exchange rate under, 137, 171; finan- 
cial management by, 135 

Chabaani, Mohamed, 59 

Chad: Libya's invasion of, 244 

Challe, Maurice, 51 

Charles X: deposed, 23 

Chelif River valley, 72 

children: custody of, 105 

China, People's Republic of: materiel 
from, 264, 273, 277 

Christianity {see also under individual 
denominations): conversion to, 10; her- 
esies of, 10; introduction of, 10, 111 

Christians: under Islam, 11, 110 

civil aviation, 164 

civil service: under Almohad rule, 16 
Classical period, 7-1 1 
Claudius, 8 

Clauzel, Bertrand, 23-24, 25 
Clemen ceau, Georges, 32-33, 35 
climate, 74-75, 157; rainfall, 74, 153 
CNDR. See National Committee for the 

Defense of the Revolution 
CNRA. See National Council of the Alge- 
rian Revolution 
CNT. See National Transitional Council 
Coast Guard, 263, 264-65 
Colonial Bank of Algeria, 142 
colonial rule. See French rule 



colonists. See colons 

colons {see also European settlers): con- 
servatism of, 38, 39, 44; exodus of, 57, 
122, 130; hegemony of, 32-34; origins 
of, 24; property abandoned by, 1 21— 
22, 153; uprising of 1960 by, 54; vigi- 
lante units of, 46 

Comite de Coordination et d'Execution. 
See Committee of Coordination and 
Enforcement 

Comite National pour la Defense de la 
Revolution. See National Committee 
for the Defense of the Revolution 

Comite Revolutionnaire d'Unite et 
d'Action. See Revolutionary Commit- 
tee of Unity and Action 

Commissariat aux Energies Nouvelles. 
See Commissariat for New Energy 

Commissariat for New Energy (Commis- 
sariat aux Energies Nouvelles), 149 

Committee Against Torture, 282 

Committee for the Legal Equality of 
Men and Women, 218 

Committee of Coordination and 
Enforcement (Comite de Coordina- 
tion et d'Execution— CCE) , 47 

Committee of Public Safety, 51-52 

Communal Popular Assembly (Assem- 
ble Populaire Communale — APC), 
203 

communications. See telecommunica- 
tions 

concentration camps, 51, 56, 84, 95 

Congo: military support for, 239 

Conquest of Literacy program, 1 1 6-1 8 

Conseil National de la Revolution Algeri- 
enne. See National Council of the 
Algerian Revolution 

Conseil Consultatif National. See 
National Consultative Council 

Conseil National de Transition. See 
National Transitional Council 

Constantine, 10; airport of, 164; French 
administration of, 29; migration to, 
79; population of, 80 

Constantine Plan (1954), 112 

constitution of 1963, 59, 178; political 
parties under, 195; president under, 
194; suspended, 60, 179, 192 

constitution of 1976, 180, 192-93; armed 
forces under, 272; freedom of expres- 
sion under, 219; judiciary under, 200; 



321 



Algeria: A Country Study 



political parties under, 195; promul- 
gated, 61; revisions to, 193 
constitution of 1989, xxix, 63, 185, 192, 
193; divisive issues in, 193; labor 
under, 282; political parties under, 
196-97, 282; president under, 194, 
257; suspended, 206; women under, 
63 

construction industry, 151-52; neglect 
of, 136 

consumer goods: imports of, 138, 169; 

shortages of, 62, 247 
Coordinating Directorate of Territorial 

Security, 280 
cotton: production of, 24 
Coty, Rene, 52 

Council of Carthage (256), 10 
Council of Ministers, 60, 255, 257 
Council of the Revolution, 60, 178-80, 
194, 195, 204, 254; eliminated, 204; 
members of, 60, 254—55 
coups d'etat: of 1958, 52; of 1965, 60, 
131, 178, 192, 254; of 1992, xxx, 64, 
175, 176, 188, 196, 198, 237, 206, 230 
coups d'etat, attempted, 179, 245, 254 
courts, 280-81; antiterrorism 281; Cham- 
ber of Accusation, 201; military, 189, 
201, 281; provincial, 201; secular, 198- 
99; sharia, 91, 198-99; state security, 
281; tribunal, 201 
Couscous Revolt. See Black October 
Credit Populaire d'Algerie. See Popular 

Credit of Algeria 
Cremieux, Adolphe, 30-31 
Cremieux Decrees (1870), 31, 111 
criminal justice system (see also judicial 

system; courts), 280-83 
crops, 157-58 

CRUA. See Revolutionary Committee of 

Unity and Action 
cultural revolution (1970), 99 
currency, 137-38; devaluation of, xxxiv, 

138, 171 

Dahra massif: Berbers in, 82 

Darlan, Jean Louis, 40 

debt, external, 136-37, 171; amount of, 

xxxv, 136, 137; attempts to reschedule, 

xxxv 

debt payments, xxxiv, 136-37 
debt rescheduling, 137; with London 
Club, xxxv; with Paris Club, xxxv 



debt servicing, 136-37, 170, 171 

Decatur, Stephen, 22 

defense spending, 1 36, 270-72 

de Gaulle, Charles, 41, 51, 52-54 

de Lamoriciere, Louis, 26 

Delegation Generate de Documentation 
et Surete. See General Delegation for 
Documentation and Security 

Democratic Union of the Algerian Mani- 
festo (Union Democratique duMani- 
feste Algerien — UDMA) , 42; support 
for, 45 

democratization, 184—88 

demonstrations. See political demonstra- 
tions 

Denmark: war with, 22 
Derradji, Tayeb, 259 
dey, 20 

DGDS. See General Delegation for Docu- 
mentation and Security 
Didouch, Mourad, 44 
Diocletian, 10 

Directions des Infrastructures de Base. 
See Directorates for Basic Infrastruc- 
tures 

Directorates for Basic Infrastructures 
(Directions des Infrastructures de 
Base), 163 

Distrigaz, 147 

divorce, 105 

Djafar al Afghani (see also Mourad Sid 

Ahmed) , xxxii 
Djanet oasis, 86 
Djendjene: port of, 163 
Djenouhat, Mohamed, 259 
Djouadi, Abdelhamid, 259 
Donatist controversy, 10 
drought, 153; of 1866, 31; of 1994, xxxiv 

earthquakes: of 1989, xxxiv 
EC. See European Community 
economic austerity measures, xxxvii, 
132,136 

economic development, 132; plans, 129- 
30 

economic plans, 130-31; First Five-Year 
(1980-84), 61, 131, 151-52, 156; First 
Four-Year (1970-73), 131; First Three- 
Year (1967-69), 131; Second Five-Year 
(1985-89), 122, 131, 151-52, 156-57; 
Second Four- Year (1974-77), 118, 
131; Third Five-Year (1990-94), 131 



322 



Index 



economic policy: factors influencing, 
132 

economic reform, xxix, xxxiv, 132-34; 
under Benjedid, 61, 62-63, 130, 183, 
184,229 

economy: under Ben Bella, 129; decline 
of, 62; liberalization of, xxviii-xxiv, 
131, 132, 139, 175, 181-84, 205, 223; 
prehistoric, 5; role of government in, 
131-34; socialist, 129, 130 

Edjeleh oil fields, 145 

education (see also schools), 112-18; Ara- 
bic in, 90, 112, 116; arabization in, 
112-13, 115, 220, 221; of elite, 96-97; 
French as language of, 90, 112, 116, 
232; under French rule, 33-34, 88, 
112, 215; of girls, 100, 115; govern- 
ment responsibility for, 203; govern- 
ment spending on, 34, 69, 113, 136; 
importance of, 96-97, 100; postsec- 
ondary, 100, 115-16, 215; qualifica- 
tion for military officers, 268; 
reorganization of, 112-14; technical, 
115; track system in, 114; vocational, 
115; of women, 115, 215 

Egalite, 41 

Egypt: materiel from, 273; military train- 
ing in, 262; relations with, 227 

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 40 

elections: candidates in, 194-95; of 1947, 
43; of 1948, 43; of 1951 , 43; of 1962, 
177; of 1963, 178; of 1976, 180; of 
1977, 180; of 1979, 180-81; of 1990, 
xxix, xxxv, 186, 196, 210, 248; of 1991, 
xxxv, 175, 188, 196, 197-98, 250, 255; 
postponed, 186, 188; rigged, 43; voter 
turnout at, 202 

electoral law of 1990, 64 

electoral system, 198 

electric power, 149; hydro, 149; invest- 
ment in, 139, 140; nuclear, 149; in 
rural areas, 149; solar, 149; subsidies 
for, 138 

El Harrach prison, 283 

elite class, 88, 175, 205-6; Berbers in, 88; 
education of, 96-97; factionalism in, 
205; under French rule, 94; members 
of, 205; as percentage of population, 
96; role of, in government, 196, 204 

employment, 143-45; in agriculture, 
152; growth of, 144; of women, 104, 
143,216 



Enagas, 147 

energy resources (see also electricity; see 
also under individual energy sources), 
145-50; exports of, 179; hydroelectric, 
149; nuclear, 149; solar, 149 

English: broadcasts in, 167 

Enterprises for Cement and Derivatives 
(Entreprises des Ciments et Derives), 
152 

entrepreneurial class, 214 

Entreprise Nationale de Production de 
Produits Pharmaceutiques. See 
National Enterprise for Production of 
Pharmaceuticals 

Entreprises des Ciments et Derives. See 
Enterprises for Cement and Deriva- 
tives 

Entreprises Publiques Economiques. See 
Public Economic Enterprises 

EPEs. See Public Economic Enterprises 

Erem mineral research, 148 

Europe: guestworkers in, 143-44; health 
care professionals from, 120; relations 
with, 229; university study in, 116 

Europe, Eastern: trade with, 168; univer- 
sity study in, 116 

European Community (EC): economic 
aid from, 138; imports from, 157; loan 
from, 137; trade with, 168 

European influence, 37 

European settlers (see also colons), 23, 
29, 93-94; exodus of, 86, 96, 129, 177; 
land owned by, 33; number of, 86, 93; 
origins of, 24, 31 

European Union: loans from, xxxv 

Evian Accords (1962), 54-55, 230 

evolues, 34, 94; politics of, 45 

exchange rate, 137-38, 139, 171 

executive branch (see also president), 
193-94 

Exmouth, viscount, 22 

exports (see also under individual prod- 
ucts), 169-70, 224; of crops, 152, 170; 
to France, xxxvi, 167, 231; to Greece, 
233; of hydrocarbons, 145, 167, 169, 
170, 181, 229-30, 231, 233; to Italy, 
233; of minerals, 149, 170; of natural 
gas, 134; to Turkey, 233; to United 
States, 229-30 

External Delegation: formed, 44 

"Face the Press" (Face a la Presse) , 220 



323 



Algeria: A Country Study 



families, 100-101; extended, 100, 121; 
kinship units in, 92; in War of Inde- 
pendence, 95 

family code, 104-5, 111, 200, 209, 216- 
18 

family planning, 105-6 
family status law, 199; women under, 62, 
199 

famine, xxxiv, 31-32 

Fan on, Frantz, 45-46 

FAO. See United Nations Food and Agri- 
culture Organization 

farmers: urban migration by, 46; social 
structure of, 91 

farming: changes in, 95 

farms: cooperative, 61; state, 153-56 

Fatimids, 13-14 

Federation des Elus Indigenes. See Feder- 
ation of Elected Natives 

Federation of Elected Natives (Federa- 
tion des Elus Indigenes — FEI), 36, 38 

FEI. See Federation of Elected Natives 

feminist groups, 111, 215 

Ferphos iron and phosphate company, 
148 

Ferry, Jules, 32 

FFS. See Front of Socialist Forces 
finance, public, 134-42; decentralization 

of, 135; reform of, 25, 135 
FIS. See Islamic Salvation Front 
fishing, 160 
flag, 26-27 

FLN. See National Liberation Front 
floods, 153 

FMS. See United States Foreign Military 
Sales Program 

food: imports of, 134, 169, 181; prices, 
181; shortages of, 62, 132, 134, 181, 
183, 247; subsidies for, 157 

foreign assistance, 138; from Arab coun- 
tries, 138; from European Union, 
xxxv; from France, xxxv, 138; from 
Italy, 138; from London Club, xxxv; 
from Paris Club, xxxv; from Spain, 
138; from the United States, 230 

Foreign Bank of Algeria (Banque 
Exterieure d'Algerie), 142 

foreign debt. See debt, external 

Foreign Legion, 54; atrocities committed 
by, 50; established, 25; number of 
troops in, 50 

foreign military assistance, 272-77 



foreign polity, 221-33 

forestry, 153, 160; area of, 160; reforesta- 
tion schemes in, 76, 160 

forests: reduction of, 75 

France: bilateral credit lines with, 137; 
blockade of Algiers by, xxviii, 22; cafe 
wars in, 45; dependency on, 230; eco- 
nomic aid from, xxxv, 138, 231; 
exports to, xxxvi, 149, 167, 231; guest- 
workers in, xxxvi, 35, 78, 143-44, 231- 
32; health care professionals from, 
120; immigrants in, 78-79; influence 
of, xxxv-xxxvi; invasion by, xxviii, 22- 
23; intervention of, in Western 
Sahara, 231; Islamists in, 232, 249; 
materiel from, 273, 276; migration to, 
78, 83, 93-94, 124, 231-32; military 
advisersfrom, 274-76; military train- 
ing in, 262, 264, 274-75, 278; opposi- 
tion in, to War of Independence, 53; 
refusal of, to recognize government- 
in-exile, 54; relations with, xxxvi, 230- 
33, 276; settlers from, 24, 94; terrorism 
in, 45, 53, 54; trade with, 18, 168; 
troops of, in War of Independence, 50 

Free French, 40, 250 

French citizenship, 86; conditions for, 
30, 34; for evolves, 34; for Jews, 31. 40; 
for Muslims, 39 

French Colonial Bank of Algeria, 134 

French Communist Party, 36, 37 

French language: broadcasts in, 90, 167, 
232; education in, 112, 115, 116, 232; 
newspapers in, 220, 232 

French rule (.see also colonists), 3-4, 22- 
56, 93-94; administration under, 27; 
banking under, 142; colonization bv, 
27; education under 33, 88, 112, 215; 
influence of, 3-4; judicial system 
under, 198; land distribution under, 
23-24, 29-30; legacv of. 210-11; mili- 
tary rule under, 27-32; Muslims 
under, 29-30, 110; opposition to, 
xxviii, 24-25, 83-84, 249; rationale for, 
23, 24; reform under, 41; social orga- 
nization under, 96; taxes under, 33; 
tribal structure under, 29-30; urban 
migration under, 93; veiling under, 
102, 215; women under, 215 

Friends of the Manifesto and Liberty 
(Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberte — 
AML). 41 



324 



Index 



Front des Forces Socialistes. See Front of 
Socialist Forces 

Front de Liberation Nationale. See 
National Liberation Front 

Front Islamique du Salut. See Islamic Sal- 
vation Front 

Front of Socialist Forces (Front des 
Forces Socialistes — FFS) , xxix, xxx, 91, 

186, 187, 250; in elections of 1990, 
197; in elections of 1991, 188, 197, 
250; formed, 59 

gas, natural: export of, 134, 229-30, 231, 
233; income from, xxix, 134-35, 147- 
48; liquefied, 147-48; prices, 231; 
reserves, 129, 147; subsidies for, 138 

Gassi Touil gas field, 147 

Gaz de France, 147 

GDP. See gross domestic product 

Gendarmerie Nationale. See National 
Gendarmerie 

General Confederation of Algerian Eco- 
nomic Operators, 214 

General Delegation for Documentation 
and Security (Delegation Generale de 
Documentation et Surete — DGDS), 
280 

generals' putsch (1961), 54-56 

General Union of Algerian Merchants 
and Artisans, 214 

General Union of Algerian Workers 
(Union Generale des Travailleurs 
Algeriens— UGTA), 58, 144, 189 

Genoa: raiders from, 14 

geographic regions, 72-74; High Pla- 
teaus, 72; northeast, 73; Sahara, 73- 
74; Saharan Atlas, 72; the Tell, 72 

geostrategic situation, 244-45 

gerrymandering, 186-88, 198 

Ghardaia oasis, 84 

Ghezaiel, Abbas, 257 

Ghodbane, Chaabane, 264 

Ghozali, Sid Ahmed, xxx, 64; in coup 
d'etat of 1992, 64; as prime minister, 

187, 188; resignation of, 190 
Ghozali government, 187 
GIA. See Armed Islamic Group 
Giraud, Henri, 40 

GNP. See gross national product 
gold: trade in, 17 

Gouvernement Provisionel de la Repu- 
blique Algerienne. See Provisional 



Government of the Algerian Republic 

government: Arabic as language of, 90, 
221, 221; decentralization of, 69; 
crackdown on Islamists, 110-11, 208, 
248-49; press under, 219; role of, in 
economy, 131-34, 177; structure of, 
176, 193-95, 204-5; women in, 218 

government, local, 202-3; under Boume- 
diene, 202; commune, 203; dawair, 
203; decentralization of, 202; in Kaby- 
lie, 83; municipal, 203; wilayat, 202-3 

government revenue, 135-36; from 
hydrocarbons, 135 

government spending, 69, 136; on agri- 
culture, 156; on defense, 270 

GPRA. See Provisional Government of 
the Algerian Republic 

grain: imports, 157; production, 157 

Grand Erg Oriental (Great Eastern Erg) , 
73, 74 

Grand Erg Occidental (Great Western 
Erg), 74 

Grande Kabylie, 72 

Grand Mosque of Cordoba, 15 

Grand Mosque of Tilimsan, 15 

Greater Maghrib, 223 

Great Eastern Erg. See Grand Erg Orien- 
tal 

Great Western Erg. See Grand Erg Occi- 
dental 

Greece: relations with, 233 

gross domestic product (GDP): growth 
rate, xxxiv 

gross domestic product fractions: agri- 
culture, 134, 152-53; health care, 119; 
hydrocarbons, 145; industry, 151; 
manufacturing, 134 

gross national product (GNP): defense 
spending as percentage of, 270, 271 

Groupe Islamique Armee. See Armed 
Islamic Group 

Guenaizia, Abdelmalek, 257 

guestworkers, xxxvi, 35, 78, 224, 231-32; 
remittances by, 143, 144, 170 

Guinea-Bissau: support for revolutionar- 
ies in, 226 

Hafsids, 16, 19 
Hammadids, 13 
Hamrouche, Mouloud, 187 
harkis, 50, 78 
Hasfids, 17 



325 



Algeria: A Country Study 



Hassan ibn Khair ad Din, 19 
Hassan II, 242 

Hassi Messaoud oil field, 145, 147, 148 

Hassi R'Mel gas field, 147, 148 

Haut Conseil de Surete. See High Secu- 
rity Council 

Haut Conseil d'Etat. See High Council of 
State 

Hauts Plateaux. See High Plateaus 
HCE. SeeHigh Council of State 
health, 118-21 

health care: access to, 118-19; spending 

on, 69, 119 
health care professionals, 18; in armed 

forces, 267; foreign, 120-21; number 

of, 120; training of, 120 
health care system: organization of, 119; 

reorganization of, 118 
health facilities, 119 

High Council of State (Haut Conseil 
d'Etat— HCE), xxvii, 192, 200, 206-7, 
255, 257; formed, 64, 189, 237, 257; 
intelligence activities of, 280 

High Judicial Council, 194, 200, 201-2 

High Plateaus (Hauts Plateaux), 72, 75 

High Security Council (Haut Conseil de 
Surete), xxvii, xxx, 188, 207, 257 

hijackers: landing clearance for, 229 

Hilton Hotels, 143 

Hippo Regius, 7, 10, 11 

Horizons, 220 

Home, Alistair, 56 

hotels, 143 

Houari Boumediene University of Sci- 
ence and Technology, 1 15-16 

households, 100-101 

housing, 121-24; in abandoned proper- 
ties, 121-22, 151; construction, xxxv, 

122- 23, 272; demand for, 152; under 
economic plans, 122; investment in, 
123; in Kabylie region, 124; policies, 
151-52; in rural areas, 80, 123, 124; 
shortage, xxxv, 69, 94, 121, 122-23, 
136, 151, 152; in urban areas, 81, 94, 

123- 24 
Hussein Dey, 23 

hydrocarbon industry (see also oil; petro- 
leum), 129, 145-48, 164; attempt to 
diversify, 135; exports by, 145, 167, 
169, 170, 170, 181; investment in, 139; 
nationalized, 230; as percentage of 
gross domestic product, 145; prices in, 



134; processing, 150; restructuring of, 
147; revenue from, 135 

Ibero-Maurusian culture, 5 

Ibn Rushd (Averroes), 16 

imams, 12-13, 208 

Imazighen. See Berbers, Kabyle 

IMET. See International Military Educa- 
tion and Training 

IME See International Monetary Fund 

imports: agricultural, 157; of consumer 
goods, 138, 169; controls on, 169; 
demand for, 170; of food, 134, 169, 
181; of industrial goods, 169; liberal- 
ization of, 139-40, 170 

income: per capita, 69 

independence, 55, 56-57, 129, 175, 177; 
interest in, 41 

indigenization: in education, 112-13 

industrialization, 181; under Boumedi- 
ene, 97, 179, 205 

industry, 150-52; under Ben Bella, 178; 
under Boumediene, 179; emphasis 
on, 131, 132, 136; government role in, 
177-78, 203; imports by, 169; national- 
ized, 130, 179; as percentage of gross- 
domestic product, 151; prehistoric, 5; 
restructuring in, 151 

infant mortality, 118 

inflation, xxxiv, 196 

infrastructure: development of, 136, 238 

intelligence agencies (see also under indi- 
vidual agencies) , 189, 245-46, 279-80 

Inter-Air Services, 166 

internal security, 277-84 

Intelsat. See International Telecommuni- 
cations Satellite Corporation 

International Atomic Energy Agency, 
277 

International Finance Corporation: 
membership in, 140 

International Military Education and 
Training (IMET), 276 

International Monetary Fund (IMF): 
loans from, xxxiv-xxxv; standby agree- 
ment with, 137, 138, 170 

International Telecommunications Sat- 
ellite Corporation (Intelsat), 167 

International Women's Day, 215 

investment, 139-42; and banking, 142; 
liberalized, 139, 182; in manufactur- 
ing, 151; priorities for, 139; spending, 



326 



Index 



136; in tourism, 139, 143 
investment, foreign, 132, 140, 171, 182; 
objectives of, 140; regulation of, 140- 
42 

Iran: release of hostages from, 207, 230 
Iran-Iraq War, 228 

Iraq: invasion of Kuwait by, 222, 228, 
241; support for, 228 

irrigation, 33, 153, 157 

iron, 129; deposits, 148; exports of, 169, 
170; mines, 149; mining, 148 

Islam, 11-17, 106-11; conversion to, 12- 
13, 107; government role in, 209, 247; 
history of, 107-8; identification with, 
107, 207; impact of, xxvii; introduc- 
tion of, 3, 108; legal schools of, 91; 
mystical, 17; proselytizing in, 109-10; 
role of, xxxiii, 178; as state religion, 
xxxiii; tenets of, 108-9; worship in, 
109 

Islam, Ibadi, 12,84, 91, 108 

Islam, Ibadi Khariji, 12; refugees, 13 

Islam, Ismaili Shia, 13 

Islam, Shia, 108 

Islam, Sufi, xxxiii 

Islam, Sunni, 107-8, 249 

Islamic brotherhoods, 108 

Islamic fundamentalists. See Islamists 

Islamic Jihad, 241 

Islamic law, Maliki, 16, 91, 249 

Islamic reform movement, 37 

Islamic schools, 37, 91 

Islamic Salvation Army (Armee 
Islamique du Salut — AIS), xxxi-xxxii 

Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique 
du Salut — FIS), xxvii, xxix, 187; agita- 
tion by, 64; banned, xxx, 64, 189, 207, 
248, 249, 255-56; in elections of 1990, 
186, 197, 210, 248; in elections of 
1991, 188, 237, 197, 255; founded, 63; 
origins of, 110; platform of, xxxiv, 
209-10; role of, 209-10; support for, 
99, 175 

Islamism, 207-10; rise of, xxxvi, 207-8, 
232, 255 

Islamist groups: appeal of, xxix, xxxiii, 
175, 208-9; attacks by, on Berbers, 
xxxii; counterattacks on, xxxii; distri- 
bution of, 259; government crack- 
downs on, 110-11, 189-90, 237, 208, 
232, 248-49, 256, 282; Libyan support 
for, 244; origins of, 110; political oppo- 



sition by, 247-49; proliferation of, 
xxxiv, 110, 208, 248; social programs 
of, 208; terrorist activities of, xxxii, 
189,190,191,237, 247, 256 

Islamists, xxvii, 191; arrested, xxx, 187, 
189, 200, 248, 282, 283; in elections of 
1990, xxxv, 175; in France, 232; goals 
of, 69; influence of, 62; number of, 
xxxiii; opposition to, 189, 224, 268; 
protests by, 62 

Islamization, 11-17 

Israel, 240 

Italy: bilateral credit lines with, 1 37; eco- 
nomic aid from, 138; exports to, 233; 
materiel from, 264-65; relations with, 
233; settlers from, 24, 94; trade with, 
18, 168 

janissaries, 19-20 

Japan: bilateral credit lines with, 137 
Jaures, Jean, 33 
Jeune Afrique, 280 

Jeunesse Algerienne. See Young Algeri- 
ans 

Jews {see akojudaism): arrival of, 10; exo- 
dus of, 55, 86, 111-12; French citizen- 
ship for, 31, 40; under Islam, 11,110; 
number of, 111; as refugees, 55; from 
Spain, 17 

jihad: of Abd al Qadir, 25-26 

joint ventures, 132, 139, 168 

Jonnart, Charles: as governor general, 35 

Jonnart Reforms (1919), 35-36 

Jordan: relations with, 227 

journalists {see also media; press): 
arrested, 220; role of, 219, 220 

journalists' associations, 63, 219 

Journal Officiel, 1 35 

Judaism {see also Jews): Berber conver- 
sion to, 10, 108 
judges, 200 

judicial system, 198-202 
Justinian, 11 

Kabyle language, 87, 116; broadcasts in, 
167 

Kabyle people. See Berbers, Kabyle 
Kabylie Mountains, 73; Berbers in, 82; 

population in, 81 
Kabylie region, 16, 249; electricity gener- 
ation in, 149; French administration 
of, 32; housing in, 124; migrants from, 



327 



Algeria: A Country Study 



78; villages in, 83; and War of Inde- 
pendence, 83 
Kabylie revolts, xxviii, 31-32, 83-84 
Kan, Ali, xxx, 207; as head of state, 190, 
207 

Khair ad Din (Barbarossa), xxvii, 19 

Khalid ibn Hashim, 36 

Kharijites, 12 

Khemisti, Fatima, 215 

Khemisti Law (1963), 215-16 

Khider, Mohamed, 44, 56; corruption by, 

58; exiled, 58; murdered, 246 
Krim, Belkacem, 44; murdered, 246 
Ksour massif, 72 
Kusayla, 12 

Kuwait: Iraq's invasion of, 222, 241 

labor movement: growth of, 212 
labor unions, 45, 145, 171, 211-12 
Lacoste, Robert, 47; new administrative 

structure under, 47 
Laghouat oasis, 72 
Lamari, Mohamed, 190 
Lam tuna tribe, 14 

land: abandoned, 153; arable, 129, 153; 
area, 69, 129; erosion, xxxiv; French 
acquisition of, 23-24, 32, 93, 153; leg- 
islation, 123; nationalized, 213; owner- 
ship, 30, 93, 153; privatized, 182; 
redistribution of, 61, 98, 153, 156, 214 

land reform, 153-57; under Tripoli Pro- 
gram, 56 

land tenure, 153-57; under French rule, 

29-30 
land use, 81, 153 

language (see also under individual lan- 
guages) : dual system of, 87 
law: secular, 201; sharia, 201, 281 
Law on Money and Credit (1990), 135, 
139 

Law on Trade Union Activity (1990), 
145, 171 

Law Relative to Political Associations 

(1989), 197 
lawyers, 281 

lawyers' associations, 63 
lead, 148; mines, 149 
League of Arab States (Arab League), 
227 

Lebanon: relations with, 227 
legal system: defendants in, 200; revised, 
199 



legislative branch, 194-95; reforms in, 
194 

Le Soir d'Algerie (Algerian Evening), 220 
Libya: disputes with, 241; materiel of, 
244; as member of Union of the Arab 
Maghreb, xxxvi, 223, 241; invasion by, 
of Chad, 244; navy of, 244, 263; rela- 
tions with, 225-26, 243-44, 260; sup- 
port by, for Islamist groups, 244; trade 
with, 168-69 
literacy: programs, 116-118; rate, 87, 
116, 118 

livestock, 93, 158-60; cattle, 158; goats, 
158; grazing, 153; poultry, 158; sheep, 
158 

Loi d'Orientation Fonciere (land legisla- 
tion) (1990), 123 
London Club: loan from, xxxv 
Louis Napoleon (see also Napoleon III), 
26 

Louis Philippe: accession of, 23 

Madani, Abbassi, xxx, xxxi, 63, 209; 
arrested, 64, 187, 282 

Maghrib, 3, 69; Islamism in, xxxvi; 
migration to, 17; prehistoric inhabit- 
ants of, 4-5; relations within, 222-26; 
role in, xxxvi; Spanish influence on, 
18 

Maghrib, Greater, 223 
Maghrib Permanent Consultative Com- 
mittee, 223 
Malek, Redha, xxvii, xxx, 191, 207 
Malek government, xxx; anti-terrorist 
activities of, xxxii; talks by, with terror- 
ists, xxx 
Mali: border conflicts with, 226 
Maliki law. See Islamic law, Maliki 
Manifesto of the Algerian People (1943), 
40-41 

manufacturing, 132, 148, 151; under 
French rule, 33; government empha- 
sis on, 134; investment in, 151; as per- 
centage of gross domestic product, 
134 

marabouts, 17, 25, 93, 108; cults of, 17; 

influence of, xxxiii, 17 
March Decrees (1963), 57-58 
Marrakech, 15 

marriage: age for, 102, 216-18; agree- 
ments, 101; contracts, 101; laws, 101; 
women in, 105 



328 



Index 



martial law, xxvii, xxx, 176, 186, 282-83; 

individual freedom under, 200 
Masinissa, 7 

mass associations, 63, 211 

Massu, Jacques, 50, 52 

materiel, 238; air force, 262, 263; army, 
261; from Britain, 264, 274, 276-77; 
from China, 264, 273, 277; diversity of, 
274; from Eastern Europe, 274; from 
Egypt, 273; from France, 273, 274, 
276; from Germany, 274; from Italy, 
264; navy, 264; procurement of, 272; 
from the Soviet Union, 238, 240, 261, 
262, 263, 264, 272-74; from the 
United States, 263, 274, 276 

Maternal and Infant Protection Centers 
(PMICS), 106 

Mauritania, 7; border dispute with, 226, 
245; as member of Union of the Arab 
Maghreb, xxxvi, 223, 241; relations 
with, 224; as signatory of Treaty of Fra- 
ternity and Concord, 223; trade with, 
168-69 

May Day demonstrations (1945), 41-42 
MDA. See Movement for Democracy in 

Algeria 
Medeghri, Ahmed, 60 
Medea: founded, 13 

media (see also journalists; press): restric- 
tions on, 220 

Mediene, Mohamed, 279 

men, 101-4; in population, 76, 77; social 
organization of, 100 

Mendes-France, Pierre, 44-45 

merchant class, 94 

Merinids, 17 

Mers el Kebir: Spanish conquest of, 18 
Messadia, Mohamed Cherif, 1 85 
Messali Hadj, Ahmed, 36-37; arrested, 
43; French view of, 38; opposition of, 
to Ben Bella, 58; political parties of, 
39,41,45 
MIA. See Armed Islamic Movement 
middle class: members of, 97-98; as per- 
centage of population, 96 
Middle East affairs, 227-28 
migration, 78-79; to France, 78, 231-32; 

to urban areas, 46, 79 
Miliana: founded, 13 
military: academies, 262; advisers, 274- 
76; conscription, 240, 265-67; con- 
scripts, 238, 259; heritage, 250-56; 



regions, 259; strategy, 26 

military officers, 267; educational 
requirements of, 268; purge of, 256- 
57; ranks of, 269-70; reorganization 
of, xxxii, 257; training of, 261-62 

military personnel, 265-68 

military rule, 27-32, 206-7 

Military Security (Securite Militaire), 
245-46, 277-78, 279-80 

military training, 264; of foreign sol- 
diers, 239; in foreign countries, 261- 
62, 264, 274-76 

millet system, 20 

minerals, 148-49; investment in, 139 
Minimum Activity Wage (Salaire Mini- 
mum d'Activite), 144 
mining, 148-49; under French rule, 33 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fishing, 116, 
213 

Ministry of Algerian Affairs (France), 29 
Ministry of Energy and Petrochemical 

Industries, 116 
Ministry of Finance, 135 
Ministry of Higher Education, 114 
Ministry of Information, 219 
Ministry of Interior, Local Communities, 

and Tourism, 163, 254, 264, 279 
Ministry of National Defense, 270 
Ministry of National Education, 114 
Ministry of Planning: abolished, 131 
Ministry of Public Health, 105 
Ministry of Public Works, 163; Airport 

Directorate, 164 
Ministry of Religious Affairs, 110, 208, 

247 

Ministry of Transport, 161, 163 

minorities, religious, 111-12 

missions, Christian, 111; schools of, 114 

Mitidja Plain, 72 

Mitterrand, Francois, 44, 276 

MNA. Soe National Algerian Movement 

modernization, 98; cultural conflict 

caused by, 98 
Money and Credit Council: duties of, 

139; financial management by, 135; 

members of, 1 39 
Moors, 92 
Morice, Andre, 50 
Morice Line, 50-51 

Morocco: air force of, 244; army of, 244; 
attempt by, to annex Western Sahara, 
270, 273, 276; border disputes with, 



329 



Algeria: A Country Study 



222, 252; border treaty with, 242; cap- 
tured by Almohads, 15; disputes with, 
241; as member of Union of the Arab 
Maghreb, xxxvi, 223, 241; military sup- 
port for, 239; navy of, 263; relations 
with, 222, 224-25, 241-43; trade with, 
168-69; war with, 22, 252 

mosques: government-controlled, 110 

Mostaganem: port of, 163; Spanish con- 
quest of, 1 8 

Mouvement Islamique Armee. See 
Armed Islamic Movement 

Mouvement National Algerien. See 
National Algerian Movement 

Mouvement pour la Democratic en Alge- 
rie. See Movement forDemocracy in 
Algeria 

Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Lib- 
ertes Democratiques. See Movement 
for the Triumph of Democratic Liber- 
ties 

Movement for Democracy in Algeria 
(Mouvement pour la Democratic en 
Algerie— MDA), xxix, 186, 228, 249 

Movement for the Triumph of Demo- 
cratic Liberties (Mouvement pour le 
Triomphe des Libertes Democra- 
tiques— MTLD) , 42; end of, 45 

Mozambique: support for revolutionar- 
ies in, 226, 239 

MTLD. See Movement for the Triumph 
of Democratic Liberties 

Mubarak, Husni, 227 

Muhammad (prophet) , 1 08-9 

Muhammad ibn Abdallah ibn Tumart, 
15 

Muhyi ad Din, 25 

Muslims (see also Islam): conversion of, 
in Spain, 17; definition of, 108; duties 
of, 109; under French rule, 29-30, 49; 
suffrage of, 52; taxes on, 109; worship 
by, 109 

Muslim courts. See courts, sharia 
Mzab, 74 

Namibia: support for revolutionaries in, 
226 

Naples: war with, 22 

Napoleon III (see also Louis Napoleon), 
29-30; decree of 1863, 29-30; decree 
of 1865, 30 

Nasser, Gamal Abdul, 44 



National Algerian Movement (Mouve- 
ment National Algerien — MNA), 45 

National Assembly: dissolved, 57, 60, 64, 
179 

National Association of Cork and Wood 
Industries (Societe Nationale des 
Industries des Lieges et du Bois), 160 

National Bank of Algeria (Banque Natio- 
nale d' Algerie), 142 

National Charter (1976), 61, 179, 192- 
93, 195, 204; foreign policy under, 
222; gender equality under, 216 

National Committee for the Defense of 
the Revolution (Comite National pour 
la Defense de la Revolution — CNDR) , 
59 

National Committee on Population, 106 

National Company for Electricity and 
Gas (Societe Nationale de 1'Electricite 
et du Gaz — Sonelgaz), 149 

National Company for Mechanical Con- 
struction (Societe Nationale de Con- 
structions Mecaniques), 151 

National Company for Mineral Research 
and Exploration (Societe Nationale 
de Recherches et d'Exploitations 
Minieres), 148 

National Company for Research, Pro- 
duction, Transportation, Processing, 
and Commercialization of Hydrocar- 
bons (Societe Nationale pour la 
Recherche, la Production, le Trans- 
port, la Transformation, et la Com- 
mercialisation des Hydrocarbures — 
Sonatrach), 147, 148, 168; formed, 
132; joint ventures of, 139 

National Consultative Council (Conseil 
Consultatif National— CCN), 192, 207 

National Corporation for Maritime 
Transport and the Algerian National 
Navigation Company (Societe Nation- 
ale de Transports Maritimes et 
Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de 
Navigation— SNTM-CNAN), 163 

National Council of the Algerian Revolu- 
tion (Conseil National dela Revolu- 
tion Algerienne — CNRA) , 47 

National Enterprise for Production of 
Pharmaceuticals (Entreprise Nation- 
ale de Production de Produits Phar- 
maceutiques) , 168 

National Fund for Provident Savings 



330 



Index 



(Caisse Nationale d'Epargne et de Pre- 
voyance), 142 
National Gendarmerie (Gendarmerie 
Nationale), 238, 256, 257, 274-76, 
277, 278 

National Guaranteed Minimum Wage 
(Salaire National Minimum Garanti) , 
144 

national identity, 88 
nationalism, 34-39 

nationalist movement, 34-39; leaders of, 
34-35 

nationalization: of abandoned property, 
153; of agriculture, 130, 179; under 
Benjedid, 130; under Boumediene, 
179; of industry, 130, 179; in March 
Decrees, 57-58; of news media, 219; 
under Tripoli Program, 56 

National Liberation Army (Armee de 
Liberation Nationale — ALN), 250; 
areas controlled by, 49; chief of staff 
of, 252; creation of, xxviii; factions in, 
49; guerrilla warfare by, 48-49, 53; 
materiel of, 251; number of troops in, 
251; organization of, 48, 250-51; train- 
ing of, 251 

National Liberation Front (Front de 
Liberation Nationale — FLN), 44, xxx, 
45-46, 55, 131; armed forces in, 237; 
under Benjedid, 196; under Boumedi- 
ene, 179, 204; under constitution of 
1989, 196; creation of, xxviii; in elec- 
tions of 1990, 196; in elections of 
1991, 188, 196; factions in, 49, 56, 187, 
195; government-in-exile of, 52-53, 
177; labor unions under, 212; as politi- 
cal elite, 205; political power of, 176, 
178; popular aversion to, 195-96; role 
of, 195-97; in War of Independence, 
44, 49, 195; workers under, 212 

National Liberation Front Central Com- 
mittee, 193, 205-6 

National Liberation Front Party Con- 
gress, 61 , 205 

National Office to Promote Prefabri- 
cated Construction (Office National 
de la Promotion de la Construction en 
Prefabrique) , 152 

National People's Assembly (Assemblee 
Populaire Nationale— APN), 104, 180, 
194-95; suspended, 189, 195; women 
in, 216 



National Railroad Transportation Com- 
pany (Societe Nationale des Trans- 
ports Ferroviaires — SNTF), 161 

National Transitional Council (Conseil 
National de Transition — CNT) , xxxii 

National Union of Algerian Farmers 
(Union Nationale des Paysans 
Algeriens— UNPA), 213-14 

National Union of Algerian Students 
(Union Nationale des Etudiants 
Algeriens— UNEA), 212; dissolved, 
213 

National Union of Algerian Youth 
(Union Nationale de lajeunesse 
Algerienne— UNJA) , 213 

National Union of Algerian Women 
(Union Nationale des Femmes Algeri- 
ennes— UNFA), 215 

NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organi- 
zation 

natural resources, 145-50 
naval academy, 264 

navy, 256, 263-65; bases of, 264; fleet of, 
238, 263; insignia, ranks, and uni- 
forms, 265; materiel, 264; moderniza- 
tion of, 263; training, 264 

Neolithic civilization, 5 

Nerva, 8 

Netherlands: trade with, 18; war with, 22 
newspapers {see also journalists): banned, 
188 

Nezzar, Khaled, xxx, 255, 256, 256, 257, 
267, 269; in coup of 1992, 188 

Niger: border conflicts with, 226; mili- 
tary support for, 239 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), 53 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 277 

Numidia, 7, 10 

OAS. See Secret Army Organization 
oases, 72 

OAU. See Organization of African Unity 
Occidental Petroleum Corporation, 168 
Office National de la Promotion de la 
Construction en Prefabriquee. See 
National Office to Promote Prefabri- 
cated Construction 
oil {see also hydrocarbons; petroleum), 
145-47; exploration, 146-47; exports 
of, 229-30; income from, xxix, 134- 
35; price crash, xxix, 62, 69, 132, 135, 



331 



Algeria: A Country Study 



170, 181, 184, reserves, 129, 146 
ojaq. Seejanissaries 

One Thousand Socialist Villages pro- 
gram, 123, 156 

OPEC. See Organization of the Petro- 
leum Exporting Countries 

Operation Torch (1942), 40 

Oran: airport of, 164; electricity genera- 
tion at, 149; French administration of, 
29; migration to, 79; population of, 
80; port of, 163; Spanish conquest of, 
18 

Oranian culture, 5 

Organic Statute of Algeria (1947) , 43 
Organisation de l'Armee Secrete. See 

Secret Army Organization 
Organisation Speciale. See Special Orga- 
nization 

Organization of African Unity (OAU), 
225, 226, 239 

Organization of the Petroleum Export- 
ing Countries (OPEC): production 
quotas, 146 

OS. See Special Organization 

Ottoman rule, xxvii, 3, 19-21; massacre 
of 1860 under, 26; social organization 
under, 91-93; opposition to, 249 

Ouarsenis massif: Berbers in, 82 

Oujda Group, 57, 60 

Oulad Nail massif, 72 

Overseas Private Investment Corpora- 
tion, 140 

PAGS. See Socialist Vanguard Party 7 
Palestine Liberation Organization, 227, 
241 

Palestinian nationalists, 227, 240 
Palestinian terrorists, 240-41 
Panhandle, 147 

Paris Club: debt rescheduling with, xxxv 
Pard Communiste Algerien. See Algerian 

Communist Party 
Parti de la Revolution Socialiste. See 

Socialist Revolution Party 
Parti de l'Avant-Garde Socialiste. See 

Socialist Vanguard Party 
Parti du Peuple Algerien. See Party of the 

Algerian People 
Party of the Algerian People (Parti du 

Peuple Algerien— PPA), 37, 41-42; 

formed, 39 
PCA. See Algerian Communist Party 



People's National Army (Armee Natio- 
nale Populaire — ANP). See armed 
forces 

Pfizer, 168 

Philippeville massacre (1955), 46-48 
Phoenicians, 7, 249 

phosphate, 129, 149; exports of, 149, 
169, 170 

physicians' associations, 63 

pieds noirs. See colonists 

Pisa: raiders from, 14 

PLO. See Palestine Liberation Organiza- 
tion 

PMICS. See Maternal and Infant Protec- 
tion Centers 

Polisario. See Popular Front for the Lib- 
eration of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de 
Oro 

political: activity, 216, 218; associations, 
182; culture, 176-77; elite, 175; liber- 
alization, 132, 175, 181-84, 200, 223, 
229, 282; movements, 35-38; partici- 
pation, 184; reform, 63, 175, 176, 184, 
192, 282; unrest, xxix, 132; violence, 
xxxi, 212 

Political Bureau (Bureau Politique), 56- 
57; abolished, 60; formed, 56, 195; 
members of, 255 

political demonstrations, 247-48; of 
1945, 41-42; of 1952, 43; of 1990, 64; 
of 1991, 186, 268; of 1992, xxx; by stu- 
dents, 62, 90, 213, 247; by women, 
104, 216, 218 

political parties {see also under individual 
parties): of Berbers, xxix; under Bou- 
mediene, 195; under constitution of 
1963, 195; legalized, 90-91, 186, 193, 
196-98, 200, 208, 209, 211, 214, 282; 
proliferation of, xxix, 193, 197, 208, 
211, 214; role of, 195-98 

political power: contention for, 177; dis- 
tribution of, 176 

political protest, 38; against Islamists, 
1 89; by women, xxxii 

politics: postindependence, 176-77 

Popular Credit of Algeria (Credit Popu- 
laire d'Algerie), 142 

Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro — 
Polisario) , 224, 242; support for, 225- 
26, 242 

Popular Wilaya Assembly (Assemblee 



332 



Index 



Populaire de Wilaya— APW) , 202-3 
population, 76-81; age distribution in, 
77; of Algiers, 79-80; of Annaba, 80; of 
Batna, 80; of Berbers, 84; of Blida, 80; 
class distribution in, 96; of Constan- 
tine, 80; density, 79-81; distribution 
of, 81, 244; of European settlers, 86, 
93; of Jews, 111; of men, 76, 77; in 
1954, 76; in 1966, 76; in 1990, 76; in 
1993, 76, 129; projected, 76; of Setif, 
80; urban, 91; of women, 76, 77 
population fractions: in agriculture, 153; 
Berbers, 82, 249; elite class, 96; middle 
class, 96; Roman Catholics, 111; rural, 
153 

population statistics: birth rate, 77; death 
rate, 77; fertility rate, 77; growth rate, 
xxxv, 76-77, 80, 105, 106, 121, 132, 
134, 157, 181; infant mortality rate, 
118; life expectancy, 77 

ports, 161, 162-63; improvements in, 
163 

Portugal: trade with, 18 

PPA. See Party of the Algerian People 

prehistory, 4-5; people in, 5 

president (see also executive branch), 
193-94; as commander in chief, 256 

press (see afcojournalists; media; newspa- 
pers), 189, 218-20; 219; censorship of, 
219; function of, 219; government 
control of, 219; nationalization of, 
219; restrictions on, 220 

prices: controls on, 69, 182-83; food, 
181; increases in, xxxiv, 132, 247 

prisoners, 283; escape by, xxxii 

prison camps, 189, 283-84 

prisons: conditions in, 283-84 

privateering, 17, 18-19; organization of, 
18-19; purposes of, 18 

privateers, xxvii-xxviii, 18-19, 92; 
income of, 19; influence of, 19, 20; 
tribute demanded by, 21 

private sector: trade, 170 

privatization, 182, 214 

Programme d'Emploi desjeunes. See 
Youth Employment Program 

professional associations, 45 

Provisional Government of the Algerian 
Republic (Gouvernement Provisionel 
de la Republique Algerienne — 
GPRA), 52-53, 177, 252; recognition 
of, 53, 54 



PRS. Sa? Socialist Revolution Party 
Prussia: war with, 22 

Public Economic Enterprises (Entre- 
prises Publiques Economiques — 
EPEs),131 

Punic Wars, 7 

radio, 167; censorship of, 219 

Rahim, Khelifa, 259 

railroads, 161-62; investment in, 139 

Rally for Culture and Democracy, 91 

Red Beard. SeeKhair ad Din 

Red Brigades: military support for, 240 

reform: under French rule, 41 

refugees: from Andalus, 92; under Fatim- 

ids, 13; under French, 31; from sub- 

Saharan Africa, 245; from War of 

Independence, 55 
regroupement program, 51, 56, 84, 95 
religion (see also under individual sects): of 

Berbers, 10 
religious brotherhoods, 25 
religious minorities, 111-12 
religious unrest, 37 
Republican Guard Brigade, 278 
Revolt of the Mercenaries (341-238 

B.C.), 7 

revolutionaries: support for, 222, 226, 
237, 239, 242-43 

Revolutionary Committee of Unity and 
Action (Comite Revolutionnaire 
d'Unite et d'Action — CRUA) (see also 
National Liberation Front) , 44 

Rhourd en Nous gas field, 147 

Rida, Muhammad Rashid, 37 

riots: of 1988, 130 

Road of African Unity, 164 

roads, 161, 163-64 

Roman Catholic Church. See Catholic 

Church, Roman 
Roman rule, xxvii, 3, 8-10; decline of, 8, 

11; opposition to, 8, 249, 250 
royaume arabe, 29—30 
Ruedy.John, 24,56 

rural areas: electricity in, 149; families 
in, 101; under French rule, 24; hous- 
ing in, 80, 123, 124; kinship units in, 
92; police in, 238; population in, 153; 
religion in, 17; social organization in, 
91, 92, 96; taxes in, 21; women in, 104; 
workers in, 98 

Russia (see also Soviet Union): health 



333 



Algeria: A Country Study 



care professionals from, 120; military 
training in, 264; war with, 22 
Rustumid imamate, 12 

Saddam Husayn, 228 
SADR. See Saharan Arab Democratic 
Republic 

Saharan Arab Democratic Republic 
(SADR) {see also Western Sahara), 225 

Sahara Atlas range, 72, 75 

Sahara Desert, 73; Berbers in, 82; erg, 73 

Sahnoun, Ahmed, 62 

Salaire Minimum d'Activite. See Mini- 
mum Activity Wage 

Salaire National Minimum Garanti. See 
National Guaranteed Minimum Wage 

Salan, Raoul, 50-51, 52 

Sanhaja, 13, 14 

SAS. See Special Administration Section 
schools: enrollments in, 112, 114-5; 

under French rule, 33; Islamic, 37; 

mission, 114; number of, 115; private, 

114; religious, xxxiv, 33, 87, 91; techni- 
cal, 115; vocational, 115 
Second Republic, 179-81, 193 
Secretariat of State for Planning, 131 
Secret Army Organization (Organisation 

de 1'Armee Secrete — OAS), 54, 55 
Secret Organization for Safeguarding 

the Algerian Republic, xxxii 
Section Administrative Specialisee. See 

Special Administration Section 
Securite Militaire. See Military Security 
security concerns: global, 239-41; and 

individual freedom, 200 
security, domestic, 245-50 
security, external, 238-45; under Ben 

Bella, 239; under Boumediene, 239- 

40 

service sector, 142-43 
Setif: population of, 80 
shantytowns, 122, 124 
shipping, 162 
shurfa, 92-93 
Sicily: raiders from, 14 
Sifi, Mokdad, xxvii 
Sivard, Ruth Leger, 271 
Skikda, 73; port of , 163 
slavery: under Arab rule, 12, 92; of for- 
eign sailors, 21, 92 
slaves: trade in, 17 

SNTF. See National Railroad Transporta- 



tion Company 

SNTM-CNAN. See National Corporation 
for Maritime Transport and the Alge- 
rian National Navigation Company 

social classes (see also under individual 
classes) : formation of, 3; system of, 96- 
97 

socialism, 131-32, 175, 176-77, 178-81 
Socialist Revolution Party (Parti de la 

Revolution Socialiste— PRS), 58 
Socialist Vanguard Party (Parti de 

l'Avant-Garde Socialiste— PAGS) , 214 
social services, 136; by Islamist groups, 

208 

social structure, 91-99, 210-11 
social unrest, 63 

Societe Nationale de Constructions 
Mecaniques. See National Company 
for Mechanical Construction 

Societe Nationale de l'Electricite et du 
Gaz — Sonelgaz. See National Company 
for Electricity and Gas 

Societe Nationale de Recherches et 
d'Exploitations Minieres. See National 
Company for Mineral Research and 
Exploration 

Societe Nationale des Industries des 
Lieges et du Bois. See National Associa- 
tion of Cork and Wood Industries 

Societe Nationale des Transports Fer- 
roviaires. See National Railroad Trans- 
portation Company 

Societe Nationale de Transports Mari- 
times et Compagnie Nationale Algeri- 
enne de Navigation. See National 
Corporation for Maritime Transport 
and the Algerian National Navigation 
Company 

Societe Nationale pour la Recherche, la 
Production, le Transport, la Transfor- 
mation, et la Commercialisation des 
Hydrocarbures. See National Company 
for Research, Production, Transporta- 
tion, Processing, and Commercializa- 
tion of Hydrocarbons 

Sofitel hotel chain, 143 

Sonatrach. See National Company for 
Research, Production, Transporta- 
tion, Processing, and Commercializa- 
tion of Hydrocarbons 

Soustelle, Jacques, 46, 52 

Soustelle Plan (1955), 46 



334 



Index 



South Africa: support for revolutionaries 

in, 226, 239, 240 
Southern Rhodesia: military support for, 

240 

South Vietnam. Vietnam, Republic of 

Soviet Union {see also Russia): materiel 
from, 238, 240, 261, 262, 263, 264, 
272-74; military training in, 262 

Spain {see also Andalus): bilateral credit 
lines with, 137; Christian reconquest 
of, 17; conquests by, 18; economic aid 
from, 138; exports to, 149; influence 
of, on Maghrib, 18; relations with, 
233; settlers from, 24, 94; trade with, 
18; war with, 22 

Spanish Inquisition, 17 

Spanish language: broadcasts in, 167 

Special Administration Section (Section 
Administrative Specialises — SAS), 50 

Special Organization (Organisation Spe- 
ciale— OS), 42-43; broken up, 44 

Star. See Star of North Africa 

Star of North Africa (Etoile Nord-Afri- 
cain), 36, 39; banned, 36, 39; demands 
of, 36-37 

state enterprises, 177-78, 203, 205; bro- 
ken up, 61, 64, 182; privatized, 182, 
214 

state farms. See farms, state 

state of emergency: of 1988, 184; of 

1991, 64, 282-83; of 1992, 64, 176, 

189, 192, 248, 255-56, 257 
State Security Court, 281 
steel: investment in, 139; production, 

151 

strikes, xxix, 145, 212, 121, 282; of 1988, 
63, 183 

strikes, general: of 1957, 49-50; of 1980, 

90,249; of 1990, 64, 187 
student associations, 45, 63 
student demonstrations, 62, 213, 247, 

249-50; proarabization, 90 
student unions, 212-13 
students: increase in, xxxv; study abroad 

by, 116 

subsidies: for food, 157; reduction of, 

138, 182-83 
suffrage. See voting 
Siileyman the Magnificent, 19 
Sultani, Abdelatif, 62 
Superior Islamic Council, 247 
Supplementary Finance Law (1990), 



139-40 
Supreme Court, 200-201 
Surete Nationale, 277, 279 
Sus, 15 

Syria: military training in, 262; relations 
with, 227 

taifa. See privateers 

Takfir wal Hijra (Repentance and Holy 

Flight), 248 
Tamanrasset, 81, 86 

Tassili-n-Ajjer, 73; Berbers in, 84; cave 
paintings in, 4-5 

taxes: under Almohad rule, 16; under 
Arab rule, 12; forms of, 135-36; under 
French rule, 33; Muslim, 109; reve- 
nues from, 136; in rural areas, 21 

teachers, 114, 115 

telecommunications, 166-67; interna- 
tional, 166-67; investment in, 140 
telephones, 166, 167 
television, 166, 167; censorship of, 219 
Tell Atlas range, 72, 75; Berbers in, 82 
Tenes: Spanish conquest of, 18 
terrain, 75-76 

terrorism, 229; casualties from, xxxi; in 
France, 45, 53, 54; government activi- 
ties against, xxxii, 50, 191, 248-49; 
Islamist, xxx, xxxi-xxxii, 189, 190, 
191, 237, 247, 256; pro-independence, 
43, 47, 55; and veiling, xxxii 

Tlemcen: Spanish conquest of, 18; 
under Zayanids, 16, 17 

torture, 189, 280, 284 

tourism, 142-43; decentralized, 143; gov- 
ernment role in, 203; investment in, 
139, 143 

Tousmi, Cherif, xxxii 

trade {see also exports; imports) , 167-70, 
231; account, 170; attempts to open, 
132; deficit, 181; domestic, 84; Euro- 
pean merchants in, 18; under French 
rule, 33; in gold, 17; liberalization of, 
171, 182; partners, 168-69; private-sec- 
tor, 170; in slaves, 17 

Trajan, 8 

transit, 3 

transportation, 160-66; airports, 161; 
government role in, 203; infrastruc- 
ture, 160-61; investment in, 140; mod- 
ernization of, 161; ports, 161; 
railroads, 161; roads, 161; urban, 162 



335 



Algeria: A Country Study 



Treaty of Fraternity and Concord 

(1983), 223, 225, 226 
treaty of 1797, 21 
treaty of 1837, 25; broken, 25-26 
treaty of 1989, 237 
Treaty of Oudja (1984), 223, 226 
tribes, 121; under French rule, 29-30; 

structure of, 29-30, 92-93 
Tripoli: war with, 22 
Tripoli Program (1962), 56, 58, 99, 177 
Tunis: war with, 22 

Tunisia: border dispute with, 245; as 
member of Union of the Arab Magh- 
reb, xxxvi, 223, 241; relations with, 
222, 225; as signatory of Treaty of Fra- 
ternity and Concord, 223; trade with, 
168-69 

Turkey: relations with, 233 

Turkish language, 19 

UDMA. See Democratic Union of the 

Algerian Manifesto 
UNEA. See National Union of Algerian 

Students 

UGTA. See General Union of Algerian 
Workers 

UMA. See Union of the Arab Maghrib 

Umayyads, xxvii, 11,12 

underemployment, 144 

unemployment, xxix, 57, 62, 69, 98, 99, 
132, 144, 181, 182, 183, 196; compen- 
sation, 144 

UNESCO. See United Nations Educa- 
tional, Scientific, and Cultural Organi- 
zation 

UNFPA. See United Nations Fund for 

Population Activities 
Union Democratique du Manifeste 

Algerien. Sa? Democratic Union of the 

Algerian Manifesto 
Union du Maghreb Arabe. See Union of 

the Arab Maghrib 
Union Generale des Travailleurs 

Algeriens. See General Union of Alge- 
rian Workers 
Union Nationale de la Jeunesse Algeri- 

enne. See National Union of Algerian 

Youth 

Union Nationale des Etudiants 
Algeriens. Seg National Union of Alge- 
rian Students 

Union Nationale des Femmes Algeri- 



ennes — UNFA. See National Union of 
Algerian Women 
Union Nationale des Paysans Algeriens. 
See National Union of Algerian Farm- 
ers 

Union of Algerian Workers (Union Syn- 
dicate des TravailleursAlgeriens), 45 

Union of the Arab Maghrib (Union du 
Maghreb Arabe — UMA), xxxvi; 
formed, 241, 223-24, 226; members 
of, xxxvi, 138, 241; trade in, 168-69 

Union Syndicale des Travailleurs 
Algeriens. See Union of Algerian Work- 
ers 

United Nations: and War of Indepen- 
dence, 48, 53; and Western Sahara, 
224 

United Nations Educational, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organization (U- 
NESCO), 118 

United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), 158 

United Nations Fund for Population 
Activities (UNFPA), 106 

United States: aid from, 230; exports to, 
229-30; imports from, 157; materiel 
from, 263, 276; military training in, 
264; relations with, xxxvi, 21-22, 229- 
30; trade with, 168; university study in, 
116; war with, 22 

United States Foreign Military Sales Pro- 
gram, 276 

universities, 115; enrollment in, 112, 
116; women in, 100 

University of Algiers, 115; Islamist move- 
ment at, 110-111, 247; system of, 1 1 6 

University of Annaba, 115 

University of Batna, 116 

University of Blida, 116 

University of Constantine, 115 

University of Oran, 115 

University of Science and Technology, 
115 

University of Setif, 116 
University of Sidi Bel Abbes, 115 
University ofTizi Ouzou, 116, 221, 249 
University ofTlemcen, 115 
UNJA. See National Union of Algerian 
Youth 

UNPA. See National Union of Algerian 

Farmers 
Uqbaibn Nan, 11 



336 



Index 



urban areas: families in, 101; housing in, 
81, 123-24; Islam in, 108; organization 
of, 91-92; percentage of population 
in, 91 

urbanization, 69, 79-81; and families, 
101; pace of, 80; under Roman rule, 8 

urban migration, 79, 157; under French 
rule, 93, 94; and housing shortage, 
121, 124, 151; in War of Indepen- 
dence, 46 

Vandals, xxvii, 10-11 

V-E Day revolt, xxviii, 42 

veiling, 96, 102, 111; and terrorism, xxxii 

Vichy regime, 40 

Vietnam: health care professionals from, 
120 

Vietnam, Republic of: military support 

for, 240 
villages, 93; industrial, 122 
Viollette, Maurice, 38 
Viollette Plan, 38-39 
Vosper Thornycroft, 264 
voting: eligibility, 32, 52; turnout, xxxv; 

by women, 43, 52 

wage, 144; minimum, 144; negotiation 
process, 145; scale, 144 

Warmer, Auguste, 32 

War of Independence, 4, 26, 44-46, 129, 
251-53; begun, xxviii, 44; 251-53; 
casualties in, xxviii, 49, 55, 76; conduct 
of, 48-51; ended, xxviii; families in, 
95; generals' putsch in, 54-56; impact 
of, 95-96; in Kabylie region, 83; lead- 
ers of, 44; opposition to, in France, 53; 
quadrillage in, 50-51; refugees from, 
55; United Nations pressure in, 48; 
urban migration in, 46; women in, 95, 
102,215 

water: distribution losses, xxxiv; invest- 
ment in, 140 
welfare system, 121, 184 
West relations with, 228-33 
Western influence, xxxv-xxxvi, 97 
Western Sahara (see also Saharan Arab 
Democratic Republic), 241; dispute 
over, 224, 242-43; French interven- 
tion in, 231; Morocco's attempt to 
annex, 270, 273; nationalist insur- 
gency in, 237 
wheat, 31 

Wilaya Charter (1969), 202 

wine: exports of, 158, 169, 170; produc- 



tion, 158 

women, 101-4; Arab, 102; in armed 
forces, 102, 267; Berber, 102; conduct 
of, 101; demonstrations by, 104; 
deprived of civil rights, 62, 63, 104; 
education of, 115; employment of, 
104, 143, 216; feminist, 111; marriage 
of, 105, 216; political influence of, 
216, 218; political protest by, xxxii; in 
population, 76, 77; rights of, 199; roles 
of, 97, 100, 215; rural, 104; seclusion 
of, 100; status of, 104; terrorist killings 
of, xxxii; veiling of, 96, 102, 111; vot- 
ing by, 43; in War of Independence, 
95,102,215 

women's associations, 45, 218 

women's movement, 215-18 

workers' committees, 130 

work force, 143-45; age of, 143; educa- 
tion of, 143; growth of, 144; size of, 
129, 143; women as percentage of, 
104, 143 

working class, 98 

World Bank: aid from, 69, 114; loans 
from, 138, 151, 162, 163; structural 
adjustment loan from, 137 

World Military and Social Expenditures 
(Sivard),271 

World War I, 250 

World War II, 40, 250 

Yahyaibn Ibrahim aljaddali, 14, 15 
Yaqub al Mansur, 16 

Young Algerians (Jeunesse Algerienne), 
35-36 

Youth Employment Program (Pro- 
gramme d'Emploi desjeunes), 144 
youth groups, 212-13 
Yusuf ibn Tashfin, 15 

Zarzaitine oil fields, 145 

Zayanids, xxvii, 16-17 

Zbiri, Taher, 247; coup attempt by, 245, 

254; as military chief of staff, 254 
Zenata, 14 

Zeroual, Lamine: as president, xxvii, 
xxxi 

Zimbabwe: support for revolutionaries 

in, 226 
zinc, 129, 148; mines, 149 
Zirids, 13 

Zouaouah dialect, 116, 221 



337 



Contributors 



Lisa J. Arone is a research assistant at Princeton University, who 
has collaborated in the past with John P. Entelis in writing 
about the Maghrib. 

Mary-Jane Deeb, Academic Director, The Omani Program, 
School of International Service, the American University, 
is the author of numerous articles on North Africa for 
scholarly journals. 

John P. Entelis, Professor of Political Science and Co-Director 
of the Middle East Studies Program at Fordham Univer- 
sity, has published extensively on North Africa. 

Boulos A. Malik has served in North Africa and the Middle East 
for the United States Department of State and has also 
written for the Voice of America and Reuters. 

Helen Chapin Metz is Supervisor, Middle East/Africa/Latin 
America Unit, Federal Research Division, Library of Con- 
gress. 

Jean R. Tartter is a retired Foreign Service Officer who has 
written widely on the Middle East and Africa for the Coun- 
try Studies series. 

Anthony Toth, an expert on Middle East affairs, has written on 
the area for a number of publications. 



339 



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Libya 




and Haiti 






550-52 


Ecuador 


550-172 


Malawi 


550-43 


Egypt 


550-45 


Malaysia 


550-150 


El Salvador 


550-161 


Mauritania 



341 



550-79 Mexico 

550-76 Mongolia 

550-49 Morocco 

550-64 Mozambique 

550-35 Nepal and Bhutan 

550-88 Nicaragua 

550-157 Nigeria 

550-94 Oceania 

550-48 Pakistan 

550^6 Panama 

550-156 Paraguay 

550-185 Persian Gulf States 

550-42 Peru 

550-72 Philippines 

550-162 Poland 

550-181 Portugal 

550-160 Romania 

5 50-3 7 Rwanda and B urundi 

550-51 Saudi Arabia 

550-70 Senegal 

550-180 Sierra Leone 

550-184 Singapore 

550-86 Somalia 

550-93 South Africa 

550-95 Soviet Union 



550-179 Spain 

550-96 Sri Lanka 

550-27 Sudan 

550-47 Syria 

550-62 Tanzania 

550-53 Thailand 

550-89 Tunisia 

550-80 Turkey 

550-74 Uganda 

550-97 Uruguay 

550-71 Venezuela 

550-32 Vietnam 

550-183 Yemens, The 

550-99 Yugoslavia 

550-67 Zaire 

550-75 Zambia 

550-171 Zimbabwe 



342 





< 





PIN: 004208-000 



